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Preface

is the official Centennial History of Hastings College ofthe Law, which was commissioned by the
Board of Directors in 1973. The faculty History and
Arts Committee, under the chairmanship of the late
George E. Osborne, discussed the nature of the project
with me and invited me to undertake it. What the
Committee wished was a full-length history of the first
century of the College that would also make a contribution to the history of California and to that of legal
education in the United States. This wish accorded entirely with my own idea of what I should do, because my
principal scholarly interests have been in the history
of institutions, either legal institutions or institutions
closely connected with the law, in the context of political
and social change, usually with a definite local focus.
What made the task both stimulating and difficult was
unfamiliarity with time and place, both far from my
previous scholarly concentration. An historian of Tudor
and Stuart legal history, who has felt very daring in
making sorties into the legal history of early Massachusetts and French courts about 1600, I found it a
new experience to work in "recent" history in the American Far West. This required the acquisition of a great
deal more knowledge of American and California history than I would otherwise have attempted. I am left
with a certain uneasiness about writing the history of an
institution which is not only not defunct but very lively
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as it rushes into its second century. On reflection, after
the fact, the work done, I have quieted my uneasiness
with the recognition that there are certain similarities in
the development of all institutions in any context irrespective of period. The narrative emphasis that a study
such as this demands knows neither place nor time. Certainly, given the paucity of institutional archival material, my fears of being crushed by the burden of documentation with which my colleagues in recent American
history must deal were chimerical-and the skills that
the mediaevalist and early-modern historian must
command to make the best use of what he has in documentation have stood me in good stead. At the time I
agreed to write this history, I thought the History and
Arts Committee was bold to confide this project to a
scholar who has for a quarter of a century exhibited
great reluctance to go beyond 1641. No less courageous
was the Committee's decision to commission a professor
at Berkeley to do the job. Perhaps that my base is
primarily the history department seemed reassuring,
but that my secondary site is Boalt Hall should have
caused some disquiet! I have striven to keep my Berkeley biases under control.
Though this study has been commissioned, it is not
"court history," not an exercise in panegyrics. I was in
no way connected with Hastings before I began work.
Over the course of research and writing, which has occupied me for four years, I have maintained as much
distance between myself and the College as I could and
still obtain the assistance of the staff for the provision of
materials for the research. While I gathered oral evidence in taped interviews, the bulk of my evidence is
written. No documentation has been kept from me, no
question that I have put has been answered otherwise
than fully and honestly, no attempt has been made to
impose a viewpoint on the work or its author. This history represents my own best interpretation made on the
basis of the evidence. Not everyone will be pleased with
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all of it, but their displeasure can only be manifested
after the fact.
Because I have not been connected with Hastings
other than in this work, this history does not have that
graceful intimacy and filial affection which Arthur
Sutherland's recent history of Harvard Law School possesses. On the other hand, it is in some ways more ambitious than Sutherland's book, since I have sought to fit
Hastings into its regional ambience and also to deal with
some of the great issues of American legal education
over the past century. This study does assume a certain
familiarity with the general history of the United States
and an awareness of California's past. Much of the
broader context is at most alluded to; I resisted the impulse to write the history of California from the perspective of Hastings. On balance, I believe that Hastings
has responded much more to professional and academic infi uences than to political and social forces. Yet I
have avoided the heavily internalized approach that
Elizabeth Gaspar Brown took in chronicling the University of Michigan Law School's first century. The glory of
Hastings has been its people, who were also singular
personalities, not limited to their intramural importance
or a purely institutional prominence. Until the last
quarter-century at least, Hastings was indeed almost entirely the shadow of its dean at the time. This is no
longer true, but the possibility for an individual to make
a perceptible and measurable impact on the institution
by a single act remains greater at Hastings than in most
educational institutions. That so much of the narrative
(and therefore the history) centers on personalities is
not a misplaced emphasis.
I confess that as I finish the race, I have come to
have genuine affection for Hastings College of the Law.
It is a seductive place, different, full of enthusiasms,
buoyed by pride, lively, loved. But then, this is not to tell
any of its faculty, staff, students, alumni, and friends
anything they did not already know. This book is of-

xu

Preface

fered to them to tell them more about what they long
ago appreciated.
Though the action of Indebitatus Assumpsit has long
since passed out of our Common Law, I stand a
seventeenth-century debtor to all those who have
helped me without any express promise on my part to
repay them for their labors!
One of the major rewards of my travail has been
the opportunity to meet personally or to talk on the
phone with many alumni, faculty, staff, students, and
friends of Hastings. All responded with graciousness,
enthusiasm, and infinite patience. Perhaps it is invidious
to single out a few to receive thanks for all, but Thomas
L. Berkley, A. Frank Bray, Jr., Albert G. Evans, Hazel
Utz Lancaster, Lewis E. Lercara, Ben Margolis, and
Wiley W. Manuel provided aid above the call of duty. Of
the many who, though not technically alumni, have
been connected with the College in one way or another,
and have accorded me assistance, I wish to thank particularly Harry H. Hastings, Juanita M. Olsson, and
Robert Gordon Sproul, Jr. The faculty of Hastings who
have gone out of their way to be of help have placed me
under special obligation. Jerome Hall, Thomas R. Kerr,
Adrian Kragen, the late George E. Osborne, George S.
Prugh, and Sheldon Tefft, all past or present members
of the History and Arts Committee, proffered advice
and encouragement much appreciated. The staff at
Hastings assisted greatly in finding information and
running to earth hard to find facts, and I am especially
grateful to Jacqueline Bartells, Myrl Northway, and
Elizabeth Stroube for their help in this. To all the College's "family," my most sincere thanks for their
forebearance and assistance.
To a number of people outside the "family," I have
incurred debts for a variety of courtesies. Lynn Otis
provided her typescript guide to the State Archives' attorneys general documents. A number of librarians and
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archivists have been most helpful, but especially Robert
H. Becker at the Bancroft Library, J.R.K. Kantor, the
University Archivist, and at the Boalt Library, Francis
Doyle and Thomas H. Reynolds. Saundra Epstein, who
is engaged on a history of Boalt Hall, to be published
next year, was unstinting in her assistance, and we have
compared notes frequently. Gary Ostrower, whom I
met at the Bancroft while he was engaged in research on
the California women's suffrage movement, put me
onto the Mary McHenry Keith papers and opened up
for me that dimension of the College's impact. Three
colleagues in History at Berkeley have rendered assistance, Gunther Barth and the late Walton Bean in
Western and California history, and James H. Kettner
in American legal history of the nineteenth century. My
former student and old friend, Leo M. Snowiss in Political Science at UCLA, critically read the first two chapters. My colleague Preble Stolz at Boalt read and
criticized Chapter VI, adding much to my understanding of the early law school reform movement. To all of
these upon whom I could fix no Hastings claim and who
are probably grateful that they will not again have to
support me talking about the College, my most profound thanks.
There is a particular pleasure in thanking those
directly engaged in the publication of this book, the first
under the logo of the Hastings College of the Law Press.
Jane-Ellen Long has undertaken production, engaging
the exceptional talents of Randall Goodall as designer,
and seeing the whole through the press. This has been a
massive undertaking, with tight schedules made more
snug by a procrastinating author, and she has done an
efficient and devoted job. Adrienne Morgan ably executed the graphs and Karen Sussell the index. Martha
A. Karatz, besides editing the College's alumni magazine, has served as editorial assistant, as retriever of rare
photographs, lost data, and errant alumni, and as promotion editor. To my fellows on the Press' editorial
. committee-Marvin J. Anderson, David A. Concepci6n,
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Dan F. Henke, and Harriet Renaud-my heartfelt
thanks and the temoinage of my happiness in having
worked with them. Of course, to the Dean of Hastings
College of the Law, the associate dean for administration, and the librarian (for Messrs. Anderson, Concepcion, and Henke, respectively, wear those hats in more
mundane moments) another debt of gratitude is owed,
and not one to be easily discharged by mere acknowledgment. And so with Harriet Renaud, latterly the
editor of this book but for many years neighbor and
friend, to say thank you for an assiduous editing of the
manuscript, constant availability to hash over crossed
"i"s and dotted "t"s, and all this as galleys arrived while
copy was still going to the compositor, is not enough.
She saved the author from egregious error and the
reader from much frustration. For the manifold help,
the encouragement, and the fellowship in the enterprise
of these colleagues, my gratitude and my homage.
To Jeanne-Marie, who knows as much about Hastings now as her husband does, to Claudine, Fran<;oise,
and Marc, who forewent the pleasurable frivolities that
depend upon a dad and bore with the grumpy inattentiveness of father, my loving thanks for their tolerance, support, and encouragement of, and ineffable
sensitivity to, an author possessed.
Berkeley, California
February 2, 1978
Candlemas

Thomas Garden Barnes

Prologue

THE history of our ci~ilization, universities have been
prominent both for what they have done and for merely
being. As for what they have done, a perception of the
university depends upon whether one is teacher or the
taught. The university has been variously an avenue to
place and power in Church and state by the vehicle of a
sharp, narrow scholastic curriculum; an institutional
structure within which an elite of status and property
might be polished in gentility and adorned with letters;
an academy for imparting a rigorous Classical learning
that fit its votaries to any pursuit; and a school in which
by the acquisition of credits in a range of subjects of
varying academic merit a career could be forged. This is
how those taught have seen it, and with good reason
their perception has been primarily vocational and even
careerist. To those who teach, the university is the keep
in which man's painfully acquired knowledge, even his
wisdom is guarded, undiminished, to be handed on
through time, the bailey for the defense of free enquiry
by which the sum of knowledge is advanced, and the
guardroom in which the community of scholars, some
of them active, some serving who only stand and wait,
follow their science, and contribute to its increase and its
diffusion. The imagery of the castle is not strained. Our
universities were born in the castellated society of
twelfth century Europe, and though the schoolmen
were clerics and the collegiate structure, where it developed, closely resembled monasticism, the medieval university in its secular aspect was closer to the castle than
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to that other great monument of the age, the cathedral.
The university was always under attack, imperilled by
the barbarians without the walls, threatened by the urge
to orthodoxy of ecclesiastical authority, in danger of
subversion by the prince and his feudatories, and subjected to the bloody incursions of townspeople. The
university's walls-of privileges and immunities reluctantly accorded by pope and prince, as well as by stone
and mortar-were the defenses of a castle. And the university, unlike the cathedral, was not an oratory but a
laboratory, a place not of prayer but of work, where
neither the things of God nor of Caesar took precedence over the things of the mind, of reason and intellect. This has remained the role of the university-its
function-in society from that day to this. No matter
how "applied" the sciences taught and researched there,
no matter how intimately involved with government,
business, the professions, no matter how importunately
students demand to be taught something useful, the
university stands in a fiduciary responsibility to the corpus of knowledge gained from the past, conveyed in the
present, and added to for the future.
The prominence of the university, by virtue of its
mere existence, is a product of its venerableness and its
uniqueness. Of all the institutions of modern society
that survive from the middle ages, the university is the
one that in form and function has changed the least.
In government, with few exceptions, kings and barons
have disappeared in the western world, and even where
they have survived, aristocracy has given way to democracy. The Catholic Church of western Europe was
halved by schism in the sixteenth century, and halved
again by secularist disbelief in the centuries since, its
works reduced to things of the spirit, its servants diminished in role and authority. Republicanism proved
the victor over monarchy, secularism triumphed over
the faith, but no ism has yet managed to destroy or even
transform the university. The president and faculty of
the poorest state university, harried by legislators and
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harassed by a suspicious and even antagonistic populace, still enjoy the privileged position of the rector and
faculties of the medieval studium generale, still do
the same things, maintain the same responsibilities. No
western society has found a substitute for the university;
indeed, it is a western institution that has become
worldwide and has remained more vital than all other
western institutions transplanted on the continents in
the heyday of western imperialism. Something of the
medieval jus ubi docendi, the right to teach everywhere,
survives, and the university world of the intellect remains a community of scholars profoundly resistant to
ideological tests and governmental and societal
trammels on free enquiry and free teaching. The university is no less today than it was yesterday the ornament of culture, the factory 'of knowledge, the nursery
of intellect, and the fount of the professions.
The earliest universities were the creation of late
eleventh and early twelfth century scholars, of the physician Constantin us Africanus at Salerno, the lawyers
Gratian and Irnerius at Bologna, the dialectician
Abelard and the theologian Peter Lombard at Paris, and
the lesser known masters at Oxford and Montpellier.
Such spontaneous generation disappeared with the first
creations. Thereafter, new universities were founded by
the migration of scholars, civic enterprise, and the act of
an individual or corporate founder, prince, prelate, or
potentate, or a combination of all of these elements. For
the scholars, it was the opportunity to gladly learn and
gladly teach in a new and (apparently) more friendly
environment. For the city, civic pride dictated the acquisition of a studium, and the bourgeoisie reasonably
expected that trade would follow where arts, letters,
and science had preceded. For the founder, the university manifested his greatness and generosity, attributes
highly esteemed by medieval man both to' advance his
stature in this world and to improve his standing in the
next. As one of the last medieval men to found an Oxford college put it in the preamble to the foundation.

Prologue

4

statutes of Corpus Christi College (1517):
We have no abiding city here (as saith the apostle) but we seek
one to come in heaven, at which we hope to arrive with the
greater ease and despatch, if while we travel in this life,
wretched and death-doomed as it is, we rear a ladder whereby
we may gain a readier ascent. We give the name of virtue to
the right side of the ladder, and that of knowledge to the left,
and between these two sides lie steps; for either side hath
rounds of its own, by which we may either soar on high, or
sink into the lowest depths. 1

Richard Fox, Bishop of Winchester and Lord Privy Seal
to Henry VII and Henry VIII, expressed a time-honored sentiment in the motives for his beneficence. And
to the initial generosity of the founder would be added
over the years the munificence of others. Munificent
patronage also set the university apart from most other
institutions, the church excepted, and that is still true
today, in the support that individuals-sons and
daughters and friends of alma mater-foundations, and
latterly the state accord it.
Whatever the range of motives that led to the
foundation of universities and their continuing endowment through benefaction, behind each university
that established itself and survived was a need. The sentiment of an age and of the society evoked the university. The degree of practicality of the need variedsome institutions have had a more "pure" and others a
more "applied" function in the vision of their founders
and benefactors. But behind all was need.
The two institutions which are the concern of this
work, the university and the law, came to this culture on
this continent at almost the same moment. In 1636 in
Massachusetts, a college was established at Newtown,
shortly to be renamed Cambridge in honor of the university from which most of those in the colony who had
a university connection had come. It was not an afterthought, but a step taken because of a perceived need a
short time after the edifying of Faith and the frame of
government and law had been raised:
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After God had carried us safe to New England, and wee had
builded our houses, provided necessaries for our liveli-hood,
rear'd convenient places for Gods worship, and setled the
Civill Government: One ofthe next things we longed for, and
looked after was to advance Learning and perpetuate it to
Posterity; ... 2

It can be argued that Harvard College came into existence before the full elaboration of the rule-of-Iaw came
to Massachusetts. In 1641, an attempt was made to establish a fundamental law for the colony in the "Body of
Liberties," but not until the gathering of the legislation
of the colony in The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes
Concerning the Inhabitants of the Massachusets (1648), was
the "Civill Government" fully settled insofar as it demands certainty in the law. 3
It was a long time before the law found a place in
the American university. The reasons were many and
complex, but the more salient ones deserve mention.
First of all, the law which was taught in European
universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, was the
highly academic law which had spawned Bologna:
Roman Law, in its two facets, the Civil Law and Canon
Law. By the thirteenth century, the Civil and Canon
Laws had come to dominate all the universities, threatening the primacy of the Queen of Sciences, Theology.
The Reformation in England expelled Canon Law from
the two universities, but Civil Law remained, and served
in one major secular court, Admiralty, and in the ecclesiastical courts. Not until the eighteenth century would
the English common law receive any attention in the
English universities, and it was not taught consistently
until the mid-nineteenth century. The Vinerian professorship at Oxford, established in 1758, was the first
chair in the common law in the English-speaking world.
It is noteworthy that the second oldest American institution of higher learning, William and Mary in Virginia,
established such a chair in 1779, and that the Royall
professorship in common law was bequeathed by Isaac
Royall to Harvard on his death in 1781, although it was
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not filled until 1815. Both American institutions followed the lead of Oxford under the influence of the
first Vinerian professor, Sir William Blackstone. Secondly, there was from the outset in the American colonies considerable mistrust of lawyers, more marked in
the puritan colonies than in those to the south. As the
early colleges did not seek to educate young men in the
law, neither did any of the colonies encourage the creation of that peculiar institution which gave England its
bar, the Inns of Court. The early evolution of the colonial bars grew out of the autodidacticism of self-styled
"attorneys" (few of them with any formal legal training
in England) and the apprentice method of law-office
study that very soon came into existence. The first "law
school," that of Judge Tapping Reeve in Litchfield,
Connecticut, in the 1780s, began as an extension of his
law office, but it grew rapidly, and between 1784 and
1833 trained over a thousand lawyers from all over the
new country. Thirdly, the pattern of westtyard expansion in this country, beginning in colonial times but
reaching the proportions of a general cultural phenomenon in the early national period, created a demand for
lawyers that could not readily be met by available formal
instructional means, and which in the opportunity society of the frontier no young man was really inclined to
tarry for. Finally, in the first flowering of higher education in the national period, the new colleges springing
up all over the United States right to the edge of the
frontier, many of them sectarian institutions, adopted a
heavily Classical curriculum. This Classicism emphasized the traditional liberal arts of humanistic learning, and by its apparent completeness and holistic adequacy persuaded one trained in it that he had all of the
learning that was necessary, and that academe might
impart, to undertake any profession. Classicism was not,
as some of its critics have urged, antithetical to professionalism. In fact, Classicism assumed that all knowledge was part of an organic whole, was governed by the
same natural rules, and that a rigorous grounding in the
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humanistic disciplines allowed the learned man to unlock any subject, follow any vocation, with no more to
add than command of the formal peculiarities of the
professional activity. In this view Classicism was the
highest level of professional preparation obtainable. It
would require a kind of enlightenment from a foreign
source-the German universities-in the late nineteenth century to cast professionalism and therefore
professional education in a new light.
In 1849 the frontier made a big jump, a thousand
miles from the Missouri River to the foothills of the
Sierra Nevada mountains, the land between abandoned
to the Indians, to the trappers and traders still left, and
to such hardy eccentrics as the Mormons. The piecemeal creeping tide of westward migration became a
single great wave that left the flotsam of many cultures
on the edge of the Pacific, the small indigenous
Spanish-speaking culture being submerged under the
wave. The new metropolis was San Francisco, the "instant city" of the first great transcontinental lunge. The
new urbanites of the instant city:
lived in a culture so totally different from the ones they had
left that often the transition was almost unbearable. Almost
everything they created was made to serve the moment and
most of their early work disappeared or fell into disuse when
the moment passed. 4

Massachusetts, two centuries later, was reborn again
three thousand miles further west, without the homogeneity of the puritan forefathers of Boston. But like
the old colony, the new sought in both the university
and the law to cultivate the unifying power of the intellect, to bring order out of chaos, and to build something that would serve not only the moment but all time.
What had taken Massachusetts a bare six years took
California twenty, but the University of California came
into existence in 1868 full of promise, ambition, problems, and inadequacies. It would be another decade before California would have its first law school-and that
would be the first west of the Missouri River. One man,
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who had played a distinctive, even determinative role
in the coming of "the law" to California, also gave
California its first academy for the formal training of
lawyers and the University of California one of its earliest higher faculties and professional schools. Serranus
Clinton Hastings stood in the tradition of the medieval
founders of colleges and universities. The comparison
to Bishop Fox is striking: a man of affairs, not an
academic, in the service of the state, seeking to erect a
ladder to heaven, with two sides, "virtue" and "knowledge." The need to be met was evident. The hope of
encouraging other benefaction was high. Civic pride
was appealed to-the new college would be sited in the
instant city, a point of distinction for the new metropolis. It would be part of a great state university, but
would enjoy a marked autonomy by virtue of having its
own trustees, presided over by the highest servant of the
law, the Chief Justice of California, a secular archbishop
or the lord high chancellor, if you wilL The new college
was not for profit, its objectives were unsullied by base
motives. Characteristically, from its conception, Hastings College of the Law was unlike any other American
law school; indeed, not quite like any other institution of
higher learning.
This is a history of that law school during its first
century. Though it was the idea of a single man, it has
been the work of many. It has reflected the greater influences washing against it from society outside it. Yet
like the university throughout western civilization, Hastings marched to a different drumbeat than society's,
that of the scientia which was its responsibility to preserve and to which it was to introduce Justitia's votaries.
Through all its trials and tribulations, for all its changes,
despite all its failures and its successes, Hastings never
shut its ear to the drummer. In that it has fulfilled the
vision of its Founder, the hopes of its professors, and
the desires of its students. In the process, it has woven
itself into the fabric of California, and contributed to
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California's phenomenal growth over the course of a
century. As with every university that responds to a true
need in its origins and continues to respond to changing
needs, the history of Hastings College of the Law will
know no end, only many beginnings.

I

Founding and
Founder

O N WEDNESDAY, June 5, 1878, Serranus Clinton Hastings was the honored speaker at the
annual Commencement of the University of California,
recently located in Berkeley. He was there to announce
that he had completed the gift that would give to the
University its "Department of Law" in the form of an
affiliated institution, Hastings College of the Law. Dr.
John LeConte, a soft-spoken Georgian, the President of
the University and the first member of the University's
faculty with his appointment to the chair of physics in
1868, was in the chair. Most of the Regents, including
Governor William Irwin, were present. It being a fair
day, the convocation was held under the oaks east of the
still-standing South Hall (the last open-air commencement until 1901, the octagonal Harmon Gymnasium
completed in 1879 being preferred to rustic simplicity
despite the inevitable aura of perspiration only slightly
lightened by the open louvres of the gym's cupola).
Perforce, the gathering was small: the faculty numbered
twenty-nine, not including the President and a halfdozen administrative officers, and the total student
body for academic 1877-78 numbered 318 students, not
many of whom save for the Class of 1878 were likely to
have been present. Of those graduating, eight students
were to receive the Bachelor of Philosophy degree in
science, six the Ph.B. in letters, including two women,
and fourteen the degree of Bachelor of Arts, one of
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them a woman. Families and friends of the graduates,
faculty families, and a smattering of interested
spectators would have completed the company. There
was no "town" yet in Berkeley, only "gown," and Oakland was a one and one-quarter hour's horse-tram ride
away. The decade-old university boasted six colleges in
three buildings at Berkeley (Mechanical Arts, just completed, and North and South Halls, overlooking fields,
the buildings in which the Class of '78 had followed a
rigidly classical curriculum), a college of medicine, and
an "affiliated" college of pharmacy, in San Franciscobut it was still primarily a small liberal arts college.
There was about the convocation the intimacy of the
few, made more pronounced by the slightly exaggerated dignity that Victorian solemnity held appropriate
for such occasions. No mortarboards were thrown into
the air by jubilant graduates, no placards of protest
swayed above the heads of the spectators, and John
LeConte, M.D., was not the ebullient, full-throated
arm-waving Robert Gordon Sproul who would give a
particular magic to three decades of later commencements. But with the presentation made by the Honorable Serranus Clinton Hastings, the University of
California took another step towards the multiversity of
our day.
For eight of the day's graduates, what Chief Justice
Hastings said was to have more than merely academic
interest. All shortly to become Hastings students, these
were Lemuel Warren Cheney, from Chico, Ph.B. in
mining, whose senior thesis, "A Method of Machine
River-bed Working for Gold," was redolent of the past
and still relevant to the present; Alexander Francis
Morrison, A.B., of San Francisco, whose thesis, "Property in Land," clearly pointed to his future; William
Martin Van Dyke, A.B., from East Oakland, whose
thesis was "Means of Improving the Condition of the
Laboring Classes," and whose oration, one of three
given by student speakers, was on "Civil Liberty";
Joseph William Winans, A.B., of San Francisco, son of a
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Regent of the University, whose thesis extolled "The
Advantages of a Classical Education" such as he had just
received; Frank Randolph Whitcomb, A.B., of San
Francisco, whose thesis on "Capital and Labor" may
have raised an uncomfortable spectre or two for his
readers; Joseph Hutchinson, another Ph.B. in mining,
of San Francisco; William Raymond Daingerfield, A.B.,
of San Francisco, whose thesis dealt with a perennial
issue about to become a burning one in post Reconstruction national politics, "Minorities and Majorities in
Representative Bodies"; and Abram C. Bradford, Jr.,
Ph.B. in letters, of San Francisco.
Three years later, in 1881, Cheney, Morrison, Van
Dyke, Winans, and Whitcomb were among the fortyfive students who received the College's first LL.B. degree. They entered Hastings in August 1878, as did
Bradford and Daingerfield, neither of whom
graduated, though Daingerfield managed after one
year at the College to be admitted to the bar, ultimately
joining an eminent firm (Morrison, his classmate, being
another partner) in the City and attaining the superior
court bench in 1892. Mining-engineer Hutchinson, who
spoke at commencement in 1878 on "The Mission of
Physical Science," followed that light for another year
before entering Hastings in 1879 to graduate with the
(second) Class of' 82. Cheney took his first year at Hastings while a graduate student at Berkeley,l took the
LL.B. in 1881, and returned to live in Berkeley; Van
Dyke went into practice in Los Angeles; Winans (who
died young) and Whitcomb practiced in San Francisco,
as did Hutchinson and Morrison. Morrison prospered;
his widow, May T. Morrison (UC, '73) donated almost
$2,500,000 to Berkeley, giving the campus its present
music building, her husband's library, and a handsome
reading room in the General Library, and endowing
chairs in Law (Boalt Hall) and History in their names-a
munificence which did not, alas, extend to the institution that gave Mr. Morrison the professional skills to
make his fortune.
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It is possible that among the lower classmen present
at commencement were two who became luminaries of
that distinguished second, 1882, class at Hastings: Mary
McHenry (A.B., UC, Classical course, '79) and Charles
William Slack (Ph.B. in mechanics, '79). Mary McHenry
was to become the first woman graduate of Hastings
and one of the first rank of women suffragettes. Charles
William Slack became more intimately involved with
Hastings, over a longer period of time than anyone else
in its history-as student, professor, dean, member of
the Board of Directors, and Regent of the Universityfrom 1879 until his death in 1945. As a close friend of
Daingerfield, having worked with him at Berkeley in the
University printing office, Slack might well have stayed
in Berkeley to see his friend graduate before returning
home to San Francisco in June 1878.
Serranus Clinton Hastings began his address by
saying, "Gentlemen, the Regents, President and Faculty
of the University of California. I appear before you to
announce the foundation and establishment of a College of Law in this University, which I will proceed to
submit to you in detail."2 Tall, dignified, blest with a
good voice and piercing eyes, Hastings made a powerful
impression. He was already a legendary figure. As a
Member of Congress, 1846-48, from the newly admitted
State of Iowa, he had rubbed shoulders with fellow
Congressmen John Quincy Adams, Stephen A. Douglas, Andrew Johnson, and Abraham Lincoln. Chief justice of Iowa for only a year, he was a Forty-Niner, actively (and shrewdly) involved in the stirring events that
led to the first California legislature and statehood, and
led Hastings to the chief justiceship of the California
Supreme Court in December 1849. That term up in
1851, he was elected attorney general for a two-year
term, and began amassing the fortune that brought him
added stature in the eyes of the generation of 1878 who
knew Hastings more as a landed magnate than as lawyer
and statesman. He was listened to.
The new "College of Law" that Hastings detailed
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was to be based on three cardinal considerations. First,
that since the law was now largely "contained in modern
codes and statutes," a student of the law could not become "imbued with the true spirit of jurisprudence"
without studying the history of the law and its
traditions. Second, that while California had many distinguished lawyers, "the general standing of the Bar is
not perhaps as high as it ought to be" because law students did not receive the "training and mental discipline" essential to "the highest success and the greatest
usefulness." Third, that the College was to "diffuse a
knowledge of the great principles of jurisprudence" not
only among aspiring practitioners, "but also among all
classes of society, to elevate the standing of the Bar, and
to maintain and perpetuate the purity and dignity of the
Bench," without which "civilized government" cannot
exist, and without which "the rights of property, life and
liberty will vanish and become an exploded theory of
the past, and communism, mobs and other disorders
will prevail against law, order and good government."
Hastings admitted that he did indeed seek to erect a
monument, not "a house made with hands, but a temple
of law and intellect which shall never perish, until in the
lapse of time, civilization shall cease, and this fair portion of our country shall be destroyed or become a
desert."
Hastings propounded definite views of how the law
should be learned and what learning qualified a lawyer
to practice. This disquisition (which warrants further
analysis later) was founded on a range of historical allusions from antique Greece to Continental Europe and
the great British universities (English, Scottish, and
Irish). What he sought is clear, since the "most eminent
nations in civilization supply the greatest number of that
class of persons known under the generic term of
lawyers." England, America, and at least republican
Rome came out with high marks; the Russia of Peter the
Great failed the Hastings criteria. "Barbarous and halfcivilized nations have but little use for these interpreters
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of the law or rules of civilized life. They repel their
presence, and treat them with contumely and oppression." What Hastings desired was a student trained
in a "system of close subjective thinking," whereih
"metaphysics of the law" produce a lawyer who "by a
cultivated instinct and apparent inspiration" can take
"complicated facts for which there are no exact precedents or formula" and tell his client what the law is.
He prefaced the description of the structure of the
College by a demurrer, even a disabling speech, that
would prove all too prophetic. Pointing out that his plan
was the result of many years' investigation, he said,
I have no right to expect that my views will be sanctioned by
that body oflearned men into whose hands I now consign this
college [the Boar9- of Directors]. They and their successors
are to goverri it in all time, and will be responsible for its
success .... If it should so be, that these views meet the
approval of the directors named in the statute, I shall be
pleased. If they do not, I shall submit cheerfully to their better judgment.

In the event, the Founder's views on the educational
program of the College did not meet with the Board's
approval. Neither did he cheerfully submit to their better judgment. But no one, not Hastings, not the Board
members present, certainly not the auditory, on that
euphoric summer afternoon in Berkeley could foresee
the chasm that would open between Founder and trustees, a chasm so wide that it almost swallowed the College.
With that precision and eye for specifics characteristic of him, Hastings detailed the structure of the
College and the functions and responsibilities of its personnel. Despite the shade of live oaks, the day was warm
and the three student orators had made the most use of
their opportunity; a stifled, discreet yawn or two could
not have been avoided as Hastings construed the founding act, recited the names of the Board members, and
set forth the duties of Dean, Registrar, the one Professor of Municipal Law, and even a student Proctor. The
evocation of the name of the Rev. William H. Platt,
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D.D., rector of Grace Episcopal Church, San Francisco,
who had consented to lecture on "ethics and rules of
morality," signalled the Founder's determination to inculcate in the College's students a high moral calling,
but might have induced some to add to Hastings' description of Dr. Platt as one, "celebrated for his eloquence, science. and religion," that he was also longwinded. Still, the ideal was novel-the ethical dimension
of the law received no formal provision in contemporary law instruction, either in law schools or in law-office
preparation for the bar. The Founder's intention of
having a chair in physiology and medical jurisprudence
was somewhat more electrifying, this being a field of
science which was becoming prominent and possessed
much appeal to contemporaries, both lawyers and doctors as well as the public. But what was most arresting
in this dry, detailed presentation was Hastings' announcement that the College would have a three-year
program. This would not only establish the new "Law
Department of the University of California" as the first
law school west of Des Moines, but it would be one of
only three law schools-the others were Boston University (1872) and Harvard (1876)-to require more than
two years for the LL.B. In 1878 this alone was almost
revolutionary; that the third year would be devoted to
study of "the codes and practice" was unique.
Certain poignant notes were struck in Serranus
Clinton Hastings' address. Clearly, he intended that the
College should be located in Berkeley, and that the "hall
at San Francisco shall be auxiliary thereto as a part of
the said college .... " In fact, the room or hall for the
College at Berkeley specified by the founding act and
mentioned by the Founder was never provided, and
from that day to this Hastings College of the Law has
never had a Berkeley site. In greatest part this was because the act specified access to the San Francisco Law
Library for the College's students as the principal resource for their legal studies. The Founder in his address might well allude to that library as the "equal to
any library of the kind in the United States," but it soon
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proved inadequate to the academic purposes of a major
law school. Also, though Hastings clearly meant that the
College should be a "post-graduate college of the University of California" and that "great care shall be observed that no person shall enter as a student who shall
be unworthy of a college of the eminent position it assumes," only 19 percent of that first class enrolled in
August 1878 were graduates, and the College was to be
plagued for a long time by insufficient academic standards for admission. On this score, however, the Founder himself showed some ambivalence in his declaratory
address, admitting that "non-graduates must understand that a limited knowledge, especially of the Latin
language, will be required," and even that some would
be admitted for the second or even the third year of
study on the basis of "examination of applicants for
advanced standing." Poignant-but pernicious-was
the Founder's suggestion that students be matriculated
from anywhere in the state (which was not an objectionable notion) and be permitted to "pursue their studies
where they reside" (which was). The extramural university, on the English model of London University's
external degree, was something of a fad in the late
nineteenth century, but it depended upon a narrow
curriculum based upon a sound schooling, which did
not exist in California in the 1880s, and it could not be
applicable to study of the law on the new basis that was
about to emerge, the "case method." Fortunately, nothing came of this suggestion. Yet the best quality of the
university-without-walls was captured in the Founder's
vehement opposition to "the rejection of any applicant
or student on account of his poverty or limited means of
support, as a calamity subversive of the object of the
foundation." The College was to be open to all who
would learn the law, to "supply a substitute for the Inns
of Court, the historic Inner Temple, a temple of the
law, which shall extend its arms and draw within its
portals all who shall be worthy to worship at its shrine,
resulting in the coronation of its votaries, as a reward

Serranus Clinton Hastings, c. 1850

Serranus Clinton Hastings, c. 1880
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for application, industry and merit." On that note Chief
Justice Hastings ended his address.
Thomas B. Bishop, Esq., prominent in the San
Francisco Bar Association and one of the most highly
respected lawyers in the state in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, rose to receive from Hastings'
hands "this munificent gift to the present and to posterity."3 Bishop acted in his capacity as one of the Directors of the new college. His speech of panegyrics and
platitudes was painful, but mercifully short; his rhetoric
was flowery even for that day. Though his remarks contributed nothing further in elucidation of the College'S
purpose, he was destined to playa major role in the
early years of the College's development. Bishop was
followed (for the day's last speech), by the Hon. Joseph
B. Crockett, former justice of the California Supreme
Court. Remarkable parallels, of age, career, time in
California, and wealth tied Crockett and Hastings in a
close bond of friendship. Justice Crockett was a wealthy
landowner on San Pablo Bay in Contra Costa county
around the town named for him in 1867. Like the
Founder, he was a legendary figure, one of the pioneers
of the New California. Alone among the speakers of the
day, he evoked the awesome spectacle of how far
California had come in a few decades:
When a literary institution like this [the University] is but
commencing its career, in the midst of a new community,
which, thirty years ago, consisted of only a few widely scattered hamlets, and a small number of rude rancheros, it encourages us to hope for the most magnificent results in the
future .... It also encourages the hope, that stimulated by the
noble example of Judge Hastings, many other gentlemen of
wealth will ere long conclude that the wisest disposition they
can make of a portion of the abundant means which our
Golden State has bestowed upon them with so lavish a hand,
will be to endow liberally this great institution of learning,
which, we hope, is destined to dispense its blessings to future
•
generatIons
.... 4

Crockett would not let the audience forget how recent
were the landmarks of its civilization, how young the
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"instant city" which was San Francisco, the "instant society" which was California. He enunciated, more clearly
than had Hastings, the civilizing mission of Hastings
College of the Law. Their generation had taken and
built, cleared and sown, spun a web of trade, met and
managed successive waves of immigrants, and succeeded in bringing order to a rootless, restless, and
burgeoning metropolis and its environs as far as the
borders of Oregon, Nevada, Arizona Territory, and
Mexico. Crockett clearly saw that to the next generation
would fall the task of civilizing what had now been ordered. Some measure of how rapid had been the work
of ordering is suggested in the allusions of both Hastings and Crockett to the subversive forces at work
"throughout a great portion of the civilized world,
which seriously threaten, not only the peace and good
order of society, but the stability and safety of all well
ordered governments."5 Within thirty years of rustic
primitiveness, of "rude rancheros," they could now afford the luxury of a shudder at the enemies, real and
supposed, of the modern, capitalist, industrial society:
Marx had taken the place of Murrieta as the threat to
order and government in California! There could be
but "one remedy for this grievance; and that is to be
found in the better education of the masses of the
people, and in wise laws, justly and temperately, but
firmly administered."6 Crockett's vision, rooted in the
sense that the past was past, was of "the noble mission of
the Hastings Law School, under the fostering care of
this University, to furnish to the younger members of
the profession, and to those preparing to enter upon it,
the best opportunity to become thoroughly instructed in
the learning of the law, and at the same time to imbue
them with those principles of morality, and with that
nice sense of professional honor, which should be the
crowning grace of every lawyer." Justice Crockett ended
with the "confident prediction, that the Hastings Law
School will speedily become a grand success, and will
add another wreath to the chaplet which is to crown the
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University of California." The prediction was justly
founded in the event, on both counts.
The Berkeley Commencement announcement was,
of course, symbolic and formal rather than effectual
and formative. The foundation of Hastings College of
the Law was effected by "An Act to create Hastings'
College of the Law, in the University of the State of
California," Statutes, 22nd. Session, Chap. 351, signed
into law by Governor William Irwin on March 26,1878,
and the subsequent fulfillment of the terms of his responsibility under the act by Serranus Clinton Hastings'
payment of$100,000 in U.S. gold coin to the Treasurer
of the State in three payments-$60,000 on April 18,
$30,000 on May 20, and $10,000 on May 27.7 With the
Founder's last payment, the condition specified in Sect.
8 of the act was met just ten days before the Berkeley
announcement. Though by Sect. 15 of the act, the act
was to take effect from and after its passage, that is,
March 26, Hastings College of the Law might as well
date from the state controller's acquittance to the Founder on May 27. The Berkeley announcement was
triumphal, the first public occasion possible to greet the
new College. And symbolic contrivances have a way of
being as real as reality. The Berkeley announcement
had great press coverage, and the speeches of Hastings,
Bishop, and Crockett were printed in extenso in a booklet. Indeed, the first meeting of the Board of Directors
of the new College took place the day after the Berkeley
Commencement, June 6, in the rooms of the San Francisco Bar Association. With that meeting, the College
was well and truly launched.
Not everyone greeted the Berkeley announcement
with the encomiums of the City'S editorial writers and
the enthusiasm that was manifested at the Commencement. Later in the summer one Charles Edward Pickett
addressed ten foolscap folios to the Regents, President,
and Faculty of the University, with a postscript to the
first students at Hastings, and a request that the Secretary of the Regents transcribe the letter and send it to
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Serranus Clinton Hastings. s Referring directly to Hastings' address at Berkeley, the redoubtable Pickett (showing a temerity equal to that of his cousin who had led the
Army of Virginia to slaughter at Gettysburg) accused
the Founder of having sold his decisions as Chief Justice, of having rendered purely political opinions as Attorney General, of having since been "the head of that
villainous squad of 'leading lawyers' in California,
known as 'Supreme Court Brokers,' " of being part of
"The California Ring" of title-manufacturers and railroad robber-magnates, and of having with others bribed
the Supreme Court to find valid their title to the San
Francisco "Pueblo Lands," thus destroying Pickett's title
to two lots on Rincon Hill. Virtually no member of the
judiciary escaped Pickett's grapeshot, and Crockett,
"that old knave and hypocrite," received a broadside.
Pickett was sure that Hastings had endowed the College
only to offset his crimes and so to secure credit with the
Almighty-or had been compelled to it by his "Father
Confessor (he is a Roman Catholic) when informed of a
portion of these crimes." In all, bench and bar, and Serranus Clinton Hastings in the van with the business
interests which Pickett castigated in a string of venomous pamphlets as the "Plundercrats," were those who
polluted the fountains of justice to aggregate the wealth
of the land into their hands, and then affected a dread
of communism! He demanded that Hastings make restitution of the Pueblo Lands taken, "and if he shall refuse to make the restitutions demanded, especially the
one to me, then ... this original letter shall be archived
in that 'Monument,' at Berkeley, he has erected to perpetuate his memory, that its students, as long as it shall
stand, may be informed what manner of man its founder was .... " The letter is "archived"-so much Pickett
accom plished.
Who was the attacker of Serranus Clinton Hastings
(and virtually everyone else of wealth and influence)?
"Philosopher" Pickett (he so signed himself) was indeed
a cousin of General Pickett, and a genuine eccentric of
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early California, of less dross than "Emperor" Norton,
and a man of always unpopular, usually unsound, but
fearlessly advanced ideas. He migrated from Virginia in
1842, aged twenty-two, to the Willamette Valley, Oregon, and found his true vocation in publishing a biting
weekly in hot pursuit of the new territory's magnates. In
1846 he set off for Virginia via California-and arrived
in July at Verba Buena just in time to witness Captain
Montgomery raising the American flag on the shore
near the U.S.S. Portsmouth. His role in the Bear Flag
Revolt was principally that of stabbing at the U.S. military establishment's questionable competency and considerable cupidity, and the hero Fremont felt his lash.
There was no silencing him, and he gave edge to the
first English-language paper in San Francisco, the Star.
Having been judge of Clackamas County, Oregon,
though without a scintilla of legal training, he tried unsuccessfully to practice as an attorney in Verba Buena
(soon to be San Francisco) under the American alcalde.
He was more successful in journalism than in any of the
myriad other metiers he tried in the ensuing years.
However, with increasing frequency editors closed their
columns to him; he was too hot to handle. He was
forced to become a pamphleteer, and without any
restraining editorial influence the stream of political
penny-dreadfuls that left his pen became increasingly
strident and scurrilous. But he was after fair game.
He saw monopoly and exploitation, the acquisition of
enormous wealth, "plunder" by the big interests. His
populism was ahead of its time. Despite his detestation
of lawyers, he relied upon the sympathy of more than
one San Francisco advocate to give him a corner to write
in. He fought strenuously for redistribution of land
(maximum lots of 160 acres to actual occupants only),
state ownership of communications, city ownership of
utilities, and tax reform (albeit he eschewed Henry
George's single-tax as too radical). And he kept up his
quest for "personal justice" in the form of claiming the
property he had received under American alcalde grant
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in Verba Buena on Rincon Hill. It was this claim that
spawned his hatred of Hastings, for Hastings with
others had acquired possession of the holdings of the
numerous alcalde grantees. City ordinance, legislative
enactments, decisions of state and Federal District
courts, and act of Congress tolled the "Philosopher's"
entry. His bitterness knew no bounds. His spirit never
flagged. In 1874, he unilaterally attempted to enforce
his interpretation of the 1849 Constitution's provisions
for the term of State Supreme Court justices by attending the opening of the court and deliberately sitting in
the seat of none other than Justice Joseph B. Crockett
on the grounds that Crockett's term had expired. Pickett was fined and imprisoned on the spot for two contempts in the face of the court, and spent fourteen
months in the county jail because he could not pay the
$1000 in fines. 9 Pickett's case excited enormous popular
sympathy for a character held in a certain affectionate
regard by everyone save his well-placed and rich
victims. The case, and the man, played a role in the
passage of the new California Constitution of 1879,
which settled the ambiguity as to the justices' tenure and
otherwise worked some necessary judicial reforms, albeit they did not go far enough to suit the "Philosopher." Pickett, a porcupine with every quill a grievance,
died attended by a widow-innkeeper at Mariposa in November 1880, lowered into the grave to a recitation of
Byron's "Inscription on the Monument of a Newfoundland Dog." That cynical and misanthropic poem was
Pickett's final quill thrown, literally, from the grave.
Was Serranus Clinton Hastings a "Plundercrat"?
The charges of selling justice, taking bribes, and other
malfeasance in office can be dismissed easily enough.
There is no evidence to support them, and Hastings
was politically prominent enough to have had detractors
who would not have hesitated to reveal particulars of
any plausibly-founded charges of corruption. Historians, following the contemporary sense of outrage,
have long accepted the last three decades of the nineteenth century as being the most venal in America's
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political annals. "Boss" Tweed, robber barons, the great
financiers who bought governor, legislature, and courts
in New York, the railroad magnates of the West swallowing whole territories and states-constituted a cast of
hundreds perverting the politics of millions. California
knew plenty of venality. But public opinion in California was less censorious than was opinion back East of the
politician who took pains to prosper and protect his
interests just short of real venality. California remained
an "opportunity" society, enabled to grow more golden
by the general economic development of the era and the
possession of vast quantities of still unsettled lands.
Every new Californian-the Chinese only exceptedhad a realistic hope of a lifetime's labor yielding prosperity and status. The Gold Rush was over, but the
"boomtown" mentality of the Sierra foothills lasted a
generation after the boomtowns became ghost towns.
Only a few nuts, particularly failures-in fine, Philosopher Pickett types-could be expected to complain
if political power brought wealth. In contemporary
opinion, Serranus Clinton Hastings was accounted a
most honest and upright gentleman, untouched by
breath of scandal, personal or public, honored for his
role in bringing law and order to Gold Rush California,
and one upon whom the Golden State had indeed bestowed abundant means with so lavish a hand because
he deserved the success brought by his own capacities,
efforts, and assiduity. Philosopher Pickett might see the
endowment of Hastings College of the Law as the
Founder's fire-escape out of Hell, but Serranus Clinton
Hastings was just one of a number of newly-rich philanthropists from coast to coast who would, to general
acclaim, devote part of their fortuitous fortunes to good
works. In fact, Serranus Clinton Hastings was one of the
earliest such philanthropists.
Yet Serranus Clinton Hastings was very rich, and
very newly-rich. He certainly was, by Pickett's reckoning, a "land monopolist." His fortune can only be estimated; it cannot be determined with exactness. How it
was acquired is plain. Born in Jefferson County, New
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York, in 1814, he was the scion of an old Rhode Island
family; his father had been a prominent commander
in the War of 1812. A sound Classical education at
Gouverneur Academy in New York prepared him for a
modest and very academic profession. At the age of
twenty, he became headmaster or principal of the Norwich Academy, Chenango County, between Utica and
Binghampton, in upstate New York. He was there only
a few months, but during that period he begain reading
law with a local attorney. In 1834 he moved to Indiana,
and in Lawrenceville completed his law studies with
Daniel S. Major, Esq., being called to the Indiana bar in
1836. He had begun his westward odyssey, but he had
not yet begun to make a fortune. In January 1837 he
moved to the far frontier, the Black Hawk Purchase,
now Iowa, then part of Wisconsin Territory. 'The set of
his entire career was determined in the year he arrived,
when he was appointed justice of the peace of the territory's strip along the Mississippi between Davenport
and Burlington. He entered politics via the judiciary,
began legal practice, and began to acquire land. He became a lifelong Democrat at the right time-the Party's
fortunes were at their peak in the pre-Civil War period.
Elected to the first Iowa Territorial legislature, he
served for eight years (one session as president of the
upper house) until his election to the 29th Congress
in 1846 as a member of the first Iowa contingent. Hastings was a prominent advocate in the Iowa Territorial
courts. Married in 1845, a political and financial success,
his appointment in 1848 as the first chief justice of the
Iowa State Supreme Court seemed a crowning glory for
a man thirty-four years old. Hastings was, though, always the activist, restless and adventurous. His first term
on the Iowa bench completed, he set out in a wagontrain for California in the spring of 1849, leaving wife
and children in Iowa.
Sired by a grub-stake brought with him from Iowa,
Hastings' California fortune was born in Sacramento
within a month or two of his arrival. His first act on
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reaching the Great Valley was to make an extensive trip
into the gold country and to the coast to survey the
prospects for future economic growth. He made the
initial mistake of entertaining serious doubts as to the
new land's agricultural potential, a misconception he
soon remedied. By breeding, education, and shrewdness he felt his place was not at Coloma, Hangtown, or
Woods Dry Diggins, but at Colonel Sutter's fort. Simultaneously, he opened a law office and a banking house,
and could brag that in the first three days he had taken
in $20,000 on deposit. He lent out money at 10 percent
interest per month-and found no want of takers. Attaining instant eminence in practice as prosecuting attorney
of the Court of First Instance, it was natural that only a
few months after his arrival, in December 1849, the
newly convened not-quite-yet-state legislature selected
him as the first chief justice of the California Supreme
Court. The appointment, which he took up with alacrity
and commitment, was a mixed blessing. He could do
good, but he could not do well-as justice he was barred
from private practice. The evidence indicates that when
he left the bench in 1851 he was in "very straitened
circumstances."lo His salary of $10,000 a year was a
pittance com pared to the opportunities available in
practice.
Having completed the term specified by the legislature as chief justice, Hastings ran for attorney general
in the fall of 1851, and without much campaigning
trounced his golden-voiced Whig opponent. There was
no barrier to the attorney general undertaking private
practice, and it was during those two years in office,
1852 to 1854, that Hastings recouped the losses of the
previous two years and built up a clientele that stayed
with him throughout his short career in practice. He
went into serious banking on the side in partnership in
Sacramento, and even the failure of the bank left Hastings relatively unscathed. He had begun to "diversify"
his interests. He continued practice for only a few years
after leaving the attorney generalship, but the income
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gained increased his stock for investment, much of it in
the form of sound loans on low interest terms, much in
property. He lived modestly. His detestation of architectural magnificence, a recurrent theme in his exhortations to those connected with his College, was reflected
throughout his life in his own unluxurious personal accommodations. In 1851 he brought his family to
California, to a simple house in the new (shortlived)
state capital, Benicia. His subsequent residences in the
Napa Valley, including the vineyard house at Rutherford, were not the stately homes affected by contemporary nouveaux riches. Though most of his California
career was centered in San Francisco, he was not the
builder of a Nob Hill palace. All available money he put
into real estate, and as soon as he established permanent
residence for himself and his family in California, he sold
off his Iowa holdings to invest in California property.
Hastings was a major purchaser of San Francisco
land (which brought Pickett's wrath down upon him).
The hazards were considerable: the unclear title to
Pueblo Lands was a constant threat to quiet possession.
Hastings was very much aware of the nature of the
problem. The first of a long string of leading cases on
the matter came before his supreme court in December
-1850. In Woodworth v. Fulton et al., 11 he entered a dissent
in favor of the respondent prima-rily on the grounds
that the law applicable to the respondent's claim by an
American alcalde's grant was the law in effect at the
time-Mexican law-and that he had a better claim to
possession. It was for this opinion that Pickett, in his
diatribe to the University, castigated Hastings' opinion
as being for the "Ring" and against law and evidence,
though on the face of the case, Hastings' position was
reasonable and very much in line with his emphasis
upon applying Mexican law, where not otherwise excluded by positive law, to the interregnum days between
Bear Flag Republic and statehood. Incidentally, there is
no evidence that the chief justice had any interest in the
San Francisco lands at the time Woodworth v. Fulton et al.
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came before the supreme court. Hastings was not alone
in fishing in these troubled waters, but he did it subsequently and by purchase of interests, some of which
failed for want of adequate title and some of which succeeded. Interests were so confused, so many of them
held conjointly, that partition was a necessity and always
a peril. That Hastings did well in San Francisco property is attested to by the almost one hundred parcels of
city property that he ultimately acquired. In 1887 the
city property still in his name was valued at $150,000;
about a decade earlier he had conveyed inter vivos to his
son, C.F. Dio Hastings, in trust for all his children, city
property assessed at about $500,000.
The bulk of Hastings' wealth was in the form of
country property. This was realty that in all instances
had good agricultural potential of one form or another,
altogether very diversified agriculturally. All of his rural
property appears to have been in five counties to the
north of San Francisco: Sacramento, Solano, Napa,
Lake, and Mendocino. We have no details about the
agricultural use to which the Sacramento property was
put. The Solano holdings were grain farms and cattle
runs; Hastings Island near Montezuma Slough in the
Delta preserves the connection. To his two eldest sons,
in the settlement of the 1870s, he conveyed a fullystocked farm in Solano county. His extensive holdings
in Napa county, including his demesne-residence at
Rutherford, comprised three large estates mostly given
over to choice vineyards. His Lake county property was
principally cattle-grazing country, but he did maintain a
summer home there. One of his single largest parcels
was the Yo kayo Rancheria, some 35,552 acres of prime
grazing land in the Ukiah Valley along the Russian
River.12 This land, the ancestral home of the YokaiaPorno Indians, Hastings bought at a sheriffs sale in
1859. Title was very confused, having been in one Cayetano Juarez by an 1846 Mexican gubernatorial grant.
Hastings' friend, John Currey (also formerly on the supreme court), had a claim by deed from Juarez, but so
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too did General Vallejo. Hastings, Currey, and another
claimant, H.W. Carpentier of Oakland, managed to acquire all interests by purchase, including that of Juarez,
whose title was confirmed by Presidential patent in
1867. Hastings and Currey were the rated taxpayers for
the property in 1864-65, when the value of the land was
assessed at $35,552-or $1.00 per acre-plus $8363 in
buildings. Even before Hastings, Currey, and Carpentier were confirmed in title, the valley was being opened
for settlement. The second wave of immigrants had
arrived, not for gold, but for soil. Hastings, Currey, and
Carpentier agreed to divest to present occupiers-not at
$1.00 per acre, but on an average of$2.50 per acre. The
true value of the holding was, then, close to $90,000. By
such astute purchasing and selling of realty, Hastings
managed to make his fortune. In 1862 he was worth
about $900,000; twenty years later, his fortune stood at
$2,500,000. Appreciation of land values had been the
single largest contributor to his phenomenal prosperity.
"Philosopher" Pickett notwithstanding, Hastings
can at best be damned for his success, not really for the
manner in which he achieved it. The smattering of
papers that remain from his days as attorney general
clearly show that Serranus Clinton Hastings was a
traditional lawyer with a traditional lawyer's notion of
the preeminence of property.13 In his 1853 report to
the governor, he deemed it his "duty to suggest a few
amendments to the laws regulating practice in Civil and
Criminal Cases; observing that experience admonishes
that in these laws there should be as little alteration as
possible." Certainly, he recommended then that the act
of May 3, 1852, for the disposal of half-a-million acres
of public land should be amended to speed up disposition of the lands, and that the clause of the law which
prevented anyone person from purchasing land warrants for more than 640 acres should be repealed as
being inconsistent with the clause which made the warrants transferable. But he was showing a reformer's impatience when he recommended a general act for quiet-

Founding and Founder

31

ing titles to real property by giving a right of action to
any claimant against any other claimant to determine
"which has the superior equity or right to possession."
And he was prepared to break with a very long tradition
in the common law of real property in recommending
that claimants settling in good faith and subsequently
being evicted be allowed at least two-thirds of improvements done, noting with approval that this was the
practice in Kentucky and other western states and had
arisen from uncertainty and conflict in titles. As attorney general, Hastings' principal involvement with proprietal concerns was in enforcing the state's claim to title
over the waterfront property of San Francisco, against
both the lessees of the same and against the City. This
was to spur on waterfront improvements by the building of new wharves, etc., by the state. It was also to evict
tenants who had either not paid rent or failed to perform the terms of their leases. If "Philosopher" Pickett
wanted to see the grasping hand of Hastings under the
table, it is worth pointing out that the effect of the evictions would be to put the property at the disposition
of the legislature and the revenues from the same into
the treasury. Hastings' traditionalist instincts were tempered by a large and very real concern for the public
weal in the new "instant state."
In turning to Hastings as lawyer, in attempting to
assess how (and in what way) he was learned, one quality
of the man demands emphasis. He was not by nature
sedate and pensive. The activism and adventurousness
that had impelled him across the Continent in three
stages in a little over a dozen years, despite substantial
blandishments to stay put at each stage, was always in
conflict with the requirement for temporal detachment,
reflection, and infinite painstaking that first-class judicial activity demands. Contemporaries remarked that he
was always on the go. Nowhere is this better revealed
than in his report, as attorney general, to the state
comptroller, February 4, 1852, in the matter of unpaid

32

Founding and Founder

state revenue from Tuolumne county.14 At the comptroller's request, Hastings had taken horse to that
Forty-Niner county, confronted the county treasurer
and the sheriff (the tax collector), and straightened out
the chaos of ignorance and misfeasance in short order.
He found mitigating circumstances for the local officials' failings-among others, that the primary form of
taxable property in Tuolumne was gold dust and so
easily "concealed from the Assessor or shipped to the
Atlantic States." Nonetheless, he gave strict instructions
for proper assessments, tax collections, and regular
payments to the state, left directions to the local district
attorney to prosecute delinquents, and rode back to
Sacramento with $1578.63 in cash against the revenue
owed for 1851. The attorney general's direct and effectual intervention was pure Hastings activism. Hastings
could never playa passive role. There is the possibility
that he found the judicial role as boring as he found it
im poverishing.
Hastings' tenure as chief justice of the California
Supreme Court is well evidenced in the first volume
of California Reports, reported by his associate, Justice
Nathaniel Bennett. In the five terms of this first court,
March 1850 to June 1851, the bulk of the per curiam
opinions (and most of the decisions were per curiam, that
is, delivered on behalf of the whole court) were delivered by Bennett. Justice H.A. Lyons delivered very few
opinions. Chief Justice Hastings delivered thirty-three
per curiam opinions, a separate opinion finding with
Bennett and constituting with his the decision of the
court, six dissenting opinions-more than either of his
associates-and in one case delivered no opinion at all
on the grounds that the record of the case at first instance had "been destroyed in the late fires .... "15 Commentators have called attention to Lyons' minor role in
the court, and have generally emphasized Bennett's
very considerable activity. Bennett was a remarkable
jurist-prolific, sometimes a bit too prolix, but always
thoughtful and learned, and invariably a close reasoner.
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Because Bennett's labors are more evident, and Hastings' opinions generally more cogent, more forthright,
and less searching, Hastings' work can be overlooked.
But Hastings followed certain consistent lines. Rather
more than Bennett he demonstrated a willingness to
avoid procedural technicalities. He and Bennett split in
Constant v. Ward, Hastings holding that where notice of
argument was given by the appellant, the respondent
could move for affirmance of the judgment upon the
appellant's nonappearance even though the respondent
had not (per the Practice Act) given notice of argument. 16 He differed with Bennett again in Osborne et al.
v. Elliott et al. (this time, Hastings in the minority), the
majority holding that the plaintiffs could not maintain
an action without showing performance or an offer to
perform the contract, Hastings not finding in the record
any evidence to show either inability or refusal on the
part of the plaintiffs to comply substantially with the
contract. 17 Hastings was adamantly opposed to fictions
and fictitiousness. In The People ex reI. Alexander Campbell
v. Clark, Hastings for the majority held that a statute
declared to take effect "from and after its passage" takes
effect at the very moment of its approval by the governor; Bennett held that it did not take effect until the
next day, the day being indivisible. Hastings was categorical: "To hold that a law operates all that part of the
day of its passage prior thereto, is as absurd and as
much of a fiction as the old doctrine that, by relation, it
should commence running on the first day of the parliament."18 In a notable dissent in Lineker v. Ayeshford,
taking to task the obiter in the majority's opinion that" 'it
is elementary law in support of which, no authority
need be cited that a suit may be brought upon a bill of
exchange in the name of a fictitious person,' " Hastings
concluded:
If the above doctrine be correct, anyone can readily conceive
with what facility our records may be made up of fictitious
beings, mere shadows. Besides, this doctrine is fraught with
much mischief; it encourages the drawing of bills in favor of
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fictitious parties; a practice which has always been condemned
by the Courts of England. as such bills were at one time both
in England and France employed as a cloak for usury and
fraud. 19

Hastings was a great respecter of the jury-an article of faith in our branch of the common law tradition
that had a particular hold on frontier sensibilities. A
jury verdict should be interfered with, he felt, only if
there had been a violation of law or established rule of
practice, a mistake, or fraudulent acts. Judgment upon
a verdict should not be overturned even if there is error
in admission of evidence unless the error changed the
result, and though defendant's counsel should have
moved for a new trial, in no wise should the Supreme
Court on the appeal interrupt the verdict of the jury in
this case. 20 Where the verdict clearly went against the
evidence, Hastings would reverse the judgment and
remand the case. On appeal of a case dating from
Summer 1849, he would quash a sentence of death for
murder, the verdict of the petit jury, and the indictment
of the grand jury, and order a new trial upon a new
indictment because "the laws of the country then in
force were but imperfectly understood and error and
irregularity are found in all of the proceedings of the
Courts, especially in criminal cases" and the errors in
this case "are so numerous that the execution of the
defendant would not be the judgment of the law, but
the mere will of the Court and executioner."21 Indeed,
Hastings did not favor a large appellate traffic. In the
second reported case of the court, he stated, "We do
not think it our duty to encourage appeals into the Supreme Court of this State, when the amount in controversy is of the character presented by this record."22
In Gonzales v. Huntley & Forsyth, Hastings' obiter, certainly well taken, was that it "must be presumed that the
Court had sufficient evidence to authorize the judg).TIent
which it rendered, otherwise few judgments of Courts
of inferior jurisdiction could be sustained."23
It was in property law that Hastings gave evidence
of unusual doctrinal openness and a highly pragmatic

Founding and Founder

35

approach to the problems of property litigation. To the
cynic who may remark that there was where his heart
was, the reply is that American law in the later nineteenth century, especially out West, could have used
more men like Hastings. Hastings shared with Bennett a
genuine desire to apply Spanish-Mexican law to matters
involving transactions that predated the Americanization of California. As Bennett put it in the preface to his
reports:
In the Supreme Court, on appeal, it was necessary to take into
consideration, so far as might be done, without infringing
positive statutory, or clearly defined and settled law, the
peculiar and anomalous condition of the country, of the Government, of the state of society, of the old citizens of California, and of their American invaders. This the Court always
endeavored to do, sometimes, perhaps, ineffectually.24

Justice Bennett was t.oo modest, because the court was
remarkably successful. Neither Hastings nor Bennett
manifested the accustomed common lawyer's denigration of the Civil Law tradition. In case after case, Joaquin Escriche y Martin's Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion Civil, Penal, Commercial, y Forense 25 in hand, they
wrestled with Spanish-Mexican law, especially possessory, matrimonial, and testamentary matters, willing
the ends but not always seeing clearly the means to arrive at a substantially equitable conclusion. The effort
was very nearly singular in the annals of the common
law tradition. Yet Hastings more than Bennett caught
the applicability of Civil Law doctrine to the unfolding
law of property in California. Three of his six dissents
grew from his willingness to shape the law of property
in a most unusual pattern. Hastings believed that the
principal hurdle both to establishing civil order and
opening up California to economic development grew
from unquiet title. The way to clear the hurdle was to
shift the emphasis, at least for the time being, from a
concern for title to a concern for possessioh. It was not a
misplaced emphasis-it was an evocation of the primal
origins of the common law in the great twelfth century
legislation of Henry II. In the third reported case,
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March term 1850, Hastings and Bennett split on what
were apparently differences as to what constituted possession at common law, sufficiency of jurisdiction at first
instance, and sufficiency of pleadings. But Hastings' dissent went higher than these issues. He argued that the
question was not what was the respondent's remedy, or
what should be the decision of the court at first instance
upon a trial on the merits of the case, but who in fact
':Vas in the "quiet enjoyment of actual possession." He
held that, "As well might it be said that he who forcibly
and with violence, enters a room in the temporary absence of the tenant, can sustain an action of recovery,
because he was forcibly ejected therefrom on the return
of the tenant."26 In Sunol et al. v. Hepburn et al., Bennett
and Hastings disagreed again; the issues were numerous, the Spanish-Mexican law that both justices sought
to employ was not clear, and the question of the ability
of an Indian to convey raised an issue of policy that was
probably insoluble. Drawing in large part on authorities from Louisiana, Hastings stood four-square on the
proposition that under Spanish-Mexican law, when an
action is brought to recover the possession, the right to
the possession must be determined before the right to
the property.27 Finally, in his dissent in the first leading
Pueblo Lands case, Woodworth v. Fulton et al., Hastings
narrowed the applicable law to Spanish-Mexican law,
and concluded:
The respondent having, in good faith, purchased and taken
possession, although he may have acquired no valid title, the
defendants having entered as a naked intruder and tress passer against the true owner or by virtue of a similar right,
subsequently acquired, I believe at the time of defendants'
entry the respondent had the superior right to the possession
of the premises. 28

Hastings clearly recognized that by the shift from title to
possession as the issue in most property litigation, time
could be bought to work out ultimate settlements on
title claims. This reflected his own way of doing business. Given the current state of property interests and
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the high incidence of litigation of proprietal claims,
Hastings' emphasis on possession held out more prom- '
ise for short-term pacification than would have been the
case if there had been a strict implementation of
common law real property actions and doctrines. Events
proved Hastings correct; it required sweeping state and
federal legislative intervention to settle title in California.
The only instances in which Chief Justice Hastings
showed himself a stickler for formality and technical
correctness in the law were in matters where the results
of slipshod practice or drafting would lead to more
clouded title. In Harris v. Brown, Hastings per curiam
damned a parol conveyance made before the reenactment of the statute of frauds in California, finding "no
shadow of equity in the respondent's case," and not
understanding how "under any system of laws, a verbal
understanding between an agent, unauthorized by any
written paper, and a vendee who neither takes possession nor pays any part of the purchase money, can be
enforced if repudiated by the vendor .... "29 In Fisher v.
Salmon, Hastings per curiam made equally short work of
a deed executed by an agent in his own, not his principal's name, as being not binding on the principal and
not transferring title of the property.30 Patently, Hastings had no intention of perpetuating the impossible
situation in which he found California property claims
when he took the presiding chair on the bench.
Hastings' most interesting opinion, technically a
majority opinion, was in fact in almost diametrical opposition to the other majority opinion written by Bennett, and it casts him in a most untraditional light as a
property lawyer. Gunter et al. v. Geary et al. came on late
in the last term of the first Supreme Court. 31 Lyons was
not present, and Hastings and Bennett agreed on a new
trial, though Hastings indicated that he would have reversed the judgment entirely and agreed to a new trial
only so that the case could be disposed of immediately
and not put over for a full bench. The plaintiffs claimed
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to be owners of a lot on the San Francisco waterfront
which was under the low-water mark. A house they had
built on pilings on this lot prevented ships from tying up
on the water front, and Mayor Geary and other city
officials pitched the house into the bay, abating (they
alleged) a common nuisance that was in obstruction of
navigation. Trial by jury at first instance resulted in a
judgment of $2,000 against Geary. The judgment was
appealed. Bennett, while holding that the city had no
title, that the plaintiffs had no title, that the. plaintiffs
had possession before the city government moved to
take possession of the lot, and that the city's officers
could not take possession without paying adequate
compensation to the plaintiffs-possessors, would have
ordered a new trial because the trial judge's charge to
the jury as to the power of the officers to abate a common nuisance-that only those who had occasion to use
the way barred by the obstruction or those aggrieved by
the obstruction could abate it-was clearly wrong and
"may therefore have misled the jury." Bennett believed
the house was not a common nuisance, and that the
damages given by the jury were not excessive. Hastings
agreed only with Bennett's reading of the power of any
citizen to abate a common nuisance. Clearly, Hastings
argued, a house erected in a highway is presumed to be
a public nuisance, and the presumption could not be
rebutted that a private house, unlike a wharf, was anything but an obstruction, being unsuitable for appropriation to a public use and therefore not subject to being
compensated for. "It is well settled, that all that part of a
bay or river below low water at low tide, is a public
highway, common to all citizens .... The plaintiffs had
no right to the possession, and had no property in that
part of the bay, and could have none, as against the
rights of the public. As well might the plaintiffs take
possession of one of the public streets, fence it in, erect a
house thereon, and claim damages for an appropriation
of private property to public uses, in case the authorities
should remove his 'improvements' as an obstruction."
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Citing both English and American law, Hastings concluded "That the absolute right of a state to control,
regulate, and improve the navigable waters within its
jurisdiction, as an attribute of sovereignty, cannot be in
any manner disputed." That clarion declaration Hastings would reiterate as attorney general in March 1853
in an opinion to the assembly as to the legality of pending legislation to extend the San Francisco waterfront,
arguing that an extension of the city front by the legislature for wharves and improvements which did not
interfere with shipping and commerce was "unquestionably legal."32 There was a real perception of economic reality behind Hastings' high notion of state
sovereignty. Without the encouragement of commerce,
California could never begin to reach its potential.
Serranus Clinton Hastings' juridical forthrightness
and openmindedness are even more remarkable when
one compares him with the run oflawyers of his age not
trained in any institutional setting. At the time Hastings
was called to the bar in Indiana, there were eleven colleges or universities offering instruction in professional
law leading to a degree, only two of them west of the
Alleghenies (Transylvania University, Lexington, Kentucky and the University of Cincinnati, Ohio), and there
were a few proprietal law schools, most of them in
the East. Only a fraction of those called to the bar in the
first four decades of the nineteenth century received
any formal instruction either in colleges or proprietal
schools of law. Most aspiring attorneys prepared for a
year or two of apprenticeship in a practicing lawyer's
office, and the master-lawyer's abilities, professional and
.pedagogical, might or might not be up to scratch.
Nevertheless, the apprentice could confidently expect to
appear at bar of a superior court, be presented ex parte
by his mentor, and with perhaps a question put to him
by the bench, be admitted to practice. What the apprentice could have been expected to learn, and to learn
well, were instruments, procedure, and a certain forensic skill. What he was likely to learn, at best sufficiently,
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was substantive law. Most lawyers' libraries were
inadequate to the task of affording more than an introduction to the law. A strong library contained at least a
run of reports for the jurisdiction, perhaps a smattering
of reports from a major eastern state. Digests began to
appear in the 1840s in increasing volume, broadening
case-law horizons. Few western lawyers' libraries were so
strong, and the student had to do with what his master
had. There was, though, one book that every aspiring
lawyer could expect to have at hand, and which he
would know inside and out: Sir William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England, either one of the
numerous, pirated, editions of the multivolume work of
that great eighteenth century scholar, or (more likely) a
one volume abridged version, a "Student's Blackstone."
Blackstone, first professor of English law at Oxford
(1758-66) and afterwards a judge of the courts of
Common Pleas and King's Bench, published the four
volumes of his lecture notes as the Commentaries (176569). Lucid and elegant (even later editors could not
much maim the prose style), Blackstone's work gave the
appearance of comprehensiveness and maintained an
air of authoritativeness. But it had the shortcomings of
lectures, even lectures thoroughly reworked for publication. The treatment of all the branches of the law was
too even, papering over the uneven scholarly development of certain aspects of the substantive law. Perhaps
a more serious defect was that it did not represent
the heavy procedural emphasis, the centralness of the
forms of action of the common law, because of Blackstone's desire to make systematic, symmetrical, and rational a legal system that begged all these virtues. To
impose order on the common law, Blackstone chose to
fit it into an explicit Roman Law arrangement. After a
brief Introduction, defining law and praising the
"British Constitution" with a short, pungent description
of early English law, the common law, Civil and Canon
Laws, and statute law, he set down the "Laws of England" in four books:
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The Rights of Persons (14 chapters)
Of The Rights of Things (26 chapters)
Of Private Wrongs (17 chapters)
Of Public Wrongs (32 chapters).

The first two books correspond in form (not, of course,
in substance) to Justinian's Institutes; books III and IV
bear resemblance to parts of book II and most of books
III. and IV of Justinian, though with a much greater
emphasis on crime (Blackstone, book IV) than Justinian
was concerned with. This Romanist structure gave
greater clarity to the common law than it in fact
enjoyed, but it was this clarity that both assured
Blackstone's survival into the second decade of our century and gave his work a longer vogue and greater influence in American law than in English law. By accident, circumstance, intention, and development, American law put more emphasis on substantive law than
adjective law, less emphasis on the forms of action and
more on the rights extended and the rules governing
those rights. When American scholars turned to analyzing American law, as Joseph Story did in his Commentaries on the Constitution (1833), Blackstone was their
touchstone.
Serranus Clinton Hastings was a Blackstone-barrister. Though he was familiar with English cases, as is
evident from his citations of them in practice, his understanding of English law, of the entire Common Law
tradition, was basically derived from Blackstone. The
impact of Blackstone was in fact liberating, and the
forced rationality gave Hastings a workable grasp of the
law. In this, he was not alone. Another Blackstonebarrister, admitted to practice in Illinois the year after
Hastings was admitted in Indiana, was the epitome of
the frontier lawyer, suspicious of mere formality, concerned with substance and substantial "equity," using all
the law he knew: Abraham Lincoln. Hastings, though,
unlike Lincoln, had one added dimension of knowledge
that gave him a real advantage in dealing with the law.
He had enjoyed a sound Classical education, finished
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off by his year of schoolmastering. Blackstone and
law-on-the-frontier stimulated the innovatory and questioning application of the law characteristic of Hastings'
chief justiceship. His Classical training gave sophistication to his legal scholarship, providing a broader horizon than many of his contemporaries learned in the law.
Hastings was not a great legal scholar or jurist. He was a
sound lawyer and judge. His intelligence was perfectly
married to his learning and his experience in Classics
and the law. It made him unusual in his time and place.
Serranus Clinton Hastings had intended the College of the Law that bore his name to preserve the best
of his own development in the law while providing more
thorough and systematic direction than he had had the
opportunity to obtain in learning the law:
In America, I must repeat what I have said before, in our law
schools we teach too much .... We should have instructors or
guides to show us the way, and be left to surmount its intricacies and difficulties through our own exertions.
We should do iri the law what was done in the great
hegira of 1849 from the borders of the Western States across
the plains, deserts, and mountains, to the shores of the Pacific.
Guides were employed who were explorers, to point out to
the emigrant how to reach his destination in the shortest
space of time, and with the least expenditure of physical
force. 33

This was the Forty-Niner, a voice from the past, proud,
nostalgic. Sadly, when he spoke these words in 1879 to
the second class to enter Hastings, the Forty-Niner's
wagon train was already going in a different direction,
under the all too able whip hand of John Norton
Pomeroy, the guide chosen by Hastings himself. Dr.
Pomeroy had very different ideas about what a law
school should do in training lawyers-not for 1849, but
for 1879.

II Trials and Ties
Disputes and
Divisions
THE LIFE of the Hastings College of
the Law has been short and uneventful, covering in all
about eight years." Thus spak~,with sophomoric naivete
bred of ignorance and possibly arrogance, the University of California's Junior Class in The Blue and Gold, the
yearbook for 1886. 1 From the idyllic scholarly Elysium
on the bay's eastern shore, the prospect of San Francisco
was patently obscured by a haze that was more than fog.
In the eight years-admittedly short-since the inception of Hastings College, the College had begun, established its program, and taken in more students, on an
average, than it would again until the early 1930s. Uneventful these years were not. At the outset, two formidable ladies opened the doors of Hastings, and hence
the doors of the courthouse, to women aspiring to be
lawyers. The more perfect union between the College
and the University, envisioned by the Founder and so
devoutly desired by him, was not consummated, with
profound results both for Hastings and the University
which continue to this day. Within a few years, the
Founder on the one hand and the principal professor
and the Board of Directors on the other hand had fallen
out, and the independence of the College was abolished
by acts of the legislature that failed in their purpose
only because they were dashed by the State Supreme
Court as unconstitutional. High drama attaches to these
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events, and there is the poignancy of tragedy about
them. Even if the fact could not be perceived by the
gentle young scholars of Berkeley, these eight years
were yet a time of trials (figuratively and literally), of ties
that failed to bind, of disputes that raged, and divisions
that poisoned old alliances, eroded new hopes, and left
enmity master of the field where once amity had
reigned.
The first meeting of the Board of Directors of Hastings College of the Law took place on June 6, 1878,
at the rooms of the San Francisco Bar Association, on
the second floor of 634 Sacramento Street, between
Montgomery and Kearny, formerly the quarters of the
Pacific Club. The meeting was at the invitation of the
Founder, and Directors W.W. Cope, T.B. Bishop, O.P.
Evans, J.R. Sharpstein, and T.!. Bergin were present;
Chief Justice William T. Wallace, Col. J.P. Hoge, Delos
Lake, and S.M. Wilson were absent from the City. "The
Founder stated that having transferred to the Directors
all future control of the College, it now is necessary that
a Dean and Registrar should be appointed."2 By unanimous vote Serranus Clinton Hastings was appointed
Dean, his eldeSt surviving son, C.F. Dio Hastings, Registrar. Curriculum planning was put over to a future
meeting of the full Board. The Registrar was ordered to
enter upon the records of the College the act signed into
law on March 26, 1878, establishing the College; the
address of the Founder given the day before at Berkeley
"expressing his own views as to the Plan and Organiza. tion and of the meaning and intention of the Founder relative to the same; ... " and the vouchers
of payment into the State Treasury of the sum of
$100,000. The meeting was adjourned. Before the first
meeting of the faculty with the first '~unior" class on
August 8, 1878, the Board met three times more, establishing the Professorship of Municipal Law (salary $300
per month), appointing Dr. John Norton Pomeroy to
that chair, directing him to draw up his "whole system"
of legal education to present to the Board, and requir-
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ing him to lecture ten hours per week, the hours to be
determined by him. Nothing more than this was prepared by the Board for the opening of the College.
Establishing curriculum and quarters, making arrangements for the Rev. Dr. William Platt to be Professor of Legal Ethics, securing the agreement of the San
Francisco Law Library to allow Hastings students to use
it as the act directed (which agreement was literally
forced from the library), and the registering of the first
class of 103 students fell entirely to Hastings and
Pomeroy. Pomeroy no sooner arrived from Rochester,
New York, than he was faced with preparing a
curriculum. He was more than up to the task. For Serranus Clinton Hastings this was the first and the last
time that he was fully involved in the running of his
College.
Despite short planning time and the Board's slight
engagement in the actual beginning of operations, the
College was launched and fully functioning by the second week of August. During the fall and early winter
the Board took hold of its responsibilities and made a
number of fundamental decisions of far-reaching import. First, Colonel J.P. Hoge was elected vice-president
of the Board; since the attendance of the current chief
justice, president by the act, could not always be assured, it was essential that in Hoge the Board had the
chairman who would see it through its early business
and controversies. Joseph Hoge was one of the four
founding fathers of the San Francisco Bar Association
and its first president, from 1872 to 1879. Intimately
involved with him in the foundation of the Bar Association, and its president from 1886 to 1889, was Samuel
M. Wilson, his law partner in one of the City's most
successful firms, and also a founding Director of Hastings. Hoge and Wilson had been in partnership in Illinois before they came to California in the early 1850s.
Hoge was a practiced politician. He served two terms as
a congressman from Illinois. In 1878-89 he was president of the California Constitutional Convention that
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produced the Constitution of 1879, still in force in
California. As chairman of the judiciary committee of
the convention, Wilson was put to a test of statesmanship. The demand for junking the Constitution of 1849 came from a new, surging working class
and small-farmer element in California society that had
no time for the politics of deference, demanded tax
reform and social service legislation, was in full cry
against the political control of the Southern Pacific Railroad and its magnates, distrustful of legislators and the
judiciary, and, hysterical over continuing Chinese immigration, adamantly opposed to granting any further
rights to Chinese already in California. The resulting
document was an enormous, complex, poorly drawn,
confusing instrument, a large proportion of which
should have been strictly statutory, which has required a
century of constitutional revision committees and annual rounds of amendment to make it workable. It was
Hoge and Wilson who provided the conservative, legalistic pressure which saved the convention from some
of the most egregious excesses. Despite their involvement at such an august level, both Hoge and Wilson
were intimately and continuously involved in Hastings'
direction during its first academic term. The Board accepted the resignation of C.F. Dio Hastings as Registrar
and appointed the Founder's brother, Charles P. Hastings, in his place, in August; established that tuition
would be free, with only a ten-dollar registration fee;
adopted by-laws for the Board; and confirmed Platt's
appointment. On October 18, 1878, the application of
one Sit Ming Cook for admission was unanimously
rejected-perhaps a small backwash of the anti-Chinese
hysteria, which was not confined to California workers.
Sit Ming Cook, of Hong Kong, is listed as a member of
the Hastings junior class, 1878-79, in the Register of the
University.3 Whether the Board's action terminated his
study, or whether it was nullified by administrative
practice is not determinable. It would be a long time
before another Chin~se name appeared on the College's
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student roll. At the same Board meeting, the application
of Mrs. Clara S. Foltz for admission was laid on the table
for consideration at the next meeting.
The next meeting was almost three months later,
January 10, 1879. The day before, the first day of the
second semester, Clara Shortridge Foltz of San Jose,
attorney-at-law, attended class at Hastings. The Board,
at its meeting, unanimously "Resolved that women be
not admitted to the Hastings College of the Law."4 The
Registrar was directed to inform Mrs. Foltz and another
applicant, Mrs. Laura De Force Gordon, of the resolution, which he did the next day. The ladies stopped
attending class, but decided to take other steps to secure
admission. Thus was joined an epic struggle between
two very determined women lawyers and some elderly
and conservative male lawyers that levelled the last formal barrier to women's education in California and
drove the first wedge between Serranus Clinton Hastings and his hand-picked Directors.
Clara Shortridge Foltz was one of the most formidable Californians of her generation. She was the antithesis of everything that Victorian convention believed
a gentlewoman should be. She was born in the Midwest,
the daughter of a "Campbellite," a Church of Christ,
minister of that extraordinarily evangelical sect that had
the odor of inordinate enthusiasm about it and was considered heterodox by all mainline Protestant churches,
preaching as it did the imminent Second Coming of
Christ and rejecting all credal formulas. She was insufficiently schooled for her time-three years in an Iowa
girl's serpinary between the ages of eleven and fourteen.
She eloped at the age of sixteen to marry a young
Pennsylvania Dutchman of wandering disposition and
slight promise. This heady passion had required that
she give up her respectable job as a schoolteacher in
Illinois, and she descended to being a dressmaker in
Oregon after she and her husband moved there in the
early 1870s. Worse was to come. At the age of twenty-
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seven, in 1876, having come to San Jose just two years
before with her husband and five small children, she
divorced Jeremiah Foltz, taking custody of the children.
She was already notorious in San Jose: she had actively
involved herself in local politics, pressing strenuously
and successfully for a paid city fire department, and
speaking on every possible occasion for sexual equality
in general and votes for women in particular. Despite
such conduct she had not been disowned by her siblings
or father (who had given up the cloth for the long
robe, and come to San Jose to practice law), but had
even been encouraged in her course of action. They
helped her in her search for a local attorney who would
be willing to take her into his office for legal training.
After having been told by one attorney that despite his
respect for her parents, he thought a "woman's place is
at home" and that he would help her find a position in
the public schools, she found one sympathetic San Jose
attorney who agreed to train her. In 1876 she began
reading law with C.C. Stephens, and just as soon
mounted a whirlwind campaign directed at amending
section 275 of the Civil Procedure Code to substitute
"any citizen or person" for "any white male citizen" as a
basic qualification for admission to the bar. The fight
took two years, and the Woman Lawyer's Bill was not
home free until Mrs. Foltz, by her own account, stormed
past the sergeant-at-arms into the governor's chambers,
and persuaded Governor William Irwin to fish S.B. 66
out of a pile of discarded bills and sign it just as the
clock struck midnight and the legislative session ended.
There was a grand irony in this scene. The act creating
Hastings College of the Law had been signed a few days
earlier by Irwin; the Woman Lawyer's Act was signed as
the last act of the same session. Clara Shortridge Foltz
and Hastings College of the Law were already conjoined
in destiny.
Whether Foltz was more sinned against than sinning, her cause more just, her aspiration more noble
than the base conservatism that would deny it, her ca-

Trials and Ties

49

pacities and eloquence more considerable than those of
most of her opponents, were considerations always lost
sight of because of her manner and personality. She was
pugnacious in the extreme, her pug nose a point of
comment in relation to her pugnacity. Her fearlessness
was beyond question. But there was an assertiveness
about her that no one-not even her adherents and
allies throughout her long career-found appealing.
She was a massive egotist, niggardly in acknowledging
the help and support and contributions of others. Her
autobiographical "Struggles and Triumphs of a Woman Lawyer," serialized in her Los Angeles suffragette
monthly, New American Woman (1916-18), was a sustained self-encomium of exaggerated facts and biting
invective against enemies and allies in the women's
movement. It revealed some paranoia, an absence of
graciousness either in victory or defeat, and a compulsion to take credit for everything that had been achieved
in the movement in California. As she aged, her egocentricity worsened. She was less than just to Laura De
Force Gordon, her cohort in the Hastings case, asserting
vehemently, "I am that woman [first admitted to practice in California] and none other can claim that distinction, which has gone down in history a thousand times,"
Gordon having been admitted to practice only after "I
had mandamized the University and the Hastings Law
College Directors .... "5 And she never acknowledged
the sterling leadership that the first Hastings woman
graduate, Mary McHenry Keith, '82, gave to the suffrage movement in California and the West. Foltz probably considered Keith one of the "pink tea brigade" of
"rich women who have taken possession of the cause
and have got into the bandwagon .... "6
Laura De Force Gordon was made of less stern
stuff, although she was admitted to practice in San
Francisco in 1879, less than a year after Foltz had
been admitted, in September 1878, in 20th District
Court in San Jose. But Gordon, as publisher of the Oakland Daily Democrat, had from 1877 been very much in-
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volved in the struggle for women's rights, and had been
a supporter of Foltz's battle for the Woman Lawyer's
Bill. She made common cause with Foltz for admission
to Hastings, and while Gordon was not plaintiff of record in Foltz v. Hoge et al. Directors of Hastings College oftke
Law, her omission might well have been related to
Foltz's pursuit of her own self-aggrandizement. The
public press, in satirizing the whole case, made Laura
Gordon as much as Clara Foltz the butt of its unseemly
ridicule. Gordon's subsequent career in practice ran a
close parallel to Foltz's in terms of type of practice, degree of success, and concern for the problem of the
indigent defendant in criminal trials. She could never
equal Foltz in quick riposte, could never have demolished a male attorney on the other side at bar who suggested that Mrs. Foltz might better be at home raising
her children with a curt, "A woman had better be in
almost any business than raising such men as you."
Laura De Force Gordon does, however, deserve a generous entry in the honor roll of the struggles for
women-in-the-Iaw and women-under-the-Iaw. She was
the second woman attorney in the state, and her career
as much as Clara Shortridge Foltz's proved that a
woman could succeed in a male-dominated profession.
A few days after Clara Shortridge Foltz began attending classes at Hastings and was barred from continuing, she applied to Judge R.F. Morrison, presiding,
4th District Court, for leave to practice in San Francisco,
presenting her certificate of admission to practice
granted by the 20th District Court. Her intention was
probably less to practice in San Francisco (since she was
well settled in San Jose) than to be admitted to plead in
propria personna in the action she meant to file in the 4th
District against Hastings. Her application hit a snag
when Judge Morrison denied the application; but he
appointed a committee of three eminent attorneys to
examine her qualifications. One member of the committee was W.W. Cope, a former supreme court justiceand a Director of Hastings! The committee reported
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favorably, and Judge Morrison duly admitted Foltz to
practice in the 4th District. Meanwhile, Gordon applied
to the California Supreme Court for a writ of alternative
mandamus directed to the Hastings Board to admit
women. On February 10 Foltz applied for a writ of
alternative mandamus to the same end in the 4th District Court. The supreme court remitted Gordon's petition to the district court for consolidation with Foltz's
action. On February 13, Directors T.B. Bishop and Delos
Lake were appointed counsel for the respondent by the
Hastings Board. Judge Morrison granted the alternative mandamus on Foltz's petition, directing the Board
to admit her or show cause why not.
Oral argument on the show-cause in Foltz v. Rage et
al. was heard by Judge Morrison on February 24.7
Foltz's case was simply that the 1868 act creating the
University of California contemplated affiliation of
medical and law colleges with the University in which
the standards for admission would be the same as for
other departments of the University; the University of
California admitted women in all departments; the
1878 act creating Hastings made no explicit special qualifications for admission to law study, neither did it make
provision for the exercise by the Board of Hastings of
any discretion to make rules governing the law college
inconsistent with the rules governing the University as a
whole; and Hastings was the law department of the
University, bound by its rules and without authority to
exclude the petitioner on the basis of her sex. Counsel
for the Board argued that Hastings was not subject to
general University rules because it was governed by a
special trust in which authority was reposed in its own
Board of Directors; that no court could review the decisions of that Board and therefore no writ could issue.
Director Delos Lake felt compelled to go further, arguing against the "enlargement of woman's sphere" and
conjuring up the spectre of how a woman's beauty
might make an "impartial jury" impossible if she appeared as counsel for a criminal! As the Board's own
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case on appeal would implicitly recognize, its case at first
instance was fatally weak. On March 5, Judge Morrison
delivered judgment for the petitioners, Foltz and Gordon, in the conjoined action.
The Board, despite the view of the Founder that
the law was with the ladies and that he did not favor an
appeal of Judge Morrison's decision, filed an appeal
with the Supreme Court. Before the appeal came on for
oral argument in the Supreme Court, Foltz passed her
third examination to practice, this time before the supreme court of the state, and on December 6 was admitted at its bar. She appeared in propria personna as respondent, established that mandamus was the proper
and only remedy, reiterated her argument as to the relationship of Hastings and the University, and submitted that discretionary power to regulate and manage
could not be used to exclude one class of citizens while
remaining open to others; that the power to regulate is
not the power to prohibit, and that the by-laws, rules,
and regulations of corporations are not to be contrary to
or inconsistent with the laws of the state. 8 Director
T.B. Bishop argued a stronger case than the College
had managed in district court. His argument was that
the statute and subsequent payment by Hastings of
$100,000 constituted a complete contract between Serranus Clinton Hastings and the state; that the College
was not a corporation but a private eleemosynary perpetual trust, the nature and character of which may be
ascertained by analogy to corporations created for similar purposes, and the perpetuity so created had express
sanction of the state constitution; that the Directors
named in the trust created by contract are the trustees
with entire control and management of the trust, subject only to supervision of a "Court of Chancery" [i.e, a
court of equity]; that no power is reserved either to the
state or the founder, the trustees having entire control
not subject to visitorial power; that the very nature of
the institution presupposes the necessary powers of
fixing the qualifications of students, of exercising a
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"wise and enlightened discretion" in government and
discipline, and this power being given to the Directors
includes the right to "decide that it is not for the best
interest of the College to admit females." He argued
further that the petitioner has no clear legal right, without which right she cannot maintain this action, and
mandamus never issues when the performance of the
duty rests in discretion; that the directors are not controlled by the general law regulating the University, for
while the College is the law department of the University by the 1878 act, the act gives no control of it by the
Regents, and the College is a branch of the University
only for the "purpose of enjoying the sanction of its
name, and the receiving of degrees"; and that the law
has never given females the right of admission to the
University, that claim being based-un tenably-on sect.
17 of the Political Code, which if it were allowed, would
make women eligible for every non-elective office in the
state. In short, the Directors' argument was that by a
contract between the Founder and the state a perpetual,
self-governing, non-corporate trust had been established which was not part of or subject to the regulations
of the University, not bound by the laws of the state
governing the University, and related to the University
only for the use of its name and the granting of degrees,
and that the Directors as trustees of the trust had discretion in all matters of governance, including admissions.
In its unanimous judgment in favor of the plaintiff-respondent, Clara Shortridge Foltz, filed on December 20, 1879, the Supreme Court made short work
of the Hastings case. 9 Dealing first with the issue of
"affiliation" of Hastings with the University, it found
that the 1868 act creating the University presented a
"complete scheme" of affiliation, prescribing general
features of the plan for the government of a future
college of law. The court held that the plan for the
organization and government of Hastings set forth in
the 1878 act "does not materially differ from that which
is contained in the act to create the University .... " The
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court turned next to the appellant's contention that the
Hastings Directors had discretionary power, holding
that as the 1878 act gave no express absolute discretionary power, neither could such power as claimed by the
Directors be implied from the provisions and general
intent of the act. Moreover, the court held, there was
nothing in the general framework of the 1878 act that
required the Directors to have greater powers over admissions than those possessed by the Regents and Faculty of the University over students at large. Then, in
a rather more sweeping manner than the issue warranted, the court declared:
It was, in our opinion, the intent of the Legislature, that the
College, when established, should affiliate with the University, and be governed by the laws applicable to the University,
except as otherwise provided, either in the Act of 1868 or the
Act of 1878; that the University and the affiliated College
should constitute one institution and be governed by the same
laws, with only such special provisions as might be required
for the harmonious operation of its different branches.

The express provision in sect. 8 of the 1868 University
act for the boards of affiliated colleges to control the
property of a college so affiliated was construed to exclude absolute discretionary power of such boards; if
such discretionary power existed, why should the particular power of control over property have been specially conferred? The court conceded that no strict legal
right to be admitted to the College existed; the Directors
could exclude applicants of bad moral character, or of
too young age, or of insufficient capacity to study the
law, or who applied after the College had as many students enrolled as could be instructed. But this was not
an unlimited discretion, and could not be taken to maintain "that the Directors are not subject to the laws applicable to the University." The "suggestive provision" of
the 1878 act, that Hastings" 'shall matriculate students
who [may] reside at the University of the State' " [sect.
9-incorrectly cited in the report as sect. 8], the Court
took to mean students of the University. The court then
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set down the admissions criteria of the University: requisite age, residence in the state, and good moral
character. Females were then and had been for some
years admitted to the University. The provision of sect.
17 of the Political Code, that words in the masculine
gender comprehended as well the feminine gender,
"would seem to entitle females to enter the University as
students at large." The court concluded by pointing out
that females by law are entitled to be admitted as attorneys in all state courts on the same terms as malesa tacit tribute to the respondent. The College was
founded to afford instruction to those desirous of admission to practice "as well as those who have been admitted." The College "was affiliated with the University,
and thus became an integral part of it," and so subject to
the same general legal provisions as are applicable to the
University. Therefore, "the same general policy which
admitted females as students of the University, opened
to them as well the doors of the College of the Law."
The signal victory of Foltz and Gordon was reported two days later to the Board of Directors of Hastings College of the Law by the Founder-Dean, and the
report was "placed on file." Judge Delos Lake, whose
feeble advocacy had contributed to the defeat at first
instance, moved a resolution that no one admitted by
the Supreme Court of California as attorney and counsellor to practice in all courts of the state be admitted to
the College except by a special order of the Board of
Directors. The resolution, a patent slap at Foltz, whose
status it covered perfectly, was passed unanimously by
the six Directors present (Lake, Evans, Cope, Bergin,
Wilson, and Bishop). The Directors evidently had not
yet read the court's opinion: in its conclusion, it had
expressly provided for the admission of those alreadYI
admitted to practice. The Board's resolution does not
appear to have kept the feisty Foltz out. Tl:!Q.ggh.!her.ejs
no record, either in the Board's minutes or in
niverSIty eg'15 er,
aL s e attended Hastings a~
Court's deCIsion, she claimed to have attended Hastings
~
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for two years, withdrawing without taking a degree or
completing the course only because of the increasing
pressure of family and practice. The Register is not entirely reliable for enrollees; Mary McHenry began at
Hastings in 1879, but is not carried in the Register for
that year (neither are three other of her UC and Hastings, '82, classmates, William Slack, M.A. Dorn, and
E.G. Knapp).
Foltz must be taken at face value when she argued
that her sole intent in applying to Hastings was to increase her competency and gain greater confidence in
her practice. But further academic, legal education
really was irrelevant to a sublimely self-confident,
learned, and peerless advocate who, on the hearing of
her case before the Supreme Court, was complimented
from the bench with the words, "I have never heard a
better argument, for a first argument, made by anyone."lO She had other battles to fight. From a practice
specializing in probate and divorce, she moved increasingly into criminal law. She was the creator of the
California parole system (1893), and a long crusade for
criminal law and penal reform culminated in the 1920s
with the adoption, in California and in more than thirty
other states, of the "Foltz Defender Bill," the public defender system. Also, journalism, especially in furtherance of women's rights, occupied her. From the early
part of the century she resided in Los Angeles, threw
herself into the suffrage movement (though she was not
as prominent as she claimed subsequently to have been),
and in 1910 became the first woman deputy district attorney in the state. She was actively involved in Republican politics, and in 1930, at eighty-one, she ran in the
Republican primary for governor on a women's rights
platform, going down to glorious defeat with about
3500 votes.
For all her works and fame, having broken open
Hastings remained in her own eyes her greatest
,achievement. The most characteristic and most widely
circulated photograph of her shows her standing
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straight and looking defiant, her right hand on a law
book, a mortar-board on her head. She had a few skirmishes yet to fight with Hastings' Directors. In October
1889, she applied for the degree LL.B. to be conferred
upon her, though she had not completed the course.
Directors O.P. Evans (her adversary in 1878-79) and
Robert P. Hastings, LL.B. '81 (a son of the Founder)
moved that the degree be conferred. The motion lost.
But in 1925, almost as a voice out of the past come back
to haunt the Board, Clara Shortridge Foltz requested
that the degree LL.B. be awarded her as an honorary
degree. The request was denied on the grounds that the
Board had no authority to grant any degree save upon
completion of the regular course of study. If niggardly,
at least the Board's act was consonant with the College's
consistent policy from that day to this of awarding no
honorary degrees. Almost a half-century after her
death, the old battler has received a higher honor from
the College than an honorary degree could ever have
accorded: in the early 1970s, the women law students at
Hastings renamed their organization the Clara Shortridge Foltz Society, and tee-shirts bearing the proud
mien of the honoree are sported by women and men
alike.
The first beneficiary of Foltz and Gordon's PiOneer-!
ing effort was Mary McHenry, the daughter of a
Louisianajudge who had settled in San Francisco. After
a ladylike education, including early schooling at the
Grace Female Institute, Mary McHenry matriculated at
the University of California, graduating A.B. in the
Classical course of the College of Letters in 1879. Her
senior thesis, "The French considered as the Language
of Polite Europe," might have the faint odor of dilettantism and thin conceptualization about it, but it evidenced her earnestness and her historical and language
interests. President John LeConte, in his own hand, certified that she had "sustained a high character both as
lady and as student" while at Berkeley.ll With such a
testimonial and such an academic record, she was
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hardly excludable from Hastings. She entered probably
in the fall of 1879, before the final outcome of Foltz v.
Rage et al. She excelled at Hastings. Her papers contain
lecture notes of Prof. Pomeroy's second-year course and
a number of third-year final examinations, which together with Pomeroy's printed Syllabi afford considerable insight into the earliest curriculum. The lecture
notes also testify to an assiduous and thinking student.
She apparently never suffered the derision of fellow
male students that had been accorded Foltz in the first
two days of her attendance, in January 1878; there was
no repeat performance of male students playing
follow-the-Ieader, such as they had greeted Foltz with:
when she coughed, all coughed; turned a page, all
turned a page; moved her chair, (all, etc.). On the contrary, McHenry was so popular that at the second Hastings commencement, May 29, 1882, she was one of five
student speakers, "representatives chosen from the
class." Her speech, "Origin and History of the Last Testament," is extant, in her own hand. 12 Full of youthful
learning, and a great deal of youthful yearning, it is
solidly based on Classical history, Greek and Roman,
and her Biblical citations are correct and apt. Her command of Roman Law is phenomenal, even allowing for
Pomeroy's emphasis on it. One can suppose that the
daughter of a Louisiana Superior Court judge would
, have considered it no foreign system. She might be
chided for relying over-much on Gaius's Institutes, but
that was the Roman Law text most usable for an American student at the time. Her treatment of English legal
history of real and personal property was conventional,
but in this, as in her use of Classical history, she demonstrated the instincts of a sound historian, concerned
with the past as something more than a boneyard for
the present. Overall, Roman Law came out as infinitely
superior to the common law. She damned the latter
because of the inferior position assigned women and the
inferior protection afforded them by the "Feudal System." The glory of Roman Law to Mary McHenry was
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that it ma.de provision for the familia, which if subordinate to the patria potestas, the power of the male head
of the family, nevertheless provided generously in testamentary matters for women. She could speak approvingly of the English Statute of Wills of 1540 which, by
giving limited devise of realty, ameliorated the rigors of
the law of descent in feudal law, but with reservations:
"Highly as the gift [Statute of Wills] should be esteemed
as tending to alleviate the condition of women under
the Feudal System, it was far from being an equivalent
for the great personal and proprietary independence of
married women under the Middle Roman Law-an
independence whose destruction has so deeply injured
civilization." As she neared the conclusion of her oration, Miss McHenry got in a dig at the gentlemen in her
audience with a bit oflegal punning: "I have heard," she
said, "that married women always succeed in carrying
their wills into execution during their lifetime." With
somewhat forced astuteness, she urged the audience to
make testamentary provision before death and get
competent legal assistance in drawing the will, citing the
sorry case of Longfellow, who had recently died leaving
an ambiguous will likely to spawn litigation. She ended
with a graceful curtsey to John Norton Pomeroy, and to
the Founder for the "forethought and timely liberality
on the part of the generous founder of this 'Hastings'
College of the Law."
Mary McHenry's valediction is an illuminating
measure of what a Classically educated law graduate of
early Hastings could do in the way of an academic exercise. It also presages her own career. Alas, it would not
be in the practice of the law, but in the service of suffragettes. Though admitted to practice by virtue of the
completion of the Hastings course and the conferral of
its degree after application to the court, within a year
Hastings' first woman graduate married California's
most eminent artist, William Keith, twenty years her
senior, and sailed off for a two-year sojourn in Europe.
Keith, a Scot, was one of the great landscapists of the
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California scene, progressing from a photographic-like
realism, a "particularity of place" a la Eakins or Canaletto, to an ultimate soul-meaningful abstractionism of
light and darkness, form and color. Her marriage inspired one wag in 1883 to produce six verses
of affectionate doggerel entitled, "A Moan from the San
Francisco Bar, On Losing an Esteemed Lady
Member":
Mary, good-bye, we must forgive the tort;
At least, you've won your case in Cupid's Court;
Your status henceforth,-may's prove no servitum,
And no beginning, but ajinis litium;
And may you ne'er encounter that fell woe
Of woman's life,-divorce a vinculo;
Or find, in time, a trusting wife's deliciae
Turning, midst married storms, to sour saevitiae;
And be the latest Mem. upon your docket,
"A baby's cradle,-how to stock and rock it."13

The point was well taken, the direst fears not realized (it
was an idyllic marriage until death took William Keith in
1911), and the best hopes fulfilled (the cradle filled).
When the Keiths returned in 1885 they built a
house in Berkeley that became the veritable powerhouse of the woman's suffrage movement in California
and the West Coast as a whole. Like all the early
California women lawyers interested in women's rights,
Mary McHenry Keith was an active journalist, writing a
weekly column in the Oakland Enquirer in support of
suffrage. By 1895, she was California's most prominent
suffragette, intimate friend of Susan B. Anthony and
Carrie Chapman Catt. She began at home-with the
University of California. In 1900, at a testimonial dinner hosted by Phoebe Apperson Hearst for the eminent
Berkeley historian, Professor Bernard Moses, who was
about to set sail for the Philippines as one of the American Commissioners to take in hand the restructuring of
government in America's newest acquisition, Mary
Keith as principal speaker was not loath to tax Moses
with certain unconscious anti-feminist attitudes he had
displayed in the classroom when she was his student.
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She also quite fearlessly suggested to him that the American High Commission accord full rights to Filipino
women. She was an intrepid battler for the vote. Less
strident, more retiring in personality, more graceful
and gracious than Clara Shortridge Foltz, she was also
more effective in the feminist cause. She charmed
a male auditory. Her husband, who would greet her
threat to return to practice (never executed) with a
laughing, "Not much you will," was a warm and outspoken advocate of the vote for women, Mary once being
urged by Susan B. Anthony herself to unleash William.
whenever he travelled. In the first decade of the century, to the day of victory in 1911 when women won the
vote in California by referendum, she contributed some
$15,000 to the cause, and tirelessly led it. Her joy at
victory was stolen from her by the death of William at
the same moment. Though she would live another three
decades, she was not of a political inclination, and the
death of her husband was a heavy blow. She was a beloved figure in Berkeley. The secretary of the Berkeley
Chamber of Commerce in 1911 wrote the accolade that
best catches her inimitable quality-that she combined
"the life and action of two generations, the younger and
the older generations of the present, moulding them
together with wit, and gentleness and patience, learned
during the years of waiting" for the victory that 1911
brought. 14
In two ways, quite aside from the admission of
women, Foltz v. Roge et al. affected the future of Hastings College of the Law. The issue raised was the first
point of division between Serranus Clinton Hastings,
Founder and Dean, and the Board of Directors into
whose hands he had committed full power and authority for the operation of his foundation. The Supreme
Court of California, in its opinion in the case, first subjected to learned, judicial scrutiny the nature of Hastings' relationship to the University of California, the
matter of "affiliation." The falling out of the Founder
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and the Board (and the professor) was intimately intertwined with the question of "affiliation." It is not too
much to say that the court's opinion in Foltz v. Roge et al.,
insofar as it touched "affiliation," represented Serranus
Clinton Hastings' thinking. It most emphatically did not
represent the thinking of the Directors of Hastings College of the Law.
What were the fundamental grounds for division,
the underlying causes of the increasing growing apart
of the parties who had so elatedly and confidently set on
foot the enterprise in the spring of 1878? It was Serranus Clinton Hastings' view of the nature of legal education that was the rock on which amity foundered.
William Carey Jones, the founder of the Berkeley (Boalt
Hall) School of Jurisprudence and for two years a lecturer in Roman Law at Hastings in the 1880s, had had
considerable contact with the Founder in the planning
stages and early years of the College. As Recorder of the
Faculty at Berkeley, Jones was an assistant to President
LeConte and present at the meetings during the two
years or so that Hastings discussed his proposal with
LeConte. For a couple of years, Jones summered in
Lake County and twice chanced to take the stagecoach
with Hastings. Jones found that Hastings' "ideas were
large, though vague and unsettled, on the subject of
legal education, and on the kind of law college that
ought to be built up in affiliation with the University of
California."15 Allowing for Jones' remarks being late
(1912) and possibly somewhat self-serving, as a justification for the newly-launched Berkeley School of Jurisprudence, they ring true as to the grandeur-and
vagueness-of Hastings' educational ideas.
By 1878, Hastings was a long way from what formal
education he had known. His Latin was still sound, the
rudiments of his Classical education still retained (nothing wrong with the mottoes, "Detur Dignissimo" and
"Fortiter et Recte," that graced the seal he designed,
and which is on the dust jacket of this book). He had
devoted as much leisure time to reading as a restless
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man of action and of affairs might be expected to set
aside. More significantly, shortly before making the
final move to establish the College, he had visited
Europe for an extensive tour, spending considerable
time at European universities. It was this experience,
perhaps not very profound (it is doubtful that his command of modern languages was up to the job), but certainly serious and informed by his acuteness as an observer, that issued in his comprehensive and somewhat
simplistic survey, "Law Instruction and Law Schools,"
his Annual Address to the students at Hastings in
August 1879. 16 He looked favorably upon the instruction given at the English Inns of Court, while recognizing how unstructured it was. He found much merit in
the German system, which resulted in every practitioner
and judge having a "thorough classical and legal education." The German emphasis on history appealed to
him, but he was aware that the full-blown German
method based on close study of the great Codes was not
wholly applicable to the American legal system which,
for all its efforts of codification, remained a case-law
system. On balance, he came down against the German
system, albeit on questionable grounds:
There is one conclusive reason why an American should prefer the system of instruction of his own country to the German method. The culture of the German is too expansive. Its
scope is so great and he knows so much, that he is unfitted
for the rapid discharge of his professional duties under the
Anglo-American common and statute laws. He cannot become a close-reasoning, astute lawyer. His knowledge is too
diffusive. His energies are wasted over too large a surface.

Reading this, one can appreciate Jones' remarks. Yet
Hastings was equally sure that in American law schools
"we teach too much," and that professors should be
merely "guides" to show the students the way in the law.
Finally, he came down as being "in sympathy with the
Germans in their manner of teaching the law," which
can only be construed as meaning relatively few classes,
while rejecting the German preoccupation with so much
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knowledge as to prevent "close-reasoning." One clue in
Hastings' meandering discourse helps unravel the ambiguity even if it does not resolve the contradictions.
Hastings' detestation of academic buildings was almost
pathological: he sought an educational ambience simpler and less corporeal.
We [Hastings College] have no lecture halls in this city. We are
liable to be under the necessity of imitating the peripatetic
philosophers, and instruct the young men of this city in the
parks and public groves; and this in a city which has in the
name of common school institutions erected almost palatial
structures in several parts of the city, in place of the cheap
common schoolhouse of our fathers.

This diatribe was meant to shame the San Francisco city
fathers into providing at least a lecture hall for the
College. But it also makes clear that Hastings harked
back to a combination of the Socratium, the academe of
Plato, the little red schoolhouse, and Mark Hopkins and
a student on a log. In short, Serranus Clinton Hastings
was a pedagogical primitivist. This was (and is) a respectable tradition. However, for 1879 it was questionable whether anyone actually engaged in teaching the law
would find it anything but a hazard as an operational
method. Hastings had a very simple view oflegal education because he had a very simple view of the law. Both
views were fallacies, one built upon the other. At best,
Hastings was a Blackstone-barrister, and in the two decades since he had last practiced the law it had begun
to change mightily, growing in all those areas in which
the classical jurisprudentialism of Blackstone, Kent, or
Story was silent. Moreover, Hastings was only faintly
aware of what went on in the great law schools of the
East and Midwest, and he failed to perceive how rapidly
the curriculum (and at Harvard, at least, the instructional mode) of formal legal education was changing.
Of one thing Hastings was certain. The law school
must be part of a great university. However, Hastings,
who had never been to a university, and not even to one
of the nineteenth century's modest liberal arts colleges,
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did not appreciate the full implications of a university.
Significantly, he was not entirely aware of the distinction
between undergraduate and graduate studies, which
was becoming fundamental to the American university
under the impact of German-derived influence. While
he hoped that most of the students at Hastings would be
graduates, it was not his intent that it be wholly a
graduate institution. Since it would be open to students
with sound schooling in languages and history, it must
supply the civilizing civility of the liberal arts tradition,
hence his concern that instruction in legal ethics be an
integral part of the curriculum. Hastings had great faith
in the liberal arts tradition; his son, Robert Paul (Hastings '81), latterly Director and dean, was a graduate of
Harvard College. If the Founder was suspicious of too
much instruction in law school, too much formal training, if he believed that the student should not be
"taught" but "must learn" by "ratiocination" what the
law is and so be "metamorphosed" into a "well-defined
legal mind," he nevertheless felt that the law school experience must be built on a sound liberal arts foundation. 17 As the Founder saw it, it was the liberal arts dimension that tied together Hastings College of the Law
and the rest of the University of California.
Though it is not susceptible to proof, it is possible
that Hastings' vision of the university was shaped by
John Henry Cardinal Newman's Idea of a University
(1873), which enjoyed an enormous vogue on both sides
of the Atlantic, especially with those who saw the Catholic Christian tradition of education threatened by secularism and materialism. Hastings was a notable convert
to Catholicism in early American California, one of
those eminent men of redoubtable Protestant origins
who were converted by Archbishop Joseph Alemany
and the resurgent aristocratic Catholicism of the first
three decades after the Gold Rush. Newman's university
did not necessarily have to be a sectarian institution.
The civilizing mission of the liberal arts would work a
reassertion of the ethos of Christian values even in the
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secular university. Newman's ideal was an education
that made a gentleman, balanced, tolerant, gracious, of
Athenian contemplativeness. One assumes that the restless Hastings aspired to but fell short of such reflective
detachment. The Platonic notion of the striving for perfection underlay Newman's educational ideal. Mental
cultivation, rather than preparation for a vocation, was
the object of the liberal education. If a liberal education
was good (morally good) then it must be useful, too.
Education teaches a man to go right to the point, to
detect sophistry, to discard the irrelevant. "It prepares
him to fill any post with credit, to master any subject
with facility."18 So armed, Serranus Clinton Hastings
believed that his College, whether sited in San Francisco
or in Berkeley, must be related in an organic union to
the greater University that would give meaning to the
College's ethical and didactic functions. In expressing
this, the Founder was unusually clear, concise, and articulate:
This College is not an affiliating college alone; it is a part
of the University: and was established not to make lawyers
merely, as is generally supposed, but to qualify judges,
statesmen, and law-makers; to educate young men who intend to engage in foreign and domestic commerce in a knowledge not only of the laws and constitution of their own country, but of the laws of foreign nations and international law;
regarding a knowledge of laws and jurisprudence not only
useful as affording good mental training, but of great practical value in every intellectual avocation. 19

No one else connected with Hastings College of the
Law shared the Founder's vision. Perhaps it was not
clear enough to be completely understood; certainly it
was not detailed enough to be acted upon. All eight of
the named Directors were, as the act specified, members
of the San Francisco Bar Association and active lawyers
in the city. Not one was a college graduate, had been
connected with the founding of the University, was a
Regent of the University, or would be. Not one had had
any experience in formal legal education, save insofar as
he had had bar aspirants prepare in his office. Only the
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one other Director, the ex officio President, Chief Justice William T. Wallace, was involved in higher education: from 1875 to 1902 he was a Regent. In the deliberations of the Board, the Chief Justice was more noted
for his absence than his presence-understandablyand a certain neutrality on critical issues on his part was
likely and desirable. Though all of the Directors were
friends of the Founder and held him in some esteem, he
had chosen them primarily for their professional eminence, secondarily for their political influence, and not
at all for their educational experience or even commitment. The Directors saw the College as a means for
producing lawyers, nothing more.
John Norton Pomeroy did not share the Founder's
vision either. Possibly, he understood it, though he
would have found its contradictions and ambiguities a
grievous intellectual failing. As Professor of Municipal
Law, in whom was confided the entire legal instruction
of the College, Pomeroy was the one didact connected
with the enterprise. Pomeroy was a graduate of Hamilton College, New York, 1847, and he had been a
schoolmaster. While his legal training was in law offices,
he displayed a genuine scholarly bent that a cynic might
feel was confirmed by the fact that in his nine years of
practice in Rochester, his native town, he had little if
any business. In 1864 he published his first book, an
elementary introduction to the law, intended for college
or academy students. His scholarly reputation was already established when he was called in 1864 to teach
law at the University of the City of New York (New York
University), which had begun continuous instruction in
law eight years earlier. During his six years at NYU, he
became a renowned teacher. When he returned to
Rochester in 1870 to continue writing, his reputation as
the leading constitutional law scholar was founded on
An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States
(1868). Much of the scholarship of his Rochester period
was dedicated to codes and codification, and this recommended him to the Founder, who chose him to be
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the professor at Hastings. Pomeroy had the education,
the training, the experience, and the academic eminence that Hastings himself lacked. He also had very
definite ideas as to what must be taught in a law school,
how it should be taught, and what kind of a product the
law school should produce. No civilizing mission for
him; a liberal education would have to be acquired
elsewhere. The law school was to teach LAW, and what
a grand expanse the LAW was! The first year was to be
devoted to a Roman-structured introduction to the law
of persons and property, with the rudiments of contract, and all served up with an historical dimension.
The second year would be devoted to mercantile and
commercial law, advanced property with emphasis on
estates, trusts, and wills, and equity jurisprudence. The
third year was to concentrate on pleading and practice
(across the board), medical jurisprudence, international
law, conflicts, Roman Law, and jurisprudence. How
Hastings must have shuddered when he saw Pomeroy's
"Outline Course of Study," readied for the first meeting
of the first class in August 1878. Every stricture Hastings levelled at the American system of teaching in the
law schools back East (teaching too much) and against
the German system (too much knowledge) could be
levelled at Pomeroy's curriculum. Patently, John Norton Pomeroy was not going to be merely a "guide" into
the law. He was going to be the captain of a magnificent
vessel,justitia, transporting a cargo of aspiring lawyers
through storm and shoals to ultimate capacity to command the law itself. Whatever else might have divided
Serranus Clinton Hastings and John Norton Pomeroy-differences in background and breeding, life experience, age (Pomeroy was fourteen years younger
than the Founder), and temperament-that which
opened as a gulf between them was their divergence
over pedagogical matters. And to drive them further
apart, Pomeroy was so supremely confident of his own
mission, so sure of what a law school must do, so convinced of the singular nature of the law school enter-
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prise, that he did not care whether the law school was or
was not part of a great university. "Affiliation" was a
matter of convenience, not an end to be desired in and
of itself.
Serranus Clinton Hastings, whether from arrogance, oversight, ignorance, or a combination of all
three, was the author of his own troubles. His intense
pride in his munificence (the seal on the dustjacket
catches it all) dictated that he would not merely give a
gift of money to the University to found a law school,
but that the institution would go the route of an
"affiliated college" established by and fixed in statute
law. A gift to the University would have resulted in almost no exercise of power and slight influence over the
creation and operation of the law school on the part of
the donor. But the "affiliation" -by-statute alternative
almost as effectively barred the donor from much more
than an advisory role, unless the trustee-Directors of the
statutory board chose to give ear to the donor. Hastings
made the mistake of choosing as trustee-Directors men
of a very narrow professional perspective. He accounted them friends, but if he was to retain a controlling or even major voice in the institution, he was
obliged, by the nature of the eleemosynary trust, to repose in the men he chose the kind of confidence one
rests in longtime intimates, and these men were less
than that. That he was promptly chosen dean was a
gesture of respect, but it was not the proffering of
power. The Board was in command. The dean would
not teach, and he was not even delegated curriculum
planning responsibility. All that was of the essence of
the College in its functioning was in the hands of the
sole professor-Pomeroy-and the dean was merely a
figurehead, the instrument of the Board if it wished to
use it, at best a go-between inter Board and professor. It
is ironic that the Founder's vision, unclear and imperfectly articulated as it was, might well have found more
sympathy, and even a genuine assist in giving it reality,
from the president, faculty, and Regents of the Univer-
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sity than it received from his own Directors and the
professor he himself had chosen.
The first rift came with Clara Foltz's first day at
Hastings in January 1879. Stopped by the janitor from
attending, she had appealed to Dean Hastings, who
admitted her subject to approval by the Board. The
Board's subsequent disapproval was also a disavowal of
Hastings' action. He had made clear to the public press,
after Morrison, J. directed the College to accept Foltz
and Gordon, that the law was solidly with them and that
he, disagreeing with the Directors, did not favor an appeal in the case. It was a small matter. It soon passed.
The fundamental break came in December 1879, ironically when the dean reported on the decision of the
supreme court in the Foltz Case and on the articles of
"affiliation" with the University. It was the latter that
brought on the rupture.
"Affiliation," from the outset of the University, was
provided for and considered desirable by a state institution of limited resources. By the 1868 act creating the
University of California, an order of priority for establishing "colleges" of the university was set out in sect. 2:
1. colleges of agriculture, mechanic arts, mines, civil engineering, other colleges of arts; 2. college of letters; 3.
colleges of medicine, law, and similar professional colleges. 2o Priorities 1 and 2 were rapidly fulfilled. As early
as 1870, however, when the Regents essayed the idea of
establishing a law school, nothing came of the plan save
the appointment of Stephen J. Field, Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, a lawyer of Forty-Niner
days, as Honorary Professor of Law (a title without
function that he retained for some years after Hastings
was founded, though it was not suggested that he teach
there). In 1872, Regent John W. Dwinelle moved the
Regents to further planning, including conversations
with State Supreme Court judges and members of the
bar. This might have been the point at which Serranus
Clinton Hastings began to think seriously about founding the law school. The Regents found themselves bur-
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dened with more pressing needs, and nothing more
happened. The 1868 act (sect. 8) provided that the
Board of Regents "may affiliate with the University, and
make an integral part of the same, and incorporate
therewith, any incorporated College of Medicine or of
Law, or other special course of instruction now existing,
or which may hereafter be created, upon such terms as
to the respective corporations may be deemed expedient; ... " the affiliated colleges retaining control of
their own property, with their own boards, faculties,
and presidents, the students to be recommended by the
faculties to receive from the University the degrees of
the colleges, the president of the University to be ex
officio a member of the faculty and president of the
faculty of each college. It was under the terms of this
section that Hastings founded his law school as an
"affiliated college," the second such (the School of
Pharmacy, San Francisco, was the first, in 1873).
As the Supreme Court held in Foltz v. Roge et al.,
the 1878 act creating Hastings in its plan for the organization and government of the College did not differ
materially from the provisions for affiliation contained
in the 1868 University act. Sect. 2 of the 1878 act was the
key provision:
Said College shall affiliate with the University of the State,
upon such terms as shall be for the welfare of the College and
University, and shall be the Law Department of the University.21

The faculty of the University would grant diplomas to
Hastings graduates, and the president would sign and
issue the same (sect. 3); a room or suitable hall at the
University was to be set apart for the use of Hastings
students (sect. 4); the Dean of Hastings was to be ex
officio a member of the faculty of the University (sect.
5); the College would matriculate students resident at
the University as well as students residing elsewhere in
California (sect. 9). Only in one respect did the Court in
Foltz v. Rage et al. exaggerate the degree of similarity
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between the provisions for affiliation of the 1868 and
1878 acts. By the 1868 act, affiliation was to result in the
affiliating institution becoming an "integral part" of and
"incorporate" with the University. This might well have
been intended by the word "affiliate" in sect. 2 of the
1878 act, but the integration and incorporation were
not set down expressly.
There are two ways to view sect. 2 of the 1878 act.
One is that it did de jure completely and sufficiently accomplish the affiliation of Hastings with the University.
This is untenable. The use of the future tense, "shall
affiliate," indicates authorization to do something not
yet completed. The Court in Foltz v. Rage et al. was inclined to the alternative interpretation in finding the
legislature's intent to be that when the College was established, it "should affiliate" with the University. The
reference in sect. 2 to "terms" clearly indicates discussion and agreement between the two entities, the College and the University, which had not yet taken place.
The second view is the correct one. Hastings would,
pursuant to the act, affiliate with the University by a
consensual arrangement upon terms of mutual benefit.
However, what about the words in sect. 2, "shall be the
Law Department of the University"? Did the act itself
make Hastings the Law Department, etc.? Or would its
status as the Law Department depend upon the completion of the affiliation agreement? The use of the present
tense would have avoided all ambiguity; but again, the
future tense is used, and it is probable that the legislative intent was for the status of the College as law department of the University to wait upon the completion
of affiliation.
The first-year class at Hastings had already completed their final examinations before the Regents even
considered terms of affiliation with Hastings. At the Regents' meeting, May 10, 1879, President LeConte submitted a "communication" from Serranus Clinton Hastings on the matter of affiliation, and on the motion of
Regent Joseph W. Winans (whose son, JosephJr. was a
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first-year student at Hastings, UC, A.B. '78), it was laid
on the table. At the June Regents meeting, the Founder's communication was read, and Winans moved a special committee be appointed to confer with Serranus
Clinton Hastings and prepare a plan for the Regents for
the affiliation of the College. Regents Winans, Chief
Justice Wallace (president of the Hastings Board) and
S.B. McKee were appointed the special committee.
At the Regents' meeting, August 7, 1879, Winans
moved a resolution of affiliation by which Hastings College of the Law "shall be affiliated with the University of
California and made an integral part of the same, and
incorporated therewith ... " on seven specific clauses of
terms and conditions "which are hereby made a part of
such affiliation and incorporation."22 .The resolution, it
will be noted, followed the 1868 act's wording verbatim
with respect to affiliation, integration, and incorporation. Clause one confirmed the method of selection of
future Hastings Directors as set down in sect. 1 of the
1878 act, except for making the selection subject to the
approval of the Regents. Clause two, however, went far
beyond the act: the Founder and his legal representatives would always be entitled to the appointment from
among the Founder's heirs or a representative of one
Director, the appointment not subject to Regental approval. Clause three was largely explanatory of sect. 3 of
the 1878 act with respect to the conferring of diplomas,
save that the Regents and not the president would issue
the diplomas, subject to the right of the Regents to refuse a diploma "for cause." Clause four reaffirmed sect.
4 as to the provision of a room or hall at the University
for Hastings students, "as soon as practicable." Clause
five gave the Founder-dean a seat and vote in the
Academic Senate of the University for life-something
less than the provision in sect. 5 that the dean of Hastings was ex officio a member of the University Faculty
(i.e., of the Academic Senate). Clause six was stunning
in its sweep: "The said College shall be subject to the
dominion of the said Board of Regents in all matters
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pertaining to its management and welfare." Quite aside
from what the legal definition of "dominion" might
be-sovereignty or lordship, fine old feudal concepts
indeed-the powers here arrogated to themselves by
the Regents ran directly counter to even the most conservative reading (that, for instance, of the supreme
court in Foltz v. Roge et al.) of sect. 11 of the 1878 act,
that "All the business of the College shall be managed by
the Directors without compensation .... " Clause seven
gave back with the left hand a bit that the right hand
had taken away: numbers and duties of the professors
were to be prescribed "and the business of the said College managed" by the Directors, subject to the approval
of the Regents. The special committee reported that the
plan and method of affiliation which seemed to them
suitable was embodied in this resolution, and that it "is
acceptable to Hon. s.C. Hastings (having been fully approved by him) .... " The Regents adopted the resolution, and the secretary was instructed to communicate to
the Founder the "recognition by the Board [of Regents]
of the donation that constitutes the above endowment."
The official Centennial History of the University of
California argues that the affiliation of Hastings with
the University was accomplished by the 1878 act, that
the affiliation resolution of the Regents was "unnecessary" and was probably taken only "to demonstrate
compliance with the Hastings College Act of 1878."23
Besides being an untenable construction of the 1878 act,
what this interpretation overlooks is that for almost a
century a succession of the University's presidents,
finance officers, and counsel to the Regents, and the
Regents themselves have continuously and without exception affirmed that by this resolution Hastings was
affiliated with the University, and that those same officials have governed their relations with Hastings on the
assumption of the validity of the resolution of August 7,
1879. To be sure, clause six proved a chimera, in theory
and in practice. But that had less to do with any reserve
on the part of the University's imperialistic adminis-
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trators than with the ability of Hastings to go its own
way, impervious to machinations in Berkeley.
What the succession of University officials never
knew was that the Regents' resolution was rejected
flatly, and unanimously, by the Hastings Board of Directors on December 22, 1879. 24 With the exception of
Chief Justice Wallace-acting in his capacity as a Regent, not as a Hastings Director-no one other than
Serranus Clinton Hastings was involved in the negotiations with the Regents. That the Regents' plan was acceptable to the Founder can be believed-he wished the
full integration that affiliation with the University provided. He might even have begun to have considerable
reservations about the direction the Hastings Directors
were taking in the administration of the College. But he
should not have been surprised at the Board's repudiation of the Regents' resolution. Clause six could never
have been assented to by fiduciary trustees aware of
their responsibilities if they intended to retain any autonomy, and the Hastings Directors were not prepared
to give over the College to the Regents. Present at the
December 22 Board meeting were Directors Lake,
Evans, Sharpstein and Hoge-with Chief Justice Wallace in the chair (the minimum for a quorum). We cannot be sure that Wallace voted in the unanimous decision to reject the resolution, but the chair did vote in at
least one other instance of a minimum quorum. The
vote was a sore defeat for the Founder. Salt was rubbed
into the wound by a resolution moved by Hoge and
carried unanimously directing Director Lake to draft an
act amendatory to the 1878 act "concerning the duties
and powers of the Board of Directors," to be approved
by the Directors and submitted to the legislature. 25 The
intention of the Board was doubtless twofold: to
strengthen the Board's powers vis-a.-vis the ,Regents'
power-play, and to counteract by better statutory definition the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation in Foltz
v. H oge et al. of sect. 11 of the 1878 act as to the Directors' powers to manage "all the business of the Col-
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lege." The Board interpreted sect. 11 as not derogating
from the Directors' powers, only as denying them compensation for their services.
In the event, nothing appears to have come of
Lake's efforts. The next battle to be fought via legislative enactment was at Serranus Clinton Hastings' behest
and to the end of accomplishing by legislation the integration with the University that the Hastings Board
would not effect. Behind the amendatory act signed
into law on March 3,1883, was a long and bitter division
between the Founder and Board that began with the
December 22,1879 meeting and grew steadily worse. In
1880, the Board delivered a number of slights to the
Founder-dean, whether intentionally or not cannot be
known. The Registrar and Prof. Pomeroy-the dean
was not included-were ordered to set examination
days and arrange for the Directors to administer the
May finals. When Hastings had concluded an arduous
round of negotiations with the University for the lease
of a lecture-hall on Front Street, San Francisco, the
Board found it "unsuitable" and rejected the lease proposed by the dean. The chair in Comparative Jurisprudence, created in October 1880, and conferred on the
dean, who was to serve in it without compensation,
might have been less an honor than an indication that
the dean was reduced to the status of a mere faculty
member. In 1881, Pomeroy was made virtually autonomous, free of the dean's control: he set his own lecture
hours, reported directly to the Board on the state of the
College, and even undertook to request the Board to
convene. When, in March 1881, the Board floated its
own "affiliation agreement" (a bald reassertion of the
Board's autonomy under the 1878 act which added nothing to it and constituted no concessions, save that the
"agreement" could be cancelled by "mutual consent" at
any time or unilaterally by either party upon twelve
months' notice), Director Evans was appointed a committee of one to negotiate with the Regents, and
Pomeroy and the Directors generally were requested to
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assist him.26 There was no mention made of Serranus
Clinton Hastings. The appointment by the Board of
Robert Paul Hastings, LL.B. 1881, son of the Founder,
to be Director in the place of Delos Lake, who resigned
in August 1881, might be taken as an obeisance to the
Founder. It was certainly in line with the Regents' affiliation resolution that would accord a seat to the Founder's heir without subjecting his appointment to the Regents' approval. There is another interpretation possible: though the Board had rejected the Regents' resolution, it chose the simpler path of picking a Director
acceptable to everyone rather than a Director-at-Iarge,
which might have precipitated a confrontation with the
Regents.
At one of the rare Board meetings that he attended
in these years, on September 4,1882, the Founder read
his "Definition for 1882."27 It was a sharp attack on the
Board's failings in living up to the terms of the Founder's benefaction, and it was a bitter document: "The
living Founder the true altruist is involved in wicked
antagonisms for causes not necessary to mention."
While he might deny any personal grievances, and generously admitted that in its four years the College had
been "successful beyond the anticipations of the Founder," Hastings had an ax to grind. Citing the
Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses (1601) as providing the definition of "charities" applicable to Hastings,
the Founder noted that in English law the Founder, his
heirs, or for want of them, the Crown, had the right of
visitation for redress of misemployment of the trust or
shortcomings of the trustees. He raised the eminent
leading English case of the nineteenth century over
Harrow School, Attorney-General v. the Earl of
Clarendon,28 decided by the Master of the Rolls in Chancery in 1810, as defining this visitorial power, and noted
that he, as Founder, had provided that one of the descendants should always be one of the Directors. Alluding to Robert P. Hastings as a present Director, he called
him "one of the special visitors," rather plaintively re-
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fleeted how the English cases exhibited generous consideration for a founder's intentions, and found a "lamentable contrast" to this generosity in "Republican
America." His specific complaints were directed at the
failure to provide for a regular course of lectures in
legal ethics and lectures in medical jurisprudence; erosion of the sole responsibility of the one professor for
the legal teaching (a repudiation of the use of one of the
Directors, Oliver Perry Evans, as "assistant professor" at
a salary that Hastings obviously thought excessive); and
the failure of the Board to enable the Registrar to provide for adequate housing of the College's records. He
restated the purposes of the College almost verbatim as
he had expressed them at the Berkeley commencement
in 1878 when he announced the foundation of the College. He taxed the state with not having provided suitable lecture halls, citing this as a violation of its obligation
in having accepted his gift. He reaffirmed his belief that
the Directors should have the "government" of the College, and that the University's "denomination" of the
College should extend only so far as an act of the faculty
of the College was deemed detrimental to the "welfare
of the University." The Founder's "Definition," duly entered in the minutes of the Board, and apparently as
quickly ignored, was a last plea to the Directors to heed
the Founder's wishes. Serranus Clinton Hastings had
already sought, or shortly would seek another means to
remedy his. grievance against the Board.
Immediately preceding the entry in the minutes of
the "Definition for 1882" is a copy of the draft bill that
would become Stats. 1883, chap. 20, signed into law
March 3, 1883, amending the 1878 act. 29 The Senate
Committee on Education introduced S.B. 355 on February 16, 1883; the Senate ordered it placed on file. The
bill was given its second and third readings on the same
day, February 17 (the three-day rule being waived by a
vote of 31-2 on the grounds that it was a "case of
urgency"), carrying by 33-1 and 34-0, respectively. It
was in the assembly on February 28, passed shortly
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thereafter without having been sent to committee, and
became law with the governor's signature on March 3.
By the amending act, the officers of the College would
be the dean and Registrar, and "The Regents of the
University shall have the same control of the College as
they possess over the academic department of the U niversity of California, except as hereinafter provided."
The provisions in fact do not substantially distinguish
Hastings from any other University department. To the
Regents redounded a number of privileges and duties:
to grant diplomas on the recommendation of the Dean
and Faculty and to appoint the Registrar after the death
or resignation of the incumbent (Charles P. Hastings);
to receive any donations of $30,000 for the founding of
new professorships; to be paid the annual interest of 7
percent on the original gift of$100,000 (as the Board of
Directors was previously the payee); and not to expend
any part of the annuity ($7000) to any other purposes
than instruction, save for the Registrar's services, these
not to exceed $600 per annum. The dean, who was
named in the act as Robert P. Hastings, "the son of the
Founder," was to be ex officio a member of the University Faculty and to have the right of audience at any
Regents' meeting when he would have College business
to lay before the Regents. Future deans would be appointed by the "highest appellate Court of the State ... "
and the dean should be "one of the male heirs of the
founder if deemed capable and competent." In this act,
as in the 1878 act, provision for a room or hall at the
University and a lecture hall in the City by the San Francisco supervisors was prescribed, and the 1878 act's
clause for reversion of the sum of $100,000 to the founder, his heirs, or representatives in the event of the
nonexistence of the College or the failure of the state to
pay the $7000 annuity (save if the legislature failed to
make the appropriation at anyone session only) was
reiterated. To remind San Francisco's city fathers of
their duty, there was a proviso that there should always
be a course of lectures "upon the duties of municipal
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officers in the City and County of San Francisco." Finally, "the Dean, Acting Professors, Lecturers, Readers,
and other instructors" were to constitute the Faculty
and "Examining Board" (hitherto the Directors had
given examinations).
The effect of the amending act was to make the
Board of Directors superfluous, though it does not appear to have effected the Board's abolition, for the University Register continued faithfully to list the names of
the Directors. The act vested in the Regents of the University all rights, powers, and authority formerly in the
Board. The Board ceased functioning. Its last meeting
entered in the minutes was that of September 4, 188l.
On May 5, 1883, there was entered in the minutes a
meeting of the Faculty of Hastings College of the Law,
authorizing the dean, Robert P. Hastings, to handle the
College's funds. Not until April 25, 1885, is there entered "a special meeting of the Directors," at which
Robert P. Hastings resigned as Dean, Joseph W. Winans, Regent of the University, was elected in his place,
and Perrie Kewen was elected Registrar to replace
Charles P. Hastings, deceased. While no roll of the Directors is given, Directors named as present were RF.
Morrison, Chief Justice, J.P. Hoge, O.P. Evans, T.!.
Bergin, T.B. Bishop, and J.R Sharpstein-most of the
original Directors under the 1878 act. The last order of
business for the day was a resolution to meet on the last
Saturday of each month in the chief justice's chambers.
The old Directors had been moved to a fighting
stance by a new essay in legislative interference by the
Founder. On February 3, 1885, Assemblyman E.W.
Britt of Lake County introduced A.B. 421 to amend the
1883 act in four substantial sections. By the bill, the
officers of the College were to be the dean, the Registrar, and three "Trustees," Thomas P. Stoney, Louis T.
Haggin, and R Porter Ashe, all San Francisco attorneys,
but not men of the first rank in the profession. In the
future, the trustees would be appointed by the chief
justice, with the consent of the remaining trustees. The
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chief justice was to be the president (ex officio) of the
trustees, responsible for drawing the funds of the College provided by the state, the trustees concurring; in
his absence, or if the chief justice "refuses or neglects to
act," the trustees were to appoint one of their number to
draw the funds. The Regents of the University were
again affirmed in their control over the College as over
"the academic department" of the University, subject to
the exceptions specified in the act. The purpose of the
College was expressed in the same terms as in the 1883
act, but to the lectures on municipal duties were added
lectures-perhaps pointed at the old Directors-"upon
legal ethics and morality in business." Tuition was to be
free. The $7000 annuity was to be paid in two semiannual installments, but not to the Directors, as had
been specified in the 1878 act. A.B. 421 received its
third reading only three days after its introduction. It
was amended on the floor to go into effect immediately,
and passed by 56-1. The bill's passage through the senate, which amended it, was less smooth, but it was signed
into law by the governor on March 18, 1885. 30
The 1883 act had given to the Regents of the University the power they had sought-and which Serranus
Clinton Hastings had encouraged them to seek-in the
Regents' resolution of affiliation of 1879. The 1885 act
was meant to cure one defect in the 1883 act. The Regents were uncomfortable with the 1883 act's vesting in
them responsibility for the property of the College,
rather than in a separate corporate entity, as had been
prescribed for an "affiliating" institution in the 1868
University act. Thus, while the 1883 act had accomplished "integration" and "incorporation" of Hastings
with the University, it had not accomplished "affiliation"
because the affiliating corporate entity had disappeared
by virtue of the act. Affiliation was important to the
Regents, because from the outset they had distinguished between a free-gift and an affiliating institution; in the case of the former, policy and law dictated
that a free-gift could not be hedged by power of rever-
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sion. The 1883 act might have proven a bad precedent
on this score, but by vesting the property of the College
in the "Trustees," the 1885 act cured the defect by recreating the affiliating entity. The "Trustees" were
meant to be strawmen, mere receivers of the state annuity and fiduciary donees for subsequent gifts to the
College, without responsibility for the functioning of
the College.
If the 1883 act was somewhat defective, the 1885
act was badly flawed, as the act itself recognized by providing an alternative in the event the chief justice did
not cooperate. The chasm that had opened between the
Founder and his Directors, regardless of how blame
might be apportioned, had worked the destruction of
the old, complex, anomalous, but still workable structure of the 1878 act. The University now had authority
at law over an institution it did not quite know what to
do with. The institution continued to function, largely
autonomously, thanks to the drive and capacity of its
professor, John Norton Pomeroy. The acts of 1883 and
1885 produced an impasse in the exercise of responsibility and powers that really did not affect function. The
Regents, realizing that they were caught in a battle between two adversaries in which the University had nothing to gain in a victory for either side (and probably not
much to lose, either), retired to a neutral corner. The
old Directors, finally stung to action by the challenge
posed by the second act's spurious "Trustees," came out
fighting for a final showdown with an imperious and
interfering Founder, even if he was one they had injured and insulted.
The old Directors had waited until death took the
Registrar, Charles P. Hastings. They had apparently
persuaded the Founder's son Robert, graduate of the
first class and a Director from 1881 to 1883, to throw in
his lot with them, probably by persuading him that it
was in the interests of the College to do so. Robert Hastings' resignation of the deanship, which had been con-
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ferred upon him by the 1883 act, left open the reassertion of the Directors' claim as the rightful authority over
the College pursuant to the 1878 act. That was the
significance of the meeting of April 25, 1885. The appointment as dean of the noted lawyer, man of culture,
bibliophile-and Regent of the University-Joseph Winans, signalled the University's neutrality. It also placed
in the deanship the most stalwart fighter for the U niversity's independence from political influence, the delegate to the Constitutional Convention who had led the
struggle to put art. 9, sect. 9 in the Constitution of
1879-the provision which the Directors realized must
be the basis of their case against the 1883 and 1885 acts
when the matter came to the courts. The Directors enjoyed the full cooperation of Chief Justice R.F.
Morrison, a shrewd and fearless man, who as district
judge in San Francisco had found for Foltz and Gordon
at first instance in 1879. By their appointment of Perrie
Kewen as Registrar-an action pursuant to their powers
under the 1878 act-the Directors grasped the initiative
and challenged the Founder to oust them by law in the
assertion of the validity of the 1883 and 1885 acts.
The Founder took up the challenge. Attorney General Edward C. Marshall, on the relation of Serranus
Clinton Hastings, brought a quo warranto action in the
Superior Court of San Francisco to remove Perrie
Kewen as Registrar. The first round in the People etc.,
ex.rel. S.C. Hastings v. Perrie Kewen went to the Founder. 31 Kewen appealed, and the case came to hearing in
the supreme court in March 1886. Counsel appearing
for Kewen were Directors Hoge, Wilson, Evans, Bishop,
Bergin, and Ralph C. Harrison (a Director since 1883).
The issue turned on the constitutionality of the 1883
and 1885 acts, the Directors having acted pursuant to
the 1878 act, which was lawful only if the later acts were
invalid. Justice Myrick accepted (uncritically) the contention in the judgment in Foltz v. H oge et al. that Hastings had affiliated with the University "and had become
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an integral part thereof, subject to the same general
provisions of the law as were applicable to the university." Consequently, by art. 9, sect. 9 of the Constitution
of 1879, "it was not competent for the legislature ... to
change the form of the government of the university or
of any college thereof then existing" by act in 1883 and
1885. He held that it was intended by the Constitution
to prohibit such changes in the structure of the University as those worked in the transfer of control from Directors to Regents (1883) and to the Trustees (1885),
"and if the college is a portion of the university, such
prohibition would extend to it." The appointment of
Kewen was legal. Justices Thornton and McKee concurred with Myrick. Justice Elisha W. McKinstry concurred, but in a separate opinion took it "for granted"
that prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1879
Hastings had affiliated with the University, and that
therefore such attempted changes were prohibited by
art. 9, sect. 9. However, "In saying this I neither take
judicial notice of an affiliation, nor hold that the fact is,
for all purposes, determined by Foltz v. Rage, 54 Cal:28;
but rest my concurrence upon the failure of the complaint to aver that such affiliation had taken place, and
upon averments in the complaint which assume it, ... "
as well as on express claims of the People's counsel.
McKinstry (who in 1888 would end his term on the
bench and immediately thereupon become Professor of
Municipal Law at Hastings) was on firm ground in
doubting that the "affiliation" had been accomplished.
Chief Justice Morrison properly took no part in the
case. The judgment was filed March 30, 1886.
The Directors' victory was complete. Kewen's Case
was not, however, lacking in irony. The Constitutional
safeguards against political interference in the University had been construed to prevent the legislature from
perfecting the affiliation of Hastings with the University
that had been intended by the original act of creation of
1878. The affiliation had not, either in fact or convincingly in law, been accomplished. The effect of the
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judgment in Kewen's Case was to freeze an imperfect
relationship and an anomalous structure on both the
University and Hastings from that day to this. What
might have been a real "marriage" was doomed to be a
"common law marriage" (almost literally)! Yet, for almost a century, despite some dreadful rows, the odd
couple has lived together in relatively mutual sustainment. Not bad as such relationships go.
Kewen's Case was the last hurrah of Serranus Clinton Hastings. Just two days after the judgment was filed,
the Directors, with unaccustomed graciousness, invited
the Founder to "make whatever statement he desired."
The Founder:
Remarked, that it was his earnest desire that there should be a
Library attached to the College. That the Librarian should act
without salary. Suggested that the Registrar would be the
proper person to act in such capacity.32

The frugal note was characteristic. Registrar Kewen
volunteered. Dean Winans indicated that due to the
pressure upon his time he was unable to perform his
duties. Registrar Kewen again volunteered and was
made acting dean. The Founder's only consolation
would have been the appointment of the Rev. Dr.
J.H.C. Bonte, Secretary to the Regents of the University, as Professor of Legal Ethics, marking both a reaffirmation of the Founder's wishes for emphasis on legal.
ethics and in Bonte's own person a closer relationship
with the University.
Serranus Clinton Hastings, while still technically
Professor of Comparative Jurisprudence, had little to
do with the College for the last seven years of his life.
He did not teach. He made occasional sallies into the
affairs of his beloved foundation, in 1887 and 1888, in
communications to the Board duly "placed on file."
There is no indication that the Directors paid any more
heed to them than that. Perhaps some of the old anger
stirred in the Founder when the Directors in February
1888 discharged the committee of one (Director Evans)
appointed seven years before ostensibly to negotiate
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affiliation with the Regents; consensual affiliation received its quietus. Hastings did have the satisfaction of
seeing Robert return to the Board (c. 1885) and become
dean again on Winans' death in early 1887. Robert predeceased his father by some two years, a sore blow to the
old man. There were other consolations-and tribulations. Hastings' first wife, Azalea Brodt, whom he
had married in Iowa and who bore his eight children,
had died in France in 1876. In 1885, Hastings in his
seventy-first year married a woman considerably his
junior, the fiery Lillian Knust. The marriage was
stormy', and he divorced her five years later, only to
remarry her shortly before his death. The Founder
spent almost all of the last seven years of his life at his
home in Napa County. Orrin Kip McMurray, '93, later
dean of Boalt Hall, looked back from the vantage point
of some forty years and remarked:
Though I was a student at Hastings for the three years between 1890 and 1893 [the year of Hastings' death], I never
saw Judge Hastings, nor do I remember that any of my fellow
students ever spoke of having seen him. He was a leader
belonging to a past generation. He had long withdrawn from
the turmoil of life, and had become, at least in our minds, a
symbol of a rapidly vanishing race of giants, the pioneers of
the golden days of 1849. 33

That epitaph cannot be improved upon. All that can be
added is that in those early years of the College, when
Serranus Clinton Hastings' life was indeed a "turmoil,"
he was no less the giant in fighting, perhaps too stubbornly and even unwisely, for a vision oflegal education
that was, thanks to his singleness of purpose, not despite
it, better realized than he was able to appreciate. Always
the man of action, not the reflective scholar, Serranus
Clinton Hastings never allowed himself the luxury of
stepping back a pace, resting a moment, and surveying
his handiwork with pleasure, pride, and demission. He
had never learned, as Louis XIV's Marshal Vauban
taught, that the prudence which knows when to retreat
and to cede to circumstances is one of the forms of the
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art of governing. It was, though, his unceasing striving
and his restlessness that made Serranus Clinton Hastings the giant that he was.
Serranus Clinton Hastings died on February 18,
1893, in his seventy-ninth year. On his tombstone in the
old family plot in the St. Helena Public Cemetery are
inscribed the words, First Chief Justice of the State of
California and Founder of the Hastings College of the
Law.

III Pomeroy
and Slack

_

THE

FIRST two decades of Hastings
College of the Law were dominated by two men, both
teachers, who were responsible for instruction. One had
been master, the other pupil. One had a reputation before he came to the College that placed him in the front
rank oflegal scholars and teachers in the entire country,
a jurisperitus whose large corpus of writings vvon acclaim
and a notice from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase that his
works had direct influence on the Supreme Court of the
United States. The other had been a college senior in
mechanical engineering at Berkeley when his future
master met the first class at Hastings, and while he attained great local recognition throughout a long career
in law as educator, counsel, and judge, and for his public service, he was never a national figure. Neither was
he a scholar in the technical, academic sense of the
word. Together, though, John Norton Pomeroy and
Charles William Slack brought to Hastings genuine
academic distinction and sustained that distinction so
that in the less favorable epoch that succeeded theirs,
Hastings' reputation was rightly maintained. While it is
an accepted convention that Pomeroy was the great
creator at Hastings, Slack deserves much more attention
than he has been given. Without Slack, Pomeroy's work
would probably have been undone in a season. Thanks
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to Slack, the Pomeroy System remained vital, and even
influential in varying degrees, until new trends in legal
education in particular, and in the law in general, dictated largescale change. It remains an open question
whether the new approaches to legal education were
better than the old system.
To anyone familiar with the evolution of educational method at Harvard Law School at about the time
that Pomeroy and Slack dominated Hastings, the names
Christopher Columbus Langdell and J ames Barr Ames
will command instant recognition. The parallels between LangdelllAmes and Pomeroy/Slack are remarkable, both in the relationship of each pair, and in the
parallel development of their methods, similar in so
many ways though the men and their institutions were
divided by a continent. The Harvard brace is more famous; by virtue of being at Harvard, it was certainly
more influential. But the work of the Hastings brace has
more than mere curiosity or local color about it.
Pomeroy and Slack provided an approach to learning
the law that made more sense in those jurisdictionsparticularly in the West-which had gone a long way
towards codification, towards systematization of the law
by a rational structure of legislation, wherein the teaching of law might benefit more from a pedagogic system
than from merely a pedagogic method. As the dean of
American legal historians, Willard Hurst, pointed out,
though Pomeroy's approach:
was radically different from the prevailing text-and-Iecture
method ... it did not fall to him to shape the whole program
of a leading school to a new technique, and thence both to
redirect and to warp the course of law training in the United
States. 1

LangdelllAmes did so shape-and did so warp-American legal education.
By any contemporary reckoning, John Norton
Pomeroy (pronounced Pum-roy) was one of ten top law
teachers in late nineteenth century America, ranking
with Langdell and Ames (Harvard), Theodore Timothy
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Dwight (Columbia), William Gardiner Hammond (Iowa
and Washington University, St. Louis), Thomas McIntyre Cooley (Michigan), Theodore Salisbury Woolsey
(Yale), and two or three others of like stature. These
were the first generation of academic teacher-scholars
in the law who were the creators of the modern American law school. They were all committed to the proposition that the law was a "science" and that it must be
investigated and analyzed by the intellectually rigorous
methods of the physical sciences. As Langdell put it,
"Law is a science; ... all the available materials of that
science are contained in printed books ... the library is
the proper workshop of professors and students
alike ... to us, all that the laboratories of the university
.are to the chemists and physicists .... "2 This positivism
or scientism was an article of faith, not by mere imitation of the increasingly rapid expansion of physical science in the latter half of the century, but by these scholars' conviction that they must master the whole of the
law and adapt the "ancient" rules of the law to new
political, economic, social, and intellectual realities.
Pomeroy, in rejecting traditional ways of categorizing
and analyzing equity by the external factual situations
giving rise to equitable rules, exploded:
A jurisprudence, however, does not consist of the mere facts
or events which are the occasions of rules and rights, but of the
rules which create the rights, and of the rights and duties
themselves which result from these rules. 3

This was not a blind positivism; Pomeroy felt constrained to breach a pure scientific methodology in his
own arrangement of equity in order to avoid repetition
in his exposition. When applied to teaching the law,
Pomeroy recognized the problems rigid scientism
raised. He informed his first class at Hastings that "the
whole course will be truly scientific in its classification
and arrangement of subjects, but practical in its modes
of study and work by the classes themselves." Indeed,
classification is the key to understanding both Pome-
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roy's scholarship and his pedagogical system which
found its final expression in the curriculum at Hastings.
Pomeroy was distinguished from his equally distinguished peers in two ways. One was in the sheer bulk of
his published scholarship and the extraordinary range
and diversity of his writings. The other was in the conceptual boldness with which he was prepared to tackle
the law. To give full attention to the first would require
a bibliography so long as to constitute an appendix. Following his lead, we can best assess the amount and scope
of his corpus by "classification and arrangement." Between 1864 and the last year of his life, 1885, he published two basic texts (virtually treatises); four major
treatises; two editions of English treatises; two major
articles on criminal procedure, six articles on internationallaw and nine short essays on the same, eleven on
constitutional law, two on the Civil Code and community property; and a number of miscellaneous works,
including the syllabi for his second-year courses at Hastings, numerous reviews, and an introduction to the
memoirs of Stephen J. Field. The two texts, which were
his earliest work, were Introduction to Municipal Law
(1864), on the entire range of law, a jurisprudential,
historical, and comparative study, andAn Introduction to
the Constitutional Law of the United States (1868), one of
the earliest theoretical expositions of the constitutional
law of the United States. The treatises date from the last
decade of his life and indicate a scope that is nearly
breathtaking: They include works on remedies and remedial rights, both at common law and in equity, by the
civil action according to the reformed American procedure (1876); specific performance of contracts (1879);
equity jurisprudence (in his monumental, three-volume
A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, 1881-83); and riparian
rights (1884). He must be credited also with a treatise on
international law essayed in lectures, which were edited
and published posthumously (1886) by Woolsey. Both
of the works Pomeroy himself edited, Sedgwick's Rules
of Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitu-
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tional Law (1874) and Archbold's Criminal Procedure,
Pleading, and Evidence (1877), date from the somewhat
unhappy years between New York University and Hastings, when Pomeroy survived by writing. If hackwork,
they are nevertheless splendidly executed adaptations
of English learning to American use by a lively intellect.
The range of his articles, most of them intended for
popular consumption, for a literate lay readership,
speaks for itself. The two efforts on peculiarities of
California law were very important. The "Civil Code"
articles, which first appeared in the West Coast Reporter (a
publication he founded and edited with his son Carter)
and were afterward printed as a pamphlet, constituted a
sharp and well-aimed attack on the more preposterous
pretensions of the California code to authoritative
finality. It was taken up with fervor in New York, and
contributed to the defeat of the referendum there
which would have adopted the code in New York. More
importantly, Pomeroy enunciated the (strict and narrow) rule of interpretation which the California courts
generally have applied to the Civil Code. Pomeroy's article on community property was the first nationally
read treatment on that remarkable institution of California law.
If none of his eminent contemporaries could claim
such a large corpus of scholarship on such a wide range
of subjects addressed to professional, student, and intelligent lay audiences, neither did any of them demonstrate quite the conceptual originality that was Pomeroy's particular gift. To a large extent this originality
grew from the imaginative perception of a need and the
filling of it. The book on remedies and remedial rights
constituted a wholly new approach to civil procedure,
founded on the recognition that David Dudley Field's
civil procedure code for N ew York begged for a jurisprudential foundation and a close logical analysis that
would enable the lawyer to give it effect with real vigor
in practice. Pomeroy argued that with the forms of action dead in all those jurisdictions which accepted (and
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were accepting) the reformed procedure, remedies constituted fundamental attributes of the new system, and
it was an error to treat procedure as if indeed, in Frederick William Maitland's phrase, "the forms of action
rule us from the grave." The treatise on specific performance of contracts accepted the burden of the English judicial reform of the 1870s (though Pomeroy
failed to credit how far English legal conservatism
would preserve the distinction in practice and forum
between "common law" and "equity") and appreciated
the extent to which American practice had always
blurred, and with the reformed procedure would blur
even more, the law-equity distinction. Pomeroy was not
a profound researcher. His works are not monuments
to the careful acquisition of unknown data, but rather
brilliant syntheses founded upon readily available facts,
fashioned by a quick intellect of unusual conceptual
powers.
Perception of need was a major element in the impetus for the Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the
United States. Pomeroy's learned son would note ruefully
that its appearance in 1868 came at the wrong time, at
the beginning of an extraordinary era of constitutional
change which made its case-law obsolete in literally a
matter of months. But its purpose was to provide a direction for the profession and the courts-and beyond
them, the nation-to regain a basis for establishing equilibrium in the aftermath of the constitutionally most
destructive epoch in the nation's history. The principal
issue of that epoch was the nature of the federal union,
whether it was an agglomeration of states or a nation.
Pomeroy understood that while the union had been
preserved, the nation might have disappeared, or might
still disappear. This fear drove him to origins, searching
the Continental jurists for fundamental conceptions of
"sovereignty," the "state," and "government." He concluded that the United States was a nation, that the Constitution was not a contract between sovereignties, but
the highest articulation of the will of a sovereign nation
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.that had come into existence before the states. This
"nationalism" was something more than "federalism." It
needed expressing as the nation crawled away from
Appomattox and plunged into radical Reconstruction.
The theoretical-historical-com parative dimension of the
book is timeless, even where subsequent knowledge
su persedes it. Just as the cases cited tumbled, so did the
author's own apprehension of "nationalism" undergo
change, as he came to fear the judicial activism that
appeared to be eroding the functions of the states.
Perhaps he did become, as one scholar believes, a
"state rights nationalist."4 Pomeroy's book was a brilliant tract for the times, with a scholarship and intellectual substance that have endured. The constitutionallaw work demonstrates something more, though,
than a mere perception of need: There 'was a strong
trait of political awareness in Pomeroy, a sense of mission, a crusading zeal for legal goodness and probity.
The articles on constitutional law, especially the nine
major pieces in The Nation, 1870-76, give point to this.
While these commentaries on current Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution during Reconstruction (amnesty, the Force Bill, citizens' rights in the
South, theory of nationality, North Carolina's constitutional agonies post Civil War) and in the first stages of
assertive legal-nationalism (civil service reform, raifway
regulation) were updates of the constitutional law
treatise, they were also vigorous, sometimes intemperate, exercises in molding public opinion.
Need and mission are best evidenced in the two
works which were his most original, most brilliantly argued, best written, longest enduring, the first and
nearly the last of his career, An Introduction to Municipal
Law and the three-volume A Treatise on Equity jurisprudence. Municipal Law was avowedly for "general readers,
and for students in colleges and higher schools."5 The
title is arresting (it has nothing to do with "municipal
corporations" as some cataloguers suppose). By
"municipal" Pomeroy meant the whole body of man-
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made, human, positive law of a sovereign entity, of the
"state." The word connotes comprehensiveness and, for
one who would use it descriptively of his work, ambitiousness. It was no accident that Pomeroy's chair at
Hastings was the Professorship of Municipal Law; no
accident that it would be filled by his two immediate
successors for a season, after which the "Municipal" was
quietly dropped. Pomeroy claimed to command the
whole body of the nation's law, ~nd the range of his
scholarship and his teachings gave him better title than
most to "municipal." The book, something over 500
pages, sets out a jurisprudential definition of law, the
law in terms of means, methods, and forms of development (statutes, unwritten law, courts, adjective law); historical origins of English and American law, including
Roman Law (ancient, medieval) and maritime codes of
the middle ages; and concludes with an "outline" of
American law on the basis of its English origins, divided
by persons, property, and contracts, and the rights pertaining under each. The book is remarkable. Even
under those title-sections, which are Anglo-American,
Roman learning and Continental practice are interwoven to make a complete explanation of the law's development. Roman Law receives detailed attention that is
both admirable and admiring. Pomeroy demonstrated,
albeit not very convincingly in the light of later scholarship, heavy Roman influence on medieval English law.
Decades later, he would note with satisfaction that much
of California's property law was closer to Roman than to
common law principles. Municipal Law bears witness to
all of Pomeroy's jurisprudential axioms: law is a science,
compounded of ethics and history and therefore understandable only in the broadest historical context of
human aspiration, yet it receives form and frame only in
the realities of a nation's own experience of its needs;
while codification can provide a more rational structure
of law, its limitations demand the maintenance of the
law of judicial decision as that best suited to a high level
of civilization and a progressive people. Pomeroy

96

Pomeroy and Slack

modestly offered the book as a preparation for
Blackstone or Kent; in fact it is a substitute for either,
more broadly based, more persuasive, more stimulating, and much more up-to-date to the American experience at midcentury. Moreover, Pomeroy's originality
shows to good advantage here; his two eminent contemporaries, Cooley and Hammond (both of whom
were invited to Hastings to fill Pomeroy's chair, but declined), never undertook anything so ambitious, resting
satisfied with new editions of Blackstone which were at
least scholarly, unlike the bulk of the editions that glutted the market. Pomeroy made no claim "to any originality of historical investigation," but "municipal" law
had never before or has it since received such
panoramic treatment. A legal historian finds the book
still very much worth reading.
The Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered
in the United States, Adapted for all the States, and to the
Union of Legal and Equitable Remedies under the Reformed
Procedure (this shortened title is perfectly descriptive of
the objective and the scope of the work) was conceived
on a grand scale and not entirely executed. Pomeroy did
see it all into print, but the pressure of work and other
projects caused him to foreshorten considerably the
part that he had envisaged as the largest-"remedial
rights and duties enforced by the various remedies it
confers." By the time he had completed his survey of
the nature and extent of equity jurisdiction in the
United States (Part I) and launched his treatment of the
"grand principles and maxims of equity jurisprudence"
(Part II) in volume one, he decided to treat the "primary
rights and duties" (equitable estates, titles, and interests)
immediately after Part II, in volume two, reversing his
original order so that it became Part III, and the remedial section became Part IV. The change in priorities
came with Pomeroy's conviction that he had something
unique to offer in the emphasis on primary rights and
duties, remedial rights and duties having too long dominated the study of equity. The choice proved sound;
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the most innovative part, Part III, was fully laid out
before his death (two years after publication of the last
volume-three-in 1883) prevented the fullness of remedial coverage he had hoped for.
Equity jurisprudence was a crusading effort. Recognizing that the reformed procedure abolished the distinction between common law and equity actions, Pomeroy prophesied that the ultimate result would not be to
increase equitable influence in the law but to erode
equitable notions by more rigid legal doctrines. He cited
with misgiving the experience of the states with reformed procedure: "In short, the principles, doctrines,
and rules of equity are certainly disappearing from the
municipal law of a large number of the States, and this
deterioration will go on until it is checked either by a
legislative enactment, or by a general revival of the
study of equity throughout the ranks of the legal profession."6 This work was to be his contribution to the
latter solution. To accomplish the "general revival,"
Pomeroy realized that something more must be done
than merely trotting out the same old tired maxims, and
certainly much more than treating equity as a matter of
jurisdiction. The reformed procedure destroyed jurisdiction as a basis for equitable rules; no longer did a
classification of exclusive jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction, auxiliary jurisdiction, make any sense. An
over-emphasis on remedies was equally disastrous, because equity was not merely a matter of solutions, but a
body of principles. Pomeroy sought a system of
classification that was comprehensive and conformable
to the realities of American practice, one that would
present all of the components in true relationship to
each other and to the law, represent true lines of distinction between the components, and serve as a correct and
practical guide for the student and lawyer, so that they
could master the "essence" of equity and thereby make
the acquisition of its rules "an easy and delightful
labor." (This last was a patently impossible objective!)
The classification adopted was that set out above, with
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the remedial rights and duties based not on jurisdictional notions, but on an understanding of their own
inherent nature and the nature of the primary rights,
the violation of which they are intended to redress or
relieve. The primary rights and duties were, for
Pomeroy, the essence of equity.
Equity jurisprudence is extraordinarily successful in
its effort. It might not manage to make learning equity
easy and delightful, but followed in its rationalized
structure it makes equity seem to be a system. Here, of
course, was its danger; equity was not then, or is it now,
quite that systemic. Approaching Pomeroy's book from
a training in modern English equity is an humbling and
unnerving experience. It is humbling because Pomeroy
made equity manageable as a subject (if not quite a system) in a way that eluded many English scholars of great
eminence during the last century. It is unnerving because Pomeroy, while using equity in a technically entirely correct way, accorded it a goodness and righteousness that has always been at best questionable and
is today irrelevant:
I need not dwell upon the disastrous consequences of the
tendency above described [erosion of equity], if it should go
on to its final stage. Even a partial loss of equity would be a
fatal injury to the jurisprudence of a State. So far as equitable
rules differ from those of the law, they are confessedly more
just and righteous, and their disappearance would be a long
step backward in the progress of civilization. 7

Even allowing for hyperbole sprung from advocacy, this
is excessive. Still, Pomeroy's fears were not entirely illfounded. Equity as an entity capable of being taught in
the American law school has disappeared, its elements
scattered over a good many courses. Equitable doctrines
and notions have survived, and Pomeroy appears to
have contributed much to that survival. A 1903 survey
indicated that Equity Jurisprudence was one of the fifty
texts most often cited in courts at that time. The date
was portentous: it opened the decade of greatest change
in the nature of law and of legal education in America.
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That the substance of equity did not disappear might
well have owed something to Pomeroy's restatement of
it at the eleventh hour.
John Norton Pomeroy was preeminently a pedagogue. Though the son of a probate judge in Rochester,
New York, he showed no early inclination to the law. On
graduating in 1847 from Hamilton College, where he
received a Classical education, he spent some three
years schoolmastering, first in Rochester and then near
Cincinnati, where he turned to the law only because he
hoped for a better income than teaching provided. He
completed his law-office study on his return to Rochester, and was admitted in New York in 1851. His financial need increased when he married an old pupil in
1855, who bore him a son the next year. He was
hardworking and frugal, a product of a long line of
eminent Presbyterians, parsons and laymen, and the
puritan work ethic of his own background was not at all
diminished by his marriage to Ann Rebecca Carter of
Savannah, who converted him to a broad church Episcopalianism. Alas, he did not prosper in ten years at the
bar. A merciful veil screens these years, with but a few
glimpses provided: some fleeting fame in successfully
defending a murderer, and a year of daunting hardship
trying unsuccessfully to prosper in New York City. He
almost epitomized Frederick William Maitland's
barrister, who would turn to scholarship while waiting
for the client who never comes. In 1861 he went back to
teaching at Kingston. Amidst the daily grind of the
classroom and spurred on by two more young mouths
to feed, he produced Municipal Law in 1864, which
brought acclaim, an honorary LL.D. from his alma mater, and an immediate invitation to teach at New York
University Law School. The next seven years were spent
in his first experience in teaching law. His most eminent
student there, Elihu Root, later Secretary of State and
the greatest international lawyer America has produced, recalled that Pomeroy was unstinting of his time
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with his handful of students, going with them from
dawn to dusk, teaching, talking, criticizing, arguing. His
only major scholarly production while at NYU was the
Introduction to Constitutional Law, 1868. His intense involvement took its toll on his health, and in 1871 he
retired to Rochester to support himself and his family
by writing. This was a productive period, albeit one of
occasional and popular pieces and edited texts more
than of the major works of his last years. He did write
the treatise on specific performance of contracts, and he
probably laid the foundation in study for his later
works. He had the time to read widely and continuously. It was, though, a bare existence. The call to Hastings in 1878 was Gabriel's trumpet.
Pomeroy's failure as a practicing lawyer was the
necessary precondition for his success as a scholar and
even as a teacher. Again, in this he was distinguished
from most of his contemporaries, who had successful
practices before and even during their years in law
teaching. The hard years of marginal existence were
Pomeroy's learning years, even if they were not years of
major scholarly production. To write, Pomeroy needed
the interchange with persons of intellect, the discourse
and intercourse with minds tied to articulate tongues
which can be afforded a legal scholar at bar or in the
classroom. Not until the end of his career did Pomeroy
have a chance to demonstrate his real capacity as a
counsel at bar. And it was not for his forensic pyrotechnics that he won his fame; he read his presentation
without a benchward glance, in a steady (and possibly
hypnotic) voice. But his briefs and his oral arguments in
the Railroad Tax Cases, San Mateo County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Co. (1882) and Santa Clara County v. Same
(1883), and the famous Debris Case, Woodruff v. North
Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co. et al. (1883 and 1884),8
were masterpieces that won the admiration of the U.S.
Circuit judges who heard these cases involving burning economic and political issues. As Judge Lorenzo
Sawyer, referring to the Debris Case, put it, "Like his
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works upon the law, his arguments were always lucid,
exhaustive, and eminently instructive-such arguments
as courts desire to hear when great interests and great
and far-reaching principles are involved."9
In the Railroad Tax Cases, Pomeroy (co-counsel
with Hastings Director Bergin and others), appeared
for the railroads, arguing that they were exempt from
local taxation as instruments of the federal government
(by grants, etc., for postal and military purposes), and
that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed limitation
upon the state's power to impose taxation on the "person," which was the railroad company. The railroads
won in the District Court for California, a milestone in
the development (perhaps the perversion) of the Fourteenth Amendment, and further encouragement to the
rapacity of the railroads, which would shortly bring a
strong, popular reaction and the Interstate Commerce
Act to begin the hard task of curbing the railroads.
Pomeroy might not have been on the side of the angels,
but the court held the law to be with him. In the Debris
Case, Pomeroy appeared for the plaintiffs, farmers outraged at the destruction of agrarian property by hydraulic-jet mining which tore riverbanks and riverbeds
to shreds and deposited the debris on the acres adjoining. The suit was in equity for nuisance. The resulting
decision and injunction, recognizing that a single tenant
of land in common could bring an action to abate a
public and private nuisance, was the death sentence for
hydraulic mining here, winning a place in the annals of
California legal and economic history (and, one supposes, if they will notice it, deserving of a place in the
books of the environmentalists). These cases were very
satisfying to Pomeroy. It assured him that his scholarship and his pedagogy were not in vain, that he could do
as he taught. Indeed, the carefully reasoned and perfectly arranged arguments were vindications of the
Pomeroy System of legal instruction, the triumph of the
master using the tools he himself had fashioned.
The Pomeroy System was above all else a systema-
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tic, logical structuring of branches of the law, and
further, an increasingly fine and detailed subdividing
of each branch. The law, of course, imposed its own
categories. But it was the arrangement and relationship
of one branch to another, the emphasis on amount of
time given to each as against the others that allowed for
creative systematization. The classification, then,
determined weight (amount of time, emphasis) and
depth (degree of detail) accorded to a subject. This was
,.elementary. Yet one suspects from texts used in laternineteenth century law school courses, and from what
few materials we have on courses actually taught in
some schools, that such elementary classificatory structuring was seldom attempted. Pomeroy was a thoroughgoing taxonomist. As he noted in Municipal Law,
the "copious table of contents is intended, not simply as
a means of reference, but as a complete analysis of the
whole book .... "10 It certainly is. His preoccupation
with classification of the subject in the first hundred
pages of Equity jurisprudence is fundamental to the very
substance of equity as he saw it. The entire curriculum
at Hastings, the structure of the Pomeroy System, is
taxonomic in the extreme.
What system did Pomeroy use to classify subject
matter? Essentially, it was the system of Aristotle, with
its emphasis on primary and secondary characteristics,
as that system was attacked, simplified, and vulgarized
by the sixteenth-century French Calvinist logician, Peter
Ramus. Pomeroy might well have been familiar with
Ramist logic. Ramus' work had been translated into
English and was in vogue with seventeenth century English puritan clerics. If Pomeroy had not read Ramus,
he had read Serjeant Henry Finch's Nomotechnia (1613),
translated and reprinted in 1759 as Law, or a Discourse
Thereof, directed at the student. The example below,
from one of Pomeroy's tables for the first-year course at
Hastings, could easily have come from Finch; though
the nomenclature is different, the structure is not. This
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is taken out here to only the fourth division; Pomeroy's
table includes two further subdivisions. This, the "Primary" rights and duties, category I, is of course m
Pomeroy's scheme matched by "II. Remedial."
Rights and Duties Relating to Things and
Transactions as their Object
I st. In Relation
to their Objects

I. In Rem, which
may be considered

2nd. In Relation
to their Essential Nature

I. Primary

3rd. In Relation
to their Means
of Acquisition

l

2. In Personam

I. Object, Thing proper
{ 2. Object, Person
3. Object, Intangible
Entity
A. Essential nature of
the right over its
object
B. Extent of right in
reference to duration
C. Time when to
commence
D. Number and union of
person enjoying the
right
A, By person's own acts
alone
{ B. On occasion of the
death of the former
owner
C. From the act of the
former living
owner

JIst. From Contracts
"\
2nd. From QuasiContracts

Such impeccable Ramist logic could be applied at
every level of curriculum development. The above example was refined, and was intended to drive home
Pomeroy's basic distinction between Primary Rights and
Duties and Remedial Rights and Duties in every branch
of the law. When applied to the entire curriculum at
Hastings, the classification resulted in the structure in
the table, "The Pomeroy System," reconstructed from
early announcements, Pomeroy's Syllabi, and the University Register.

THE POMEROY SYSTEM

Junior [First] Year: Continuous reference to California & Pacific states statutory law. Lectures, discussions.
First Course:

Second Course:

Introductory lectures on nature of law

Four tables of classification; Pomeroy Munic.
Law.

I.

Law as to Persons

Kent Commen. lects 24-32. Collateral reading:
personal rights, torts (Bigelow) (Addison) (Hilliard) (Waterman Trespass) (Bigelow Cases);
slander & libel (Townshend) (Starkie) (Smith
Cases) (Amer. Ldg. Cases); marriage, divorce,
domestic (Bishop Mge. & Div.) (Schouler) (Reeve) (Bingham) (Parsons Contract) (Bishop
Marr. Worn. Prop.) (Smith Cases) (Amer. Ldg.
Cases).

II.

Law as to Personal Property

Kent Commen.
(Williams).

lects.

34-38.

Collateral

III. Law as to Contracts-general doctrines
& principles of mercantile contracts

Metcalf Contract; Parsons Contract; Kent
Commen. lects. re merc. contracts. Collateral:
(Langdell Cases) portions of (Smith) (Chitty)
(Story) or (Addison).

Law as to Real Property---origin & history,
excluding that covered in middle yr.

Blackstone Comm. Bk. II; Washburn Real
Prop. Collateral: (Williams) (Kent Commen. re
realty) (Smith Cases) (Washburne Easements)
Oones Mortgages).

Middle [Second] Year: Lectures & discussions based upon Syllabi, with collateral reading & study of cases.
Mercantile & Commercial Law, full course;
corporations, agency, partnership,
sales, bailments, bills & notes,
insurance, shipping contracts,
surety ship
Real Property (rest of); remainders & executory devises, uses & trusts, powers
Wills, Testaments, & Administration
Equity Jurisprudence (reference to statutes)
Torts

Pomeroy Syllabi; treatises assigned in the Syllabi; leading cases cited in the Syllabi; California
statutes.

Senior [Third] Year: Principally lectures; exercises in preparing pleadings, drafting papers & instruments.
First branch:

Remedies: pleading & practice per the Reformed System-theory of forms of action;
common law & equity pleading; evidence

Pomeroy Syllabi; Gould or Stephens Com. Law
Pleading; Lube Equity Pleading; Pomeroy
Remedies & Remedial Rights; Greenleaf Evidence. Collateral to be referred to.

Second Branch:

Constitutional Law, U.S. & California
International Law, public & private
Roman Law and General Jurisprudence
Legal Ethics
Criminal Law

Pomeroy Const. Law; Cooley Consti. Limitations; Wheaton Internat. Law; Wharton Priv.
Internat. Law or Story Conflict; Sandars' Instit.
Justinian; Maine Ancient Law; Blackstone
Commen. Bk. IV; Penal Code of California.

Moot Court open to all the classes for the argument of cases and discussion of legal questions.
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The curriculum contained all of the law requisite
for a sound legal education of the day. What was unique
was the arrangement of the courses. The first year was
given over to introductory material, which in itself was
an entire year of classifying the law, largely on the basis
of its historical development. Even the "second course,"
an introduction to real property, is heavily historical;
the real property that counts is reserved for the second
year. In comparing Pomeroy's System with our present,
virtually universal American law school curriculum for
the first year, it becomes clear that the System provided
everything but criminal law and civil procedure. Unlike
our curriculum for the first year, this one is holistic, the
parts bearing a functional relationship to each other
and thus to the whole, thanks to the arrangement under
the categories of persons, property, and obligations
(contracts). The categories are a bit forced; they are far
too Roman (justinian's Institutes, Books I, II, III, respectively) to fit snugly an Anglo-American structure
born of accident. Yet they constitute a superb introduction to the law, which we no longer even attempt to
match. With the second year, the Pomeroy System
comes to the LAW in its mass rather than its majesty, the
stuff that the practicing attorney would have to deal
with every day he went to the office. This is the law that
Pomeroy would characterize in gross as Primary Rights
and Duties. In the System, the second year was
paramount in importance; in our curriculum, we have
reversed the paramountcy, shifting it to the first year.
The attention to detail, the weight of lectures and discussions, bore down most heavily in the second year. By
Pomeroy's reckoning, the third year altogether constituted Remedial Rights and Duties. This is patent in the
First Branch, but it is only slightly obscured in the Second. Constitutional law, international law, and conflicts
were, from the vantage of a late nineteenth century
practitioner, more a matter of "remedial rights" (if that
is not taken too narrowly to mean only adjective law)
than of "primary rights." The practitioner reasonably
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might expect to have slight concern with these parts of
the Second Branch. In criminal law, though he had to
be prepared to practice it, the concern was more procedural than substantive (as it still is in the law school
curriculum). The more arcane subjects of the Second
Branch were to add polish, in fact were heavily "remedial" in supplying the ornament oflearning, the rhetorical polish demanded in the forensic art, and the finetuning of that emotional sensitivity which t/le Victorians
called "sentiment," and which was a necessary ingredient in a good courtroom manner. The Pomeroy System is impressive still because it covered all of the law,
put the emphases where they were most appropriate,
built upon the accumulating mastery that the student
built up year by year, and gave to the student a grasp of
the whole law that we have since despaired of inculcating. The remedies emphasis of the last year, including
practice in drafting, founded upon mastery of the primary law of the second year, launched the fledgling
LL.B. into practice with a momentum that we are still
trying to emulate with a clinical semester, judicial externships, student-initiated projects, and trial practice
courses.
Having given the highly wrought, architectonic
structure of the Pomeroy System, it remains to describe
its dynamic-how it actually worked. The first and second years called for lectures and discussions; the third
year was principally lectures, but with practical workshop exercises in drafting, and probably the bulk of
mooting that a student did over the course of the three
years. The first-year classroom situation would resemble
an upper-division course in history or the social sciences
today, with discussion built on a range of assigned reading, but with full allowance for developing naturally as
the discussion progressed. Conceptual originality rather
than technical rigor was the objective. True to his System, Pomeroy used the statutory law as the frame of the
law for the "Junior" students; though he had always
expressed doubt as to the virtue of legislative enactment
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and code as being dominant in law, Pomeroy recognized
the fundamental attributes of statutes and the convenience of using them to layout the boundaries of the
law. The first year concluded with a set of comprehensive examinations. Unfortunately, we have no example
of them, but they might well have been similar to the
college essay exam of today, demanding that fact and
theory be woven together to provide a total explanation.
The second year was an experience different in
kind from the first. The student was plunged into the
substantive law, with very little reading in treatises and
texts. At least three-quarters of the pre-class preparation was devoted to cases. The Syllabi that Pomeroy
prepared, and which were printed and given to the student at the beginning of the course of lectures devoted
to the subject in hand, directed the student to work up
the cases cited in conjunction with code provisions and
collateral reading in texts before attending the relevant
lecture. The Syllabi were updated at least every two
years to take account of new cases. We have Syllabi for
all the second-year subjects save Partnership, Insurance,
Shipping Contracts, Powers, Torts, and (unhappily)
Equity. From Mary McHenry's lecture notes of the
second-year course we know that Pomeroy adhered to
the syllabus in delivering his lectures, expanding on the
precis of the subject matter in the syllabus and construing the leading cases which the students had already
studied, weighting some more than others. Within each
subject, where relevant, the topical organization followed the California Civil Code section by section, with
few exceptions. In most subjects the bulk of the cases
were drawn, understandably, from California and New
York. Each syllabus was some twenty to forty ,pages
long, varying less with the difficulty or intractability of
the subject matter than with the number of lectures devoted to the subject. The result was a distinct evenness
of treatment. From the existing Syllabi, we can project
the number of lectures in the subjects for which we do
not have Syllabi: Commercial Law and Real Property;
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and for the whole of Equity, the later student edition of
Equity jurisprudence (edited by John Norton Pomeroy,
J r. and published in 1907) provides a guide in its ra-

tional and analytical table of contents as to how Pomeroy Senior might have handled the subject. Mary
McHenry's lecture notes fill gaps. The second-year
curriculum can be plotted thus (the square brackets indicate suppositional number of lectures):
A.

Mercantile and Commercial Law
1. Corporations
2. Agency
3. Partnership
4. Sales
5. Bailments
6. Bills & Notes (Negot. Instr.)
7. Insurance
8. Shipping Contracts
9. Suretyship

10 lectures
10
[6]
8
10
8
[6]
[6]
2
Total

B.

Real Property
1. Remainders & Executory Devises
2. Uses & Trusts
3. Powers

[66]

4
6
[8]

Total

[18]

Wills, Testaments, &
Administration

Total

9

D.

Equity Jurisprudence

Total

[74]

E.

Torts

Total

[14]

C.

As projected, this would come to 181 lectures-which
matches the 180 lectures given at Hastings in a year (5
lectures per week, 36 weeks). If Equity Jurisprudence
seems overemphasized, it should be recalled that Pomeroy conceived it more broadly than most and felt im-
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pelled to maintain its vitality. That there was "constant
reference to statutes" under Equity indicates that it
served as a vehicle to instruct in statutory interpretation
and jurisdiction. At the end of the second year, another
set of comprehensive examinations was set. We have no
examples of these, but there is a likelihood, judging by
extant examinations for the third year, that the questions were much less factually set than are today's, and
yet emphasized statutory and case foundation for the
conclusions to be arrived at. They were certainly both
searching and comprehensive; Prof. Pomeroy did not
give a choice of questions, and the student had to do an
essay on each one posed.
The third-year course did not rely on Syllabi.
There is one extant Syllabus, entitled "Remedies,"
which is markedly different from the second year Syllabi: not a case is cited, no code provisions or statutes are
cited, and it is not broken down by lectures. It is in effect
a precis of legal and equitable remedies, in rem and in
personam; obviously a brief guide to the subject. For
remedies and for the subjects under the Second Branch
Pomeroy relied on the standard texts. There is no indication that there was "discussion"-if there was, it was
probably more like the general, free-flowing discussion
of the first year than the kind of "discussion" that obtained in the second.
The Pomeroy System and the Langdell/ Ames
method bear comparison. Beyond both being caseoriented, the similarities are less evident than the differences. The Pomeroy System was just that, a system,
an entire curriculum of three years in which something
different and unique was done each year in a progressive development that was deductive in the first year
(working from the generalities of law to the particular
doctrines of law), diametrically opposite, inductive in
the second year (working from the particular of cases to
generalities of doctrines), and reductionist in the third
year (bringing all of the learning acquired to bear on the
practical dimension, the "remedial," of legal practice).

I
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The LangdeWAmes method was just that, a procedure
for reducing the law to make it manageable enough to
be learned, or perhaps, more accurately, to reduce it to
a method for learning each branch of the law, because
in their method the LAW ceased to exist as an entire
structure, being reduced to so many discrete groupings
of doctrines reflecting a practical development that was
principally jurisdictional and "remedial." The Pomeroy
System presupposed that the LAW was more than the
sum of parts labelled property, contracts, torts, equity,
etc. The LangdelI/Ames method did not concern itself
with more than the parts, and could be applied to any
part, without respect to its origins, development, or
present state, with equal facility. What parts should be
taught was, of course, a matter of curriculum planning,
though largely dictated by the practical dimension; in
what order the parts should be taken didn't make a
great deal of difference, though for the first year the
LangdelI/Ames disciples increasingly favored the "biggest" or "grandest" parts that the method's narrowed
perspective of the law could conceive of: Property,
Torts, Contracts, Criminal Law.
Behind the Pomeroy System was an understanding
that the LAW was a development of history and ethics,
and that in our legal system a fully-formed lawyer was
produced by the study of cases, codes, legislation, and
especially the "municipal law" of the United States and
its principal state jurisdictions, against the background
of historical and jurisprudential knowledge. Behind
Langdell's case method was an almost fanatical positivism, a view that law was a science reducible to principles which could be determined by finding the "right"
cases and winnowing out the "wrong" cases. Legislation,
he felt, was a nuisance, the intervention of non-legal
purpose in the law which would corrupt the "axioms" of
the "science" and should be tailored (or butchered, if
necessary) to fit the cases. And the cases, the "right"
cases, were principally English cases, the fundamental
cases of our system, not the cases from American courts.

112

Pomeroy and Slack

Now, what appeared to be inductive-from the cases to
the doctrines-in fact was deductive, from the doctrines
to the cases. As Grant Gilmore, a perceptive current
critic of the Langdell method, puts it, Langdell had no
intention of studying all the cases, only those not "useless" for the purpose of "systematic study." Gilmore
concludes that "the doctrine-the one true rule of
law-does not in any sense emerge from the study [in
the Langdell method] of real cases decided in the real
world. The doctrine tests the cases, not the other way
around."ll Gilmore may not be charitable, but he is substantially correct in describing Langdell as an "essentially stupid man who, early in his life, hit on one great
idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the tenacity
of genius."12 No one could so characterize Pomeroy. His
System was the product of the evolving experience of a
subtle mind of wide-ranging interests and correspondingly broad knowledge. The System was too good for an
epoch of legal educational development during which
the law itself was narrowing, becoming wholly
functionalist and increasingly simplistic.
. What kind of "discussion" did the second-year
course feature? On the answer turns another parallel
(some might argue a departure) between Pomeroy and
LangdelllAmes. Indeed, the emphasis on case study was
not confined to Pomeroy and Langdell as pioneers;
Hammond at Washington, St. Louis, used a case method. Did Pomeroy, though, by some sort of so-called
"Socratic method," carryon the disciplined and pointed
dialogue that Langdell attempted and Ames perfected,
the case-putting argumentation that we today call the
"case method?" Elihu Root, recalling Pomeroy at NYU
in the 1860s, wrote to Pomeroy's son, in 1906, that his
father had had a broad and accurate learning, a powerful and discriminating mind, and a strong sense of proportion,
but he had also an innate and overwhelming impulse, which
drove him at legal questions as if they were tribal enemies ....
Into the fields of conflicting decisions, which so confuse the
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younger student and the older practitioner, he would lead us
with amazing vigor and enthusiasm, and presently order
would appear, compelled by ... high intelligence in the application of fundamental principles to confused conditions .... His method of working was an especially valuable
example of thoroughness in the collection and testing of all
necessary data before beginning to reason towards conclusions, and of breadth of view in determining what data were
necessary; yet the greatest benefit came from the spirit in
which he worked, which made the discussion of the dullest
subject seem the most delightful pastime. 13

Root's description seems to indicate that even at that
early date Pomeroy practiced a form of Socratic dialogue; it is hard to see how all this could be read as an
hour's continuous brilliant monologue. The reference
to "discussion" should be taken literally. Henry McPike,
'81, gave some insight into Pomeroy's method at Hastings (albeit writing a half-century later). Noting that
Pomeroy lectured in the first year, he recalled that
sometimes Pomeroy would:
pause and quiz the class, passing questions around indiscriminately, and treating all answers with gravity, no matter
how far off any of them might be. He corrected errors in the
most kindly spirit, and in turn when questions to him were
ventured, he would give ear patiently and an answer was always vouchsafed .... 14

McPike mentioned that in the senior year (possibly a
mistake for the latter part of the second year) Pomeroy
used advanced sheets of his Equity jurisprudence in that
course, and taught by "the actual case method," referring constantly to the "leading cases, from which the
text rule was deduced, and urged and encouraged the
constant reading and study of them." The latter statement does not go one way or another to the use of a
Socratic dialogue, but "quizzing" a first-year class where
there was no pretense of using the case method argues
that Pomeroy would almost certainly employ the same
technique in later classes where the case approach was
heavily stressed. On the other side, Slack, writing for a
Boston journal in 1889, observed that "the lecture sys-
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tern of instruction was at first adopted," but because of
objections to it, "formal lectures are not now given except on special subjects."15 While textbooks were being
used in 1889, "leading cases are constantly referred to
and required to be studied" (that had also been required
by Pomeroy) and "comments are made, to such an extent as may be thought necessary, but they are chiefly
informal." Slack said that discussions and recitations
had become daily practice. Slack's testimony must be
understood to refer to a difference of degree rather
than of kind. That Slack went a step further than Pomeroy in using dialogue can be accepted; it does not mean
that he originated it. The same phenomenon was evident at Harvard. While Langdell did originate a case
method there (and published his casebook on contracts
to provide the material which in Pomeroy's system had
to be gotten from the Reports via the Syllabi), he proved
less than successful in applying it in the classroom. It fell
to Ames to perfect Langdell's method by a fully Socratic
method of teacher-student dialogue. One could conclude that Pomeroy's System was heavily case-oriented,
but that in the classroom implementation of it he, like
Langdell, fell victim to all of the hazards raised by a
pioneer's inexperience.
The measure of any curriculum is not only what it
contains and how it is conveyed, but how the acquisition
of knowledge gained from it is tested. At Hastings, at
the end of the third year, there was a comprehensive
final examination, both written and oral (in the early
years, some of the Directors sat as oral examiners with
Pomeroy). The examination covered the work of all
three years, with some weighting towards the "remedial" subjects of the third year, as is apparent from the
examination papers Mary McHenry kept. With the exception of a paper set for drafting complaints, etc., none
of the examinations required much competence in handling the factual dimension of the law, the questions
going to doctrine almost exclusively. A question from
the constitutional law paper for 1882 will illustrate:

John Norton pomeroy

Charles William Slack
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Has the State of California, or any other State, power by
statute to prevent Chinese or other foreigners from coming
within the State to reside? Give the reasons for your answer.
Where does the power of exclusion reside? Assuming that
there are no treaties concerning the subject, has or has not the
United States Government the power, under the International Law, to prevent the people of any foreign country from
coming to and residing within the limits of the United
States?16

The question was not merely an academic one in 1882,
and it was a good test of the student's detachment as
well as of his command of constitutional and internationallaw. Depending on the grade standard (and there
are questions as to how high it was in those years), a
battery of such examination questions was a good test of
knowledge and of the ability to use it.
The Pomeroy System in structure, execution, and
examination lived up to its creator's boast that it was
truly scientific in classification and arrangement, and
practical in its modes of study and the work asked of
students. As teacher, Pomeroy inspired universal praise.
That he read his lectures, that his voice, while strong
and well projected, was monotonic, moved some to wish
for a rhetorical flourish or two. But he was in magnificent command of his subject, his material was brilliantly
ordered, and for all his dryness (one newsman reporting the Santa Clara Case dubbed him "Pomeroy Sec,
Extra Dry" in a play on Pommery Sec, a popular brand
of champagne), his intellect inspired the breathless
respect that is usually reserved for more charismatic
teachers. Rather fragile looking, his pince-nez firm on
the bridge of his nose, his outward appearance somewhat severe when he was silent, he broke easily into a
stealthy smile. His unfailing courtesy and his felicity of
expression had a charm of their own. Elihu Root's image, of Dr. Pomeroy attacking legal questions as if they
were tribal enemies, catches the vigor, the infectious
enthusiasm, and the power to teach and to move students which is the mark of a great teacher.
John Norton Pomeroy was fifty years old when he
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came to Hastings. The ill-health that had forced his retirement from NYU in 1871 appears to have ameliorated considerably in the climate of California. He loved
the outdoors, and explored the Sierras in the summers.
Otherwise, he worked twelve hours a day, with enormous mental stamina, giving two one-hour lectures each
weekday at the College, spending as much time as he
could in his study, with its view of the Golden Gate,
turning out the prodigious work of his last years. His
family life was idyllic, his vivacious Georgian wife
sympathetic and loving, his three boys and a girl
successes-two of his sons, Carter Pitkin, LL.B. '81, and
John Norton, Jr., LL.B. '91, followed in his footsteps,
the former a collaborator and disciple in his father's last
years. He was active in cultural societies, founding with
others a San Francisco political science society, at which
he read a paper on industrial relations, and his house
was always open to old students and such eminent visiting busmen as eminent barrister and political scientist
Sir James Bryce. But labor took its toll. He succumbed
to a virulent pneumonia on February 15, 1885, not
quite fifty-eight years old. Elihu Root pronounced the
most just epitaph:
Few men with so little desire for display, with so little personal
ambition, making so little noise in the world, have accomplished so much. 17

The Pomeroy System was the creation of a single
brilliant mind. To work effectively it required the labor
of a single teacher, and to reach its full potential the
teacher would have to have the same brilliant mind that
fashioned the System. It verged on the idiosyncratic,
requiring commitment to its holism and the perfect collation of its parts not likely to be present in any second
party. Only the first two Classes, those of 1881 and
1882, received their entire instruction from Pomeroy
himself. In 1880-81, Pomeroy had to teach all three
classes, junior, middle, and the first senior class; in
1878-79 there was only ajunior class; in 1879-80,junior
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and middle classes. Teaching all three classes necessitated three one-hour lectures each day, five days a week,
for thirty-six weeks, dawn to dusk every day. The
classes were large, much larger than they had been a
decade before at NYU. It was too much for a man of
frail health, who was dedicated to scholarship and had
in train an enormous work, which was Equity jurisprudence. For the next two years, 1880-81 and 1881-82, the
junior class was taken by Director Oliver Perry Evans as
"adjutant" professor at a modest salary. Evans had just
been elected to the superior court of San Francisco, but
he carried on at Hastings for two years. He was popular
with the students, to judge by class testimonials. With
Evans' resignation, the Directors hastily established a
chair in "common and statute law" to provide assistance
to Pomeroy, and appointed Calhoun Benham to it in
September 1882. Benham was a "scholarly and accomplished gentleman" who also had been second to former
Chief Justice David S. Terry, and helped incite the duel
in which Terry killed Senator David C. Broderick in
1859. Benham took the junior class for the next two
academic years, but died sometime in early academic
1884-85. Pomeroy, faced with taking on the junior class
for the remainder of the year, hit upon a felicitous shift
in having the junior class taught by a graduate of
1882-therefore, a person thoroughly familiar with the
System: Charles William Slack.
Slack had been brought as an infant from his native
Pennsylvania to San Luis Obispo county, where his
father farmed. Slack never lost his love of country, and
his childhood experience directed him into a practical
bent. At the University of California he was a student in
the College of Mechanics, taking the Ph.B. in 1879, his
senior thesis "A Problem in the Transmission of Power."
What urged him into the law is not clear, but he enrolled in the second class (possibly remaining resident at
Berkeley and nonmatriculated at Hastings in his first
year), graduating LL.B. in '82. He had caught Pomeroy's eye early on, and in his last year Slack worked as a
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"literary assistant" on volume three of Equity jurisprudence. Slack had two years of practice behind him when
he received Pomeroy's summons to fill in for Benham.
What seemed temporary was to last considerably longer.
When Pomeroy died in February 1885, Slack was left to
carry the whole load to the end of the year. In May,
Thomas McIntyre Cooley of Michigan refused the
chair, and Slack was named acting professor pending
the appointment of a suitably eminent successor to
Pomeroy. Save for constitutional law and Roman Law
for seniors, taught by William Carey Jones from Berkeley as an unpaid professor (1886-88), Slack carried
the entire instructional load for three years. And his
service did not end then, but continued until 1901.
Pomeroy's death and Slack's advent coincided with
the worst period of the divisions within the College's
government. Slack was left to fend for himself, in total
command of the College's functioning. He was a match
for the task, despite his tender age of twenty-seven. He
was one of those rare individuals whose career, as recorded in the written word, never indicates any hesitancy or weakness, but always purposefulness and mastery
of every situation. Slack was formidable. He had high
standards for himself and he applied the same to others,
without respect for excuses; he suffered neither fools
nor weaklings. He was a practical and pragmatic man of
cool temper and a sharp, analytical mind. He had great
will-power and a capacity for delayed gratification
which was evidenced by his ability to work steadily to an
end, taking adversity and opposition in stride, whether
it was raising Hastings' standards for admission and
graduation, husbanding and multiplying the trust that
John Henry Boalt's widow created to endow the law
school at Berkeley that bears Boalt's name, attending to
the multifarious details of his clients in the large estates
and company practice that he built up after his years at
Hastings, or (not least) waiting a Biblical seven years to
marry his college sweetheart until he had the financial
surety that his Hastings post brought. He was indefatig-
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able, managing in the 1890s to be a superior court
judge in San Francisco, dean and professor at Hastings,
and a Regent of the University. Slack was always direct
in discourse, and his candor could be wounding. He
characterized those who believed law schools were overcrowding the profession as "persons who were never
educated in them, knowing nothing about them, and
who will not learn anything."18 His bluntness might explain why, though he commanded respect as a teacher,
he was not loved by his students as Pomeroy had been.
While Pomeroy seemed severe, Slack had a penetrating
eye that made him appear almost fierce.
The first sign that acting professor Slack was a new
broom which would sweep very clean came in May
1886. Four students appeared at a Board meeting on
behalf of four seniors who had failed the final examinations. After the student-advocates withdrew, "Prof.
Slack made a statement in regard to the matter," and
the Directors resolved unanimously that hereafter a
passing grade was 75 percent. Equally unanimously, the
Board upheld Slack's failing the four as having been
"exact justice."19 This is the earliest recorded instance of
a grade-appeal at Hastings. The circumstances behind it
indicated that a tough new standard would be exacted.
Slack was not content with doing "exact justice"
on hapless seniors. He saw the problem as a matter of
low admissions standards. The original admissions requirements had been: a certificate of good moral character; a ten-dollar matriculation fee; the ability, in the
case of juniors, to "satisfy the authorities of the institution that they possess sufficient knowledge and culture
to enable them to profit by the course of study"; and a
passing grade on an examination in the study of the
preceding year or years for admission directly to middle or senior status. 20 Noone had been admitted to
senior status directly, though a number, including Slack
himself, appear to have been admitted to the middle
class directly. Pomeroy seems to have been more exercised by the absence of a certificate of character than by

120

Pomeroy and Slack

a want of proof of capacity. Henry McPike, '81, was
admitted on the first matriculation day only because the
Founder, being present, vouched for him, to an audible
whisper of, "I wonder who will vouch for the Judge?"
from Judge Hudson. 21 During Pomeroy's tenure,
students were matriculated by a kind of brief voir dire
that was satisfied by exaggerated (sometimes perjured)
claims to Classical learning, and the only requirement
added under Pomeroy was that a student must be eighteen. But Slack wanted requirements that were both
more rigorous and more detailed. At a Board meeting
in October 1886, a committee composed of Prof. Slack
and Directors Evans (chairman), Bergin, and Harrison,
reported a draft of new admissions requirements, which
was adopted. The new requirements demanded a command (to the same level as the admissions requirements
of the University for the course in Letters) of English,
mathematics (arithmetic, algebra, plane geometry), history, geography, and Latin (Caesar, Cicero, Vergil), to
be drawn from specific texts in the humanities subjects.
Graduates of the University absolutely, and graduates
of other institutions of learning at the Board's discretion, would be admitted without examination. Most
significantly, the applicants were to sit written examinations in these subjects at the University in Berkeley
with other applicants to the University taking the entrance exams. Except for special admissions (advanced
class placement, graduates of other institutions), the
Hastings Board was out of the business of admissions
(for a time). This was the first step taken to get the
Board of Directors of the College out of the administration of the College, and as such it is something of a
landmark. That the Board was willing indicates considerable confidence in Charles William Slack. These admissions standards, with only a few changes (most of
them towards greater rigor), remained in effect until, in
1911, students admitted were required to have had four
years of high school; in 1912, four years of high school
and one of college; and in 1913, four years of high
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school and two years (junior standing) of college. The
man responsible for the new higher standards of 191113 was Director Charles William Slack.
Three years after the new admissions standards,
Slack looked back at the results with considerable and
only faintly disguised satisfaction. He noted that the
new requirements had cut the student body by about
one-half. Of the seventy-seven students enrolled in
1889, forty-three had college degrees, and the average
age of the students was about twenty-two or twentythree. He wrote:
It would be difficult to find in any college a body of young
men of equal number who are superior in point of education,
ability, earnestness and in all the qualities which go to make
up perfect gentlemen. 22

Slack had cause for satisfaction; his reform had given
Hastings very nearly the highest entrance requirements
of any law school in the country and higher than most.
The new admissions standards began to reduce the rate
of senior failures in 1890. McKinstry and Slack forwarded the names of thirteen seniors who had sat the
final exams, recommending that all thirteen be awarded
the degree, and that two others absent from the exams
because of sickness be allowed to receive the degree
subject to successful completion of an early makeup
exam. The professors reported, "there never has been a
class superior to this in general educational attainments
and legal scholarship, and ... they have passed the best
average examinations ever passed in the Law School."23
Failures would occur again, especially in the lower
classes, but with a better entrant it was no longer the
slaughter of the innocent.
The following graph gives the total college enrollment from the first year of a full three classes (1880-81)
to the last year of the Slack regime (1898-99). The early
enrollments were very high (the first junior class, 187879, numbered 103); Hastings' foundation had responded to a genuine need. However, once the backlog
of aspiring attorneys that peopled the first few classes
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had passed through, enrollments declined to a steadier
flow. Slack's higher standards merely accelerated the
decline. The steady increase, beginning in 1889 from
the trough of 1887-88 and peaking in 1895 with what
turned out to be the highest enrollment until the end of
the 1920s, indicates a continuing hunger for legal education in the state, not a falling off of standards resulting in the admission of poorly qualified entrants. The
higher admissions standards remained in effect and
were even toughened slightly. To some extent the
hunger was stimulated by increased enrollments in and
graduation from colleges, importantly from the University, but also from other institutions on the Coast, and
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by an increasing tendency to send sons back East to
be educated. America was then just beginning its first
major takeoff in college education. Hastings, until the
last years of the Slack regime, was still the only law
school in California, and one of only five west of the
Rockies (two in Colorado, two in Oregon). Consequently, it attracted graduates seeking a career in law in
somewhat disproportionate numbers. Law-office training was beginning to decline, certainly among the sons
9f the intellectual elite, the established well-to-do, and
lawyers themselves. As Slack put it, perhaps the best
proof of the success of the law school "is that judges and
lawyers send their sons to it to be educated."24 The following figures indicate the impact of college education
on Hastings enrollments. These are five-year averages
of the percentage of LL.B. graduates of Hastings, from
the first class of 1881 to the class of 1900, who held an
undergraduate degree:
1881-1885
1886-1890
1891-1895
1896-1900

19%
31%
47%
42%

The 1886-90 percentage indicates Slack's reform. In
fact, the percentage increase of graduates for the year
1886 alone was 12 percent, and graduate entrants rose
to 67 percent with the Class of 1890 (admittedly, of
course, the size of the graduating classes diminished,
from 25 in 1886 to 15 in 1890). Slack's higher standards merely caught up with a better-prepared entrant,
thanks to the increasing college population. The College and the profession were the beneficiaries.
The search for a new professor does not appear to
have been prosecuted very vigorously. However, Slack
was an ambitious man, desirous of building up a practice, and he was heavily overworked for the $4000 a
year Hastings paid him (which was, incidentally, about
$1000 more than the average paid a professor at Berkeley). In April 1887, "the founder of this College" was
authorized by the Board to engage William Gardiner
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Hammond of Washington University, St. Louis, as principal professor at a salary not to exceed $5000. Hammond, who was certainly eminent, turned down the offer. Finally, in 1888, the Board persuaded Elisha W.
McKinstry, whose term as a justice of the California
Supreme Court was coming to an end, to accept the
professorship of municipal law. Slack consented to remain as assistant professor of municipal law at a much
reduced salary, and he and McKinstry worked well together until at least 1892, after which the last three
years of McKinstry were not so smooth, for reasons that
will be made clear. Splitting the work between them,
McKinstry took the bulk of the first-year subjects and
Slack the bulk of the second- and third-year subjects
until 1894-95, when Slack became dean on the resignation of C.F. Dio Hastings (who had succeeded his
younger brother, Robert, on the latter's death in 1891).
In McKinstry's last year at Hastings, an attempt was
made to parcel the work more equitably. Slack was very
much the junior partner; he taught more for $2700 a
year than McKinstry did for $5000. Shortly before becoming dean, Slack was promoted to "Professor," but
neither this title nor the deanship brought a salary increase or more power. Slack had in fact, if not in theory,
run Hastings since Pomeroy's death.
In 1889 Slack reported that "The course of instruction at the college has remained substantially the same
as that introduced by Prof. Pomeroy."25 He was right.
While perhaps diminishing lecturing and increasing
"recitation" and "discussion," Slack had preserved the
Pomeroy System. He continued to use syllabi for the
second-year course; the Board authorized the printing
of his own syllabi in September 1887. Slack was Pomeroy's disciple. McKinstry, a college graduate (Kenyon
College) admitted to the bar in New York in 1847 after
reading law in an office, had no strong views on legal
education, and was not prepared to be particularly creative in it. McKinstry had a tendency to verbosity (to
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judge from the Reports), but a quick mind and a capacity for seeing to the heart of a legal issue. His opinions were well organized and clear, and he was death on
humbug and obfuscation at bar (or on the bench). The
Pomeroy System appealed to his orderly and wellhoned mind. The advent of McKinstry necessitated the
first significant amendments to the System. Slack and
McKinstry had to divide the work between them. In
1889-90, they adopted a system of course rubrics, such
as we have today, and although they preserved the
names and most of the substance of Pomeroy's subjects,
some substantial changes were made. The few headings
of torts that Pomeroy taught in the second year were
included in the first-year survey under the course, "Persons and Personal Rights." The remaining parts of real
property taught in the second year in the System went
back to the first year under "Real Property." More
significantly, Equity Jurisprudence was made a thirdyear subject and time found for it by simply dropping
Roman Law/General Jurisprudence and International
Law, since neither professor felt comfortable with these
subjects. John Norton Pomeroy must have turned in his
grave. On balance, these amendments were just that;
save for the casualties of the third year, the structure
and the substance of the Pomeroy System were preserved ~n the rearrangement worked out for the sake of
convenIence.
The few frills to the Pomeroy System were maintained. Moot court continued, though compulsory participation was restricted to the middle and senior classes
in 1886-87, and to the senior class only in 1894-95. Slack
and McKinstry dutifully bore with the lectures on legal
ethics, the Rev. Dr. William Platt, for all of his reputation, having not been a classroom success. Despite his
oratorical skills, his grandiloquence betrayed a shallow
and conventional mind, no matter how deep his apparent scholarship might have been. 26 He resigned in
September 1882, and his chair of "ethics of the law and
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rules of morality" was deemed abolished by his resignation. The Founder's insistence, and Pomeroy's own profound belief in the relevance of ethics to the development of law, resulted in the appointment in 1886 of the
lawyer-clergyman, J. Harmon C. Bonte, D.D., LL.D.,
secretary to the Regents of the University, as professor
of legal ethics without salary. Bonte was less high-flying
and more academically sound and worldly than Platt.
He was a success; anyway, the Board enjoined that he
should lecture no more than ten times a year. With
Bonte's death in 1896, legal ethics as a subject, a feature
of the Pomeroy System, died with him.
The next round of changes came in 1894-95, the
work of Slack rather than McKinstry. The changes were
less substantial than those of 1889-90, in essence a reordering of the first two years and some cosmetic
name-changes that symbolized the abandonment of
Pomeroy's Romanist categorization of the first-year
course. The Law as to Persons was dropped, and two
courses taught by Slack and McKinstry, Domestic Relations and Torts, respectively, were substituted. The new
courses, Contracts, Real Property, and Personal Property are clearly evident in Pomeroy's System under his
grander headings; the only substantial shift here was
more time given to Contracts and less to Real Property.
The main change came with a short course on Criminal
Law, extending over the whole first year, and taught by
Slack. It is not difficult to see why this radical departure
took place. Slack had been a superior court judge in San
Francisco since August 1891; he was obviously not
much impressed with the learning of the criminal law
bar. The second-year structure returned to a truer version of the Pomeroy System than it had been with the
compacted courses of the 1889-90 amendments. Most
of the old subjects were distributed under course titles
identifiable with the titles of the System, the only notable addition being Quasi-Contracts (Slack). Probably
equal weight was given to each of the nine courses of the
second year, a not inconsiderable although subtle
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change from Pomeroy's ornate weighting. The third
year remained unchanged from the amendments made
in 1889-90.
McKinstry had recommenced practice in 1890,
sometime afterwards going into partnership with his
son. By the summer of 1893, it was the common bruit
that he was not devoting enough time and attention to
his teaching. He ignored a letter from the Board for an
explanation. In 1893-94, the Board began to assert itself
across the entire administration: audited accounts were
set up; Edward J. Ryan was forced out as registrar and
his place taken by Leonard Stone, '94, who was to
be held directly accountable, and that closely, by the
Board; and C.F. Dio Hastings (the last of the line to
serve in an administrative capacity) found it opportune
to resign as dean. On August 2, 1895, McKinstry, who
had ignored a final "communication," was fired, and his
chair being declared vacant, was immediately conferred
on Slack, who became "principal professor" with a $300
annual increase in salary. Slack found himself alone
again. He could not be a part-time superior court judge,
yet the shooting of McKinstry was obviously pour encourager les autres, to "encourage" Slack, and he could not
be part-time dean and professor at Hastings. The
Board, reluctantly perhaps but of necessity, on August
30, 1885 appointed Warren Olney, Jr., '94 (Harvard
A.B. '92) and William Bradford Bosley, Yale, '94, "assistant professors" at a salary of $1200 per annum. Both
men would long be connected with Hastings, latterly as
Directors. With their appointments came the first major
expansion in the Hastings faculty: In 1896, Louis T.
Hengstler, Ph.D., was lured from the department of
mathematics in Berkeley to serve as a part-time assistant
professor; in 1897-98 Louis deF. Bartlett, '96, served as
an instructor for the year, and was succeeded for a year
in 1898-99 by Sheffield S. Sanborn.
This expansion in faculty was the death knell of the
Pomeroy System. None of the young men had the grasp
of the whole that Pomeroy and even Slack had. None of
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them had ever seen John Norton Pomeroy; he was a
respected legend only. No matter what his own sentiments were, Slack could not hold his new assistants to
the old System. They had already begun to march to a
different tune, either to Slack's own variations on the
Pomeroy theme, or to their legal training elsewhere,
which had taken place to the beat of the ever-mounting
crescendo of the Langdell/Ames method. It is signiflcant that the last year in which a Pomeroy book was used
as assigned reading at Hastings was 1894-95. Thereafter, the case-books and related texts produced by
Langdell's disciples, Ames, Beale, Keener, and Williston
predominate. Indeed, it was in these case-books that the
Langdell/Ames method stole a march over all others.
Pomeroy's System required going from the Syllabi to
the Reports; Langdell/Ames served up the cases in a
book. Pomeroy never produced a case-book. Sadly, Olney, in third year Equity (no longer Equity Jurisprudence) used William A. Keener's Cases on Equity
JURISDICTION (how Pomeroy would have loathed that
title) and James Barr Ames' Cases on Trusts. Between
1896 and 1899, the entire curriculum at Hastings was
restructured piecemeal, reflecting the reduced perspectives and interests, maybe the diminished capacities, of
the bright young men. In 1898-99, Slack's last year as
dean and full-time professor, the first-year curriculum
was: Elementary Law (Slack, Bosley, Olney, Hengstler);
Contracts (Olney); Quasi-Contracts (Olney); Property
(Bosley); Torts (Hengstler); Criminal Law (Hengstler);
and Bailments, etc. (Hengstler). Elementary Law, a
cafeteria course in which four hands were to do the
work that once one genius managed, was the last obeisance to the old tradition. Even Slack's earlier Domestic
Relations had been shifted from the first year to the
second and given the ugly, accurate, and narrowed title,
Marriage and Divorce. The second and third years
otherwise remained true to the System as earlier
modified by Slack. It was the changes in the first year,
however, that were the significant ones. The curriculum
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was already manifesting the shift of the beginning of
professional courses from the second year, when they
had been given under the Pomeroy System, to the first
year, as has obtained from that time to this. This was
essentially our present-day structure. There is probably
no law professor alive who would not remark somewhat
ruefully that the Pomeroy System, especially in its introductory first year, provided a panorama of the law
that eludes our law schools today.
The Pomeroy System might disappear, but not its
emphasis on comprehensiveness. The Hastings curriculum of 1898-99, and for many years after, sought to
provide a broad grounding in all practical law. If the
horizons were narrower, the program not so well structured to lead naturally from subject to subject with the
growth of the student's grasp, Hastings still provided a
balanced legal education. To quote an equitable maxim,
Arbitramentum aequum tribuit cuique suum, a fair judgment
gives each his due, and the Hastings of the twentieth
century must render due homage to Pomeroy's System
of the nineteenth.
Slack found it increasingly difficult to continue at
Hastings to the satisfaction of his students, the Board,
and his own high standards. The Board wanted a fulltime dean and principal professor; memories of
McKinstry were very fresh. In January 1897, Slack resigned effective the following July. Following a rather
formal exchange of letters, Slack agreed to continue at a
salary of $5000 and indicated he would try to wind up
his judicial duties and resign his judgeship. The next
year he decided otherwise, resigning from Hastings in
May 1898, but agreeing to remain as caretaker dean and
professor until a suitable replacement could be found.
He continued one more full year as "Dean of the Faculty" before he was replaced as dean and professor.
Despite the load upon him, despite some tension between him and the Board, Slack never let his teaching
slide. Once he was released from what had become an
intolerably heavy burden, Slack and the Board parted
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with mutual respect. His successor and the Board continued to call on his services in the classroom part time
until 1901. In 1903 he was named a Director. Only his
death in 1945 ended the long association of Charles
William Slack with the College that he had come to serve
as a teacher for a semester or two and stayed to run for
sixteen years.

IV Dr. Taylor's
Hastings

ON

MAY 26, 1899, the resignation of
Dean Slack was accepted by the Board of Directors. At
the same meeting, a very formal resolution was moved
that Edward Robeson Taylor, M.D.,
be employed as Professor of the Hastings College of the Law
to take charge thereof and conduct the same, subject to the
order of the Board of Directors, devoting his whole time and
attention thereto and not engaging in any other occupation or
pursuit during such employment, , ,I

at a salary of $4000, effective July 1, 1899. Five Directors voted aye; two voted no. Thomas I. Bergin (an
aye vote) was appointed a committee of one to inform
Taylor of his appointment and procure his agreement
to the terms. The split vote, even though it was not
close, was an inauspicious start to a deanship of two
decades which proved to be markedly uncreative and
very troubled. On May 29, Taylor wrote a short, correct
letter accepting the appointment as professor of the
College "to take charge thereof and conduct the same,
etc.," and assuring the Board that he appreciated "this
mark of your confidence .... "2 Taylor was too astute
not to suspect undercurrents of doubt on the Board,
and his "etc." was a studied bit of equivocation. For the
next nine years, he felt no compunction about undertaking time-consuming responsibilities having nothing
to do with Hastings College of the Law. In retrospect,
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the College would bask in his reflected glory, but the
dean-of-many-parts did not always mind his duties. The
vacuum left by his inattention to his office was filled by
the Board. The Board's resurgence nearly cost him his
job.
Edward Robeson Taylor was sixty-one when he became Dean and Professor of Hastings. He was born in
Illinois and schooled in Missouri, and without a trade he
migrated to California at the age of twenty-four via
Panama and the hellhole of Chagres. He enrolled in
Toland Medical College (later the medical school of the
University of California) on his arrival in San Francisco,
receiving his M.D. in 1865. He was less interested in
practicing medicine than in politics, and two years into
his practice he joined Governor Henry H. Haight as his
private secretary. Possessed of a quick mind, widely
read, an apt pupil, he was called to the bar in 1872, and
joined his mentor Haight in his law practice in San
Francisco. Taylor was already something of a celebrity
in the "instant city," having published four learned papers, between 1869 and 1871, on what today we call
internal medicine; one of these, "On the Chemical Constitution of Bile," was a prize essay of the American
Medical Association. A paper on medical training
(1872) pointed towards his long career in medical education, which began in 1882, when he became the first
vice-president of the newly founded Cooper Medical
College (later the medical school of Stanford) and subsequently its president, in the first decade of the twentieth century-all while he was dean and professor at
Hastings. He practiced law continuously from 1872,
slacking off a bit only after taking the Hastings post.
Much involved in the San Francisco pueblo-lands litigation, he wrote a learned paper based on his own
firsthand experience in the matter which is still useful.
He had a reputation for being an expert on Mexican
water-law. He had a good command of languages.
Scholars of French literature remember Taylor as the
translator of the one-hundred and eighteen sonnets of
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the Cuban-born Hispanic-French contemporary poet
Jose Maria de Heredia, whose Les Trophees (1893), published in translation by Taylor in 1897, are accounted
masterpieces of the sonnet form in French literature.
Gem-like, full of nuances, perfectly formed poems, full
of Classical lore, Heredia's poems were magnificently
Englished by Taylor. Their appeal to Taylor tells much
about the rare qualities of his own brilliance and mastery of language. Unfortunately, Dr. Taylor's own
poetry, published in two anthologies just as he became
dean at Hastings, verges on the maudlin. 3
As a politician, Taylor was accounted a reformer,
and a pretty radical one at that. He did not seek elective
office; when his career in politics reached its zenith, as
mayor of San Francisco, the office came to him by election of the supervisors, not at the hustings. Land reform
first caught his attention, and his involvement in the
pueblo-lands controversy made him well-disposed to
radical land reform. In the 1870s he became acquainted
with a far less sophisticated but no less brilliant and
certainly more creative man than he was himself, who
had been a foremast boy on ships, a printer, and latterly
a journalist in San Francisco-Henry George. George
was an angry man, and his anger was aroused by the
land-monopolists, especially the railroad barons, of
California. Perhaps the most original of all American
economists, one of the really creative economists of the
nineteenth century, Henry George postulated the
single-tax on land as the device to break economic
monopoly. George argued that land values represented
the basis of monopoly power, and that by taxing land,
rather than its product, industry would be encouraged,
economic opportunities would be opened to all, and
monopoly would be destroyed. It was Taylor who, in
1878, suggested to his prickly friend George that what
was intended as an article should be expanded into a
treatise. Taylor read the manuscript, suggested
changes, helped set up the type for printing, and revised the proofs of George's best-selling bombshell of
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1879, Progress and Poverty (still in print in nine languages). George acknowledged that it was Taylor's help,
judgment, sympathy, and faith in him that sustained the
endeavor. Ironically, Taylor's wife at the time was the
niece of none other· than one of the greatest railway
robber-barons of them all, the land-monopolist who
made the Central Pacific Railroad, Leland Stanford.
As political reformer, Taylor took his text from
Henry George:
A corrupt democratic government must finally corrupt the
people, and when a people become corrupt there is no resurrection. The life is gone, only the carcass remains; and it is left
for the plowshares of fate to bury it out of sight. 4

In the 1880s, Taylor threw himself into San Francisco
municipal reform as a sparkplug of the third board of
freeholders, the elite citizens' group that pressed for
and failed to carry charter reform in 1886. In 1898, as a
member, indeed one of the leaders of the fifth board,
Taylor had the satisfaction of seeing charter reform
succeed in the new city charter. But he was not long
under any illusion that charter reform was enough to
prevent the corruption of the people. There was an
example of corruption close to home. Taylor knew a
young attorney who had entered politics as an idealistic
reformer in the ranks of the Republicans: Abraham
Ruef, Hastings '86. Ruef had a large practice, was respected as a trial lawyer whose courtroom presentations
were "sincere, spirited, and demonstrative" and "always
well received."5 Along the way, however, Ruefs ambition outran his idealism and his scruples. He became a
ward politician and finally the "boss" of San Francisco
politics, leaping onto the bandwagon of the Union
Labor Party, managing the election of his hand picked
protege, the orchestra leader and president of the musicians' union, "Handsome Gene" Schmitz, in 1901.
Schmitz's reelection in 1903 revealed the existence of
corruption; his reelection in 1905 laid bare the extent of
a misalliance of corruption and incompetence of ex-
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traordinary proportions. There was nothing left but the
carcass of the old reformer in Ruef. Taylor was an early
member of the coalition of muckrakers, conservative
elite citizens, outraged businessmen, and labor leaders
who brought in a private detective and an outside
lawyer of questionable reputation but unquestionable
ability, and prosecuted Ruef into San Quentin. Taylor
was asked by the coalition leaders to take the mayor's
office after the prosecution of Schmitz drove him from
office, and inJuly 1907 Taylor was elected mayor by the
supervisors. He was faced with having to deal with the
disorders of the aftermath of the Great Earthquake of
fifteen months before, and with the open grafters
capitalizing on the opportunity afforded by the rebuilding of the city. In November 1907, Taylor was reelected
by popular vote. He did not choose to run in 1909-had
he done so, he might very well have been defeated, for
reform was clearly rebuffed at the polls that year, and
though Ruef remained at San Quentin, his cronies and
counterparts began to come out of the woodwork again.
Taylor was fatigued and disillusioned by the firsthand
experience of real politics, by his seeming success and
profound failure, as mayor. In 1909 he went back to
being dean of Hastings, for the first time, full time.
Dr. Taylor came to the deanship suspect because of
his zeal for reform, and especially because of his connection with Henry George. He was a bit too much of an
activist for the taste of many. He had, however, won the
respect of the legal profession by virtue of his success at
the bar, and in 1890, 1891, 1894, and 1895 he was
elected the fourth president of the San Francisco Bar
Association (his predecessors, J.P. Hoge, 1872-79, W.W.
Cope, 1880-85, and S.M. Wilson, 1886-89, all having
been Directors of Hastings, and Cope still serving). His
distinctive intellect and the breadth of his abilities and
interests were not likely to endear him to lesser mortals.
As his colleague at Hastings, James A. Ballentine,
pointed out with entire affection, "Most men with whom
he came in contact were his inferiors."6 Taylor found it
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possible to work with his inferiors only by the exercise of
considerable modesty, always forced and perhaps even
false. He stooped to conquer. He was affable and a bit
playful-a very social man, he was one of the leading
lights of the Bohemian Club (the first of an unbroken
succession of Hastings deans to be members) when the
club was still predominantly literary and intellectual and
had the faint aura of restrained naughtiness that its
name implied. The club's motto, "Weaving spiders
come not here," hardly applied to restless, involved
Taylor, who was always spinning webs (albeit honorable
ones to catch dirty insects). The club's symbol, the owl,
the bird of Athene, the goddess of wisdom, was more
applicable. In physical appearance, Taylor was short,
somewhat corpulent, with a great wild head of hair (to
which he owed his nickname, "Fuzzy"). He had the appearance of a squat, wise old owl. In speech, Taylor
affected the oracular when occasion demanded, and his
solemnity gave assurance of his wisdom. He could be
thoroughly charming. Going with young Ballentine to
the latter's house for lunch, he paused in the garden
and remarked, "1 know I'm going to like your wife. She
is so fond of flowers."7 Witty, he was a good companion
in the company of his equals, with Disraeli-like racy
self-deprecation. When, in 1908, at age seventy, he
made a second marriage, to a young woman of twentyseven, he replied to a friend who had taxed him with
not marrying a widow closer to his own age, "I would
rather surprise a virgin than disappoint a widow."8 He
was not so friendly with those he considered truly beneath him. He was distant and formal with his students
at Hastings. When, on his marriage to young Miss
Eunice Jeffers, his students gave him an old-fashioned
country shivaree (in downtown San Francisco where the
couple lived), he sallied forth from the house amid the
din of cans and bells wholly unamused and threatened
to flunk every student present. He was wont to remark
that an effective teacher combined the qualities of scholar and actor. Taylor combined both. But as actor,
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whether in or out of the classroom, Taylor always
sought effect. Testy irascibleness and a wounding
tongue were closer to Taylor's real personality than his
gracious affability when the occasion required it.
As he began his deanship, Taylor had much going
for him. Slack had been the first Hastings dean in the
style that reached its apex with David Ellington Snodgrass (1940-1963): in command, expansionist, tender of
prerogatives, responsible but not subject to the Board,
clearly aware of the difference between "running" and
"administering" the College, and bent on the former.
Slack's relationship with the Board had always been
tense; there was the age difference, his former student
status, his multifarious activities; but above all, his assertiveness in demanding high admissions standards and in
exacting total control over the curriculum was the point
of tension. However, he had managed to move the
Board out of admissions (although it began to creep
back in by "special admissions"), he had kept the Board
out of any involvement in curriculum and so managed
to justify to it and obtain from it the new appointments
that brought the first real expansion in the faculty. The
Dean and Professor became perceptibly more and more
a dean in the late 1890s as a faculty gradually formed
for him to be dean of. Because until the middle of the
first decade of Taylor's deanship the College was not in
any financial predicament, Slack was never dependent
upon the Board for money-the $7000 annuity from
the state and the $10 per head student registration fees
made the modest operation of the 1880s and '90s selfsustaining. Slack had living room, and using it he generally enjoyed his own way.
Because the Founder had been the first dean, the
deanship was considered essentially honorific in the
early years. This honorific quality was reinforced by the
breakdown between the Board and the Founder, with a
Board-appointed dean, a statutory dean, and finally a
dean of reconciliation, J. W. Winans, who didn't serve at
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all, followed by the successive deanships of Hastings'
two sons. Slack was the first dean and professor-a relationship between functions that has been maintained
from 1894 to the present-so that the Hastings dean of
today is involved in the continuous routine of the College at the basic level, instruction. Because of the honorific nature of the early deanship, there was no need to
have the dean as a regular attender, ex officio, at Board
meetings; with the Founder as dean, it was indeed most
desirable never to have him attend if possible. Both of
the Hastings sons were Directors as well as deans, and so
present at Board meetings. Slack did not attend Board
meetings, though on occasion he was invited to appear
and report to the Board, which he did. The only nonDirector present was the Registrar, who was secretary to
the Board and the Board's formal channel to the dean,
who was his superior after alL At least theoretically, this
was a poor arrangement, a breeder of ignorance on the
Board's part and of distrust on the dean's. In fact, it
isolated the Board and insulated the dean. The gulf
worked to keep the Board out of the College's functioning and encouraged the dean to exercise the initiative.
The Board that Taylor faced was unchanged from
that of the Slack deanship, but only four of the original
nine Directors were still serving: T.B. Bishop, O.P.
Evans, T.I. Bergin, and W.W. Cope (the latter 1878-85,
and from 1893-1903). During Slack's deanship, the
most active Directors were three of the grand old men:
Evans, Bishop, and Bergin. Of these, Evans, having
taught in the 1880s, best appreciated Slack's problems.
Bishop and Evans were active on committees, the work
of which became increasingly useful and prominent in
the Board's functioning. Ad hoc committees were the
rule; the only permanent one was the auditing committee, its purpose being to hold the registrar accountable
and to keep expenditures down. Bergin was vicepresident of the Board from 1893, and so took the chair
in the absence of the Chief Justice, who was ex officio
president of the Board. Among the newer Directors,
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Ralph C. Harrison (1885-1917) was a hardworking and
balanced man, active on committees. From 1889 until
his death in 1914, Chief Justice William H. Beatty was
president, remarkably assiduous in his attendance and
always a moderating influence. Robert Y. Hayne
(1891-1903), one of the original Superior Court judges
of San Francisco in 1880 and in active practice after
leaving the bench, was a faithful attender and, with
Harrison, a good committeeman. Henry S. Foote
(1892-1903), a former governor of Mississippi, could be
troublesome; Cope stayed in the background; and C.F.
Dio Hastings (1890-1907) never attended·a Board meeting after his resignation as dean in 1894. By and large,
there was no factionalism evident in the Board. From
issue to issue the Directors divided in different ways,
allied on one issue, splitting on another.
Most striking is how infrequent Board meetings
were. From the outset, the Board was to meet monthly;
.this remained the ideal, but it was never attained. One
. to three meetings a year was usual; some years there
appear to have been none. Occasionally meetings failed
for want of a quorum (five Directors). Attendance fell
off in the late 1890s and in the first few years of Taylor's
deanship. The Directors were aging and over-occupied
with other pursuits, and Slack's administration had
.given them very little to do. Accepting the report of the
three-man auditing committee on the quarterly registrar's account constituted the major routine of Board
activity. Meddling in admissions began again in earnest
in the last years of Slack's deanship. Behind it lay a deep
division over how high standards should be-Bergin,
Harrison, Hayne, and Foote agreeing with Slack that
the higher the better, and Bishop, Evans, and Cope
worried about the impact of higher standards on enrollment. What really occupied the Board's time was the
ongoing problem of housing the College.
Taylor started with a strike against him in the split
vote for his appointment. It was a more parlous situation than the initial 5-2 vote indicated. The two "no"
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votes had been cast by Bishop and Foote, two of the
three members of the committee charged with finding a
successor to Slack. Evans, the third member so charged,
had apparently persuaded the Board to make the selection at large, and he was not present at the meeting that
appointed Taylor. Evans' success was nothing short of
phenomenal. It was up to Taylor to use the inheritance
of the Slack deanship to recover lost personal ground.
Instead, he dissipated the inheritance, though not over
any great issues. Taylor taught a steady ten hours per
week, the single largest teaching load, and by all accounts, he taught well. He was also careful to give the
Board an annual report of the College's functioning.
What was wanting was any great enthusiasm, the demonstration of real assiduity on his part. He not only
continued his association with the Cooper Medical College, but from 1903 on he became increasingly involved
in the municipal politics that brought him his finest
hour. He continued to practice law. In short, at least
superficially, he was neglecting the terms of his employment so explicitly laid down in the resolution of
appointment.
If Taylor was doing his job adequately, what he was
not doing was exercising the office of dean in the activist
manner that Slack had. And there was a growing apprehension that an activist dean at Hastings was a necessity: The law department at Berkeley was beginning to
look like a law school. When Louis Hengstler, at his own
request, transferred from Berkeley in 1898 to teach full
time at Hastings he had been replaced by two young
men, and in that same year William Carey Jones' persistence paid off in the creation of the "Department of
Jurisprudence" at Berkeley. Students from this department were expected to enter Hastings in the middle
class. In 1897, the Hastings Board had rescinded a resolution, passed in the previous year, requiring students
to be graduates of the University, other specified
California universities, or equivalent institutions of
higher learning. This had been a sore blow to Slack, but
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the new higher standard had been wholly unrealistic at
the time. The aborting of the new standard, however,
gave a spur to the Berkeley department's development,
because if Hastings had become entirely postgraduate,
the Berkeley department's function would have remained wholly preparatory. As it was, one of the new
young Berkeley professors in 1901 could boast that,
"With the interest in the new department shown on all
sides, the latter is certain to make its influence felt and
to aid most materially in raising the scientific standard
of the profession throughout the State."9 These were
fighting words!
In 1899, Jones found a captain he could march
with: Benjamin Ide Wheeler became president of the
University, the first to serve more than a half-dozen
years or so. He was the first of the "imperial presidents"
of the University, and when he retired in 1919, he had
tripled the size of the student body and established the
first new campus in the "Southern Branch," in Los
Angeles. It was in the middle of Taylor'S deanship that
Wheeler and Jones founded a "School of Jurisprudence" at Berkeley. Already, in 1899, Wheeler had expressed his conviction that a first-rate legal education
was obtainable only in the unity of a law school with a
great university. In May 1899, Director Foote had
raised the alarm at Hastings over what was going on in
Berkeley. The new dean had his work cut out for him.
As it was, Taylor did nothing, and it was left to the
Board to deal with the growing threat across the Bay.
A still more nagging problem arose with Taylor's
expansion of the faculty. Slack had increased the instructional staff to five, and Taylor, in 1903-4, added
another instructor. Faculty salaries were not increased
(if anything, they were eroded by the replacement of
relatively short-term staff with less well-paid successors).
But the income was going down. From the time of the
first faculty expansion under Slack, the $7000 annuity
from the state had not been enough alone to pay for the
operating expenses of the College, and the ten-dollar
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student registration fee had been depended on to make
up the difference. However, from a high in the late
1890s of an average of 135 students each year, enrollments had plunged to an average of 85 each year in the
early 1900s, and the income from student fees sagged.
The Directors faced dipping into their invested fund
(about $35,000) that they had built up over the years by
a tight hold on expenditures and astute investment of
such surplus money as came in. This they would not do.
N either would the dean cut back on faculty, although an
argument could be made for one less assistant professor. At that point the Board, not the dean, came up with
the solution. In July 1906, Director Slack moved that
the Registrar, Leonard Stone, be let go (after twelve
years of very efficient service) to save his $50 per month
salary. Taylor undertook the Registrar's duties until
1910 without extra compensation. The Board froze
faculty salaries, and faculty undertook heavier teaching
loads without more pay. James A. Ballentine was most
onerously overworked.
On April 18, 1906, the roof literally fell in. The
earthquake destroyed City Hall, making Hastings
homeless. The College, forced to find other quarters,
was also required to pay for them, and the $50 per
month saved by dismissing the registrar just covered the
rental for temporary quarters during the first two years
after the earthquake. Not until 1909 did the state again
appropriate funds for the College's rent, as it had from
1880 to 1899, before the City undertook, under the
1878 act, to provide quarters gratis in City Hall. In the
midst of this physical and financial crisis, Taylor managed to make do by moving Hastings for two years to his
other seat, the Cooper Medical College. He then went
off to save the City. The Board might applaud his public
spirit, but in-1907 and 1908 it witnessed its dean displaying administrative skills and energetic application on
behalf of the City that he had never demonstrated for
the College.
As the Board had changed considerably between
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1889 and 1893, so it went through another round of
changes between 1903 and 1907. This was more startling than the first round, because it was more sudden
and the new men were markedly a generation younger
than those recruited earlier. At one Board meeting,
August 28, 1903, three new Directors were appointed
by the existing Board. Charles William Slack was appointed in place of Henry S. Foote, who had resigned
the previous November, virtually forced out because ill
health and his absence from California meant that he
could not be relied upon to make up a quorum. William
C. Van Fleet, a Republican who had enjoyed a brief
tenure on the Supreme Court from 1894 until defeated
for reelection in 1898-brought down because his opinion, in a case on appeal in which a laborer's child had
been killed by a streetcar in Oakland, appeared to be
class-inspired-was made a Director in the place of
W.W. Cope, deceased. James M. Allen, another judge of
the original Superior Court of San Francisco, was ap. pointed in the place of R.W. Hayne, his colleague on
that court, who had recently died. Neither Van Fleet
nor Allen had had any intimate relationship with Hastings, but both were men of pronouncedly conservative,
even old-fashioned views. In 1906, Walter B. Cope,
currently President of the San Francisco Bar Association and son ofW.W. Cope, was put in the place ofT.B.
Bishop, who had died in the previous year. With C.F.
Dio Hastings' death in 1907 and his replacement by
Hoyt Hastings, who was an active member during his
first few years, a majority of the Board was thus constituted of members appointed in the preceding four
years. The new members, relatively young, were
energetic, committed, and effective. The Board, beginning to chafe at its inactive role, regained from the faculty final approval of graduates, and from 1904, when
the books were accountant-audited for the first time in
ten years, it established regular outside auditing to reinforce the Board's own auditing committee. The most
active Directors, Bergin and two new men, Slack and
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Allen, were prepared to take any steps necessary to keep
the College going if the dean was not prepared to do it
himself.
From among the five new Directors came three of
Dr. Taylor's nemeses. On October 2, 1908, VicePresident Bergin moved the following resolution:
Resolved that the contract now existing between Hastings College of the Law and Edward R. Taylor, the Dean of the College, be terminated, said termination to take effect on December 31, 1908.10

One Director was absent-O.P. Evans. The ayes were
Allen, W.B. Cope, Van Fleet, and Vice-President Bergin. The noes were Chief Justice Beatty, Harrison,
Hoyt Hastings, and Slack. The resolution failed to carry
only because of even voices. It was a close call for
Taylor. Had Evans been present, he would doubtless
have voted against the motion. Edward Robeson Taylor
was present; as acting registrar he was secretary pro tern
of the Board. He had been allowed to defend himself,
and he had been able to say, justifiably, that he had not
missed classes. But the attack was not upon Taylor as
professor; it was directed at him as dean. That Bergin,
who was a solid and dedicated Director, had come so far
around was a measure of the erosion of confidence in
Taylor. Allen and Van Fleet took a high notion of duty,
and they found Taylor's radicalism distasteful. W.B.
Cope might have had a less noble motive: he had been a
classmate of Abe Ruef at Berkeley, was a director and
counsel of a realty company which had given Ruef a
$30,000 bribe to advance a development project, and he
had been of counsel with other of the defendants in the
graft trials of the Ruef-Schmitz machine. In the event,
Taylor got the point. He did not stand for reelection as
mayor in 1909. He devoted the rest of his career to
Hastings, and only to Hastings. It was a chastened, not
quite so arrogant Dr. Taylor who left the Board meeting
that day, stooped, not conquering.
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San Francisco burned down, in whole or in part, six
times in the 1850s. Conflagration was the greatest
hazard of the "instant city." What happened on April
18, 1906, and in the fires that raged for days afterwards,
was cataclysmic. When the $7,000,000 City Hall disintegrated, leaving only the outer walls and the steel
frame and cap of the dome standing, Hastings College
of the Law became one of the sorrier victims of the
Great Earthquake. Since 1901 the College had occupied
three rooms on the third floor, vacated by the move of
the district attorney to the Hall of Justice. The Board
had grudgingly put $1200 into furnishing the rooms,
and the City was to provide heat, light, and janitor service. In the middle of winter in 1902 the students complained of no heat in the lecture rooms. The College
found it expedient to hire its own janitor from among
the students (usually a boy from Southern California for
whom the $20 monthly salary just paid for his room and
board)-the beginning of Hastings' long and honorable
tradition of employing students that continues to this
day. At the eleventh hour-March 1906-Bergin and
Slack were still trying to negotiate the services with the
Supervisors. From April 18 to the end of the spring
semester, the College had no lecture halls; for the only
time in its history, Hastings was shut down. The dean
and Registrar also lost most of the College records,
which they had kept in City Hall and in their respective
offices elsewhere. The worst loss, though, was shattered
hope and long expectancy. In 1901, Hastings had finally
found a home, not an ideal one, but satisfactory. The
move to City Hall had been the exercise of an option, a
considered choice between two alternatives which even
at the time was the less advantageous one. From the
retrospect of the burning buildings of downtown San
Francisco, it was calamitous.
From 1878 to 1901, Hastings' instruction had been
carried on in decidedly makeshift quarters. Save for two
years (1880-82) when the lectures were held in the se-
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vere and small Academy of Sciences at California and
Dupont Streets, the large assembly hall of the Society of
California Pioneers at 808 Montgomery Street was Hastings' home. There, beneath the clutter of California
curiosities (including a large Arizona meteorite), the
maps and portraits redolent of the great events of the
already dim recent past, the first class met, and all the
other classes heard Pomeroy, McKinstry, or Slack. The
Founder had believed such quarters more than ample.
For lectures they were adequate until, in Taylor's early
years, the amount of time each of the three classes spent
in the classroom began to increase. Under Pomeroy and
Slack, the student spent one hour per day, five days per
week in the classroom. The first-year students met in
the morning (beginning at 8 a.m. or 8.30 a.m.), the
second-year in mid-afternoon, and the third-year in the
late afternoon. Taylor believed that sound educational
practice demanded ten hours of classroom time. His
expansion of the faculty was intended to provide this
doubling of teaching hours. Moreover, the newly recruited, largely part-time faculty composed of active
practitioners made it clear that they had to have afternoons free; consequently, all classes were held in the
morning, which was also a boon for the large majority of
students who worked in law-offices as well as attending
Hastings. More than a single lecture hall was needed,
however, one lecture hall for each class being a necessity. Slack and Taylor both recognized the real disadvantage in having the dean's office and the Registrar's
office separate from the lecture halls, and from each
other. From 1895 to the end of his deanship, Slack
maintained an office in Pioneer Hall on Montgomery
Street, while Registrar Stone remained in the old Emporium Building, a considerable distance away. Slack
especially was well disposed to any opportunity that
might bring the entire College into one place in San
Francisco.
In 1895, Adolph Sutro, then mayor of San Francisco, offered to the Regents of the University thirteen

Edward Robeson Taylor
(by Pitzella)

Sutro Heights, "Affiliated Colleges," 1899.
The building on the right was intended for Hastings.
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acres of a twenty-six acre site on the sandy slope of
Mount Parnassus, known as Sutro Heights. Sutro was a
wizard mining engineer, a real estate speculator in the
City, a visionary and self-styled city planner. He was also
a bibliophile, and he proposed that one-half of the site
house his enormous library. The cranky and near-senile
Sutro suggested to the Regents that on the other half be
sited the "affiliated colleges" in San Francisco: the (Toland) College of Medicine, the College of Dentistry, the
College of Pharmacy, and Hastings College of the Law.
A Regents' committee was already working on such a
grouping, and Hastings had been invited to send two
delegates from its Board to assist the committee in
selecting a site. O.P. Evans handled the negotiations,
insisting that Hastings was entitled by the 1878 act to
have a separate building for its sole use. The Sutro site
seemed ideal to the Regents. But Sutro had tied up the
offer with near-impossible conditions, and it was some
time before the gift was accepted and construction begun. Sutro pointed out that the site was a fifteen-minute
ride from City Hall, and that before long a streetcar line
would undoubtedly be run to the area. The view of the
Golden Gate and the accessibility to Golden Gate Park
would relieve the "drudgery of student life" and spur
the young scholars to higher achievements. l1 Though
the Hastings Board actively pursued negotiations with
the Regents' committee as the construction began, in
April 1897 it also opened negotiations with the City to
see if space could be had in the new City Hall. By the
end of 1899, the three buildings on the site were finished, the other colleges had already moved in, and the
Regents pressed Hastings for a decision as to whether or
not the College would move in to the westernmost of the
three buildings which had been reserved for its exclusive use. The Board stalled until the San Francisco
Supervisors assured them that space would be available
in City Hall, at which time it informed the Regents that
they would not take up the Sutro space. An anthropology collection was put in the handsome, solid stone,
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Richardson-Romanesque building. The new building
was ample enough to have served the College for decades to come, with lecture halls, offices, and library
space. But the Hastings Board turned down such
munificence principally because of the distance of the
location from the law courts and the San Francisco Law
Library, preferring to subsist in cramped (and unheated) quarters. On April 18, 1906, City Hall fell in;
the massive buildings on the Sutro site survived (the last
of them was demolished in 1967 for more medical
school facilities).
There was a double price paid for the Board's
myopia and Taylor's unwillingness to take the leadership in providing the College with adequate facilities.
The number of moves that Hastings made between
1906 and the move to hopelessly inadequate quarters in
the new City Hall in 1916 were wearying and harmful to
Hastings' competitive stance against the other growing
and more adequately housed law schools in the Bay
Area. From 1906 to 1908, the College was in the Cooper
Medical College, Sacramento and Webster; from 1908
to 1909, in the Grant Building, at Seventh and Market;
from 1909 to 1913, in the Whittell Building on Geary;
from 1913 to the spring of 1916, in the Underwood
Building on Market Street. Each move cost a higher
rent, offset from 1909 on by increased state appropriation to cover the rent. If the new City Hall in 1916
looked like the promised land, the College was soon
disillusioned. After seven years in that wilderness, the
College managed to find somewhat more adequate
quarters in the long-bruited, newly constructed State
Building in the Civic Center. There it would remain for
fifteen years.
The higher price paid was in the perpetuation of
the Abe Lincoln Myth of legal training-that a comprehensive modern law library was an unnecessary luxury for law students, who could learn the law from texts,
without much reference to the legal sources requisite
for legal scholarship. Admittedly, in the first decade of
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the twentieth century and the victory of the Langdell!
Ames method, the Myth was reinforced. After all,
Langdellianism managed to reduce all the law to the
"right cases," and the mass of the reports could be ignored as long as the "right cases" were in hand. The
flood of case-books that the Langdellians produced became the new texts; they were abundant and every student could purchase all that he needed. However, long
after other law schools became aware of the fallacy of
this notion and emphasized legal research in statutes,
reports, treatises, journals, etc., Hastings remained
locked into the case-books almost exclusively, in part
because it did not have the space necessary to provide
real library facilities until 1953. By not having moved to
the Sutro site, Hastings remained dependent upon such
library facilities as its students could compete for with
the bench and bar in the San Francisco Law Library. It
was an excellent library; in the 1870s it already possessed runs of most major legal, political, and economic
periodicals. It also had all of the other series, including
the reports, that the most fastidious and searching
lawyer needed. 12 But Hastings students were never
much welcome in a library where the facilities were always overtaxed. The Founder's parsimoniousness had
initially dictated that there be no separate library
facilities for the College, though even he, by the end of
the first decade, had begun to see the necessity for a
College library and for at least a small collection of necessary works. Later, when Slack resigned as dean, he
urged the Board to set aside a special fund for "library
purposes," but nothing came of his proposal. From
1910, the College did begin fitfully to collect runs of
reports and certain journals, always, however, sacrificing acquisitions to more pressing concerns. In the early
1920s, in Maurice Harrison's administration (1919- 25),
acquisitions increased, and the widow of formerDirector Robert Y. Hayne in 1925 presented some 1000
volumes, which capped a series of generous gifts of
books by two attorneys, Charles S. Wheeler, Jr., Frank
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R Sweasey, and by Lawrence W. Young, '25, and
others. But it was Charles William Slack who gave Hastings the real nucleus of its present library; in his will he
left a magnificent library of 12,000 volumes, including a
com plete -set of the National Reporter System.
The long-term effects of an inadequate library
came to rest only in the interwar period. The short-term
effect was serious enough. In 1901, Dean Taylor had
carried Hastings into the Association of American Law
Schools as a charter member. In 1916 Hastings was
dropped from membership in the AALS because its library resources were not up to AALS standards.
Taylor's successor, Dean Maurice E. Harrison, managed
to get Hastings readmitted in 1920, the AALS accepting
that the College'S statutory right to use the San Francisco Law Library, located on the same floor as the College, constituted compliance with the library standard.
But the College's four years out of the AALS was a
portent of much more severe criticism of the College'S
standards.
The Sutro site negotiations had revived the question of "affiliation." The University Regents' solicitude
for Hastings' interests, reflected in the very substantial
concession that it would have one of the three buildings
to itself (whereas Dentistry and Pharmacy would have to
share the other smaller building) indicated that the
University still considered Hastings in the fold. It is possible, though there is no evidence for it, that the Regents' open arms contributed to the Board's preference
for City Hall. The warmer the Regents' embrace, the
cooler the Hastings' Directors became, fearful of being
drawn into a closer relationship with the University than
then existed under the 1878 act and in the incomplete
affiliation that had obtained since the 1880s. Anyway,
thirteen years after the last committee-of-one (G.P.
Evans) to consider affiliation had been discharged for
want of business, the Board on May 9, 1901, appointed
a three-man committee, G.P. Evans, T.B. Bishop, and
RY. Hayne, "to enquire into the Status of the College as
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to its affiliation with the University," and to report at the
next meeting. 13 The absence of President Benjamin Ide
Wheeler from Berkeley delayed the discussions, and
nothing appears to have been done until, in November
1902, the committee was discharged and a new one appointed. This time, Chief Justice Beatty, T.!. Bergin,
and (again) G.P. Evans, were charged to confer with
President Wheeler and "agree upon a course of action
concerning the relation of the two institutions."14 Incidentally, this committee appointment marked the
emergence of T.!. Bergin as the principal power on the
Board. Yet, despite the critical nature of the issue, this
was the last to be seen of the committee or of its deliberations in the minutes of the Board. There is no doubt
what gave such directness and urgency to its mandate.
The Berkeley department of jurisprudence had added
four additional lecturers, and would at the May 1903
commencement award Bachelor of Law degrees to
three postgraduates who had completed a full threeyear professional program in the department of jurisprudence of the College of Social Sciences. From the
bosom of alma mater had appeared the asp of competition. No longer was the Berkeley department merely
preparing students to enter Hastings in the middle year.
It was now in the business of granting degrees. It did
not require prophetic powers to foresee that the granting of three law degrees would soon be followed by
many.
The commotions of mid-decade, Taylor's insouciance, and a general sense of helplessness appear to
have prevented any appropriate response to the Berkeley challenge. But by 1910, the necessity for defining
further Hastings' relationship to the University could
no longer be ignored. Elizabeth Boalt's generous gift in
memory of her husband, Judge John H. Boalt, had enabled the Regents to begin construction of the small
elegant building-the first Boalt Hall-which today is
called Durant Hall and is on Campanile Way. It was
ready for occupancy in Jan uary 1911. The flyer to raise
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money among lawyers for the Boalt Hall building fund
was a barb tossed at Hastings, stating that the University's objective was "to create not merely a law department
of good standing, but a center of legal education of the
highest rank-a Harvard and Columbia of the
West. ... "15 More than once, Wheeler had referred to
Hastings in terms that would indicate his opinion that it
was a "law department of good standing," with the implication that it was nothing more.
In May 1910, the Hastings Board held two important meetings. Both dealt with the challenge of Boalt
Hall in two different ways. Charles William Slack, true
to form, believed that the way to meet the Berkeley
challenge was by making Hastings everything that Boalt
could hope to be, and more, and to begin by taking in
better prepared and perhaps brighter students. Slack,
then both a Hastings Director and a Regent of the U niversity, was also a trustee of the Boalt endowment. Six
months before, he had persuaded the Board to appoint
a committee under his chairmanship, with T.!. Bergin
and R.e. Harrison as members, to review the admissions requirements. The committee was hopelessly split,
2-1, against an ambitious plan of Slack's to raise the admissions standard to that of the Berkeley department of
jurisprudence, which the University's Academic Senate
had recommended be raised three steps over three
years. Slack had the backing of the University's Academic Senate. In a written minority report, Slack
pointed out that the College's requirements had not
been changed for many years (not since his deanship, in
fact, though he was too clever to mention that), "while
the requirements for admission to institutions of learning generally have been constantly increased .... "16 He
was blunt, with a touch of hyperbole: "the entire University has been discredited throughout the country by
the low standard of the requirements for admission to
the College .... " But his proposal that by academic
1913-14 the requirement for admission be raised in
three stages to the equivalent of junior standing at
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Berkeley, an aggregate of six years of high school and
college, was the right medicine. Beginning with
academic 1910-11, his proposal also would put the
supervision of admissions at Hastings in the hands of
the Berkeley Academic Senate. Put to the vote of the
Board on May 31, 1910, Bergin and Harrison voted
against it, but Perry Evans, J.M. Allen, W.C. Van Fleet,
and Slack-the three Directors appointed on the same
day in 1903-voted yes. If Slack's rhetoric was hard to
swallow, his reasoning was sound. The higher admissions standards had by 1914 cut back the size of enrollments by about a quarter of what they were in 1909 and
1910, but to about the same level as they had been in the
five years before 1909. Hastings was henceforth in a
competitive position with respect to Boalt. When, in
1911, Taylor suggested restricting direct entrance into
Hastings' middle and senior classes, Slack and Harrison
consulted with eastern universities and then recommended that advanced standing be given for work done
at other law schools, provided they were members of the
AALS. The Slack reforms of 1910 and 1911 brought
. Hastings' standards to a par with the best law schools in
the country-including the fledgling one across the Bay.
The other response to the Berkeley challenge was a
curious one. On the same day that Slack's admissions
reform passed the Board, Judge Harrison moved that
the Class of 1910 be recommended to the first district
court of appeal for admission to practice in all the state
courts. Such explicit direction for what had always been
a matter of course had point to it. The Board probably
intended its ex parte motion for admission of the
twenty-three graduating LL.B.s would result in obtaining judicial recognition that Hastings was the law department of the University of California. A judicial
opinion of this sort would serve notice on the Berkeley
jurisprudentialists that while they might provide legal
education, they would not be training lawyers for admission to the bar on the same terms as Hastings under
the privilege accorded Hastings graduates by the 1878
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act. On June 1, the day after the Board's resolution for
the graduates' admission, Dean Edward R. Taylor appeared as counsel for the twenty-three graduates In Re
Students of Hastings College of the Law 17 before the Court
of Appeal, and moved the admission of the twentythree. To Taylor's consternation and the anger of his
twenty-three clients, T.!. Bergin also appeared, ostensibly as counsel for the Board. In fact, Bergin represented no one but himself; it was Taylor who was doing
the Board's bidding. Bergin spoke against the motion to
admit, on the grounds that Hastings was not part of the
University and was not affiliated with the University beyond the pious hope expressed in the 1878 act. Bergin's
motives might have been of the best, and derived from a
sincere wish to avoid a declaration from the bench that
affiliation had, as a matter oflaw, taken place. He might
also have been moved by his considerable animus towards Taylor, dating at least from Bergin's unsuccessful
attempt to oust the dean two years before. The court
rendered judgment, finding that it was its duty to grant
the license since each of the graduates had a diploma
signed by the President of the University. But it went on
to hold:
We must presume that official duty has been regularly performed, and that the faculty of the university has granted the
diplomas in pursuance of the law. We must also presume that
the said Hastings College of the Law has affiliated with the
university of the state; in fact, the Legislature, by its many
appropriations for suitable buildings for the law department
of said college, has time and time again recognized the Hastings College of the Law as a department of the university.
The very title of the act is "To create Hastings College of the
Law in the University of California." The questions as to
whether or not the said college has, as matter oflaw, affiliated
with the university, and as to whether or not the faculty of the
university has granted the diplomas which the said persons
hold, cannot be tried collaterally on this application. 1s

The court's judgment both went too far and did not
go far enough. It did not establish "as matter of law"
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that affiliation had taken place and that Hastings was
the law department of the university. It merely presumed this to be the case. At the same time, it was a
presumption that might prove grounds for a dangerous
precedent in the future. Bergin's sally had succeeded to
the extent that the court was not prepared to provide a
definitive determination of the College's status vis-a.-vis
the University. From the Directors' point of view-and
in this, Bergin was as one with Harrison and Slack-it
was better that the court's judgment be limited to the
admission of that one class of graduates on the basis of
the most narrow interpretation of the privilege accorded by the 1878 act. On June 24, the Board "respectfully requested" the court to delete that part of the
judgment quoted above. The court refused to amend its
opinion. Clearly, the Board's attempt to establish that
Hastings was the law department of the university had
gone down to resounding defeat in a judgment that
carried considerable potential for future mischief. Even
if the Court of Appeal had bought the obvious try-on in
Taylor's motion, it is questionable whether the judgment would have made much difference. Boalt Hall
could not have been so easily strangled so long after
birth. The despair of the Directors is understandable.
Clark Kerr's "multiversity" was a half-century away,
Robert Gordon Sproul's multi-campus empire forty
years in the future, and Benjamin Ide Wheeler's
"southern branch" still a decade from realization. No
one could have conceived of the University as having
two law schools, let alone the four (if we include Hastings) which it has today.
At this same 1910 Board meeting, the committee
formed in 1902 to confer with Wheeler was discharged.
In the next two years, Hastings worked out an understanding with the President of the University for formal
certification of graduates by Board action and biennial
reports of the College for presentation to the Regents,
including the names of Hastings faculty. (From 1913
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on, these reports were annual.) In 1914, the University's
Extension Division requested and was granted use of
the Hastings lecture halls when the College was not
using them for extension courses (not in law). In 1913,
the Board went back to worrying affiliation again, appointing Van Fleet, Warren Olney, Jr., and Slack a
committee to investigate the legal status of the relationship and report on what they "deemed advisable to
bring about a formal affiliation" of the institutions. 19 In
August 1916, the Board discussed affiliation a,gain, and
joined a new Director, William B. Bosley, with Olney
and Slack on the committee-all three of whom had
been faculty members at Hastings before becoming Directors. These committees were exercises in futility.
Without affiliation, and without defining what the relationship was, Hastings and the University were once
again living together in relative amity and in slightly less
isolation from one another than before. But it was still
no marnage.
If Taylor became far more involved in Hastings'
affairs after his close call of 1908, he did not prove to be
any more creative a pedagogue than he had been before. In turning to the much expanded faculty of his
deanship and the courses they taught, one is struck by
the solidly competent but unexciting teachers and the
adequate but unimaginative curriculum for which they
were responsible. There were still little touches of the
Pomeroy System left, most notably in Taylor's own
first-year course in Real Property, in which he lectured
(the subject that best lends itself to the lecture treatment, especially in a code jurisdiction). In his third-year
Equity course, while he used that most Langdellian.
casebook of Austin Wakeman Scott of Harvard, Taylor
still had "reference to Pomeroy's Equitable J urisprudence."2o Indeed, Taylor agreed with Pomeroy completely in deploring the perpetuation of the dual system
oflaw and equity, especially in the code system, in which
equitable principles were too often submerged.
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Edward Robeson Taylor, however, was the last man
left on the faculty who found merit in what Pomeroy
had done. The new men were very new. It was with
mixed pride and regret that Dean Taylor, in 1901,
could recommend the appointment as assistant professor of Robert W. Harrison, LL.B. Harvard 1898, describing him as a man of scholastic attainment who
"knows thoroughly the Harvard method of law teaching, which in the main we ourselves follow."21 Harrison
was the first thoroughgoing and Harvard (Ames)trained exponent of the LangdelVAmes method, and he
had considerable influence with his colleagues. He was
the son of Director Harrison. Taylor noted his disposition for industry and research, and mentioned his fine
mind, the latter a point concurred in by some and disputed by others of his students. He was extremely personable and well-liked, even loved, by his students. He
had plenty of time to leave his mark on Hastings, serving longer than any other member of the faculty, from
1901 to 1947. Throughout his career, his courses
ranged over the entire spectrum of civil law, though his
main interest was property. He was far too occupied
with extra-Hastings pursuits to be a great academic, but
his students remembered him with fondness and respect. Suitably, a chair was endowed in his honor after
his retirement.
Of Slack's recruits, only Louis Hengstler remained
by 1901-02 (if Sheffield Sanborn, LL.B. Harvard 1897,
who had been an instructor in 1898-99 and served again
as an assistant professor, 1901-03, is excluded). Hengstler was a brilliant man, who had been trained as both a
mathematician and a lawyer in his native Germany. He
had begun at Hastings in 1896, while retaining his Berkeley assistant professorship in mathematics and jurisprudence; by 1898 he had come to Hastings exclusively,
though technically part time, and was promoted in 1901
from assistant professor to professor. Over his years at
Hastings, he built up a large San Francisco practice that
moved him to give up teaching in 1916. He was cold and
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severe in class, brooked no noise, and was called "the
Prussian General" by his students. When a future justice
of the Court of Appeal and his pal were playfully kicking each other during class in the demonstration theatre
at Cooper, Hengstler, who alone could see the commotion, stopped the class until they stopped scuffling. He
taught a variety of courses, but his mainstays were
third-year Evidence and Constitutional Law. The intricacies of both appealed to him, though he sometimes
found it hard to get his students to see through the
intricacies as clearly as he did. He was an early and
faithful convert to the case method, which he employed
with such verve and inquisitorial zeal in the classroom
that he made it truly socratic. With his resignation,
Taylor's faculty lost its brightest intellect.
Besides young Harrison, Taylor's recruits included
men with a wide range of abilities, but all were men of
competence. Orrin Kip McMurray, LL.B. '93, taught
pleading and practice for two years while also teaching
at Boalt, where he had a distinguished future, as professor and from 1923 to 1935 as dean. William Denman, a
UC graduate and LL.B. Harvard 1897, was on the faculty for three years contemporaneously with McMurray, teaching first-year Contracts and a third-year
course in Admiralty which did not survive his resignation. There was considerable turnover in junior faculty
during the years 1903-10, doubtless some of it attributable to Dean Taylor's inattentiveness to the College. Besides McMurray and Denman, four other assistant professors taught for short periods, one of them,
Walter S. Brann, '96, being remembered as an exceptionally fine teacher of Contracts, practical in his approach and stimulating. The turnover was highest in
Contracts until Golden W. Bell was hired in 1911. A
1910 Harvard LL.B., Bell remained at Hastings until
1930, despite a large admiralty practice, government
service, and the associate editorship of American Maritime Cases. When he went to Washington in 1930, his
course in Contracts fell to another young Harvard
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LL.B. who had a future at Hastings, David E. Snodgrass. The turnover left the burden of continuity to
Hengstler, R.W. Harrison, and James A. Ballentine; the
latter, who had no law degree, was hired in 1904.
Though Harrison and Ballentine could be counted on
to fill in on short notice where needed, Ballentine was
treated badly; his salary remained the lowest for the
amount of work done of any faculty member throughout most of Taylor's administration. That the College
had to purchase the law dictionary which was his sole
scholarly achievement (and is still in print) was just retribution. 22 To Taylor's credit, in 1916 he did move the
Board to increase Ballentine's salary from $600 to $780 a
year.
The faculty began to firm up in 1910 with the appointment of Robert W. Harrison's brother, Richard C.
Harrison, whose field was pleading and practice; with
Golden Bell's appointment in 1911 and that of his
brother, George L. Bell, in 1912, the faculty received
its finished form that would obtain to the end of
Taylor's deanship. Two young men were added in
1916, Thomas A. Thacher, LL.B. Yale, '10, and Alan C.
Van Fleet, Director Van Fleet's son. Thacher and
George Bell went offto civilian war service on leave, and
did not return. By the end of Taylor's deanship, a remarkable continuity in the faculty had set in. This stability was welcome, and it testified to a more stable administration achieved after Taylor settled down.
The faculty was a good faculty, but it was not an
outstanding faculty. It was not distinguished by scholarship, though Ballentine had a name known through
publication, and Taylor's articles had won him a reputation, already fading, however, in the second decade of
the century. The faculty's claim to quality lay in its classroom competence, which in turn was based upon the
teachers' professional practice. All of them, even the
younger men, were practitioners, and the more senior
of them very well practiced. All were recruited from the
San Francisco bar, but Hastings LL.B.s did not predom-
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inate, and the Harvard and Yale men were prominent.
In 1916, in looking for two instructors to replace
Hengstler, the Board's search committee wrote the
deans of leading Eastern schools for leads to their
recent graduates practicing in the Bay Area; both
Thacher and Van Fleet, the men hired for constitutionallaw and evidence, respectively, were products of
Eastern schools. All had LL.B. degrees save Taylor and
Ballentine. Only Taylor was full time, with ten hours
per week; all the rest were part time. The Board felt
compelled to give sporadic but sometimes intense attention to assuring that the faculty did their appointed
teaching. It was necessary. Robert W. Harrison and
Hengstler (until he reduced his load to four hours per
week) came closest to Taylor in amount of teaching
time, six hours per week. During Taylor's deanship,
Harrison taught his six hours, and concurrently taught
either at the Y.M.C.A. Law School (Golden Gate) or San
Francisco Law School, practiced law until 1912, and
from 1906 was successively chief deputy district attorney of San Francisco, deputy attorney general of
California, and chief deputy and first assistant attorney
general, until he retired in 1942. Harrison was a very
busy man, absolutely assiduous in his teaching, but
hardly in a position to bring to it that creative flair that
makes a good teacher a great teacher. There was little
else that the Board could do about teaching other than
make its sporadic checks on time spent in the classroom.
The quality of teaching was not something that they
were much interested in, save in 1905 when the Board
left it up to individual Directors to visit classes if they
wished. A strong dean-Dne more energetic and committed than Dr. Taylor-would have been able to get
more out of a faculty. It was a constant refrain during
those years that as soon as a class was over, the professor
bolted. There was no time for casual contact. The students had to pay a price for the excellence of the practical dimension of their instruction.
It was certainly not high salaries that kept good
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teachers at Hastings; there was no general increase in
salaries between 1899 and 1921. Taylor was paid $4000
throughout his tenure, and on promotion from assistant
to full professor, Hengstler and Robert W. Harrison got
very modest increases. Of the rest, only Ballentine had a
small upward adjustment in 1916 because he had been
so grossly underpaid for so long. The wide variance in
the faculty's hours resulted in some marked discrepancies in pay rates. The following table shows the faculty,
their instructional load in hours per week, and their
annual salaries, monthly salaries, and the rate for each
expressed as one hour per week per month, in June
1916.
Professor

E.R. Taylor
R.W. Harrison
L. T. Hengstler

hr.!wk.

per yr.

per mo.

wk.-hr.
per mo.

10
6
4

$ 4000
1500
1110

$ 333.33
125.00
92.50

$ 33.33
20.83
23.13

5
4
3
2

1000
600
600
390

83.33
50.00
50.00
32.50

16.67
12.50
16.67
16.25

Asst. Professor

R.e. Harrison
J.A. Ballentine
C.W. Bell
C.L. Bell

(This was before the adjustment to Ballentine's salary,
and clearly shows his inferior salary position relative to
other assistant professors, though he was the longest
tenured of the four.) Adjusted to full-time basis (ten
hours per week) and compared to average salaries at the
University of California in 1916, Taylor was paid
virtually the same salary as a Berkeley full professor.
Considering R. W. Harrison and Hengstler more as associate professors than full professors, their average
annual salary, if full time, would have been about
$2650, which was $200 more than associate professors
were paid at Berkeley. The assistant professors were
just $50 per year lower than their equivalents at Berkeley.
Hastings' salaries were not out of step with the University's, but whereas University salaries had risen by about 15
percent between 1899 and 1919, Hastings salaries had
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remained frozen, and the initial salary advantage of the
Hastings professoriate was lost by 1919. A solidly frozen
salary over two decades is not much of an inducement to
academic improvement.
If a certain stability came ultimately to obtain in the
faculty, the curriculum showed signs of becoming static.
Slack's earlier reforms had been modifications of a system, Pomeroy's System. Within a few years of Taylor's
administration, the Slack curriculum was transformed.
The shift of the basic subjects in legal education from
Pomeroy and Slack's second year to the modern first
year was almost accomplished by 1901-02, with four
major, basic first-year courses: Contracts, Real Property,
Torts, and Criminal Law. During McMurray'S two years
(l903-05), a fifth course was added, Common Law
Pleading; it disappeared with McMurray, but with R.C.
Harrison's appointment, Pleading came back to stay in
1912-13. The Big Five first-year courses had arrived.
The second-year courses varied considerably in number, but tended to be refinements of subjects that had
been taught under a broader rubric during Slack's administration: where there had been Corporations, now
there were Private Corporations and Municipal Corporations, the latter giving over to Public Service Corporations by 1915-16; Agency spun off Carriers. Trusts
essayed an existence separate from Real Property as a
second-year course for ten years, and then became a
third-year course. The thirp year remained truer to
Slack's modified Pomeroy System, the heart of it being
Equity, Pleading and Practice (until in 1915-16 that was
put over entirely to the first year), Evidence, and Constitutional Law. The curriculum had some perceptible
omissions. In 1918, eighteen students petitioned the
Board for a course in Admiralty in the third year. The
Board referred this remarkable instrument (the first indication of formal student input into curriculum at
Hastings) to the dean and faculty. Nothing came of it,
though in Golden Bell the College had an eminent practioner in admiralty.
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It would be unjust to tax Taylor and his faculty with
not having attempted something radically different
from what all other law schools in the country were
doing. By and large, with few exceptions, and most of
these post World War I, American law schools during
the first four decades of this century were saddled with
the rigidity of a single system that was rapidly losing its
capacity to inspire and stir innovation in the men teaching the law. The period was a dismal age in American
jurisprudence as a whole. 23 It required the Depression
as the malady and the New Deal as the therapy to open
up the law and the law schools to new concerns and new
subjects. Hastings under Dr. Taylor was not alone in its
increasing ossification in the curriculum. What gives
unusual poignancy to the process at Hastings is the contrast between the exciting old system and the dull new
structure. A man of Dr. Taylor's catholicity of interests
and multifarious abilities ought to have done better. He
at least might have tried.
Edward Robeson Taylor's last decade at Hastings
was untroubled. There were no complaints; there could
not be because the place kept functioning. The First
World War was a hard period. Enrollments sank from
99 in 1917-18 to 34 in 1919-20. We find it difficult to
comprehend how big an army this country fielded in the
AEF in a very short time and how war activism and
patriotism gripped young men with an almost hysterical embrace. Colleges and universities were literally
stripped-and a number of small law schools went
under. There was talk of closing Hastings. To his credit,
Dr. Taylor held firm and confident. He was failing fast,
in his eighty-first year when the war ended. Athene's
bird looked more sleepy than wise. And the saddest part
of his growing old was that it took the edge off his
passion for the good life, companionship and gourmandism, witty conversation, and the bibulous arts. He
knew when to quit, and he knew how. On February 13,
1919, he wrote his letter of resignation to the Board of
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Hastings College of the Law, to take effect on July 1
next, at the same time informing the Directors that he
was presenting to the College a portrait of himself
painted by his Bohemian crony, Pitzella. No false
modesty in Dr. Edward Robeson Taylor. Slack moved a
short but gracious resolution of thanks, naming Taylor
emeritus professor of law. Taylor also knew how to retire. He did not haunt the halls of Hastings, but stayed
in his comfortable house with his young and adoring
wife, reading the French and English classics which one
suspects were really his greatest intellectual delights.
Heredia, whom Taylor so much admired and whose
sonnets he had translated, said of poetry that it "dwells
in nature and in humanity, which are eternal, and not in
the heart of the creature of a day, however great."
Taylor would have agreed with the poet's high notion of
the creative act, and he might have taken some comfort
in that thought if he reflected at all on what more he
might have managed to create at Hastings. He died on
July 5, 1923.

V

Aurea Aetas

GREEK· AND ROMAN poets praised
Aurea Aetas, the Golden Age, when men lived in arcadian simplicity and idyllic prosperity, happy, undefiled
by sophistication, crime, and greed. This blissful vision
has never faded. Western man since has not ceased to
hope, even when he could not believe, that such an age
existed. With a compound of nostalgia and optimism,
the children of Classical civilization still drape the
time-past in the raiment of golden virtue. Fifty years of
reign, or marriage, or even mere existence suffice for a
golden jubilee, from the vantage point of which all that
went before appears transformed-ill to good, pain to
pleasure, misery to joy, poverty to prosperity, and enmity to friendship. In 1928, Hastings College of the Law
celebrated its golden jubilee, and its sons and daughters
looked back at the fifty years past with unalloyed satisfaction and genuine pleasure. If they looked forward at
all, it was without anxiety for the future. Were those
first fifty years Aurea Aetas? They had not been simple;
prosperity and happiness had not always prevailed, and
hurt and disorder had sometimes stalked the College.
Greater difficulties were already upon Hastings by
1928, and worse was to come. There was no reflection of
this, only of the sentiment of pride, in the historical
essays contributed to the Golden Jubilee Book, 18781928,1 and prepared for the occasion by Orrin Kip
McMurray, '93, Chief Justice William H. Waste, '94,
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Chief Justice Frank M. Angellotti, '82, Henry C.
McPike, '81, Charles W. Slack, '82, Professors R.W.
Harrison and J.A. Ballentine, and ex-Dean Maurice E.
Harrison. Yet the contribution of the dean, William M.
Simmons, "Ideals and the Future," was sobering. It
struck a somewhat apologetic note with respect to the
other leading law schools in California, emphasizing too
vigorously Hastings' uniqueness as a law school in close
proximity to the courts, and its reliance on local
students to fill its classrooms. There was a note of
isolation-and isolationism-in Simmons' essay. Not
least, he was forthright in identifying the growing problem of the inadequacy of the College's physical facilities.
Certainly Hastings would not know again the advantage of preeminence by age. In the next fifty years it
would playa different role in California legal education
than it had in the half-century of its primacy. It is now
time to look at the last years of the Golden Age, the
1920s, to see a Hastings that had given California formal legal education, some of its greatest judges and
lawyers, and a high standard of excellence-a Hastings
on the eve of hard challenges. "As wee reade of them
which in oulde tyme lyued in the golden age," we can
catch something of the pride and, the satisfaction that
the first half-century engendered.
Hastings' oldest dean was succeeded upon his resignation in 1919 by its youngest dean. Maurice Edward
Harrison was not yet thirty-one when the Board appointed him dean and professor of law on June 13,
1919, at the same annual salary of $4000 as Taylor's
had been. Slack had chaired the search committee,
which had taken three months and some pains to find a
new dean, without success. As late as May, still facing
the prospect of having no dean for the coming year, the
committee was preparing to recommend temporary instructors to take Taylor's courses. It is probable that
there were some doubts that the right man had been
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found. Not only was Harrison appointe9- to hold the
appointment "during the pleasure of the Board," but it
was well known that he had a sizable practice of nine
years' standing in partnership with his father. No pressure was put upon him to devote his whole attention to
Hastings; he continued in practice throughout his tenure. Harrison was never entirely satisfied with his post.
In 1922 he submitted his resignation, only to be persuaded to stay by an over-generous deal: a salary of
$6500 for only six hours, rather than ten hours, of
teaching per week. The Board set out to search for a
successor to take over in 1923, but without success. In
March 1924, Harrison again signalled his intention to
resign if his teaching load was not further reduced.
Though his partnership with his father had ended, he
was still in practice, and he was on the verge of joining
that soon-to-be prestigious firm of Brobeck, Phleger,
and Harrison. The Board reduced his load to four
hours per week and reduced his salary to $5900 for
1924-25, but in January 1925, Harrison submitted his
final resignation, effective June 30, 1925. He joined
Brobeck and Phleger and enjoyed both a practice at the
bar and eminent public service that brought him to the
top of the profession. From 1935 until his death in 1951
he was a Director of Hastings, serving also as a Regent
of the University from 1944.
Harrison was a native San Franciscan and a product
of the University of California, graduating A.B. in 1908.
He was one of the early graduates in the professional
program of the Berkeley Department of Jurisprudence,
receiving the degree Juris Doctor in 1910. His thesis,
"Constitutionality of the Federal Corporation Tax of
1909," demonstrates some potential for scholarship,
having the virtues of clarity and conciseness, if not quite
the scent of brilliance, that indicate a lively intellect and
the ability to order material, facts, and doctrine, and
draw reasonable conclusions from them. Harrison had a
genuine academic bent. While beginning and advancing
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his practice, from 1911 until his appointment at Hastings, he was a part-time lecturer in law at Boalt. At
Hastings he taught Property and Equity, and taught
them well, even if his reputation was not that of a brilliant classroom performer. He was a slim, handsome
man with very fine features, blest with boyish good
looks, a firm voice, and a pleasing manner, and he'
dressed well almost to the point of dandiness. He made
a favorable impression on his students, and his openness and directness in discourse were universally admired. He was also a scholar. Though he was too busy in
practice and too soon out of academic life to produce
much written work, his article in the California Law Review (1922), "The First Half-Century of the California
Civil Code,"2 is a persuasive and learned review of the
history of the implementation of the code by the
California courts, weighing its merits and demerits and
the advantages and disadvantages of Pomeroy's
judicially-accepted rule for its interpretation. The article is still reprinted in anthologies, and alas it has not
been improved upon as an essay in legal history.
Harrison took great pride in the Hastings of his
day, and in its development of nearly a half-century,
almost as ifhe had himself been an alumnus. Indeed, he
was responsible for creating the first permanent alumni
association and an alumni following for the College. He
noted with satisfaction that the students "during the
post-war period included, for instance, Bahrs, Bergerot,
Eickhoff, Leicester, Treadwell, and others of the second
generation of San Francisco lawyers."3 Such was his
genuine esteem for the College-its standards, faculty,
Board, students, and uniqueness-that his enthusiasm
was infectious. Hastings' reputation had never stood
higher than it did during his tenure. That reputation
was on the threshold of a rude shaking, but the blow
did not come until the early years of Harrison's successor. It was, however, a reputation deserved, founded
upon proven accomplishment represented by the College'S product of its first four decades.
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The fortieth class of Hastings, and the first to be
graduated by Dean Harrison, the Class of 1920,
brought to 988 the total number of students who had
received the degree LL.B. from the College. This represented an average graduating class of about 25 students
per year between 1881 and 1920, though the last five
classes had been small, averaging only 11 degree recipients, the World War having dealt a blow upon the
blow already delivered by increasing competition. Hastings' students were considerably less homogeneous than
those of most other law schools of the period. Where
Clara Shortridge Foltz and Laura De Force Gordon had
not feared to tread, 20 other women had stayed the
course from Mary McHenry's graduation in 1882 to
Helen Garland Siebert-Smith's graduation with the
Class of 1919. Two students of Latin-American background had received degrees: of these, only Thomas
Francis Lopez of San Luis Obispo (who settled in
Fresno), LL.B. 1912, was clearly Mexican-American, the
other, Roberto Antonio Jimenez, LL.B. 1920, being of
Panamanian parentage. Though he had not graduated
from Hastings, Pedro E. Zabala, a native of Monterey,
studied there for one year, 1887-88, after taking his B.S.
at Santa Clara in 1886. He practiced in Salinas and from
1891 to 1899 was District Attorney of Monterey County,
enjoying a very good practice and high reputation. A
number of Japanese consular officials and students
from Japanese universities had been admitted to Hastings from the 1880s, though the first JapaneseAmerican to receive the degree was Tom Okawara of
San Francisco, LL.B. 1919. No Chinese-American had
graduated from Hastings. After the United States' acquisition of the Philippines, a number of Filipino students had attended Hastings for a year or two, but none
had taken the degree. Though there were a few prominent Black attorneys in practice in the state by the second decade of the twentieth century, they do not appear
to have been Hastings graduates. The first Black student (known to me) to enroll in Hastings was Tabytha
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Anderson of San Francisco. She withdrew after her first
year, 1928-29. The reasons for her withdrawal are not
clear, but apparently she suffered more than the ordinary roughness accorded a freshman in James A.
Ballentine's Torts-. Ballentine's noted Southerngentleman manners at best fell short of women students
and were certainly not color-blind. One minority long
discriminated against in professional education was
prominently represented from the earliest graduating
classes. There had been a steady increase in the number
of Jews receiving the LL.B., and by 1920 some of Hastings' most distinguished alumni were Jews, many of
them active in B'nai B'rith and other Jewish social and
cultural organizations. The College was well in advance
of San Francisco society in banishing the pale antiSemitism that kept an attorney of such distinction as
Sidney M yer Ehrman, '98, from membership in the best
San Francisco clubs which welcomed his Gentile
classmates. There is nothing to indicate that there was
any discrimination against minorities in the matter of
admissions or instruction. Hastings had the most open
admissions policy of any law school in the country, accepting any student who met the none-too-rigorous
academic requirements for admission. The underrepresentation of minorities grew from the more subtle form
of discrimination inherent in society as a whole, from
economic inability and lack of educational opportunity.
The increasing numbers of graduates from the "old"
minorities-Jews and those of Italian, Irish, and eastern
European extraction-reflected the increased economic
power and educational opportunity enjoyed by these
minorities. Indeed, because the fees at Hastings were
lower than those of any other law school (including
Boalt) and its curriculum and studies program were organized to permit a student to work at least half time, its
record in these early years in the encouragement of
minority students, to judge by the roll of its graduates,
was better than that of its competitors. It certainly of-
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fered better opportulllties than were available to
minorities in law-office preparation, where old patterns
of prejudice and continuing rampant discrimination effectively closed the door to minorities seeking entry to
the profession by that route.
Institutions of higher learning bask in the reflected
glory of their eminent alumni. Such pride is perhaps
even more marked in the case of law schools. The structure of the legal profession, as bench and bar, provides
a simple pecking-order of eminence (with the bench at
the top), if not of success. There never has breathed a
law school dean who did not regularly note, with considerable satisfaction, the appointment of an alum to the
bench, the number of partners in major firms who were
old grads, the election to important public office of a
graduate, etc. In lean times such notice brings some
comfort as the dean reaches for his tin cup; at all times,
it is a measure of pedagogic success. In an ethos where
merit is supposed to bring praise and demerit opprobrium, colleges are happily immune to blame for their
sons' and daughters' sins. No one at Hastings had to
blush with shame at the revealed corruption of that
scoundrel Abe Ruef, '86. And how many today condemn the famous law schools that produced the infamous lawyers-in and around the Oval Office-of
Watergate?
While we still have publications devoted to puffing
eminence in the guise of "directories" of notables, the
heyday of panegyrical instant apotheosis was the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Oscar T.
Shuck's History of the Bench and Bar of California (Los
Angeles, 1901) was more informative, largely because it
was more anecdotal, than the efforts of his successors,
but it is too respectfully breathless, high blown, and
eulogistic to be entirely convincing. Still, a crude measure of Hastings' impact on the profession in the state
within a bare two decades is afforded by the high proportion of former Hastings students singled out for
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homage in the section on "Junior Rank." Of the 165
young lawyers Shuck noted, 38 had been Hastings students, 29 of them Hastings graduates. This represented
23 percent of all those mentioned in this "Junior Rank"
category, and 57 percent of those (67) who had attended a law school. Shuck's omission of Charles
William Slack, '82, Frank M. Angellotti, '82, and a
number of others who by 1901 were eminent practitioners and judges, is inexplicable, but those included
were entirely deserving of recognition. Peter A.
Bergerot and William 1. Brobeck, both '92, Emanuel S.
Heller, '89, Edgar D. Peixotto, '88, and James A. Devoto, x'90-93, already were attaining the height of their
powers that would number them among the greatest
lawyers of the California bar.
A decade later, J.C. Bates, in a compilation echoing
Shuck's title, was both more comprehensive (though
Slack and Angellotti were still overlooked) and less
adulatory than Shuck. 4 Bates provided factual and
low-key notices of 1384 attorneys prominent in 1912,
most of them middle-aged. Nearly half of these had not
attended law school even for a year, having prepared in
an office or privately (one intrepid counsellor proudly
noted that he had learned the law in the San Francisco
Law Library). A considerably smaller proportion of
lawyers without degrees were admitted to the bar after
1900; some law school training was becoming de rigueur.
Exactly 11 percent of the total had attended a law school
for at least a year; 3.2 percent had attended Hastings,
7.8 percent some other law school. Of the 1,384 attorneys listed, 581, or 42 percent, had a law degree. Of
these, more than one-quarter had received the Hastings
LL.B. By 1910, the latest year for which there was the
slightest possibility of a graduate finding himself in
Bates, Hastings had graduated 815 students. The 158
LL.B.s noted in Bates constituted about 20 percent of
the College's graduates-a remarkable figure, even if
not very meaningful considering how many eminent
graduates of Hastings were not included. Hastings
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LL.B.s clearly led the field, and that by a wide margin,
in Bates' hagiography. The only law schools that even
approached Hastings were the University of Southern
California and the University of Michigan, which together almost equalled the 27.4 percent of Hastings
LL.B.s found in Bates. These figures mount in
significance as they are viewed later in Chapter VI
against the challenge mounted by Hastings' competitors. It must be noted now, though, that to all of Bates'
shortcomings must be added the further one of bias,
represented by his definite San Francisco Bay Area
slant. His book was published in San Francisco, and
Bates had not entirely perceived the expanding bar of
the rising metropolis to the South. Still, so far as Hastings' children are to be found in Bates, res ipsa loquitur.
The indefatigable William Carey Jones, who had
played his part in pressing forward legal education at
the University of California both by encouraging President LeConte to look with favor on Serranus Clinton
Hastings' original proposal and by going ahead with the
Department of Jurisprudence at Berkeley, took stock of
the whole university in an Illustrated History of the University of California (San Francisco, 1895). It provides the
kind of hard biographical data for all Hastings LL.B.s to
.1894 which is otherwise unavailable. We can add to it
the Class of 1895, and see what the first fifteen Hastings
classes had done with their education by 1895. There
were 399 graduates, 18 of whom were dead. The occupations of the living in 1895 can be broken down in
percents as follows:
Judges (serving and former)
3%
Attorneys in practice
80
Court officers, government officials,
reporters, librarians
4
2
Physicians, clergymen, educators
In business, agriculture, journalism, real estate, mixed 6
Of unknown occupation
5

The servingjudges included three members of the Class
of 1882. Frank M. Angellotti, elected to the Superior
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Court of Marin County in 1890, was the first Hastings
graduate to take a seat upon the bench. Charles William
Slack was elected to the San Francisco Superior court in
1891, and in the same year Charles Edward Davidson
became a county judge for Crockett County, Texas.
Walter Burton Cope, '86, was on the superior court of
Santa Barbara County, Abraham Lincoln Frick, '88, a
superior judge of Alameda County, and Joseph Emmet
Barry, '91, a justice of the peace in San Francisco.
Former judges as of 1895 were John Francis Davis, '84
(superior, Amador), and two graduates of 1886 were
former superior court judges: John R. Aitken (San
Diego) and William G. Britton (San Francisco). H.J.
Stafford, '82, and John Joseph Dunne, '83, had been
San Francisco justices of the peace, as had a deceased
member of the first class, James I. Boland, '81. The
former judges had returned to active practice at the bar.
Graduates in practice included a state senator,
Eugene F. Bert, '87 (San Francisco) and two assemblymen, Charles A. Swisler, '83 (El Dorado) and H.H.
North, '93 (San Francisco). Others also had sampled
political power. Four graduates were former assemblymen, all in the early 1890s: F.G. Finlayson, '85 (Los
Angeles), and Bertrand Schlessinger, '85, William Hendrickson, Jr., '88, and A.T. Barnett, '89, all from San
Francisco. The practicing attorneys included two former deputy attorneys general for California, La Fayette
C. Marshall, '81, and C.H. Jackson, '84, and a former
attorney general of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Charles
Creighton, '83-a harbinger of the future prominence
of Hastings graduates at the Hawaii bar. The witty
Henry Clay McPike, '81, had been an assistant U.S. attorney for the Northern District of California, and that
eminent practitioner and jurist, Charles A. Shurtleff,
'82, had also served in that office. By 1895, 16 Hastings
graduates had served as district attorneys, and six were
currently in that office in California counties, pretty well
covering the state geographically. A handful of other
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attorneys either had been or still were police court prosecutors or city attorneys. The practicing attorneys were
active in local politics as supervisors, school board members, on public works boards, and the like. Two of them
played a distinguished role in public affairs: George
Lezinsky, '83, had served as a special attorney in 1889 in
the matter of railroad taxes before the legislature and
was a member of the Executive Committee of the Citizens' Defense Association of San Francisco, and his
classmate, William T. Phipps, was currently the manager of the State Anti-Debris Association. Though
Lezinsky, in the matter of railroad taxes, was on the
opposite side of the fence from his late master, John
Norton Pomeroy, Phipps would have gladdened the
heart of the old man. Of the five ladies who had
graduated from Hastings between 1881 and 1895, only
two were in practice. Josephine Melvina Todman, '83,
was listed as "attorney and clerk in the office of James
H. Budd" of Stockton, and Alice Ann Clark, '95, was
struggling to begin a San Francisco practice.
Hastings LL.B.s who were court officers included
former or present clerks of the federal district courts
and state superior courts; those in government service
spanned the continent at various levels and included M.
F. O'Donoghue, '82, who was chief of the contest division, General Land Office, in Washington D.C.; Lidell
Baker, '85, secretary of the Oregon Railway Commission; and Charles James Evans, '92, u.S. Customs examiner in San Francisco. Other graduates in more literary
pursuits: Edwin Du Bose Smith, '91, was associate editor
of the American State Reports published by BancroftWhitney in San Francisco; Carter P. Pomeroy, '81, displaying his father's bent, was editor of the West Coast
Reporter, editor of the California Codes, and editor of
later editions of well-known and much-used texts.
J ames Henry Deering, J r., '81, was the first professional
librarian of the San Francisco Law Library. He built up
its large holdings only to see the collection perish in
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April 1906, and went back to work rebuilding the widely
appreciated collection to a 70,000 volume excellence by
the time of his retirement in 1928. Deering was remembered with genuine fondness by generations of Hastings
students, for whom the library was their principal resource, as a scholarly man of simplicity, gentleness, and
courteousness. He was always ready to assist them and
to shield them against the annoyance of practitioners
who considered the students interlopers. He created
and edited the great compilation of California Codes
known as Deering's Annotated California Codes, produced
a digest of the first 136 volumes of California Supreme
Court Reports, and in 1886 published a work on negligence that was at the time a significant contribution to
the subject.
Some graduates made only slight use of their legal
education, preferring other professional paths. The exceptions were three physicians. Jose de Sousa Bettencourt, '85 (San Francisco), an Iberian who was an M.D.
before entering Hastings, Samuel Tevis, '82 (San Francisco), and William Wenzlick, '85 (Port Townsend,
Washington) were able to capitalize on the contemporary vogue for forensic medicine, much emphasized by
Edward Robeson Taylor. The clergymen-graduates
were two Episcopalian rectors, both of that eminent
Class of 1882, the Revs. Henry McCrea, of Philadelphia,
and Frank D. Miller of Bakersfield, and the Rev. Henry
D. Whittle, '83, a Roman Catholic priest and professor
at Santa Clara College. Whittle was the most eminent
academic among the graduates, and the only one in
higher education, if one excludes Slack, the former registrar, E.J. Ryan, '87, and the serving registrar,
Leonard Stone, '94, who were actually practitioners.
The twelve graduates who became businessmen
were in a number of lines: banking, customs brokerage, petroleum, lead-smelting, salt, railroads, municipal
transit, publishing. The four graduates in agriculture
were in what for the 1890s was "agri-business" and included a stockman, John T. Wheeler, '88, a former
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Nevada assemblyman and currently sheriff of Eureka
County, Nevada. Leander Shores, '81, with becoming
candor, listed himself as a real estate speculator and
broker in San Francisco. Journalism was the light of
James Thomas O'Keefe, '92, editor of the Redwood City
Times-Gazette and of Richard Gibson, '87, of San Francisco, and Mabel Clare Craft, '95, was a reporter on the
San Francisco Chronicle. Arthur Inkersley, '90, beggars
description. Oxford graduate and former Classics master in Australia and New Zealand, the elegant Mr. Inkersley turned his hand to practice in San Francisco
(without notable success), continued to tutor in Classics
and law in this country, and free-lanced for magazines.
He and a friend, A. Daw-Kerrell, founded the AngloCalifornian Publishing Co. and produced private-press
books, including a very pretty calendar of their own
contriving (both prose and art), "The Daies of the Yeare
1898, an Auntiente Kalendar," a la Poor Richard's Almanack, with some playful but poor doggereP Two
gentlemen of Gallic background, a Quebecois named
Joseph Louis Dumontier, '90, and Oscar Adolphe
Rouleau, '91, worked at the hard, necessary, and not
very remunerative task of record-searching in San
Francisco.
For the score of graduates to 1895 about whom
William Carey Jones was silent, we can add little. A few
appear to have become eminent practicers; most disappeared from view. About one of them, simply listed as
resident in Berkeley, Mary McHenry Keith, '82, we do
indeed know a great deal, and her career was as fruitful
as those of the many graduates who practiced the law.
Doubtless some did very little with their training. It is
sad that Emily Buckhout, '83, one of the three earliest
women graduates, who in her youth had espoused the
cause of women's suffrage, suffered from ill-health and
despondency, though her marriage to Joseph Baker
and her move to Oregon provided some solace, if it did
not present much opportunity for public-spirited activity. Even if we assume that the score of LL.B.s of

178

Aurea Aetas

"unknown occupation" as of 1895 did not make much
use of their legal training,. a 6 percent black-sheep or
lost-lamb factor would have been judged very respectable by Victorian work-ethic standards.
Hastings graduates of the first thirty classes, to
1911, the eve of the first period of heavy com petition
fro~ other law schools and the dislocation brought by
the First World War, not only furnished a great many
members of the bench but also a large proportion of the
giants of the profession who dominated California law
until the mid-twentieth century. Not all of these were
practitioners only. Frank Prentiss Deering, '81, brother
and classmate of the San Francisco Law Librarian, published the first annotated edition of the Codes of
California, in four volumes, in 1886, and was one of the
editors of the first thirty volumes of American Decisions.
An active practitioner, he lived into his mid-eighties, a
warm supporter of the arts, sciences, and local history, a
committed Republican and a devout and active Episcopalian layman. Deering had the further distinction of
marrying, in 1902, a Hastings graduate of similar literary interests, the journalist, Mabel Clare Craft, '95.
Randolph V. Whiting, '95, was not so eminent as Deering, but in a long career, beginning two years after leaving Hastings and lasting for a half-century, he was the
sparkplug of the California Reports and California Appellate Reports, bearing the full redactal responsibility for
them from 1917. Through the activities of Carter P.
Pomeroy, Edwin Du Bose Smith, the Deering brothers,
and Whiting, Hastings law graduates came close to cornering the legal-literature market in California for almost a half-century. Orrin Kip McMurray, '93, was
another particularly distinguished alumnus, professor
of law at Boalt from 1907 to 1940, and dean there from
1923 to 1935, succeeding its founder, William Carey
Jones, and spurring Boalt onward in its first great
growth period. McMurray, as chairman of the Berkeley
Academic Senate, 1921-23, was prominent in the famous "faculty revolt" that curbed presidential-autocracy
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in the University and gave to the academic senate great
powers over budget and appointments, complete control over curriculum, and a major voice in administration-prerequisites for the future excellence and eminence of the University of California. McMurray enjoyed an international reputation as a jurisperitus, respected for his range of interests and his vigorous prose
style, his commitment to the proposition that the life of
the law is life itself, and his capacity to draw on history
and literature for illumination of the law. He was probably the most distinguished academic lawyer that Hastings has produced. It was fitting that Orrin Kip McMurray became the first member of the famous "Sixty-Five
Club," that eminent body of erstwhile retired law
teachers which has borne the brunt of instruction at
Hastings for the last three decades.
The College produced some remarkable charac_ ters, known for other attributes than merely success at
the bar. Matthew I. Sullivan, who attended Hastings for
two years, 1878-80, but did not graduate, enjoyed notable success at the bar. He also presided over the
Panama-Pacific International Exposition of 1915, the
West Coast's first world fair. He was a special U.S. prosecutor for a time in land-fraud cases in the West, and
proved an effective harrier of corruption, both in preparing the cases and prosecuting them in court. Close
on the heels of these labors, he was appointed Chief
Justice of the California Supreme Court, to serve until
the next election; in November 1914 he was elected by a
write-in vote to continue until the end of the term, after
which he refused to run. He was a firm proponent of
city planning in San Francisco and authored the original
city planning ordinance, serving as president of the city
planning commission for thirteen years. He also found
time to serve as dean of the University of San Francisco
Law School until 1934, seeing that struggling institution
through some of its hardest days. Big, energetic, restless, Matt Sullivan left a large and enduring mark on the
City and the State.
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In the prosecution that sent Boss Abe Ruef, '86, to
San Quentin, Matt Sullivan was one of the special prosecutors serving under the special deputy district attorney, Francis Joseph Heney, forced upon District Attorney William H. Langdon by the reform coalition to
clean out the Ruef-Schmitz gang. 6 Heney was a restless,
hot-tempered, and absolutely fearless man. He was extremely belligerent. He grew up "south of Market,"
bruised and battered by kids bigger in physique though
not in spirit. He toiled at night and without family help
to get admitted to the University of California-and was
expelled his freshman year for fighting, having challenged another student to a duel, squaring off with him
in fisticuffs during which a gun was drawn but not fired.
Heney, admitted to the bar in 1883, attended Hastings
in 1883-1884. Shortly afterwards he drifted into the
Arizona Territory, traded in cattle, and ran an Indian
trading-post at Fort Apache. He acquired a reputation
as an Apache-fighter. In 1889 he hung out his shingle in
Tucson, developing a big practice in land-litigation
which confirmed him in his hatred of the Southern
Pacific Railroad. In 1891 his career and his life almost
came to an abrupt end in a scuffle on the courthouse
steps with a Dr. J.C. Handy, who was bigger and
tougher than Heney. Heney was representing Mrs.
Handy in her husband's divorce and custody suit
against her. Handy grabbed at Heney's gun-this time
the gun went off and Handy was killed. Heney was
exonerated. Active in Democratic politics, in 1893 he
was appointed attorney general of the territory by President Cleveland. He lasted one year. He charged the
territorial governor with corruption, and when Cleveland delayed in sacking the governor, Heney quit. He
returned to San Francisco and went into private practice. His zeal against corruption found an outlet from
1903 to 1905, when he served as a special United States
prosecutor in public-land fraud cases in California and
Oregon. Teamed with the eminent detective William J.
Burns, Heney secured the conviction of a U.S. Senator
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from Oregon who had been the state political boss for
years. The Heney-Burns team was no less successful in
smashing the Ruef machine. In the process, Heney got
another taste of his own violence. On November 13,
1908, in the courtroom during a recess in the RuefSchmitz trial, a deranged man who some months before
had been called as a venireman and subjected to a brutal
voir dire by Heney which exposed the man's earlier
(and since pardoned) crimes, shot Heney in the head.
Heney survived, but the prosecution had to be continued by Hiram Johnson (whose success in it brought
enormous political reward), assisted by Matt Sullivan
and other attorneys. Heney had been much assisted in
the prosecution by his clerk, John H. Riordan, '09, who
is one of the last survivors from those halcyon days intimately involved in that episode in the history of San
Francisco. Heney was too zealous for even the reform
coalition, and when he indicated that he meant to probe
behind the corrupted to reach the corrupters, coalition
support for him waned rapidly. For three years he
served the cause with every ounce of his little frame and
big zeal. He had received no compensation, and worse,
he had made too many enemies in San Francisco. He
moved to Los Angeles, where he practiced law and essayed a political career. He shifted parties, from Democrat to Republican to Progressive to Democrat again
in a half-dozen years. He fell out too readily with
allies-defeated for the U.S. Senate on the Progressive
ticket in 1914, in 1916 he came out for Wilson's
pacifist-sounding campaign. 7 His bid for the governorship in 1918 as the Democratic nominee was
dashed by his being prevented from getting his name on
the ballot. There was still plenty of fight in the old
muckraker: In the mid-'20s he was special counsel to a
senate committee investigating Internal Revenue. His
private practice suffered from his public forays and his
reputation as a scrapper. He ended as a superior court
judge in Los Angeles, a tranquil conclusion to an almost
theatrical career that began in the Wild West before
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FrederickJackson Turner's "frontier" disappeared, and
finished in the fastest growing urban agglomeration of
the twentieth century. On October 31, 1937 he died in
bed, his "rusty mail"-or rusty sixshooter-hanging on
a nail "quite out of fashion," but not "in monumental
mockery."
.
A less colorful figure, but one no less dedicated to
good causes, was William Edward Colby, '98, who
wielded pen and ice-ax with equal facility. His practice
was in mining law, but his heart was in the Sierras. An
active alpinist, he was variously secretary, counsel, and
president of the Sierra Club, and brought practice and
passion together as counsel for the Save the Redwoods
League. He was an unyielding conservationist and John
Muir's intimate ally in the struggles to create the national parks system. Muir acknowledged that Colby was
the only Sierra Club member "who stood by me in
downright effective fighting" to have Yosemite taken
back into Federal control so as to stop the railroad interests' exploitation of it for tourist trade; that battle they
won in 1906, when Colby was only eight years out of law
school. 8 Colby was chairman of the California State Park
Commission at a fortuitous time, 1927 to 1936, when
unemployment and pubric-works projects combined to
enable California to create the nucleus of its great state
parks network. Bright and vital, for more than a quarter
of a century Colby lectured on mining law at Boalt. He
was a prolific author of law review articles and of contributions to treatises, and he was associate editor of the
standard work on mining law, Lindley on Mines, written
by the man with whom he began practice. The law of
mines and land-use was the subject, but the message was
conservation. His marriage was another Hastings romance, and one from the classroom: He married his
classmate, Rachel Vrooman, who later was active in
Hastings alumni affairs.
Another Hastings "favorite son" was of the same
generation. His contributions to bar, bench, and the
College have been major and continuous in the six dec-
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ades since he enrolled at Hastings. Absalom Frank Bray,

Jr., '10, was in the class that was admitted ex parte in the
Court of Appeal in the case, In Re Students of Hastings
College of the Law, 1910. Much of his practice at the bar
was in public advocacy, as an assistant district attorney
and as city attorney for three Contra Costa county cities.
Actively, humanely interested in charitable organizations, he has long given unfailingly of his time to service
organizations. After serving on the superior court of
Contra Costa county, in 1946 he became a justice of the
district court of appeal, First Appellate District, retiring
in 1964 at the age of seventy-five. "Retiring" has no
meaning in his case; to this day he serves pro tem on the
court, deftly, learnedly, and judiciously handling a volume of work that fatigues judges half his age. Since
1951, he has been a Director of Hastings (vice Maurice
E. Harrison) and since 1959 vice-president of the Board
and chairman in the absence of the chief justice. Frank
Bray, one of now less than a dozen graduates who link
the Hastings of today with the Hastings of the first generation of its sons and daughters, is honored and beloved by his alma mater, still in her service, in the service
of the profession, and in the service of the people. As
Voltaire observed, "Honor is the diamond that virtue
wears on its finger."
The early Hastings graduates produced some notable philanthropists. Alexander F. Morrison, '81, provided the fortune that enabled his widow to give the
University of California at Berkeley one of its most notable large gifts, in their joint names. Sidney M.
Ehrman, '98, remembered Hastings: He donated its
first professorial chair and remained an active contributor of money and service to the College throughout
his long tenure as a Director and until his death in 1975.
Russell K. Pitzer, '03, provided the basic endowment for
the college that bears his and his wife's name-Pitzer
College, one of the Claremont group. Pitzer was a
Pomona boy, a graduate of Pomona College, which was
also the alma mater of his wife, Flora Anna Sanborn

184

Aurea Aetas

Pitzer (A.B. Pomona '01; A.B. University of California,
'02), a woman devoted to the education and advancement of women. Russell Pitzer still lives in Pomona, a
few miles from his benefaction, the newest and one of
the most splendid of the Claremont Colleges.
With the dawn of the new century, the California
bar began to undergo a fundamental change: the large
modern law firm began to emerge. The development
began in San Francisco, peaked in the inter-war period,
and still determines the structure of legal practice in the
state, with Los Angeles having become its leading exponent. In the first generation of its emergence, the large
firm was a long way from being symbolized by the
crowded letterhead of defunct eminenti, a score of living
partners, and another of "associates," privates each
hopeful of having a marshall's baton in his brief case.
But in 1900, the big firms were on their way. For the
first half-century of the common law in California,
two-man partnerships of relatively short duration,
largely unspecialized, had been the norm. The modern
"associates'" various chores were undertaken by
"clerks" who might well not be admitted to practice,
although they were usually preparing in the office for
the bar. The high incidence of shingle-changing looked
like musical chairs as partnerships were formed and dissolved. The emergence of the "firm" (even if it was not
quite yet a "big firm") owed a great deal to a wide range
of phenomena, internal and 'external to the law. The
most significant factor was the growth of large, national
corporations, beginning with the railroads in the last
half of the nineteenth century, but extending by the
beginning of the twentieth to oil, mining, metals,
utilities, and finance. The three railroad defendants
(Southern Pacific, Central Pacific, and Northern) in the
Railroad Tax Cases in Federal District Court in 1883the notable cases in which Pomeroy distinguished
himself-were represented by six counsel, including the
professor, who were not in partnership with each other
and epitomized the single-practitioner or small-partner-
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ship attorney of great eminence and reputation in advocacy.9 A quarter of a century later, such a defense would
have been centered in a single large firm. Big corporations demanded the talents of big law firms that would
look out for the whole range of the corporate client's
interests. And the range was broadening: besides the
traditional branches of the law connected with proprietal and commercial concerns, the growth of gov'ernment involvement in both tax and regulatory functions, and the rapid expansion of injury matters with
which a corporation had to deal brought new complexities. Specialization, among and within firms, was
inexorable. At the same time, and because of the pressures of complexity and non-litigation business, lawyering shifted increasingly from advocacy to counselling.
The role of the corporation-client firm increasingly became a matter of intimate involvement in business policy rather than one of forensic activity. Whole areas (not
least the criminal law) in which the partnership lawyer
of the early days was expected to have some competence
and to be at least occasionally involved in disappeared
from the lawyer's function in the large firm. As Hurst
put it, citing the career of Paul D. Cravath (LL.B. Columbia, '86, of Cravath, Henderson, and De Gersdorff,
New York), the new breed of great lawyer "disciplined a
large law office, to produce a professional product of
high technical quality, through businesslike organization."lO The firm became a cohesive team rather than a
stable of brilliant individualists. Expansion in the
number of attorneys in the firm grew with coordination,
contraction in function, specialization, increased business, and every new major legislative enactment affecting business.
The first generation of Hastings graduates were in
on the ground floor of this development. Some of the
large firms that now dominate the San Francisco bar
were founded by them. Pillsbury, Madison, and Sutro
began with the one-man practice of an eminent advocate of the late nineteenth century, Evans S. Pillsbury.
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In 1889, Pillsbury hired Frank Delino Madison as his
clerk. Madison received his LL.B. at Hastings in 1892,
and in 1896 was taken into partnership by Pillsbury.
From 1896 to 1898, Pillsbury's son, Horace Davis
Pillsbury, attended Hastings, was admitted to the bar in
1898, married a Boston girl, and entered his father's
firm without taking the LL.B. The firm was quick off
the mark in appreciating the opportunities afforded by
American acquisition of the Philippines, and from 1901
to 1904 young Pillsbury teamed up to practice in Manila
with Oscar Sutro, who had been at Hastings with him
(and who also did not take the LL.B.). In 1904, the firm
in San Francisco became Pillsbury, Madison, and Sutro.
It expanded rapidly under Horace Davis Pillsbury,
Madison, Oscar Sutro, and his brother Alfred Sutro,
'94. Pillsbury was heavily involved in utilities practice,
particularly for Pacific Telephone and Telegraph and
its subsidiaries.
Out of similar small beginnings evolved the firm of
Brobeck, Phleger, and Harrison, which had a largely
Hastings origin. Peter Francis Dunne, '81, began alone
in the general practice of the law. For awhile he was in
partnership with Henry Clay McPike, ' 81, and by 1904
he was general counsel for the Southern Pacific Railroad. In 1911, Dunne joined Alexander F. Morrison,
'81, and William I. Brobeck, '92, who had been in
partnership with Judge W.B. Cope (a Hastings Director) until the latter's death in 1909. The new firm,
Morrison, Dunne, and Brobeck, lasted until 1924, when
Dunne and Brobeck-Morrison having died in 1921took in Herman Phleger, who had gone to Harvard Law
School after graduating from the University of California and practiced in the firm from his admission to the
bar in 1915. In 1925, Maurice E. Harrison,j.D. Boalt,
'07, joined the firm as he left the Hastings deanship.
Dunne formed a new partnership which lasted until his
death in 1933, and hence from 1925 the firm was
Brobeck, Phleger, and Harrison. No less distinguished
than these firms was Heller, Ehrman, White, and
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McAuliffe, which began as Heller, Powers, and Ehrman
in 1906. Emmanuel Heller, '89, and Frank H. Powers,
who had been admitted after private study in 1889,
went into partnership in 1896; Sidney Myer Ehrman,
'98, joined them in 1906 after six years with W.S. Goodfellow and Garret W. McEnerney. With the addition of
Jerome B. White, '06, and F.M. McAuliffe, who prepared in a law office, the firm has borne its present
name since 1921. Hastings men were behind other firms
which have not preserved quite so unbroken a continuity in name as the firms above but which were of
similar size and equal standing and importance.
McCutchen, Olney, Mannon, and Greene, which was
renowned in the 1920s and '30s, was driven by the
mainspring of Warren Olney, Jr., '94, who was on the
Hastings faculty from 1895 to 1901, Director from 1910
until his death in 1939, and justice of the California
Supreme Court from 1919 to 1921. Olney also was general counsel of the Western Pacific Railroad for a
number of years. William H. Orrick, '03, had been secretary to the California Code Commission, 1907-08, and
was a founding partner of a major firm of attorneys
known today as Orrick, Herrington, Rowley, and
Sutcliffe. Orrick died in 1976, but his name and the
Hastings tradition are carried on in the firm by his son
and surviving partner, Andrew Downey Orrick, '47. Indeed, a measure of how recently the great firms connected with the first generation of Hastings graduates
still enjoyed their presence as well as felt their mark is
afforded by the reflection that the deaths of William
Orrick in 1976 and of Sidney M. Ehrman in 1975
robbed their firms and Hastings of the company of distinguished men, fathers of their firms, sons of Hastings.
From its founding in 1872, there has been a distinctive link between the San Francisco Bar Association and
Hastings, for long more intimate and more pronounced
than the association's relationship to any other law
school. The first three presidents of the association,
from 1871 to 1889, were founding-Directors of Hast-
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ings: Joseph P. Hoge (the prime mover in setting up the
association), W.W. Cope, and Samuel M. Wilson. The
president of the association, 1890-91 and 1894-95-the
only two-term president-was Edward Robeson Taylor.
Director Robert Y. Hayne was president, 1896-97. Gaining the laurel of another first, Charles William Slack,
'82, was the first Hastings graduate to be president,
1900-01. Characteristically, Slack was for the association
as he was for Hastings a shaker and mover. By the turn
of the century, the association was an exclusive and very
comfortable, in every sense of the word, club of aging
lawyers; its denizens were better known for their success, wealth, and paunches than for any hot enthusiasm
for professional or civic causes. Slack's immediate predecessor, William H. Fifield, 1898-99, epitomized the
membership: fifty-five years of age, well-practiced, and
trained in a law office. Judge Slack was in vivid contrast:
aged forty-two, recently off the bench and out of the
Hastings deanship, and a graduate of a law school (the
first president of the association to be so). Slack began
the campaign for the reform of the association that bore
fruit in the next presidential tenure, that of Warren
Olney, a graduate of the University of Michigan Law
School who sent his son and namesake to Hastings.
Slack was senior vice-president under Olney, and they
were aided and abetted by the two junior vicepresidents, Henry Eickhoff, LL.B. Columbia, '75, and
August Comte, Jr., an A.B. from Harvard and successful probate lawyer. The reformers increased the
number of committees of the association, establishing
one on grievances aimed at self-policing of the bar;
pressed for more members, and by abolishing the initiation fee and reducing the monthly dues, attracted
younger lawyers and doubled the membership in a
couple of years; began agitation for more superior court
judges in the city and county (accomplished in 1903);
appointed a permanent paid secretary to give continuity
to program and to administer the quarters and library
of the association. The recent historian of the associa-
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tion says that" 1901 and 1902 are probably the two most
important years of the Association's existence ... " by
virtue of these reforms. l l The permanent secretary,
George J. Martin, from his appointment as registrar of
Hastings in 1910, provided a continuing nexus between
the association and the College until his death in 1936.
Walter B. Cope, a newly-appointed Hastings Director,
was president from 1906 to 1908. Between 1913 , when
Judge Charles A. Shurtleff, '82, became president, and
1941 when the tenure of Harry S. Young, '07, ended, of
the association's 13 presidents, eight were Hastings
graduates (Shurtleff, Beverly L. Hodghead, '91, Warren Olney, Jr., '94, Randolph V. Whiting, '95, four of
them in succession, from 1935 to 1941: Arthur W.
Brouillet, '11, John H. Riordan, '09, Hartley F. Peart,
'01, and Young) and one more, Maurice E. Harrison,
not a graduate, was a former dean. Hastings has not
done so well since: Bar Association Presidents Wallace
Sheehan, '20 (1951-52), A. Brooks Berlin, '24 (1956-57),
Ben K. Lerer, '33 (1963-64), and Charles H. Clifford,
'56 (1972-73) were graduates of Hastings, and E.R. Wallach (1975-76) is an adjunct professor of the College,
very active in reinvigorating the old Hastings-Bar tie.
Another measure of how intimate that tie was in the
quarter-century before World War II is indicated by the
fact that in 1924, of the officers and members of the
association's standing committees, 17 were without a
Hastings connection, 10 were Hastings graduates (including the president, Hodghead, the junior vice-president, and treasurer), and three past or present faculty
members. When the association again faced a crisis of
aging, it was another ex-dean of Hastings, Maurice E.
Harrison, who led the way to resolving it by creating the
Barrister's Club in 1927, a club within the association to
attract younger lawyers. In the 1920s, nearly every
member of the Hastings faculty was a member of the
association, many were in it in the 1930s, but very few
have been since the onset of the 65 Club. For a number
of reasons, perhaps not least the nonmembership of the
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faculty in the association, the relationship between Hastings and the San Francisco Bar Association became very
chilly in the 1940s and 1950s.
By Hastings' Golden Jubilee in 1928, hardly a
superior judicial bench in California had not borne the
weight of a Hastings lawyer. At one time or another,
and increasingly, Hastings men were superior court
judges in most of the better populated counties of the
state. Starting with Slack in 1891, the San Francisco
Superior Court was heavily weighted with Hastings
alumni: Slack, '82, William R. Daingerfield (no LL.B.),
Rhodes Borden, '84, Edmund P. Mogan (no LL.B.),
John J. Van Nostrand, '96, George H. Cabaniss, '84,
Marcel Cerf, '00, Adolphus E. Graupner, '97, Daniel C.
Deasy, '97, Edward P. Shortall, '96, Timothy Fitzpatrick
(no LL.B.)-with the heaviest concentration of them
first serving between 1908 and 1914. Thomas E. Haven,
'90, William H. Waste, '94, John F. Tyler, x'87-88, took
seats as justices of the district court of appeal, First Appellate District between 1918 and 1921; Frank G. Finlayson, '85, went from Los Angeles superior court to the
presiding justiceship of Division 2 of the Second Appellate District in 1919; Emerson J. Marks, '99, in 1929
became a justice of the Fourth Appellate District.
Matthew 1. Sullivan, x1878-80, in his brief tenure in
1914 as chief justice of the California Supreme Court,
was the first Hastings alumnus to attain that august position, but Alexander Melvin, '92, had become a justice in
1908 and served until 1923. Frank M. Angellotti, '82,
succeeded Sullivan as chief justice in January 1915 and
served until 1921. Warren Olney,Jr., '94, was a justice,
1919-21, and in the latter year both Charles A.
Shurtleff, '82, and Waste became justices, Shurtleff sitting until 1923. Waste became chief justice in 1925. Finlayson moved from the District Court of Appeal to the
Supreme Court in 1927. It is fair to say that in the early
part of the 1920s, when the California Supreme Court
delivered its judgment, the hand that wrote it had probably first begun to grasp the law in a Hastings classroom.
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Within its own walls, Hastings manifested its satisfaction with its graduates. By the golden jubilee year of
1928, six of the nine Directors, including the ex officio
president of the Board, the chief justice of California,
were Hastings graduates: Chief Justice William H.
Waste, '94, three members of the renowned second class
who had all held judicial office (Charles William Slack,
'82, Charles H. Shurtleff, '82, and Frank M. Angellotti,
'82), Warren Olney, Jr., '94, and Sidney M. Ehrman,
'98. William B. Bosley was LL.B. Yale, '94, Allen L.
Chickering had been at Harvard Law School, 18981900, and the representative of the Hastings line,
Joseph Fiske Catherwood, was not a lawyer. Chickering
made amends for his youthful transgression in going to
Harvard by sending his son, Allen L. Chickering, Jr., to
become a Hastings LL.B., '33. With the exception of
Catherwood (who took the seat of Hoyt Hastings, deceased, in 1926) and Chief Justice Waste (seated in January 1926), the jubilee year Board was the Board that
Maurice E. Harrison had to deal with. Harrison established an excellent working relationship with the Directors. At the outset, the Directors invited him to be
present at all their meetings, thereby initiating a practice that obtains to this day. The Directors' common
Hastings background and affection for the College,
Slack's and Olney's previous experience as faculty, and
the high legal competency of the Directors made them
well-disposed toward Harrison, who built upon their
favor by being a persuasive and assiduous administrator. He was actively involved in the San Francisco
and California State Bar Associations and he enjoyed
friendly relations with other California law school
deans, not least his old teacher and mentor at Boalt,
Orrin Kip McMurray. He was imaginative and activist in
the deanship; the Board could afford to overlook both
his lively practice at the bar and his oft-repeated desire
to quit Hastings.
Harrison was a whirlwind compared to Taylor. He
was no sooner in office than he took a hard look at
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faculty and curriculum and persuaded the Board to
make some changes. Assistant Professor Thomas A.
Thacher, who had not returned from his leave for wartime service, was let go, his course shifted to that workhorse, James A. Ballentine. George L. Bell, in a similar
situation, was also let go, and Robert L. McWilliams, a
Boalt graduate, was appointed to teach Trusts. William
M. Simmons, who succeeded Harrison as dean, was
added to the faculty as an instructor in Public Corporations in 1920. Promotion for merit was given Richard
C. Harrison, from assistant professor to professor. In
1921, a 10 percent across the board faculty salary increase was granted, the first general salary raise since
1899. Registrar George Martin was raised from $27.50
to $35.00 per month for his part-time, but demanding,
job. The raises were really insufficient, but they were
good for morale. The dean, armed with a resolution of
the Board, discouraged Hastings faculty from "giving
instruction in law schools of inferior standing .... "12
This provision was aimed at Robert W. Harrison, who
also taught at San Francisco Law School from 1907 to
1929; McWilliams was dean of the same school from
1924, and did not resign from Hastings until 1928. In
1922, Harrison secured the appointment of a special
lecturer to give four lectures in legal bibliography. And
it was Harrison who first seriously undertook the building up of the College'S own library as a matter of policy,
securing a number of gifts of books, and with Slack's
encouragement undertaking systematic purchase of reports, law reviews, and the Corpus Juris.
With the appointment of Sidney M. Ehrman, '98, to
the Board in 1922, a veritable "angel" was found for the
College. Ehrman regularly provided the money from
his own pocket for the dean to attend the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, until
1927, when Hastings was dropped from membership
in the AALS. Ehrman's munificence was aimed at
strengthening the College'S scholarly reputation. He established a fund to bring a distinguished academic
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lawyer to give an annual lecture series. The first lecturer, in April 1925, was the eminent dean of Northwestern, John W. Wigmore, who gave five lectures on
"The World's Legal System." Ehrman crowned his generosity with the establishment of the College's first chair,
the Isaias W. Hellman Professorship (in honor of Mrs.
Ehrman's father). The $30,000 gift was given in 1925,
and the first incumbent was the new dean, William M.
Simmons. The professorship has remained attached to
the deanship from its creation.
College finance did not present a major problem
during Harrison's administration. The registration fee
was raised from $40 a year to $50 in 1922, and to $75
in 1925. The Directors' solid and careful investments of
some years brought a modest yearly income. This nestegg was much increased by the investment of the
Hellman endowment, the income from which paid
about one-third of the dean's salary until the Great Depression. From 1911 to 1935, the state appropriation
remained at $18,800 for the biennium, or $9400 per
annum. The $2400 beyond the $7000 specified in the
1878 act was for rental of quarters, first in the new City
Hall, and from 1923 in the newly-constructed State
Building. In 1921-22 a supplemental appropriation of
$3000 was made for new equipment for the State Building quarters. The steady rise in enrollments-1919 (34),
1920 (89), 1921 (89), 1922 (114), 1923 (117), 1924 (112),
1925 (150)-cou pled with the increased registration fee,
provided the necessary revenue to allow the College to
do better than break even.
The figures above indicate how hard hit the College
was by the First World War. With "Normalcy," Hastings
shared moderately in the general increase in the number of people going into law. Maurice Harrison suggested to the Class of 1920 that it undertake the foundation of an alumni association. Henry Eickhoff, J 1'. and
Eugene D. Bennett of that class joined a number of
eminent graduates, including William Colby and his
wife Rachel Vrooman, Slack, Shurtleff, and Angellotti
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in the enterprise. Eickhoff was very much a leading
spirit; in 1924 he gave a generous gift of books and
periodicals to the College. The Alumni Association was
formally organized at a luncheon meeting in August
1922 during the ABA convention in San Francisco. Sidney Ehrman, the principal speaker, made a strong plea
for the creation of an endowment fund for "financially
the poorest first-class institution of its kind."13 Though
Ehrman by his own munificence blazed a bold trail,
none followed him down it. Yet the mere continued
existence of the Alumni Association had promise for the
future; it served as a source of continuity and a focal
point around which the college spirit and college pride
that infected Hastings students during the 1920s could
express itself.
Hastings could hardly aspire to the traditional
halls-of-ivy collegiate tradition of American higher education which predominated in the 1920s, no less in
California (where ivy was not encouraged) than in the
East where the ideal (and the ivy) had taken root. Bereft
of campus, a tenant-at-will at one end of one floor of a
badly designed, architecturally pretentious government
building set down in an urban viscus surrounded by
areas already showing signs of inexorable decay, Hastings was not even a suitcase college-it was a lunch-box
college. Its students commuted considerable distances,
by trolley from the other parts of the City as far out as
the Sunset District, by ferry from the East Bay. Between
8 and 11 in the morning, Monday through Saturday,
there was an educational institution in action; as the sun
reached its highest altitude, the institution melted away.
Faculty went back to their practices. Students went to
work in law offices, banks, shipping companies, brokerage houses, and stores where they gained the wherewithal to continue study. There was only one scholarship at
Hastings, no loan funds, no means of support other
than what the student had or could acquire. Estimates
vary, but probably nine out of ten Hastings students in
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the 1920s worked for a living. A constant refrain in
student memories of the period was the heavy burden
of work on the job, the sandwich grabbed on the run,
long hours behind a desk, the tiring trip home at the
end of the day. Study was sandwiched in at odd
moments; you could always tell a Hastings student on
the ferry or the trolley at rush hour because he had his
nose in a casebook. There was little free time; Hastings
students didn't yet qualify for inclusion in Thorstein
Veblen's "leisure class." Saturday afternoon at the ballgame was a major recreation. One lady graduate of the
Class of '29 recalls that her "most poignant memory of
entering Hastings was the leaving of the swimming pool
at UC Berkeley."14 The YMCA wasn't too far away from
the State Building (and it still s'rves Hastings students
for relaxation), but classes all morning and 1-5 pm at
work left little time even for a quick dip.
In this unpromising ambience a social life flourished. Like everything else about Hastings of that day, it
was sandwiched in-somewhere-between everything
else. Five enterprising, aspiring Chrysostoms (including
Edward Mancuso, '29, who would long serve as
San Francisco's Public Defender) founded the Eunomathia Debating Society in 1927 to hone forensic
skills. This was the latest of six student societies in which
the College's social life centered. The four fraternities
and one sorority were professional societies, not residential organizations, and with Eunomathia were the
principal formal vehicle for student activities and student camaraderie. There was no hazing. The societies
were not very exclusive. Some 60 percent of the students belonged to them in the later 1920s. The oldest,
the Pomeroy Inn of Phi Delta Phi, was established in
1883. Phi Alpha Delta's Jackson Temple Chapter was
set up at Hastings in 1911. Sigma Delta Kappa and
Sigma N u chapters both made their appearance at Hastings in 1926. Because there were so few women students, Kappa Beta Pi sorority (founded 1924) was the
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least exclusive of these student groups. The Greek
societies put on "affairs," very formal dinners given at
exclusive hotels and country clubs. Since most of the
students were single (this was an age when one "got an
education and got ajob" before embarking on the marital ship), these affairs were well attended and always
looked forward to with great pleasure. The Volstead
Act notwithstanding, gin usually ended up in almost
everyone's water glass before the evening was over. The
graduating class had a "stag dinner" to which the
women students were welcome, provided they could
bear up under being the cynosure of all male eyes. The
jokes were never particularly risque. The one truly
male-only affair was the annual graduation "smoker,"
which was sometimes noisy but not wild, since the dean
presided over it with an eagle eye. The Greek societies
were also responsible for creating and maintaining a
student government, complete with officers, the principal function of which was to advance "school spirit."
Grievances were either few or not widely felt. In March
1928, Hazel Utz, '29, was elected the first woman student body president. Hazel Utz Lancaster claims that it
was all a joke, and that she turned the office over to
Frank Parker, '29, her opponent at the hustings, who
had more time and money than she to devote to the
office. However, the newspapers' announcement of her
election were widely read and brought a congratulatory
letter from Clara Shortridge Foltz.
The moot court activity connected with the upper
classes and studying for examinations created some
camaraderie and a degree of intimacy among students.
A certain formality obtained otherwise, and students
addressed each other as Mister and Miss. By the third
year a class was on first-name terms, and the anticipation of parting gave a special urgency to amity. Strong
friendships were forged that lasted for lifetimes. A class
was small enough for every member of it to know every
classmate. It is amazing how well, a half century later,
alumni can recall something about most of their fellow
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students. The recurrmg theme among students from
this period is the sense of common commitment to
learning the law and preparing to practice the law.
Some saw the Hastings experience as a matter of business, considered Hastings to be a "business organization" (and a good one) directed to a business end. All
believed that nothing was lost by the want of social frills
and lack of ivy-collegialism. This picture of the professionalism of the students might have gained something
over the course of long professional careers, from the
vantage of fond retrospect. But a genuine satisfaction
was more apparent than dissatisfaction. The students
respected their teachers for their professional practitioners' competence. The students were convinced
that they were learning the law. They did not feel compelled to voice the trite phrase that they were learning
"how to think like lawyers." This notion, a creation of
the Langdellians, might once have been a significant
conceptual breakthrough in legal education, but it has
always eluded analysis and perhaps been pitched too
high as a claim to stand the test of reality. Hastings
students were convinced that they were learning how to
practice the law, and the law-office work that most of
the students undertook during their three years at Hastings seemed to them time well spent. There were immediate benefits that derived from their jobs, such as
access to the office library, which supplemented the
woeful lack of books in the College library and reduced
dependence on the overcrowded San Francisco Law Library. But above all, there was the experience of putting
into practice almost daily, under the eye (always benevolent in retrospect) of the "boss," what was being learned
in the cramped and airless classrooms at Hastings. That
experience, with the formal class work, added up to a
sound legal education. The subsequent success of most
of those young men and young women provided real
testimony to the excellence of the total Hastings education.
The students from those "Roaring Twenties" recall
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Hastings with affection and pride. They were soon to
taste the bitter, hard years of the Great Depression; it
took less than a decade for the 1920s to appear as the
Golden Age. Yet who can deny that it was indeed the
Golden Age? "Youth, what man's age is like to be doth
show/ We may our ends by our beginnings know."15
Good youths, good ends: Aurea Aetas.

!
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ON

THE WHOLE, the fortunes of
higher education in America have followed the country's economy. The 1920s saw a bullish economy and a
relative upsurge of prosperity for colleges, universities,
and specialized professional educational institutions;
the 1930s were bearish, and for institutions of higher
education very nearly catastrophic. In this, though, as in
other instances, Hastings College of the Law was something of a deviant from the mean. The 1920s brought
very little real financial betterment for the College. On
the other hand, the 1930s found Hastings in a less parlous position than most other law schools on the West
Coast, or for that matter in the country as a whole. This
is not to underestimate the threat of the Depression,
only to emphasize that Hastings weathered a prolonged
tempest that sank a number oflaw schools and sore hurt
others for a long season. It would be satisfying to be able
to say that it was the dean's superior administrative skill
and the Directors' assiduous and devoted attention to
the needs of the College that enabled the College to
survive so well. However, this was not entirely the case.
Dean William M. Simmons (1925-40) and the Board of
Directors were not unmindful of their responsibilities or
ineffectual in discharging them, but their efforts were
not extraordinary or extraordinarily successful. Rather,
Hastings continued in what today's academic adminis-
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trators term a "steady state," that is, no significant
growth or palpable erosion took place in faculty numbers or normal expansion of program. Hastings grew in
numbers of students only slowly over the 1920s, enjoyed
a sudden, even spectacular, increase in the early 1930s,
and managed to maintain a good enrollment until the
end of the Terrible Thirties. During the period between
the wars, the College faced vigorous challenges from
other law schools, some its peers and others its inferiors,
many of them close to home; it was attacked by outside
interests, some national, bent on the reform of legal
education in America; it was treated like a stepchild by
the University of California. What saved Hastings College of the Law was its clientele, those students who in
good times and bad had no other alternative for the
acquisition of a legal education. They kept faith with
faculty and Board when all others seemed set against
the College. No noble motive need be ascribed them;
enlightened self-interest and necessity set them on that
course. Yet they remained proud of Hastings, and in
the College's first bitter taste of adversity the students
were supportive and committed. As the Witch in Macbeth prophesi~d:
Though his bark cannot be lost,
Yet it shall be tempest-tost
[l.iii.2S]

Hastings sailed on unsinkable, thanks in greatest part to
the loyalty of its students.
On May 1, 1925, the Board of Directors appointed
William Marvin Simmons Dean of Hastings College of
the Law, and conferred upon him the just-established
Isaias W. Hellman Professorship of Law. Simmons,
forty years of age, had served on the faculty since September 1920, teaching Public Service Corporations,
Conflict of Laws, Mortgages, and Pleading and
Practice-all second- and third-year courses, two of
them "new" courses that had come into American law
school curricula only since" the eve of World War I. As
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dean, he taught first-year Property (course II, Real
Property), as well as the more specialized upperclass
courses.
The appointment of Simmons constituted a break
with tradition and proved to be a precedent. The search
committee that recommended his appointment consisted of Directors Sidney M. Ehrman and William B.
Bosley and Dean Maurice E. Harrison. Never before
had a non-Director served in this role, and indeed,
never has one since, because Harrison was the last dean
who did not die in office. More significantly, Simmons
was the first of an unbroken succession of deans who
were appointed from within the faculty and virtually
handpicked by the preceding dean. A close friendship
developed between Harrison and Simmons. They were
about the same age, of similar personality, had gotten to
know each other in San Francisco practice, and were
gentlemen of genuine cultural interests. Simmons,
though he had no formal rank other than that of assistant professor, appears to have been Harrison's strong
right arm. It was natural for a committee of which Harrison was a member to move for Simmons' appointment
as dean. What is most striking about the appointment is
that Simmons was to be paid the relatively large salary
of $6000 (a generosity made possible by the Hellman
chair), and while he was to hold it during the Board's
pleasure, there was no explicit prohibition against his
taking part in outside activities, including practice. In
fact, Simmons was also the first in an unbroken succession of deans who really were full time, without significant outside activity save of a temporary or voluntary
nature, who devoted their entire waking hours to the
operation of the College. This was a departure which
has never been deviated from since.
Simmons was an Iowan and a graduate of a small
Iowa liberal arts college, Cornell College at Mt. Vernon.
He received his LL. B. at Harvard in 1911, was admitted
that same year in California, and practiced first in the
legal department of the Western Pacific Railroad before
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going into partnership in a private practice in the City.
In May 1917 he answered the call to the colors, arrived
in France with the AEF, went into action in the early
engagements, and was wounded. For Bill Simmons, as
for so many other young Americans of his day, the
peculiar horrors ofthe Great War on the Western Front
left an indelible impression-rarely did he fail to give a
sobering and moving homily to a first-year class at Hastings on the dreadful wastefulness of war. In 1919 he
was discharged with the rank of captain. Before returning home, he had, like a number of young American
soldiers who were at loose ends after the Armistice was
signed, availed himself of the Army's offer to finish out
his service in a European university for a few months of
study (and good fun) in early 1919. Some preferred the
Mediterranean blandishments of the U niversite de
Montpelier, but Bill Simmons went to Oriel College,
Oxford, sharing rooms with four other Yanks. With his
interest in literature and history, young Simmons found
the sojourn enjoyable and broadening. He returned to
practice in San Francisco in 1919, and took up the Hastings instructorship shortly afterwards. An extremely diligent and hardworking teacher and administrator, he
kept an open door at all times to his faculty and students. He never married, and like many academic
bachelors, he found his college a substitute for a household. His very presence provided continuity to the College. Everyone stood in awe of his broad learning and
cultivated conversation. He was a dapper dresser, always dignified and soft-spoken, but without a trace of
arrogance or side. "Elegant" is the word that is most
often used to describe him by those who remember him.
He had a piercing eye, a strong, even stern gaze that was
sometimes unnerving, especially to one with a guilty
conscience. He was eminently fair and just. He was not a
particularly inspiring teacher. Always competent, he did
not brook any nonsense in class; a student who was one
minute late arriving for class found the door locked.
Over the course of his fifteen years as dean, Simmons
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became a beloved figure. His successor, who was not
given to excessive praise of any other mortal being, delivered a eulogy after Simmons' early death at fifty-five
that was genuinely deepfelt and moving.
The relations of Simmons with the Board of Directors were harmonious and even warm. The Board
underwent very little change during his tenure, and
Simmons managed to obtain what he wished from it.
Bosley, Ehrman, and Slack were the commanding Directors, and they held Simmons in high esteem. The
Board delegated almost all responsibility to the dean;
there is no hint that they ever saw cause to regret it.
Adversity, the challenges from without the walls, drew
dean and Board closer together.
By temperament, Simmons was not a fighter. He
was almost too academic, cultured, and dignified. The
Biblical adage, that the gentle answer turneth away
wrath, was invariably followed by Simmons in any controversy in which he found himself (always regretfully)
engaged. Perhaps such gentleness, such unstudied civility, was a good form of defense. The College's detractors should, one senses in retrospect, have been
made to smart some. That was not Simmons' way. Still,
he never gave a handle to the detractors. Never was his
personality caught up in battle. Never was his image
confused with that of the College. In the process he
maintained internal peace, a certain equanimity of
routine that allowed the College to function very largely
unbuffeted by the waves that were washing against it.
He was neither ignorant of nor insensitive to the
danger. He was well aware of how seriously the challengers were eroding the College's position and reputation.
But he recognized the financial limitations within which
the College must function, and believing discretion the
best part of valor, he worked steadily from within at
least to maintain the College as an institution providing
sound training for the practice of the law. It was a fulltime job. It was an onerous and killing task. The repeated blows he took, thereby shielding the College
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from them, led him to an early grave. A week after his
sudden death from a massive stroke in July 1940, the
Board expressed its
profound regret for his untimely death, its appreciation for
the fine service that he has rendered the College and his
country, and for the consequent loss to the College .... 1

The Board rightly mourned the passing of a good and
faithful servant.
Between 1878, when Hastings came into existence,
and 1920, 99 law schools had been founded that were
still in operation in 1920. These law schools virtually
covered the country. They ranged from prestigious
major university law schools through law schools of
smaller universities, individual colleges oflaw, and some
so-called "universities" that were only law schools, to
part-time or evening law schools. During the same
period, about half as many law schools as still existed in
1920 had come and gone, most of them disappearing
without a trace, a very few of them merged with other
essentially proprietary schools or else absorbed by a
state or private university. One result of the proliferation of law schools was the rapid disappearance of the
old method of legal training, "reading law" in the law
office, especially in the more urbanized areas of the
country. Significantly, by the second decade ofthe twentieth century, urban bar associations, many state bar associations, and the American Bar Association had come
to be dominated by younger lawyers, and the majority
of these Young Turks were law school graduates. About
1910, the American Bar Association (which was as old as
Hastings) began to manifest considerable uneasiness
about the competence of practicing attorneys and the
quality oflegal education. These were, of course, closely
linked, complementary concerns. The disquiet grew less
from any real perception of the failings of the legal
profession than from recognition of how methodically,
effectively, and advantageously, in terms of both professional probity and profits, the American Medical
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Association was organizing doctors and influencing
medical education for the better. The Bar Association's
response to the problem was vague, and directed toward restructuring the Association, stimulating greater
activity in its functions, increasing membership, and
exploring means to assure a higher minimum standard
of professional competency both in legal education and
at the time of admission to the bar. Rather surprisingly,
the ABA was not as concerned with the inadequacy of
law-office training as with the shortcomings of law
school programs. Part of the explanation for this lay in
the general acceptance of the imminent disappearance of
law-office training; little was to be gained by flogging a
dying horse. Part, probably the larger part, of the explanation lay in the efficacious intervention of that first
great private foundation zealous in public causes which
was prototypical of all those institutions which have become such a characteristic part of American learning
and culture, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. To a foundation of such august
interests, law-office training was beneath notice.
The Scottish-born Pittsburgh steel-magnate of
purposeful eccentricity and enormous wealth, Andrew
Carnegie, established the foundation with an endowment of $10,000,000, and in 1906 appointed Henry S.
Pritchett its first president. Carnegie was a strenuous
advocate of technological education; himself deprived
of virtually all formal education, he was a self-made
capitalist whose philanthropy was consistently devoted
to education, in part from the yearning to accord to
others what he had been denied, in part because he
recognized more clearly than anyone of his generation
that education was the foundation of economic growth
in the industrial society. In 1900 Carnegie endowed the
Carnegie Institute of Technology in his home bailiwick,
Pittsburgh, to give practical expression to his conviction.
Shortly afterwards, he warmly supported discussions
for merger between Harvard and a neighboring undergraduate technical college with a high-sounding name,
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the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The promerger forces at both institutions envisioned MIT as
becoming a graduate school of engineering, part of
Harvard. The president of MIT from 1900 to 1906,
against an overwhelming negative vote of his faculty,
the student body, and the almost violent sentiments of
the college'S alumni, almost pulled off the merger. Only
the judgment of the courts dashed the union by preventing MIT from selling its existing property to pay
for new buildings to be constructed on Harvard property. The MIT president had argued that:
Everything points to the fact that we are in a transition stage,
and that a new step must soon be taken in this country in
technical education: either the courses must be lengthened or
some of the strongest schools become graduate schools, or
some other means must be taken to meet the changing demands for education and for research in technical schools. 2

MIT President Henry S. Pritchett may have lost the
argument, despite such persuasive perspicacity, but he
had won the friendship and admiration of Andrew
Carnegie. By appointing Pritchett president of the Carnegie Foundation, Carnegie gave him the position, the
support, and the opportunity to attempt to work his
educational revolution on a national scale.
Pritchett graduated from a mediocre college in his
native Missouri in 1875. But he received a thorough
grounding in mathematics and adequate training in astronomy. Early service as a government astronomer, including a great deal of field-observation, brought him a
chair and the directorship of the Washington University
observatory in St. Louis in 1883. In 1894 he entered the
ranks of that new breed of American academics who in
his generation dominated American science; in that
year he received the Ph.D. from the University of
Munich. This was formative of his approach to education. The "new professor" was to be not an autodidact,
but a research scholar meticulously trained to the highest technological perfection possible. Dr. Pritchett in
1897 became director of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic
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Survey and reorganized the old Federal Bureau of
Weights and Measures into the truly scientific research
establishment that still exists, the U.S. Bureau of Standards. As president of the Carnegie Foundation, he recruited his own kind. His chief assistant was a young
graduate of Johns Hopkins (the American "German"
university) and Harvard, with a year of postgraduate
study at Berlin under his belt when he joined the enterprise in 1908: Abraham Flexner. Flexner, too, was a
Westerner, a product of that remarkable community of
"long-established Jewish merchants and intellectuals in
Louisville, Kentucky, which also produced Justice Louis
Brandeis. Flexner was a Classicist whose uncompromising fidelity to modernistic German educational notions
appeared to his fellow Classicists to amount to apostasy.
He pioneered the abolition of Classics in American high
school education in a New York experimental school
established in 1917 under his influence; Greek Furies
descended upon him! A further frontier, Colorado,
produced Alfred Zantzinger Reed, whose father was a
country doctor prepared to finance a Harvard and Columbia education for his son. Reed received his Ph.D. in
politics at Columbia in 1911; in 1913, he joined the
Carnegie staff with a special interest in legal education.
Pritchett, Flexner, and Reed had a great deal in common. None of them had been born into the Eastern
intellectual and cultural establishment, but all were
products of German higher education or its American
imitators, the imitators being confined almost entirely to
the Eastern seaboard. None of them had any real
classroom experience in implementing German postgraduate educational methods. Pritchett had come
closest while at St. Louis, but Washington University was
not an adequate forum for innovation in the German
mode. Neither Flexner nor Reed had taught at the university level; their teaching experience had been at the
high-school level, and Reed spent the eleven years preceding his Carnegie debut as a private tutor in New
York City. None of them saw the classroom again after
joining Carnegie.
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Flexner delivered the Carnegie Foundation's first
great bombshell in 1910 in the renowned Bulletin no.
4, Medical Education in the United States and Canada. 3 The
manifesto, crammed with facts, exposed every weakness
in contemporary medical school education. It received
great publicity; its effect was considerable. The AMA
took it to heart, even though Flexner was not a physician. Encouraged, the foundation decided to turn its
pitiless light on the legal profession. Reed, "whose previous training had been acquired in the field of politics
or government, rather than in that of its technical subdivision, professionallaw,"4 was chosen to illuminate the
dark recesses of Justitia's untidy house.
Reed's self-description, quoted above, is revealing.
Law was merely a "technical subdivision" of government. Therefore, to borrow an old legal maxim, MaJus
continet minus (The greater contains the less), Reed could
consider himself qualified to inform the legal profession
what it must do to reform itself. Also, the use of the
term "technical"-which has the effect of making
the lawyer an engineer of the purer science of
government-was quite in keeping with the socialscientific emphasis of the German conception of learning and knowledge. It was a concept the Carnegie
savants had imbibed, represented, and intended to implement across the board in American education. Reed
was very proud that Flexner had pointed the way in the
medical education manifesto for the reform of all professional education. That the lawyers "might profitably
learn from physicians how to improve their own system
of education"5 was posited on the unquestioned assumption that the role, and therefore the training, of
physicians and lawyers differed only in one significant
way: there was a "public" dimension to the activities and
the aspirations of lawyers that was irrelevant to physicians. The legal profession was the cradle of politicians,
and in a democracy it was essential to assure all classes
and kinds of people easy access to the profession to
prevent the stranglehold of aristocratic monopoly. The
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perceived difference between the professions was understood to be one of degree, not of kind, and one
which, with a bit of professional reorganization, could
be provided for. It certainly was not so serious as to
prevent the application of the perfect method, growing
from the perfect education afforded by German scienticism, to the reform of legal education as effectually as it
had been applied to medical education. Armed thus
with the perfect method, Alfred Zantzinger Reed would
be no less the Old Testament Prophet calling the chosen
people of the legal profession back to probity.
There was more of Jeremiah than of Elijah in Reed.
His fate was to lament the ingratitude and misunderstanding of those whom he had come to save rather
than to receive the apotheosis of translation into heaven
before the wondering eyes of the people whom he had
delivered out of spiritual bondage! The legal profession
greeted his crusade with mild interest, some derision,
and considerable reluctance to fall in behind his banner.
He began his jeremiad for the reform of legal education
in the foundation's annual report for 1915, and maintained it in the same vehicle annually to 1925, and
thereafter in the annual Review of Legal Education to
1934. His manifesto for reform appeared in 1921 as
Training for the Public Profession of the Law, Bulletin no.
15 of the foundation. It was all too much like Flexner's
manifesto of a decade earlier for the reform of medical
education, though it was less well written, far longer,
less decisive. Despite his promises and protests to the
contrary, Reed failed to comprehend the force and the
extent of the "public" nature of the legal profession; the
blueprint was really Flexner's. More significantly, Reed
advanced no major thesis for systematic development.
In a work that was more a mammoth than a manifesto
(420 pages of text, 49 pages of appendices), a great
thread of analytical development was essential. Reed intended that the history of American legal education
would furnish the line. An historian cannot quarrel with
the argument that the "underlying causes that have
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made it [American legal education] what it is to-day determine also the broad lines within which future development is possible."6 But there was entirely too much
history in the book, so much that it deserves the devastating criticism made of history, that it is only one damn
thing after another. Congeries of facts and many digressions robbed the manifesto of punch. Admittedly, a
subsequent bulletin (which appeared, belatedly, in
1928) was intended to cover the contemporary period in
detail. However, there was too much treasure piled up
here to warrant such small-change in the conclusions.
Reed argued that there were three types of law
schools in existence in 1921: the school "rooted in our
colleges and universities which, teaching national law by
the case method, is destined to produce a minority of
our actual legal practitioners, but textbooks for all"; 7 the
school of part-time teachers teaching full-time students
essentially local law, and this without a university context or the higher admissions standards required by the
university law school; the school of part-time teachers
and part-time students, otherwise hardly distinguishable from the type immediately preceding. A fourth
school, with a program of less than the three years full
time or four years part time that obtained in the three
foregoing types still existed but was, he prophesied correctly, going to disappear. Grudgingly, he accepted the
political and social necessities for these three types, albeit his ideal was the first type, reformed to be even
more rigorous. Reed saw no way of getting rid of the
part-time (evening) school responsive to the individual
and community "demand that participation in the making and administration of the law shall be kept accessible
to Lincoln's plain people."8 To solve the problem of how
to protect the consumer of legal services from incompetent practitioners, he proffered the sensible suggestion
that all three types of schools be encouraged to attain
their optimum potentials for training, and added the
quixotic suggestion that the legal profession be
transformed into a "differentiated profession" of a

Maurice Edward Harrison
(Courtesy of Mrs. Donald B. Campbell)

William Marvin Simmons
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"functionally divided bar," in which differentiation and
function would be determined by the type of law school
from which the lawyer came. The best law schools, the
university law schools, would produce graduates prepared to practice in any aspect oflaw (there was the hint
of specialization in such practice); the products of the
"superficial schools" would be fit (and fitted) to trial
work, conveyancing, probate matters, and criminal law
only. Though he did not say so explicitly, Reed had in
mind the English example of a bifurcated profession.
The business left to the product of the poorer education
would be that of the English solicitor, assuming trial
work to mean advocacy in inferior courts. What Reed
overlooked was that in England, though professional
education for the barrister and the solicitor was different, the standard of legal training required for each was
roughly the same; if anything, perhaps more rigorous
for the solicitor. Reed's proposed solution was astounding. He meant less to reform legal education than to
transform the legal profession. Like Jeremiah, he did
not quail before the magnitude of his task.
Though Reed found recruiting difficult, he did not
stop beating the drum. He believed the moment was
ripe for as revolutionary a change as he suggested.
After all, Reed had been hired because in 1913 the
ABA's Committee on Legal Education and Admission
to the Bar had approached Pritchett for just such a
study as Flexner had provided for the AMA. The five
able, younger lawyers composing that committee were
the stalwarts for the revitalization of the ABA; four of
them were academic lawyers. 9 Unfortunately for the
Carnegie reformers, Reed was all too thorough, too
concerned with historical foundations, too committed
to having all the data in hand, too much the model of
German scienticism. The ABA reformers were not
ready to tarry for his massive manifesto. By the time it
was published, Reed's potential troops, including the
committee that had issued the invitation to Pritchett,
had enlisted under a less shrill and more professional

212

Challengers Without

marshall, Pomeroy's old student, Elihu Root. Indeed,
the committee, following the strategy suggested by one
of its members, William Draper Lewis, dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, conspired to offer
the aged, illustrious Root his baton. In 1920, the ABA
created a special committee to be appointed by and to be
under the chairmanship of Root to recommend ways of
assuring better candidates for admission to the bar.
Root wisely appointed all nonacademic lawyers to it, excepting only Lewis. While the committee had available
the draft of Reed's manifesto, it went ahead with its
recommendations to the ABA without waiting for the
book's publication. Moreover, it categorically and chillingly rejected Reed's prime and revolutionary proposal, t~e "differentiated" profession:
With this position we do not agree. In spite of the diversity of
human relations with respect to which the work of lawyers is
done, the intellectual requisites are substantiailY the same. 10

The Root Committee's reasoning was sound but superfluous; hardly a voice was raised in support of Reed's
notion, which was universally condemned as elitist.
What satisfaction Reed found in the committee's
report was limited wholly to the considerable-but
hardly revolutionary-recommendations for improved
education in law schools adopted by the ABA in August
1921. The report deserves our attention. To this day,
the standards of our law schools remain founded on it,
and any developments, innovations, and improvements
of those standards have been merely in degree. The
ABA declared that it was "of the opinion that every
candidate for admission to the bar shall give evidence of
graduation from a law school ... " that met four requirements: 1. admission only upon two or more years
of college, 2. a three-year curriculum for full-time students or a proportionally longer course equivalent in
number of working hours for part-time students, 3. an
"adequate library" for student use, 4. a "sufficient
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number" of full-time teachers.u The ABA urged the
abolition of the privilege of direct admission to the bar
upon graduation from a law school and urged the examination of every candidate by "public authority" to
determine fitness for admission. The ABA's recentlyestablished Council on Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar was directed to publish, from time-to-time, a
list oflaw schools complying with the four-point criteria,
and to make it available to prospective law students. The
president of the ABA and the council were to cooperate
with state and local bar associations to urge the states to
adopt the requirements specified for admission to the
bar. Finally, the council was charged to summon a national conference on legal education, with delegates
from state and local bar associations, to attempt to unite
the various bodies in support of the adoption of the
requirements. The conference, held in 1922, adopted
the ABA's standards with only a slight weakening of the
admissions requirement by accepting work equivalent to
two years of college. In the event, it was a long time
before the states accepted the ABA standards in toto.
The quality of legal education was not dramatically improved in the wake of the ABA's reform.
Reed took hard the rejection of his notion of a "differentiated" profession. It was bad enough that the
ABA, which after all was dominated by practitioners
and could be expected to be hidebound, "contemptuously dismissed" the idea;12 but Reed had hoped for
something better from the academic lawyers' own organization. The Association of American Law Schools
had been in advance of the profession as a whole in its
concern with legal education. Founded in 1900, it had
grown in influence and purposefulness. Though closely
linked to the ABA, the AALS was autonomous and,
until the second decade of the century, much more
active than the professional association. But the
academic lawyers did not take any better to Reed's revolutionary suggestion than did the practitioners. In
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1921, the AALS president, Prof. Arthur L. Corbin of
Yale, damned the notion of differentiation in his address. 13 In 1923, almost as if to add insult to injury, the
AALS accepted evening schools for membership, a radical departure from the growing exclusivity of the Association that had led to Hastings' expulsion a few years
before for inadequate library resources. The AALS,
feeling compelled to make common cause with the ABA
in the matter of educational standards, accepted the
minimalist criteria of the professioJ;lal association, albeit
without much enthusiasm and not for very long.
Reed' found himself isolated, a' prophet with diminished honor everywhere, a general without a host.
He continued the struggle for higher standards in the
annual review of legal education until 1935, when it
came under the auspices of the ABA and the editorship
of a Boalt graduate, Will Shafroth, who was much more
temperate than Reed. The annual review provided
much useful information. It was also a dreary reminder
year after year of how little progress was being made
towards large scale reform. Still, Reed did not discourage easily; his righteousness remained undiminished.
He had one more bolt to hurl, in the form of the study
of the contemporary state of law schools, the follow up
promised in the volume on historical background published in 1921.
Reed's Carnegie Bulletin no. 21, Present-Day Law
Schools in the United States and Canada (1928), implicitly
castigated the profession for approaching the "educational and professional problem" of weak legal education "in a spirit of making difficulties" rather than of
"scientific enquiry."14 It was no call to reform the
profession--only the law schools. Reed pinned his
hopes on the university law school, both as showing the
way to sound education and also as a behemoth that
might roll over, crush, and extirpate bad law schools.
The 1928 study is not so easily tolerant as the 1921
study had been of the school of part-time teachers and
full-time students outside a university context, or of the

Challengers Without

215

school of part-time teachers and part-time students.
Reed was especially critical of the five law schools (out of
III university-connected schools) which, "although
bound to the university connection, possess, either
through legislation or by contract, powers or privileges
of which they cannot without their own consent be deprived."15 These anomalous institutions were, of course,
in a position to withstand the healthy ministrations. of
saving grace that the nominally-related university might
confer. Cincinnati Law School, Albany Law School, St.
Lawrence University (New York), and the law faculty of
the University of Denver might well have been considered to have the seeds of redemption in them; at least
Reed described them always without censoriousness and
occasionally with praise. But Hastings College of the
Law seemed beyond salvation, like Jeremiah's kingdom
of Judah:
The sin of Judah is written with a pen of iron, and with the
point of a diamond: it is graven upon the table of their heart,
and upon the horns of your altars; whilst their children remember their altars and their groves by the green trees upon
the high hills. Ueremiah 17: 1-2]

Reed's description of Hastings, longer than that of any
one of the other five schools, was a diatribe. 16 Hastings
was a "highly anomalous institution" with respect to its
organization, established by a "carelessly drawn act"
which its founder "lived to regret," a college "lacking
the usual attributes of a corporation," over which the
University of California "was accorded no control, other
than that which it might secure from its power to defeat,
or at least to refer to the courts, terms of affiliation of
which it might disapprove." Despite this and the rejection of affiliation by the Hastings Board, the school has
been "consistently announced in the University catalogues as an affiliated college, and University degrees
are conferred upon its graduates .... " Whether the
1918 constitutional amendment giving full power to the
Regents over the University empowered either the Re-
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gents or the legislature to "dispense with the selfperpetuating Hastings Board of Directors, as a permanent feature of the University organization, only the
courts can decide." The whole ended with a barely concealed note of disapproval that "another law school
(officially known as the 'School of Jurisprudence') is
maintained on the University grounds in Berkeley."
Reed's intemperate blast was not the work of a day.
In 1918 he had done a first draft of the treatment of
Hastings, against the 1921 study; this was not published
because the 1921 study was restricted to the historical
background. This draft was even more inflammatory
against Hastings than the final draft for the 1928 study,
which was ready by the summer of 1926. In 1918 Reed
had noted pointedly that the College had been dropped
from the AALS in 1916 for want of a library. The 1918
draft also described Boalt as a "rival law school (disguised under the title of Department of J urisprudence),"17 and this went forward into the draft for the
1928 book. But the 1918 draft contained a long paragraph that was a call to the Regents of the University to
take over Hastings, which Reed omitted from the new,
final draft. For reasons that are not clear, Reed, during
a meeting at Washington, gave Orrin Kip McMurray,
the Boalt dean, a copy of the paragraphs on Hastings.
The new draft contained the same disparaging reference to Boalt, but McMurray's outrage went further. He
sent copies of the draft to President W.W. Campbell and
Vice-Presidents W.M. Hart and Robert Gordon Sproul
of the University, suggesting that it be referred to the
Regents' attorney, voicing concern that in such an "intricate" matter it "would be unfortunate if anything that
Mr. Reed should say might tend to crystallize opinion in
an erroneous way."18 Campbell sent the file to Regent
Garret W. McEnerney (a prominent San Francisco attorney), the Regents' attorney also saw the file, and
McEnerney recommended that Dean Simmons of Hastings be given the file. McEnerney agreed with Campbell
that there seemed to be "animus on the part of the
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writer [Reed]."19 McMurray then showed Simmons the
Reed draft. McMurray had already written Reed making specific suggestions of items that should be toned
down or omitted altogether. He took strong exception
to the reference to Boalt as "disguised" etc.; Reed ultimately dropped it. Further, McMurray urged Reed to
reconsider the statement that the state would have to
return Hastings' endowment to his heirs if the College
should cease to exist (the statement did appear in 1928
anyway). McMurray noted that "there has been no discussion, so far as I know, concerning the possibility of
the disincorporation of Hastings College, though in recent years there has been an increasing tendency on the
part of legal members of our Board of Regents to raise
questions concerning the affiliation."20 He loyally noted
that Sidney M. Ehrman had recently given a large gift to
Hastings and intended to provide further support,
indicative of the interest of Hastings' trustees in the College. Dean Simmons, having had an opportunity to digest Reed's diatribe, on June 28, 1926 wrote Reed a
civil, but direct letter pointing out inaccuracies in the
draft (which were, in fact, few) and objecting strenuously to the "general tone of the article .... " With justice and correctness, Simmons noted:
I do not believe that any fair minded and intelligent person
can read this article as it stands without gaining the impression that it casts a serious reflection upon Hastings and to a
certain extent upon the University as well and at least suggests
that unharmonious relations exist between the Board of Directors of the College and the Board of Regents .... Again, it
seems inappropriate to suggest unsatisfactory relations between the Board of Directors and the Board of Regents when
those Boards themselves have been able to function together
harmoniously and without friction. 21

Simmons sent a blind copy of his letter to Campbell;
indeed, Simmons apparently held off sending it until
Hart and McEnerney had read it and advised Campbell
to tell Simmons to mail it. Hart and McEnerney further
advised Campbell to raise the matter with President
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Pritchett of the Carnegie Foundation. Their sensitivity
was less to the rough treatment of Hastings than to the
im plicit condemnation of the University for not taking
steps to rid itself of the embarrassment of that "highly
anomalous institution," its San Francisco "affiliate."
Campbell's wire to Pritchett respectfully requested
reconsideration of the Reed draft. Campbell pointed
out that many able and successful attorneys had graduated from Hastings, and that it "is an institution with
good faculty and administered successfully in behalf of
an excellent student body made up largely of men and
women working in San Francisco law offices."22 The
allusion to the law-office work of Hastings students gave
Pritchett a handle with which to excoriate Hastings in
his reply.23 The University offered legal education on
"different educationallevels"-Boalt at a "higher level,"
and Hastings at a "lower level." Such a "dual standard"
did not fit the "conception of University teaching." If
Hastings was a good school, then why a second school at
Berkeley? If Boalt "represents the university conception
of Law education it is difficult to reconcile the maintenance of a school on a lower level with the ideal of
intellectual integrity." That Hastings students worked in
law offices and that Hastings had able graduates were
considerations that might be equally applicable to
medicine, engineering, or any other vocational instruction. Pritchett was alarmed that with so many pressing
into law, society could not be sure that those admitted
were of ability and high character. Experience showed
"that on the whole a high intellectual requirement for
admission is' the safest method for exclusion of the
unfit." Finally, Pritchett noted that the Foundation's
interest was only to set forth "as accurate a statement of
the facts as can be had ... " so that "after these facts
have been agreed on we may preach a little sermon
concerning them." What is not clear a half-century later
is why Hastings was singled out to provide the text for
the Prophets' sermon.
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Pritchett had California connections: his wife was
the daughter of that legendary early California lawyer,
Hall McAllister, and the Pritchetts vacationed in Santa
Barbara. Campbell and Pritchett were astronomers and
both were members of the Bohemian Club. Apparently
they met later in the summer of 1926 at the Grove and
smoothed their ruffled hackles, talked about interstellar
velocities, and enjoyed some common good cheer. But
neither Pritchett nor Reed made any substantial concession to Hastings' position, and the passage appeared in
the final work in 1928 largely unaltere4.
Pritchett's letter demonstrates the mind-set of the
Carnegie reformers. No professional education could
be "high quality" unless it was in the full context of the
university community. Preferably, the professional
school should be ,on the campus of the university; if it
was not (and a great many medical schools, especially,
were not) then it must be under strict university control.
Pritchett also could not conceive of a university with
more than one professional school in anyone discipline.
The Germanists' conception of educational institutions
was of the unitary campus, the neatly arranged "faculties" of the traditional European Continental model. Already the University of California had begun to break
the symmetry, with its "Southern Branch" at Los
Angeles. Campbell, who had been under pressure to
start a law school in the Southern Branch and had resisted successfully, was sympathetic to Pritchett's position on this.
Was Hastings offering a legal education at a "lower
level" than Boalt? As far as admissions standards were
concerned, not at all. Since 1913, both institutions had
required two years of college for admission. There was
only the small difference that Hastings had a provision
for "special students," those already admitted to the bar
who wished to receive more formal education; they did
not receive the LL.B., and save for the immediate post
World War I years of dislocation, they did not comprise
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more than 10 percent of the student body, and usually
about 5 percent. Neither Boalt nor Hastings had any
other academic requirements for admission: no tests, or
other formal assessments. With respect to curriculum,
in the 1920s there was little or nothing to choose between the two schools. The first-year curriculum was
virtually identical, and the curriculum of the last two
years demonstrated no significant variations. The instructional method, the case method, was the same in
both. Grading standards at both institutions were markedly similar, and not rigorous enough, but that was a
common failing of all law schools at the time. In only
three areas was there marked dissimilarity between
Hastings and Boalt. One of these was in the lack of
adequate physical facilities at Hastings. The three lecture rooms on the ground floor of the California State
Building, where Hastings had been since 1923 and was
to remain until 1938, were adequate in capacity until the
early 1930s, but bad acoustically, ill-proportioned (being too long and cavernous), arranged so that passage to
classes was disturbing, poorly ventilated, and too susceptible to interference from street noise. The library
(only about 4000 volumes in 1930) was inadequate and
at best a supplement to the City law library; worse, it was
located in the corridor to the classrooms and doubled as
a cloakroom and the assistant registrar's office. Only the
dean had an office; other faculty did not. The cafeteria
chairs in the classrooms were apparently made in San
Quentin and were inferior to the desk-type seating that
had become universal and was considered essential (as it
still is) to instruction by the case method. The second
area in which Hastings and Boalt differed was in the
utilization of faculty. Save for the dean, the Hastings
faculty was all part time and engaged in practice,
though two Hastings professors taught what was substantially a full load at Boalt. At Boalt, where there was a
better ratio of faculty to students than at Hastings, the
faculty was largely full time. In terms of quality of faculty based on academic background, there was little to
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distinguish between the two. During Harrison's administration, all Hastings faculty, except for James A.
Ballentine and two instructors who taught one or two
courses in the 1920s, had a law degree from one of the
"best" law schools, including Harvard and Yale. Finally,
all Hastings instruction was given in the morning, and it
was accepted that the students could be employed in the
afternoon. Boalt classes were not limited to the morning, outside employment was not encouraged, but Boalt
students were expected to partake of the collegial pleasures of a most pleasant and lively campus. Hastings
students were hardly in a position to be enticed by such
extracurricular activities. It is a moot point as to which
was the better way for young students to pass the hours
outside the classroom and study.
Hastings also deserved better at the hands of the
Carnegie reformers by virtue of the role it played,
through its dean, faculty, and alumni, in the reform of
bar admissions standards in California. The California
Bar Association, founded in 1909 by such reformminded lawyers as Warren Olney, Jr., had from its inception a Section "I" on Legal Education and Admission
to the Bar. The first report of the new section presented
to the first annual convention in 1910 proposed legislation requiring every applicant for the bar to have had at
least three years of "actual study of the law" and establishing a state board of law examiners.24 Nothing came
of this proposal at the time, but Section "I," like its ABA
counterpart, was heavily academic in membership and
thrust, and not to be easily deterred. Orrin Kip McMurray was the moving spirit behind higher admissions
standards. In 1918, the CBA accepted the Section's
proposed legislation abolishing admission by privilege
of graduation from law school and requiring examination of all candidates by a board of bar examiners appointed by the state supreme court. In 1919, the legislature and governor enacted the proposal. The first
board of bar examiners, appointed by the supreme
court, consisted of three practicing attorneys (teaching
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lawyers were excluded to avoid the appearance of favoritism), two of whom were Hastings alumni. Charles
A. Shurtleff, '82, soon to be a justice of the supreme
court and a Director of Hastings, 1915-19 and 1921-41,
and Warren Gregory, '90, a stalwart of Section "I,"
served with Max C. Sloss, Harvard LL.B. '93, a former
justice of the California Supreme Court. They were all
active reformers.
The first bar exams were set in 1920. By the new
system, Hastings lost its statutory privilege of having its
graduates admitted ex parte. Henceforth, its graduates
would compete on equal footing. There was no opposition from anyone connected with Hastings or acting on
Hastings' behalf. On the contrary, the newly-appointed
dean of Hastings, Maurice E. Harrison, served on Section "I" in 1919-20, and succeeded McMurray as chairman of the Section in 1922-23. In 1921, McMurray had
moved that the CBA take note of the ABA resolution
growing out of the report of the Root Committee. In
1922, the CBA incorporated the ABA resolution in the
form of a legislative proposal, with the intention that it
should take effect in 1926. This proposal went nowhere
in Sacramento, and it fell to Harrison in 1923 to move
reaffirmation of the ABA resolution and to move
further that, as a step in that direction, at least "graduation from high school" be required for admission to the
bar. 25 The convention was deeply split, not over reaffirmation of the ABA resolution (its opponents realized
that for the time being the new standards were moot),
but over the requirement for a high school diploma. In
this argument, W.B. Bosley, Yale LL.B. '94, former
instructor and latterly a Director of Hastings, pressed
for allowing "equivalent work" as an alternative to
"graduation." The section had to accept an amendment
that would add to "graduation" the words "or the completion of such preliminary education as will be accepted for entrance to the Department of Letters and
Science of the State University." Even thus amended,
the resolution passed by only one vote-27-26. The Abe
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Lincoln Myth was not yet dead. At least Dean Harrison
was on the side of the angels-and of better educational
standards for candidates for the bar.
The ramifications of Reed's blast out of Zion were
considerable. Strangely, the Hastings Board of Directors took no official notice of the blast. Slack was
certainly fully informed by Simmons before Simmons
replied to Reed, but Slack's reaction is unknown. The
University administration, particularly President
William Wallace Campbell, was not prepared to put up
much of a fight once the draft had been toned down so
as not to reflect disparagingly upon the University and
its Berkeley constituents. Boalt's Dean McMurray had
done his best for alma mater, but he was not in the
strongest position from which to launch a counterattack. The Reed attack came at an unfortunate moment. In 1922, the Hastings Board had made an overture to the University for the granting of the A.B. to
Berkeley students who transferred to Hastings after
their third year and completed the first year of law
school there. A Berkeley undergraduate who did the
same with respect to Boalt would be granted the A.B.
There was no academic reason against it; the first-year
work at both law schools was identical. The proposal
knocked around the corridors of Berkeley for over a
year. Campbell finally vetoed it, fearful that any closer
tie between the University and Hastings would be taken
as encouragement of "duplication" of programs within
the University structure: "There would probably be the
encouragement to legal interests in other parts of the
State to hope for even a third Department of Law within
the University."26 The Reed attack went some way towards confirming Campbell's instinctive reluctance to
have much to do with Hastings. In his principallieutenant, Vice-President Robert Gordon Sproul, the sentiment induced by Reed was that of a deep suspicion that
Hastings was not up to the University's standards of
scholarship. In 1930, Sproul became president of the
University of California, to serve for 28 years, the
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longest tenure in its history, and to become the single
most powerful figure in its history. As president of the
University, he would prove to be no friend of Hastings.
Beyond the playingfield of university politics,
Reed's attack contributed to Hastings' exclusion from
the Association of American Law Schools in 1927. Having lost its membership in the AALS in 1916 and regained it in 1920, the College was in a weakened condition vis-a.-vis its sister institutions in the professional association of law schools. Reed's criticisms of legal education as a whole had made the AALS more sensitive to
standards and it had moved the association to higher
standards for its members in the mid-1920s. Though
Reed's final trumpet was not publicly blown until 1928,
the contents of Carnegie Bulletin no. 21 were well
known a year before publication. Reed's particularly
scathing criticism of Hastings made the College exceptionally vulnerable to peer pressure and subject to
rather closer scrutiny than would have been the case
otherwise. In the summer of 1927, Professor Richard R.
B. Powell of Columbia was dispatched to San Francisco
to make an official inspection of Hastings on behalf of
the AALS executive committee. He found that it had
admitted students without the requisite prior two years
of college work from an accredited college (though its
admissions requirements called for this standard), that
it did not have three full-time instructors as the new
AALS criteria required, and that it did not keep
adequate records of student performance. 27 Of these
findings, the latter two were incontrovertible; the first
turned on what constituted an accredited undergraduate college, and the College was not much of a
sinner. At the AALS annual meeting in December 1927,
Hastings was dropped from the association. It would be
two decades before it again enjoyed the company of its
sister law schools in academic association.
While Hastings might brave its loss of membership
in the institutional association, Reed's polemic tarnished
its reputation at large just as the College was feeling the
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full force of competitors in California legal education. It
required more skepticism than most academics, practitioners, and prospective law students possessed to put
Reed in perspective, to ask the question: How correct
was Reed's singleminded-perhaps simplemindedproposition that only one kind of university-level legal
education was valid and satisfactory?
Hastings had no California competition in formal
legal education for the first two decades of its existence.
Its most strenuous competitor then was the University
of Michigan, and it lost a few of its potential students to
other Midwestern law schools and the major Eastern
schools. With the turn of the century, out-of-state
schools beckoned fewer Californians. The reason was
the rapid, almost sudden appearance of three new
schools in California. Between 1898 and 1901, Hastings'
three great rivals, Boalt, and the law schools at USC and
Stanford, came into being. The Law School Association
of Los Angeles, formed in 1896, had been incorporated
as the Los Angeles Law School in 1898. In 1901 it
affiliated with a Methodist college, the University of
Southern California, that was from the outset ambitious
and expansionist, even aspiring to be the southern surrogate of the northern-based state university.28 In 1904
the law school was integrated with USC. Leland M.
Stanford J r. University was the foundation of a single
donor in 1885. It rapidly developed a law program
which became a fully developed degree program in
1899. Stanford, well-situated on the peninsula below
San Francisco, rapidly acquired a devoted clientele and
a reputation for academic excellence. The developed
degree program at Berkeley began in 1901. Boalt, Stanford, and USC, all full-time day schools, like Hastings,
constituted Hastings' peers in the California spectrum
of legal education before 1940. Until the later 1920s,
USC's standards and program left a great deal to be
desired. Located in downtown Los Angeles, the USC
law school had low admissions standards, a poor

226

Challengers Without

faculty-student ratio, a program which at best provided
the essentials, and a strident student recruitment policy.29 But increasingly, its graduates were filling the
judiciary of the rapidly expanding California southland,
and it was already establishing a persistent reputation
for being the law school to attend for those aspiring to
practice south of the Tehachapis.
Below the august level of Boalt, Stanford, and USC,
Hastings was being challenged by a plethora of new law
schools. By the end of the 1920s, Hastings was literally
surrounded by competitors in its own metropolitan
bailiwick. San Francisco Law School was in business in
1907, Oakland College of Law secured a charter in 1912
(later it would absorb the St. Mary's College law program), in 1910 the YMCA Law School began to offer
degrees (it became Golden Gate), and two Jesuit colleges, Santa Clara and St. Ignatius (afterwards the
University of San Francisco), were in full operation in
1910 and 1912, respectively. San Francisco Law School
and Oakland College of Law were strictly proprietary
schools-six of the seven stockholders of the latter were
its instructors in the early 1930s-and both were evening schools. San Francisco Law School was almost a
stepdaughter of Hastings; its first dean was James A.
Ballentine, one of its earliest and longest-tenured
teachers was Robert W. Harrison, its second dean was
Robert L. McWilliams, and David E. Snodgrass began
his teaching career there in 1925 as a part-time instructor. YMCA-Golden Gate was a nonprofit evening
school. The two Jesuit institutions were, of course, nonprofit and church-related, and both were evening
schools only until about 1930. In 1919, an enterprising
former salesman for the La Salle correspondence law
course founded Lincoln University College of Law in
downtown San Francisco, secured its incorporation in
1926, started a Los Angeles branch, and operating it
primarily as an evening school turned a roaring profit
with more than 500 students in 1927. Somewhat further
afield, in 1927 a nonprofit evening school was founded

Challengers Without

227

in Sacramento by a local lawyer named Verne A.
McGeorge. Even Fresno boasted a law school of sorts, a
profit-making, hand-to-mouth operation that failed
after a few years because it did not make enough profit
for its entrepreneur. The same phenomenon of proliferation was apparent in the southern part of the state
where, by the end of the 1920s, a number of evening
schools had come into existence, most of them centered
in Los Angeles, but some along the southern littoral to
San Diego. USC felt the competition of these schools
most keenly.
Of all these lesser competitors two things can be
said insofar as Hastings was affected: they were all
urban-centered, and they tended to draw students from
the same milieu as Hastings. While there was some variation in standards (the two Jesuit colleges were credited
with good standards of instruction and testing), all of
these schools were markedly inferior to Hastings in admissions requirements and program. They challenged
Hastings for the part-time student in the urban environment, but the competitive sting was somewhat ameliorated by their clientele being strictly evening students. The evening schools had a bad reputation with all
academics, the leaders of the bar, and many of the general public. The worst of them deserved it; the best of
them should have been accorded a bit more tolerance
because they did offer an honest path to the bar. All of
these schools posed a problem for Hastings that went
beyond mere competition for students. Despite the evident superiority of Hastings in every way, that most
Hastings students worked in the afternoons tended to
blur the distinction between Hastings and the evening
schools. The uninformed-even those who were informed, but only by Alfred Zantzinger Reed-were easily persuaded that Hastings was closer to the evening
schools than it was to Stanford and Boalt with respect to
standards and program.
How serious was the competition for students
mounted against Hastings by all of its challengers?
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Ranged against Boalt and Stanford, competition appears to have cost Hastings something in the formal,
paper qualifications of its entrants. Increasingly in the
1920s, during the second great "boom" period of American higher education, it was the aspiration of every
professional school to become a wholly graduate institution. The Carnegie reformers found substantial agreement among academics with this dearly held proposition of theirs. The assumption was that a full four-year
college course produced a student better able to undertake professional study than one who had had only two
or three years of college. Between 1913 and 1927, Hastings, Boalt, and Stanford required only "junior standing" (two years of college) for law work. In fact, in
1925-26, of Stanford's 314 law students, 115 (37 percent) had a bachelor's degree. In 1926-27, of Boalt's 195
students, 181 (93 percent) had a first degree, a remarkably high percentage, made more impressive by the fact
that none of the 14 without the degree were merely of
junior standing when admitted. In the last year for
which we have complete degree data for Hastings in this
period (1924-25), of 112 students, 21 (only 19 percent)
had a first degree. Until well into the first decade of the
century, the entering class at Hastings had between 30
and 45 percent bachelors, save for the first five entering
classes, when the proportion was about 20 percent. The
peak of degree entrants until after World War II was
during the years of Slack's administration (40-45 percent), a direct result of his emphasis on high admissions
standards. Considering how little emphasis was then
placed on a first degree preparatory to entering professional study, this was a remarkable showing for Hastings
during the first three decades of its existence. Beginning in the second decade of this century, the percentage of degree entrants at Hastings declined from about
25 percent to 15 percent in the late 1920s. Clearly, those
with the money and the time to complete an undergraduate education (even at the relatively inexpensive
state university) were under less pressure to find a job
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while attending law school, and preferred to remain in
the campus community amidst the pleasurable charms
and engrossing extracurricular activities of Berkeley or
the Farm in Palo Alto. The son of a Sicilian immigrant
shoemaker found three years as an undergraduate at
Berkeley expensive, even though he lived at home in
San Francisco, whereas enrollment at Hastings afforded
him a chance to get to the bar by the most direct route,
and with a sound legal training, during which he could
also work to support himself. This Hastings graduate's
subsequent career at the bar and on the bench should
serve to put in perspective how little the formal, paper
qualification of the first degree counted in practice. The
decline of degree entrants at Hastings was undoubtedly
caused by Boalt's and Stanford's attraction of students
with the bachelor's degree. But the decline had little
ultimate significance with respect either to the true quality of Hastings entrants or to the professional competency and career potential of its graduates. This would
remain the case long after Stanford and Boalt became
entirely graduate institutions, requiring the bachelor's
degree for admission, about 1930.
The real impact of the challengers' competition
came in the matter of numbers. The graph below tells
the tale. It displays the average size of a graduating class
at Hastings by five-year periods, from 1881 to the end
of Simmons' administration in 1940. The darkened
bases indicate graduates with a first degree, save for
the years 1906-10, for which the data are insufficient.
The early peak periods were 1881-85 and 1896-1900.
The lows between them represented the fewer graduates that resulted from Slack's tough admissions
broom sweeping fine. Beginning with the turn of the
century and rising competition from new law schools in
California (especially from the lesser schools, which
were generally inferior to Hastings), there was a steady
decline of graduates broken only by a modest upturn in
1911-15. The deep trough in 1916-20 was occasioned
largely by the impact of the First World War. The post-
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and of Graduates with a First Degree, 1881-1940
war educational boom worked a reversal of the trend,
but the 1921-25 pickup was really slight, and the 192630 increase brought a graduating class back only to
about the level of the first decade of the century. The
significance of the great jump in the 1930s is discussed
more fully below.
Another way oflooking at the competition posed by
the new law schools, including Hastings' peers (Boalt,
,St~nford, and USC), as well as the lesser schools, is to
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note the geographic origins of Hastings recruits. At the
outset, around half of the College's entrants came from
San Francisco, 80 percent from San Francisco and the
Bay Area as a whole. There was not much fluctuation in
this proportion of City and Bay Area entrants to entrants from other parts of the state (out-of-state entrants
were negligible) until about 1910, when there was a
sharp upswing (from 15 to 30 percent) in students from
other parts of California, excluding southern California. In 1915-19, the proportions returned to the earlier
levels and remained there until 1930. USC's challenge
to Hastings was already being felt in the much reduced
number of students coming to Hastings from southern
California; by 1915, Hastings' draw of southern
Californians had become negligible, down from about
10 percent of entrants in its early years to about 3 percent. In the early period, the high percentage of City
and Bay Area entrants was accounted for by the relatively high proportion of the population of the state in
that region. Reasonably, it could have been expected
that as the population of California increased, not only
south of the Tehachapis, but also in the Central Valley,
the mix at Hastings would begin to reflect a wider geographical base of recruitment. However, what USC did
in the south, Boalt and Stanford accomplished on a
broader plane in the north. Hastings became increasingly confined to being a northern-metropolitan law
school, confirming the tendency for the College to find
its students among those who lived and had to work in
close proximity to the City while attending law school.
Consequently, the rapid proliferation of City and Bay
Area evening schools, drawing from roughly the same
pool of potential students as Hastings, sharpened the
com petition.
Competition for students was not merely a matter
of prestige. The student registration fee was the only
elastic source of revenue that Hastings enjoyed. During
the 1920s the numbers of students did not rise rapidly
enough to provide the increased funds requisite for
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maintammg the program. Only by increasing fees,
which threatened the College's economic competitiveness with its evening-school challengers, could revenue
be increased. The general round of faculty salary increases in 1925 was provided for by increasing the registration fee from $50 to $75 a year. The 20 percent
salary increase of 1928 required the fee to be increased
to $100 a year, a sizable jump. In 1936, the addition of
another full-time professorship was funded by increasing the fee to $110 a year. Thanks to the sudden jum p
in Hastings enrollments in the early 1930s, the 17 percent faculty salary increase of 1933 required no increase
in the registration fee.
The impact of the Great Depression on the six
major California law schools in terms of enrollments is
vividly displayed in the graph below, which plots fall
semester enrollments for the years 1928 to 1937. Only
two institutions evidenced increased enrollments in the
early 1930s: Hastings and Boalt. The reason is not difficult to determine; these two state institutions were
much gentler on the student's pocketbook than virtually
any other law school in California. In 1928 Hastings,
Boalt, and Golden Gate had a $100 annual fee. Over the
period, Hastings and Boalt increased their annual fees
to $110 and $106 res pectively; the fees for the other law
schools went up sharply (only Balboa Law College, San
Diego, an unincorporated evening school loosely
affiliated with the school system of the city, and with an
enrollment that hovered around 50, never went above
$100). Stanford's fee was $285 in 1928; in 1937, it was
$360. USC's fee in 1928 was $249, and in 1937 was
$300. The fees of the three Jesuit schools, St. Ignatius
(University of San Francisco), Santa Clara, and Loyola
in Los Angeles, began at the $100-$200 level in 1928,
and by 1937 had risen to a range of from $186 to $280.
To the low fees at Hastings and Boalt was added the
advantage of getting a degree from a "better" school in
hard times, there being no point in getting a degree
from an inferior institution, especially if it cost more.
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Boalt's growth was the most phenomenal and the most
steady: by 1937 it was at 179 percent of its 1928 enrollment. Hastings did well, with a net increase by 1937 to
127 percent; though the later 1930s witnessed a steady
decline, probably accelerated by Hastings' not yet having achieved accreditation, and by its limited enrollment, beginning in 1933-34. Stanford, of the private
schools, did best. It entered a situation of financial
"steady state" in the early 1930s, but its enrollments did
not plummet, and its net loss over the period was only
14 percent. Stanford's alumni were loyal and possibly
less severely wounded by the Depression than were
humbler folk. As the Depression lightened somewhat in
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mid-decade, the old Stanford clientele began to come
back, and a new clientele that was prepared to put its
money on prestige also emerged. USC was harder hit.
Its net loss between 1928 and 1937 was 21 percent.
However, it still enjoyed its regional preeminence, and
if its clientele was less moneyed than Stanford's, it was
no less loyal. The three Catholic schools were in dire
straits. The graph shows how beset were USF and
Loyola, and Santa Clara, always a small school, was in
danger of failing entirely. Only the devotion of the Society of Jesus and the Church's generous and committed
laity managed to keep open these schools which were
monuments both to the educational ideals of late
nineteenth century American Catholicism and the aspirations of immigrants, especially those from Ireland
and Italy, to have their children enter the mainstream
of American professionalism and play the political role
commensurate with their numbers. The schools which
exhibited the highest mortality rate were the part-time
schools, especially the proprietary schools run for
profit. All of the San Francisco Bay Area part-time
schools (proprietary and nonprofit) survived, albeit with
much reduced enrollments. McGeorge in Sacramento
managed very creditably with a 7 percent net loss in
enrollments. The Los Angeles Area schools were shattered. Of the nine law schools founded there between
1924 and 1932, four did not make it through the Depression, and their lives were in fact very short indeed.
The five that survived suffered enrollment losses that
reduced them to shadows of their former size.
Financially, the Great Depression brought no real
hardship to Hastings. The increased fees coupled with
the increased numbers of students in the early 1930s
gave the College a taste of prosperity such as it had not
enjoyed before. The College'S library was a major beneficiary; Slack, who as vice-president headed the
Board and as chairman of the finance committee had
the major say in College economics, saw to that. The
library'S growth was modest, but it was significant, espe-
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cially in building up the reports. The 1933 faculty salary
increase made Hastings' salaries about 20 percent
higher than the average of D niversity of California
salaries for the lower ranks, and only slightly lower in
the case of the three professors (R.W. Harrison, J.A.
Ballentine, and Perry Evans), adjunct to Dean Simmons,
whose salary of $8400 was higher than that of Dean
McMurray at Boalt. Indeed, since the average of DC
salaries eroded for the professorial rank and remained
almost steady for the lower ranks from 1933 until post
World War II, Hastings' salaries, which were not lowered in the 1930s, were better than competitive. It is
hard to say how well the College did with its endowments, particularly the Hellman chair funds, but the
finance committee was actively selling and buying stocks
in the early 1930s. In academic 1932-33, a six-week
summer session of two courses was instituted, bringing
in $35 per course per student. The summer school continued throughout the decade, giving to the faculty who
taught in it $600 extra and a nice surplus to the College's general funds. The College was not in the lap of
luxury, but it did not suffer want.
The greatest problem faced by the College was the
inadequacy of its physical plant to deal with increased
enrollments. In academic 1933-34 Hastings for the first
time in its history limited enrollment; it continued to do
so until the end of the decade. This eased the problem
somewhat. Though the choice of students was made on
the basis of academic record at the undergraduate level,
there were some complaints from unsuccessful candidates and some instances of pressure placed on the dean
to admit favored students.30 A fourth, smaller classroom was secured in the State Building, but the overcrowding remained severe, and a search was begun in
earnest to find new quarters. The search reached fruition in Simmons' last years, raising the acute problem of
securing a larger state appropriation for the larger,
commercially let new quarters. The state had already
expanded its largesse to Hastings to cover the additional
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space in the State Building and to provide additional
equipment. With biennium 1933-34, the $9400 per
annum appropriation which had obtained since 191112 was increased to $14,200, in 1935-36 to $15,312,
where it remained until biennium 1939-40, when it was
raised to $20,661 per annum, principally to cover the
higher rent and new equipment needed for the new and
somewhat larger quarters which the College occupied in
May 1938 in the California Building at 515 Van Ness
AvenueY The University had been approached by the
state to make up the required sum, but disclaimed all
responsibility for housing its "affiliate," making the additionallegislative appropriation necessary.
Hastings' relatively benign financial condition during the Great Depression was too modest to stimulate
curriculum change or faculty expansion, to expand
significantly the College's instructional program. At the
outset of Simmons' tenure, 38 hours of instruction per
week was offered; by the end, this had risen to 47 hours.
The first year was largely unchanged: rather less emphasis on Real Property at the end of the period than at
the beginning, which redounded to Contracts (6 semester-hours increased to 7); Equity was reduced from 2
semester-hours to 1, and Agency correspondingly increased from 2 semester-hours to 3. A course in Legal
Ethics (1 semester-hour) was introduced in the 1930s,
less from any outside stimulus, such as has led to reemphasis on the subject in the last few years, than from a
commendable desire to introduce fledgling attorneys to
the subject. At this distance, it is impossible to say
whether or not it was any better taught or any more
effectual in its aim to heighten the moral sensitivities of
lawyers than are our efforts today. Between 1925 and
1940, the second-year curriculum was altered, largely
by rearrangement with the third-year curriculum. The
core of the second year remained Sales of Private Property, Negotiable Instruments, Private Corporations,
Wills-Titles-Administration, and Equity (jurisdictions).
But by 1940, Trusts had been shifted to third year,
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Mortgages combined with the third-year Suretyship,
and Public Service Corporations dropped. Constitutional Law was moved from third year to second, and a
course in Legal Bibliography (1 semester-hour) was added. The third-year curriculum remained centered on
Conflict of Laws, Evidence, Code Pleading (and Practice), Suretyship (and Mortgages). Robert W. Harrison's
peripheral course on California Government was
dropped when his load was reduced in 1936-37 to accommodate a second full-time professor. Admiralty was
given as an elective throughout the period, and new
electives in Taxation, Bankruptcy, Accounting, and
Administrative Law were added. The increased number
of instructional hours (9) were the modest consequence
of the additional third-year electives.
The most notable curriculum advance was the creation of a Legal Aid Clinic course in 1931-32, taught by
Alex Sherriffs, '23, a first semester ten-week course
comprising a weekly two-hour seminar and a half-day in
the office of the San Francisco Legal Aid Society. The
chief proponent of clinical training was John S.
Bradway, who had moved from private practice in
Philadelphia (where he had sparked the successful
Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia) into academia via
political science at Haverford and two years at USC's
Law School before joining the law faculty at Duke in
1931. Bradway was a prolific writer on clinical work,
active in the ABA and the AALS in promotion of the
program that he believed would supply the practical
dimension of legal education that was lost when lawoffice training gave over to the law school. 32 Hastings
was an early convert to Bradway's crusade, and Sherriffs' thoughtful, well-structured, and academically
sound clinical seminar was a major addition to a law
school whose avowed purpose was "to offer systematic
and thorough instruction in those branches of jurisprudence which will prepare the student for the practice of
the profession of the law."33
Over all, however, Hastings' curriculum in the
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Simmons years was not so imaginative as the clinical
seminar, and the College fell behind its peer competitors in the number and range of electives available to
third-year students. For all of its practical emphasis,
Hastings should have made at least a faint obeisance to
the philosophy of law, legal history, international law,
and comparative law. And the failure to offer courses of
a most practical nature, such as Domestic Relations
(tried, but soon dropped at Hastings), Insurance, Government Regulation, and Industrial Law was a serious
defect in its curriculum; it was unduly restrictive of the
training its students ought to have received in the age of
the New Deal if they were to hold their own against
Boalt and Stanford graduates in practice at the bar.
The faculty continued to be a good one, though
some of its stars of former years were not replaced by
men of equal capacity. Robert W. Harrison remained a
steady performer, but he was spread too thin among the
attorney general's office, San Francisco Law School,
and Hastings, and he was aging. The loss of Golden W.
Bell to government service in 1930 was a sore blow. His
course in Admiralty was in due course restarted. His
course in Contracts fell to David E. Snodgrass. Snodgrass had the reputation of being one of the best
teachers at Hastings--quick, always prepared, maintaining a rigorous standard, and manifesting a flair for
teaching Contracts that is rare at any time, anywhere.
William H. Bryan (Equity and Trusts) was learned, but
always had trouble getting the best work out of his students, tended to lecture too much, and so failed to attain
the full potential of the case method in his courses.
James A. Ballentine became increasingly cranky and
appears to have slipped as a teacher; in 1935-36, he had,
to be relieved of Constitutional Law, though in his defense it must be stressed that Criminal Law and Torts
were his specialty. Two former San Francisco superior
court judges, Marcel E. Cerf, '00, and Adolphus E.
Graupner, '97, gave good service teaching Code Pleading and Practice and Taxation, respectively. Dean Sim-

Challengers Without

239

mons, whose specialities were Property and Conflicts,
and (under duress) Constitutional Law, and David
Snodgrass were the best that Hastings had in the classroom. The College could have used more teachers of
that caliber. Because its faculty was almost entirely part
time, Hastings did not have to keep pace with the
academic labor market as did the peer schools manned
by full-time, wholly academic, teachers. At the same
time, it could not recruit from a national talent pool,
having to find its teachers from the profession in San
Francisco. During the Depression, the College's monetary incentives suffered in proportion to what the ablest
lawyers could still make in practice, and consequently
the faculty became increasingly composed of younger
lawyers with small practices and older lawyers, such as
Cerf and Graupner, who could afford semi-retirement.
During the same period, the peer schools were in an
even stronger position to recruit and retain eminent
academic lawyers because such non practicing teachers
had no alternative employment. In the matter of quality
of faculty, as in the case of curriculum and program,
Hastings began to slip behind its peer competitors.
It was the Board of Directors' growing appreciation
of how rapidly the College was falling behind its peer
institutions that moved Hastings out of its somewhat
self-satisfied reverie and into a more competitive stance.
The Board had taken with apparent equanimity Alfred
Z. Reed's jeremiad; it took no official notice of the College's expulsion from the AALS in 1927. An astute,
knowledgeable, and friendly outsider observed in the
mid-1930s that the Directors had long been more concerned with substance than with form, that so long as
the work done by Hastings was of good quality, they
were not particularly interested in outside opinion of
the College. 34 Such indifference to image was commendable, provided it did not constitute a myopic disregard for changing-mounting-standards of legal
education. In fact, the Board's studied indifference was
fast becoming untenable. It might well have been enjoy-
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ing the boom of so many students that it had to exclude
applicants, feeling the warmth of greater revenues from
students and state, but the Board could no longer ignore Hastings' loss of preeminence in California legal
education, and the speed with which it was being outdistanced by its younger rivals. By the mid-1930s, Hastings
was sensitive to the need for change. Another clarion
call from without the walls moved the College to a positive response.
This time, the outside stimulus was more muted
than Reed had been, and it represented not a private
foundation, not even the academic association, but the
practitioner's professional body, the American Bar Association. Since the Root Committee's report, the ABA
had moved into the business of accrediting law schools.
In 1933, of 199 law schools only 85 were approved by
the ABA as meeting the rather minimal standards of
two years of college for admission, a three-year program (for full-time schools), a library of 7500 "usable
volumes," at least three full-time teachers, a teacher to
student ratio of 1 to 100, adequate facilities, and operation on a non-commercial basis. There were six full-time
institutions connected with a university or college which
came very close to meeting these requirements. Hastings was the largest, and the most eminent, of these six.
In the August 1934 issue of the American Bar Association
Journal, the secretary to the Section of Legal Education
of the ABA, Alexander B. Andrews, called attention to
the problem of law school standards, and pointed out
that it "would appear that immediate further improvement of the [law] schools is most likely to be found ... "
among such schools as approached so closely the ABA
approved schools. 3s In January 1935, Andrews wrote
Chief Justice William H. Waste, '94., and the rest of the
Hastings Board, with copies to Dean Simmons and President Robert Gordon Sproul of the University, calling
their attention to Hastings' status and also noting that
the regional accrediting association of universities and
colleges required that the professional schools of a uni-

i!

Challengers Without

241

versity be accredited by the relevant professional organization-the ABA in the case of law schools. 36 Implicit
was the threat (not very present and clear) of disaccreditation of the University because Hastings was not
approved by the ABA. However, the University took
the matter seriously, and Vice-President Monroe E.
Deutsch (who was a good deal better disposed towards
Hastings than Sproul was) conferred with Simmons
about the matter. Simmons, understandably, was cautious, pointing out the problems of expense, the difficulties of getting two additional full-time faculty-the
only step that would be required for ABA accreditation-of sufficient experience and standing, the delicate matter of having to let go part-time teachers of
proven worth and long devotion in order to hire the
full-timers, and the fact that Hastings had a "special
obligation to turn out men for the actual practice of the
law, not for teaching or research in it."37 But Simmons
did admit that the success of Hastings graduates on the
bar examinations had not in general been as high as that
of Boalt graduates. This was the key to Simmons'
willingness to broach the whole matter to the Board. In
February, a special committee of the Board (Directors
Ehrman, Bosley, and Olney) was appointed to confer
with Simmo.ns about the "desirability of the appointment of one or two additional full-time instructors .... "38 The committee's report to the April meeting
was deferred to a future meeting. Again in July action
was deferred-but Simmons was authorized to attend
the ABA Convention in Los Angeles the following
month. Finally, in February 1936, the Board took the
first step towards accreditation. Effective July 1, 1936,
Assistant Professor David E. Snodgrass was to become a
full-time instructor (8 hours per week) with the rank of
professor. Professor Robert W. Harrison was to be reduced in load and salary to effect the conversion, and
the student registration fee was raised from $100 to
$110 per annum to cover the increased salary commitment. Simmons reported to Deutsch, with considerable
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satisfaction, that Hastings was now two down and one to
go, and that the third full-timer would be added probably in the "near future."39
It was a long time before the other shoe dropped.
The Board backed off from further action. The conversion had not gone down well with Harrison; moreover,
an old grad and part-time instructor had had to be
dropped. Once more, external pressure was required to
support Simmons' request for further change. This
time, it came from the AALS via Dean Edwin D. Dickinson of Boalt (who had succeeded McMurray in January
1936). In October 1937, the secretary of the AALS
wrote Dickinson that Boalt was in danger of losing
AALS membership if it accepted work towards its degree taken by a student from a non-AALS or non-ABA
approved law school-to wit, Hastings. Moreover,
Boalt's AALS membership was in jeopardy because
Hastings, ostensibly an institution of the University
preparing students for the bar, was not accredited by
the ABA, and the AALS rules prohibited membership
to a school if some other agency of the parent university
provided substandard legal education. 40 Dickinson was
scared. Simmons was sympathetic-with a purpose.
After considerable preparation of his ground, Simmons
persuaded the Hastings Board of Directors to invite
Dickinson to explain to the Board how Hastings' nonaccreditation threatened Boalt's AALS membership. The
historic meeting-historic because never before had an
outsider addressed a meeting of the Hastings' Board of
Directors-took place on December 20, 1938. 41 After
Dickinson delivered his plea, the Board went into
executive session. Simmons' proposal for the addition of
a third full-time instructor was referred to the Finance
Committee, whose chairman, Charles William Slack,
none of his zeal lost for high standards, was ready to act
favorably. Yet, what swung the Board's decision in February 1939 to appoint a third full-timer was Simmons'
point that 21 states and Hawaii required applicants for
the bar to be graduates of ABA-approved law schools.
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On the motion of Slack, Duncan Douglas Low, LL.B.
Stanford, '33, associated with Dunne & Dunne, was
hired as a full-time assistant professor effective July 1,
1939, at a salary of $3000. No one was displaced, fees
were not increased, and indeed the College was so flush
it even hired an additional stenographer.
At the August 1939 ABA convention, Hastings College of the Law was granted provisional approval by the
association, bringing the number of approved law
schools to 102. William M. Simmons had less than a year
to live, one more academic year to direct the College.
The ABA approval was a monument to his persistence,
his quiet and unspectacular devotion to what he saw as
the best interests of Hastings, and to his realization that
Hastings could no longer exist in not-so-splendid isolation from the new currents in legal education. The College was prepared for the greatest crisis that would face
it. It had achieved professional recognition of its contribution to legal education; it had given pledges to future
improvement; and in the first appointment of a second
full-time professor since its inception it had in effect
chosen the man who would direct it during the coming
crisis. Within a month after the ABA convention in San
Francisco accredited Hastings, Hitler's panzers crushed
Poland and a war of global dimensions began that
would ultimately engulf the United States. To William
Marvin Simmons' successor fell the task of meeting the
strains and stresses of war and peace, a decade of
swords and ploughshares.

VII Swords and
Ploughshares

W,TH SIMMONS' sudden death less
than a month before the beginning of the new academic
year, the Hastings Board made a series of quick decisions which were the most momentous in the College's
history. The first was to appoint David Ellington Snodgrass acting dean, at a hastily summoned special meeting with six Directors present on July 31, 1940. Snodgrass, as senior full-time professor, was the only possible
choice at such a late date. His salary was increased by
$70 per month. To find a permanent dean, the Board
appointed a search committee composed of the three
most active and powerful Directors, Slack, Bosley, and
Ehrman. The same Directors were named an executive
committee, by Chief Justice Phil S. Gibson, to hire
enough instructors to take Simmons' courses. On
August 7, this committee met in Slack's offices, and
Slack moved the appointment of two men, both with the
rank of professor, at $100 per month: Orrin Kip
McMurray, '93, recently retired as professor of law at
Boalt, to teach Conflicts, and Arthur Martin Cathcart,
Harvard x 1896-97, professor of law emeritus at Stanford, to teach Constitutional Law. Simmons' other
courses were apportioned among existing part-time
faculty, and a San Francisco attorney, Francis P. Walsh,
'26, was hired to teach Bankruptcy. The executive

Swords and Ploughshares

245

committee met again with Snodgrass present on August
12, to tidy up loose ends. With Snodgrass' acting appointment, Hastings had in fact found the dean that
would lead it for almost a quarter of a century; with the
appointment of McMurray and Cathcart, the "65 Club"
came into existence. Thus were met man and institution
which would give to Hastings a unique distinction in
American legal education.
If necessity is the mother of invention, accident is
the stepfather. Had Simmons' upperclass courses not
been Conflicts and Constitutional Law, courses on still
rather arcane subjects (from the practitioner's perspective), a couple of practitioners might have been pressed
into service at the eleventh hour. As it was, these courses
could not be gotten up at the last moment, and they
required teaching by a specialist. It was also too late to
canvass the law schools for younger teachers. Perforce,
retired faculty were the answer: McMurray and Cathcart had specialized in Conflicts and Constitutional Law,
respectively, both were available, and both lived in the
area. Snodgrass knew them well, had great respect for
them, and in hiring them made no long-range commitment. Slack also knew them intimately-McMurray had
been a student, and there was a genuine bond of affection between the two. Hastings had no rule requiring
mandatory retirement because it had no pension plan.
One member of the faculty, Robert W. Harrison, had
reached sixty-five in 1937, and was still going strong in
1940; Dean Taylor had quit in his eighty-first year. Indeed, the hiring of McMurray might have foundered,
since the University of California had a pension plan
and mandatory retirement. However, the University
held that Hastings was not part of the University and so
was not bound by its retirement rules. McMurray was
free to accept employment without jeopardizing his
University pension. The shift would work. As yet,
though, there was no bold concept in Snodgrass' mind
of creating a faculty made up in large part of retired
greats from other law schools. Once more necessity (and
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accident) would have to intervene before the architectonic structure of the 65 Club emerged. The intervening graces were not far off, however.
Though the late dean's regard for Snodgrass was
evidenced by Simmons' choice of him as the second
full-time professor, it was not a foregone conclusion
that Snodgrass would be appointed as regular dean.
The search committee under Vice-President Slack
undertook a thorough search outside Hastings to find
the right man. It appears to have considered it advisable
to get as dean someone of national standing. A leading
contender was Charles Herman Kinnane (LL.B. Illinois,
'24, J.S.D. Yale '26), formerly dean at Wyoming and
latterly at the University of San Francisco, currently a
professor at De Paul. He had, apparently, left USF because of its low academic standards. Kinnane had the
"drive and ambition which Dean Simmons did not have,
but on the other hand he does not have the charm and
culture which he had."l Kinnane made the mistake of
setting on foot a campaign soliciting telegrams from
friends urging his appointment; he was too anxious.
The campaign also elicited a particularly crude and vicious poison-pen attack by an anonymous detractor who
called into question-without any evidence-the candidate's manliness. This probably had no effect on the
search committee's deliberations, but since one of the
screeds was directed to President Robert Gordon Sproul
it brought his active interest and that of Dean Dickinson
of Boalt to the outcome of the search. Certainly more
distinguished than Snodgrass, Kinnane maintained his
reputation until his untimely death in the mid-1950s.
But Snodgrass had taken firm hold of the College'S administration, had already demonstrated that executive
decisiveness and purposefulness with a touch of panache that would be his hallmark for almost a quartercentury, and he was a thoroughly known quantity. On
May 7, 1941, the committee recommended Snodgrass'
appointment as dean with a salary of $7200; because
there was not a quorum of the Board present, the ap-
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pointment had to be ratified at another special meeting
of the Board five days later. It was probably never really
a close thing, but Snodgrass doubtless breathed easier
on May 12. He had no time to savor his triumph. The
United States had a year's expansion of its armed forces
and rapidly increasing arms production behind it by the
time Snodgrass was confirmed in office, Lend-Lease was
already a reality, and Pearl Harbor was just seven
months away.
The impact on Hastings of the National Emergency
and the country's entry into war was immediate and
brutal. Nineteen percent of each of the Classes of '41
and '42 disappeared between their second and third
years; in the immediately preceding years, the withdrawal-flunk rate between second and third years had
been about 7 or 8 percent. The Class of '42 felt the
attrition even as the academic year 1941-42 progressed.
It began the academic year with 55 students; 15 (27
percent) left at the end of the first semester, in the days
immediately following the "day of infamy." Of the 38 in
their last semester, only 30 graduated in May 1942;
some failed to get the degree for academic reasons, but
a few appear to have been called to service even at that
late date. The classbook gave the names of28 classmates
already at war, either in the armed forces or in civilian
war work, and the editor, Andy Anderson, noted that
not many of those graduating would be able to take the
1942 bar examinations, "but there'll come a time when
we'll meet again before the bar of justice."2 More of that
class than an historian can record with dispassion would
never be met with again. In academic 1941-42, the
lower classes suffered proportionate losses. The Class of
'43 was reduced by 34 percent in the days following
Pearl Harbor; the Class of '44, by 39 percent. In all, of
the 188 students who began the year in September
1941, 62 left between the first and second semesters,
some of them on Monday, December 8, the very morning that President Roosevelt asked Congress for a decla-
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ration of war. If the swords took time to forge, the
swordsmen were made in a day.
Worse was yet to come. The table below indicates
the withering of the College over the war years. The
table gives the enrollment each semester (save the
spring semester of 1940-41, for which data are not
available), the size of the entering first-year class, and
the number graduated at the end of the year (which
included some members of earlier classes who had not
graduated with their classes because they had had to
retake work to make up deficiencies).
Fall

1940-41
1941-42
1942-43
1943-44
1944-45

272
188
67
40
44

Spring

126
55
37
37

1st year

Graduating

134
64
15

54
32
22
13
8

11

18

The Class of '45, comprising 5 women and 3 men, was
the second smallest in the College's history-only the
Class of ' 18, with 6 graduates, was smaller. The Class of
'45 fulfilled the grim prophecy of Dean Albert]. Harno
of the University of Illinois to the August 1943 ABA
Convention, that with law school enrollments already at
about one-sixth what they were in 1938, by fall 1943:
the indications are that this company will have dwindled yet
further-indeed, almost to the vanishing point-for we can
anticipate that it will then be restricted, with few exceptions,
to men classified IV-F and women. 3

Harno was particularly concerned that standards for
admission to the bar might not be maintained because
of sentiment for men about to enter the armed forces.
Some states had already lowered requirements for admission; California did not. Yet Harno was equally concerned about the need and demand for lawyers, even
in-perhaps especially in-wartime, and the fact that
because of diminished enrollments, there would be an
insufficient supply of young, beginning lawyers. Government service had drawn away many active prac-
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titioners. A genuine shortage of young lawyers existed.
As the case of Hastings made clear, the Selective Service
System-the draft-hit the law schools more severely
than any other professional school. Hastings was
grouped with the University of California for Selective
Service purposes; the deferment umpire for Berkeley
also handled deferment matters for Hastings. The University's archives indicate how relatively poorly Hastings
(and Boalt, for that matter) fared in deferments. 4 The
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended
in December 1941, provided for generous deferments
for pre-med undergraduates and medical students.
Even pre-divinity undergraduates and seminarians did
relatively well by the formula that seminaries were entirely postgraduate, requiring a bachelor's degree, and
that because of a shortage of ordained ministers, deferment would be given until the divinity degree was
obtained. The shortage of lawyers did not weigh heavily
in the system. The most that a law student could hope
for was completion of a year in progress; usually, he was
fortunate to be permitted to complete the semester.
The human dimension was both heartrending and
onerous. A state senator (and Hastings alumnus) wrote
President Sproul of the University in March 1943 with a
plea that a third-year man at Hastings who had just
been called into the Air Force be allowed to graduate on
the basis of work done to date. Senator Clair Engle, '33,
urged that the College "adopt a policy which will give
degrees to those young men whose scholastic standings
are good and who have completed their courses except
for a few months."5 Sproul referred the matter to
Snodgrass. While Snodgrass was sympathetic and acknowledged that allowances had been made in some
cases, he held that the problem was so universal he
needed ABA clarification. The ABA's wartime rules for
approved law schools permitted a senior to graduate
short of completion provided he lacked no more than
half-a-term of residence and his average to date was that
required for graduation. Unhappily, the young man in
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question met neither criterion, and he went to war without receiving his degree. He returned, unscathed, received the LL.B. in 1947, was called to the bar and enjoyed a successful practice, capped by ajudgeship, in his
native Glenn County.
Despite the fact that the College was desperate for
students, fewer women enrolled than might have been
expected in light of the opportunity afforded by reduced male competition and the increased demand for
lawyers. Certainly, the proportion of women to men
students was much increased (the Class of '45 was the
only one in Hastings' history in which the women
graduates outnumbered the men). But in absolute
numbers, the 11 women who graduated between 1941
and 1945 were close to the average of 3 women
graduates per year that obtained from 1930 to 1945.
The women who did go to Hastings would have gone
anyway, being committed for a galaxy of reasons to
being lawyers. The war was a liberating experience for
women, but the tendency was for women to go into war
work, into the women's auxiliaries of the armed forces,
into government civilian service, into war industry.
Women responded to the same patriotic urge as men,
perhaps even more strongly. Rosie the Riveter was
legendary but not mythical; Confederate General Longstreet's widow worked in a Los Angeles war plant. Law
school seemed tame, even irrelevant, to a great many
women, the majority of whom were not particularly
careerist and many of whom meant only to make their
contribution to the War Effort while awaiting the return
of their men and the re-creation of the more tranquil
family life which was still the social norm.
The war was also liberating for Hastings. The
plummet in student enrollments broke the College's
dependence upon the registration fee as the principal
source of its income, and forced it to turn to a much
higher level of state support. During the late 1930s the
annual fee was $110; in 1945-46 it had risen to only
$120. Because of its specialized nature, indeed its
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"uselessness" to the War Effort, Hastings, unlike universities and even colleges, did not enjoy sudden munificence in the form of government contracts, or in the
form of the Army Specialized Training Program
(ASTP) and the Navy's famous "V" program, that took
students off campus, put them in uniform, and put
them back on campus again. Hastings did not have any
physical facilities that the government might need; it
could not, like the UC agricultural facility at Davis
which was taken over by the Signal Corps, be "drafted."
It had to go on being a law school, or it had to shut
down. The decision ultimately rested with the State of
California. Hastings stayed open. The state appropriation of $41,322 for biennium 1939-40 was maintained
for 1941-42, but was sharply increased for 1943-44 to
$65,072, and slightly increased for 1945-46 to $69,403.
Though the ploughshare years of the GI Bill, 1947-53,
saw the annual appropriation return to the statutory
$7000, the state had taken the decisive step in wartime
of providing the College with virtually its entire sustenance. As it was, sustenance was really subsistence,
enough to maintain the bare functioning of an institution with only a fraction of its normal student complement, though the fewer students required as much instruction as did the more numerous students pre-war.
Three California law schools, Loyola, Santa Clara, and
McGeorge, were forced to suspend operation during
the war. Hastings did not have to, thanks to the state's
assumption of full responsibility for maintaining its
program, though on a drastically reduced scale.
The College economized with mounting stringency. The Board considered moving into smaller quarters
as enrollments dropped, decided against it, but did save
on rent by releasing some space to the state. The main
reduction in costs came in progressively reducing
course offerings and so reducing payroll. Staffing presented a problem anyway, since war service resulted in
some faculty leaving for the duration, including one
who was full time. The principal concern was to main-
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tain three full-time faculty to meet the ABA requirement. Academic 1940-41 was a normal year, and with
Snodgrass, Low, and the two 65ers, McMurray and
Cathcart, there were four full-timers. McMurray left
after one year, but Cathcart continued, and 1941-42
presented no staffing problems. Fourteen faculty gave
92 semester units covering the entire curriculum. The
need to economize and major staffing problems both
arrived in 1942-43. The fall enrollment was only onethird what it had been the previous year. The staffing
problem provided the economy. Duncan Low and
Francis Walsh went into government service, leaving
uncovered first-year Property, second-year Equity, and
third-year Code Pleading and Practice (Low's courses),
and Walsh's first-year Legal Bibliography and thirdyear Bankruptcy. A retired federal judge in the Virgin
Islands and former law professor; Albert Levitt, took
Property; a practitioner, Lawrence Baker, was hired
part time for Equity; another part-timer, Alden Ames,
was brought in for Code Pleading; Legal Bibliography
was shifted to an existing part-timer, Edward G. Benard; and Bankruptcy was foregone for the duration.
Lyman Henry's second-year Admiralty was also not given, and it remained a casualty until peace. Ira Rowell's
second-year Administrative Law disappeared. While
Low's absence on leave threatened the continuation of
three full-time professors, Levitt supplied the need for
the moment. But the entire program was reduced to 88
semester hours.
The radical reduction of both courses and staff
came in academic 1943-44. The first-year program was
left intact, to serve an entering class of 11 students.
There were only 12 students in the second-year class,
and 12 in the third. The two upper-classes were combined into a single curriculum of third-year courses,
and the second-year courses were cancelled entirely for
that year. The result was that only 71 semester hours
were offered. Staff adjustments had to be made to gain
the benefit of such economy. Things were eased consid-
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erably by the forced retirement of James A. Ballentine,
who had long since been reduced to teaching only firstyear courses, but was no longer competent to teach at
all. His 11 semester hours, including first-year Agency,
Common Law Pleading, and Criminal Law, were parcelled out among others, the bulk going to the indefatigable Robert W. Harrison, who was now teaching 14
hours, and Judge C.]. Goodell (who had joined the
faculty the year before). Levitt had quit, along with
Rowell; Low and Walsh were still on leave; Benard,
Henry, and the stalwart part-timer, Perry Evans, were
temporarily laid off. Cathcart's load was reduced from
10 to 6 hours. To maintain the ABA requirement of a
third full-time faculty member, the eminent Edward S.
Thurston, author of the standard casebook on Restitution and recently retired after a distinguished career,
latterly at Harvard, was hired to teach a third-year
course in Restitution. Thurston was the third member
of the 65 Club. The temporary layoffs of part-time staff
were necessary to pay for Thurston's services.
In 1944-45, the third-year curriculum was given,
and the second-year curriculum omitted. The thirdyear class of that year took the second-year courses with
the new second-year class. Alternating the second- and
third-year programs was a brilliant expedient for economizing and making the best use of available staff. In
1944-45, only 58 semester units were given; in 1945-46,
the second-year program was put in escrow, and a total
of 59 semester hours were given. In each of these latter
two years the services of 6 part-time faculty were not
used, at considerable savings to the College. Such an
expedient, justified though it was by necessity, would
have been difficult if not impossible in a more conventional university law school because of tenure restrictions and the hardship that a layoff would work on
full-time faculty. Hastings' reliance on part-time faculty
who made a good living in practice was a distinct advantage in a time of unusual circumstances. The faculty laid
off remained on the College roster, their feelings and
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self-esteem left intact, and they were available for future
serVICe.
No essential part of the full curriculum was lost to
the students by the system of alternation of the upperclass curricula. The Class of '45 graduated with 87
semester units, 2 more than the required number,
though there were slightly fewer required units than
there had been pre-war. The only courses the students
did not have which normally they would have had were
all 2-units each: Admiralty, Bankruptcy, and Taxation.
Admiralty and Bankruptcy were electives anyway, the
former expendable and the latter of understandably
limited appeal. Taxation was a significant want, but part
of the problem with continuing it was the difficulty of
finding someone truly competent to teach it. In retrospect, the graduates of 1945 do not find the experience
to have been at all damaging, preferring to tally the gain
rather than count the loss. One of the Class of '45 recalls that in a course where there were as few as 13 and
no more than 25 students, in one hour every student
was called upon at least four times. Though unnerving,
such over-attention kept the students at a high level of
involvement and demanded much more thorough
preparation than a larger class would have required.
The happy breed, the wartime band of brothers and
sisters, are convinced that they received the best education of any students in the College's history. They probably did; certainly they received the most personalized
education. The benefits were immediate, for the success
rate on the first try of Hastings students taking the Bar
Examination was never higher than during these years;
the Class of '45 (all 8 of them) made it with 100 percent
success. It is also worth remarking upon that these students' experience in the system of curricula alternation
mocked the conventional wisdom that saw the law
school program as one of progressively more difficult
courses. Under Hastings' original curriculum-the
Pomeroy System-this was doubtless true. But with the
triumph of the Langdell/ Ames case method and its ap-
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plication to the entire curriculum, at best a distinction
could be made between the first-year courses and the
whole body of upper-class courses, and that distinction
stemmed more from the unfamiliarity of the freshman
with the method and the law than from the subject matter itself. By the use of the case method, inherently difficult, even intractable categories of substantive law can
be reduced to the same degree of manageableness as
simpler categories. The amount of case material used in
a course can be adjusted to the degree of difficulty
posed by the subject matter of the course. Put crudely,
one case is like another; the case method is a great
eq ualizer of subject matter because it is a great sim plifier
of difficulties. The convention by which the better law
schools no longer make any distinction between secondand third-year courses, and each upper-class year is no
longer a curriculum in itself, has been a long time coming. Despite its experience of the war years, Hastings
did not abolish the distinction until 1971-72.
To David Ellington Snodgrass must go the credit
for maintaining a sound curriculum under trying circumstances of indefinite duration. He taught a heavier
load (11-12 hours) during these years than any dean in
the College's history, while energetically coping with
more administrative matters than had his predecessors.
Snodgrass even undertook some part-time work for the
War Department in 1942-45 (reducing his College salary by $90 per month) without sacrificing his teaching.
Except for the addition of a stenographer, there was no
expansion of administrative staff. Though the Board
was always supportive of the dean's efforts, the creativity to conceive of solutions to problems and the initiative
to act in confronting them was Snodgrass' own contribution. In this he was ably and devotedly served by the
Registrar. Since George Martin's death in 1936, Miss
Juanita M. Olsson held that office, the only non-lawyer
registrar in Hastings' history. She had been Simmons'
secretary from 1925 until her promotion (with precious
little salary increase) to Registrar. "Ole," for so she was
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known to a generation of adoring Hastings students and
admiring Hastings faculty, was the daughter and stepdaughter of Swedish master-mariners. During the war
she found time to take night-courses in navigation,
which lent a theoretical dimension to an already accomplished sailor, and had there been a bit more women's
liberation then she would have had her ticket. The -Registrar handled all routine administrative matters, was
the recorder of Directors' meetings, and exercised responsibility for the College's general records and student files. She was librarian besides. During the war
years, though Snodgrass' energy never flagged and he
gathered more administrative reins into his hands than
he could manage to handle, it was "Ole" who provided
day-to-day continuity in the College's life. The confusion brought by a constantly shifting student body,
curriculum, and staffing pattern was her particular foe;
she triumphed over it. She was also the vital, cheerful,
kindly, and caring confidante of hundreds of students
in these years. For many a young man who received
"Greetings" from the President of the United States,
"Ole" was the last-always cheery-soul he saw at Hastings when he dropped by to take care of his College
affairs. Her memory for student names and faces was
famous. And it still is. "Ole" is just as lively and active as
ever, albeit on the beach in landlocked Santa Rosa.
January 1944 was as bleak a month for the College's
fortunes as the war years produced. There were only 37
students beginning the new semester. The Committee
of Bar Examiners, insensitive to the problems raised by
war, seemed bent on requiring a higher percentage of
success on the bar examination for a law school to remain accredited by the Examiners-with fewer graduates, a few failures multiplied the peril of disaccreditation. It was universally believed that the new year would
see the mounting of the grand offensive against Hitler's
Fortress Europe-bloody Anzio presaged D-Day six
months later-and the massive attack on Japanese con-
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trol of the Central Pacific was well underway, with the
Marines suffering 3,000 casualties on Tarawa in three
November days. Everyone knew how long losing had
taken; no one could be sure how long it would take to
win. There was only one ray of sunshine. The Veterans'
Administration was beginning to consider seriously
what the nation owed those who had served it beyond
widows' and childrens' benefits and hospital beds for
broken bodies. "Rehabilitation" began to mean also
educational assistance, and six months before June 22,
1944, when Roosevelt signed into law the "GI Bill of
Rights," the local Veterans Administration office made
enquiries of educational institutions as to whether or
not they were prepared to contract with the V A for
educational rehabilitation. On January 17, 1944, the
Board authorized the dean to negotiate a contract with
the VA for education of returning veterans, at $85 to
$90 per month per veteran, by which Hastings would
accept them, furnish them "with books, fountain pens,
pencils, paper, etc. (title to such property to be vested in
the College),,6-Professor Snodgrass had taught Contracts for too many years not to know how to drive a
hard bargain.
Dean Snodgrass appreciated the financial bonanza
that the GI Bill would prove once it became fully operational. But his enthusiasm for the Bill went beyond
motives of gain. During World War I Snodgrass had
served on a destroyer as an ensign. He was active in the
American Legion, and was the founding father and
guiding spirit of the appropriately named Blackstone
Post No. 143 of the Legion's Department of California.
Returning Gis quipped that though it was not compulsory for a Hastings student-veteran to join the Legion, it
was obligatory. During World War II, Snodgrass served
as a government appeal agent for Selective Service
(1942) and as a member of the state board of the Selective Service System from 1944 to 1947, and he continued to serve the System with the revived postwar
draft, receiving a ten-year certificate of appreciation
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from the System in 1962. He was consultant to the chief
of the legal branch of the Army's San Francisco
Ordnance District, 1943-45, the income from which
moved him to reduce voluntarily his Hastings salary,
and he contributed further to the war effort as a public
panel member of the regional War Labor Board from
1944 to 1946. The war was no less a personal crusade
for him than if he had donned a uniform again. He had
enormous sympathy for the plight of servicemen whose
education and careers had been interrupted, and he
would always take pride in having made available the
opportunity for a legal education to as many GIs as
could meet admissions qualifications and for whom
there were chairs in a classroom.
The challenge of the GIs was formidable. In common with all American educational institutions, Hastings had never experienced either a deluge of students
of such proportions or the administrative problems
posed by wholesale public support channeled through
individual students. In the aftermath of World War I,
Hastings had contracted for "vocational education" of
disabled veterans with the Federal Board for Vocational
Education, but the number of these veterans was small.
During the Great Depression, Hastings had participated
in the federal Emergency Relief Administration's parttime employment program for needy students. 7 This
program was small (about a score of students were involved at anyone time), it was limited to the darkest
years of the early part of Roosevelt's administration,
and it was administered by the University of California.
The College had been slow to develop any form of student assistance. At the outbreak of the second war it
shared with Boalt in three scholarship endowments that
provided Hastings with three modest grants per year,
and the College'S first exclusive scholarship (value,
$150) was established in 1939 in honor of the late Warren Olney, Jr., former professor and Board member.
Three memorial loan funds had provided some assistance in the 1930s to hardpressed students; such sparse

Swords and Ploughshares

259

student aid had afforded little or no experience in that
dimension of administration. The dribble of returning
vets that began in August 1945 was too small to do more
than familiarize dean and registrar with the myriad VA
forms. The deluge of January 1946 exceeded anything
that anyone could have expected in terms of numbers
and headaches.
The College had prepared as well as it could, but
the sudden collapse of Japan and V-J Day, August 15,
1945, took the College, like everyone else, by surprise.
Assuming a rapid demobilization, a rush of veterans
could be expected at the beginning of the next year. A
special session of the College was planned for January 2
to April 27, 1946, the only time in Hastings' history that
a new class began other than in the fall. On the day after
New Year's, 151 students registered, 86 percent of them
veterans. With 60 continuing regular second-semester
students, place had to be found for 211, the same
number as in the fall of 1937, and about a score more
than in the last "pre-war" fall of 1941. Most of the new
students were first-year; the few who were upperclassmen were integrated into the regular secondsemester courses of the second and third years. Dave
Snodgrass, who had taught the first half of Contracts in
the fall with 29 students, faced a new first-semester Contracts class four times as large. The second semester for
the special session students began the day after the end
of the first semester, April 28, and ended on August 22.
Ten percent of the students did not return, leaving an
enrollment of 136, comprising 118 veterans (one of
them a woman) and 18 civilians (6 of whom were women). After an exhausting first year, the students who
returned in fall 1946 for their second year had the luxury of beginning on September 16, following a summer
vacation of a little more than three weeks.
The graph below of fall enrollments, 1940-1953,
provides a vivid still-life of swords and ploughshares.
It is not difficult to feel the dynamism of the upward
curve that characterized the years 1946 to 1949. And it
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takes little imagination to recapture the cattle car conditions of Hastings' classrooms, where no fewer than 483
and as many as 915 students were to learn the law each
fall. The California Building at 515 Van Ness had
seemed like the Promised Land in 1938 when Hastings
moved in. The old State Building had provided Hastings with some 4000 sq. ft. of floorspace; the California
Building had 11,160 sq. ft., quite adequate for the
largest pre-war enrollments of about 270 students. With
a student population of 915, the California Building
provided an average of 12 sq. ft. per student. The famous Ventilation Ukase of Dean Snodgrass that went
out over the Registrar's signature in November 1950
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appears highly amusing today, but it was serious at the
time, considering the inadequate ventilation of overcrowded classrooms. Windows had to be kept closed
because of Van Ness' heavy traffic noise, but with the
huge whirring exhaust fans in each room packed tight
with shuffling feet and sniffling noses one strained to
hear. Students turned off the fans, "in complete disregard of the welfare of their classmates," and faculty
were directed by the Ukase to keep the fans running
and to report the name of any student "observed turning off a fan."8 The fate of the miscreant is not indicated, but the dean's wrath is patent. The terribly
crowded conditions during the GI years are remembered with no fondness by anyone.
To accommodate the deluge and to provide at least
a passable learning situation, a year's class was divided
into two or more sections for instruction in the same
courses. By doing this, Hastings stole a march on Boalt
(and Stanford too), much to the delight of Snodgrass;
during the GI bulge, Boalt's fall enrollment stayed
steadily in the upper 200s while Hastings' soared to almost four times that number. In 1946-47, only the first
year was divided into two sections. There were two sections thereafter in the first year until in 1949-50, to
accommodate the maximum bulge, three sections were
established. In 1948-49 and again in 1949-50, the second and third years were given in two sections. The
contraction in numbers of GIs in 1950-51 resulted in
only two sections being given in all three years, and with
a further drop in enrollments, no double sections were
required in 1951-52. Another singular break with tradition, or rather a return to Pomeroy's years, when a lone
professor had made it necessary, was that classes were
given all day long, Monday through Friday, and Saturday classes were extended into the early afternoon. This
scheduling began in 1947-48 and continued until
double-sections were abolished. The first year was instructed in the afternoon, upper classmen in the morning, enabling them to work, as Hastings students always
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had. In such tight quarters, such shifts were unavoidable if the College was to fulfill Snodgrass' pledge
that every qualified veteran would have a chance.
The special sessions of 1946 had been taught by
assigning some existing faculty double duty, the hiring
of a raft of part-time practitioners, and the addition of
two 65ers, Oliver L. McCaskill, who had retired after
two decades at Illinois, and Chester G. Vernier, who
had spent thirty years at Stanford. Their appointment
signalled Snodgrass' commitment to hiring as many retired professors as he could find, and filling in the interstices of faculty needs with part-time staff. In 1947,
Augustin Derby of NYU joined the club. Eight 65ers
were aboard in 1948-49, though only three, Lawrence
VoId (Nebraska and Boston University), Ernest G.
Lorenzen (Yale), and George G. Bogert (Chicago) continued over the next year. Bogert was technically a onesemester visitor in spring 1949. The luminous Max
Radin of Boalt fell out with Snodgrass after the fall
semester 1948 and his resignation was demanded;
another Boalt emeritus, Dudley O. McGovney, filled the
gap for the second semester. In the last year of the
bulge, 1949-1950, William G. Hale of USC and Everett
Fraser of Minnesota joined the faculty. Losses of 65ers
were few. Discounting McMurray, Radin, and McGovney (who stayed a year or less), the 13 emeriti hired
between 1940 and 1949 had given up two to
retirement-Thurston in 1948 and Cathcart in 1949and Vernier to death, in 1949. The rest saw the College
through the GI bulge and most well beyond. A faculty
which in 1939-40 had numbered three full-time, 11
part-time teachers, in 1949-50 comprised 10 full-time (7
of them 65ers) and 20 part-time. What had begun in
August 1940 as a last minute solution to a desperate
situation had grown a decade later to provide the
backbone of the faculty and the core of the curriculum.
The ramifications of this development were determinative of the next quarter of a century of the College's
existence.
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The strain imposed by the deluge (which came
more and more to resemble a tidal wave) was considerable. It took its toll on Juanita Olsson's health, and in
1946 she resigned as Registrar. David Ellington Snodgrass, who resembled a great little tower of strength,
was clearly overworked. In the fall of 1946, after 14
months of unbroken toil, he was discouraged. He had
apparently "given up hope for Hastings," according to
an old friend, Warren Seavey at Harvard, to whom he
had written about the possibility of finding a job at
another law school. 9 In the event, nothing came of his
overture. Some relief came in 1947, when the Board
authorized some expansion in administrative staff. A
graduate of the College, Arthur M. Sammis, '39, joined
the faculty as a part-time instructor to teach Legal Bibliography and first-year Property in 1944-45. In 1947 he
was made a full-time professor and Registrar. Sammis
had a natural penchant for administration. He remained outwardly cool under pressure, and his sense of
order made him a much steadier administrator than
Snodgrass. He was a superb lieutenant to the dean at a
time when a large part of the routine burden had to be
executed by someone in whom the mercurial Snodgrass
had complete confidence. Added secretarial help made
for a more efficient operation. A librarian-faculty
member assumed a burden too long carried by the Registrar. Finally, a coordinator of veterans' affairs was appointed to take over the paperwork involved in the GI
program. Yet even with these additions, to the practiced
eye of three outside experts who visited in 1948, the
school remained "badly understaffed," and they recommended the appointment of an associate dean and
an executive secretary.l0
In dealing with the Veterans' Administration nothing ever proved routine. The VA was the first massive
federal bureaucracy with which American higher educational institutions had to deal. For Hastings, the original contract negotiations went smoothly enough. But
Public Law 16 and Public Law 346 of 1944 were com-
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plex acts, and the VA was slow to evolve a sound administrative structure to implement them. The local administrators were helpful and easy to work with. Col.
Thomas J. Cross was deputy administrator of the local
branch of the VA, and Snodgrass had established a
close, even warm working relationship with him in
1946. The trouble came in dealing with Washingtonand Washington made the important decisions.
A major problem with the VA arose almost at once
after Hastings entered the first contract in 1944. The
"GI Bill of Rights," P.L. 346 of 1944, provided for compensation to the host institution on the basis of fees as of
June 22, 1944, when it was signed into law. Hastings
had always had only one registration fee, charged alike
to residents and non-residents of the state of California.
In 1941, the Board had rejected the idea of charging a
higher fee to non-residents. At the time, the matter was
of only academic interest, since the College had very few
out-of-state students. The University, however, converted to higher fees for non-resident students as a
form of tuition. In 1944, the VA ruled that Boalt would
receive $210 per semester in compensation for each
veteran, resident of the state or not, because it already
had its (raised) non-resident fee charge of $210. Hastings, however, would receive only $60 per semester
compensation because that was its highest fee. Snodgrass argued that Hastings was the "law department" of
the University by virtue of the act of 1878 and the Supreme Court's decision in Foltz v. Rage et al.; that the
cost of the College's wartime operation amounted to
more than $210 per student per semester; that even in
peacetime student fees had never covered the cost of
operation; and that equity demanded that Hastings be
reimbursed for veteran training at the same rate as
Boalt, to wit, $210 per student per semester whether
resident or non-resident. While Washington pondered
the dean's demand for equal treatment with Boalt and
for reversal of the original ruling (and President Sproul
puzzled how to deal with Snodgrass' request for the
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University's assistance), the Hastings Board increased
the fee for non-resident students to $210 per semester
effective January 1,1945. Sproul appears to have delivered the assistance requested; at least Snodgrass
thought so. The Veterans Administration ruled that
Hastings could establish a non-resident fee comparable
to Boalt's, and that if it was applicable to all classes of
students, then it would be allowed for compensation of
veterans' education. Snodgrass interpreted this to mean
that the higher fee was chargeable to a veteran whether
resident or non-resident. His interpretation held,
though the University in March 1945 put a ceiling on
VA fees of $150 per semester, thus reducing Hastings'
compensation (thanks to the doctrine of parity) to the
same sum. 11 What appears to have been settled in 1945
blew up again in 1949. This time it was the local office
that ruled that whether or not Hastings was part of the
University was irrelevant, that it did not have the higher
fee on June 22, 1944, and therefore it could claim
higher compensation only by justifying actual cost of
operation. Washington supported the local office. Despite the intervention of Senator William Knowland, in
early 1950 Hastings had to capitulate. It could not justify the $150 compensation on the basis of cost. Snodgrass agreed in March 1950 to reduce the non-resident
fee to $84.15 per semester for the current academic
year, with a further reduction in 1950-51. In the event,
the compensation paid by the VA in 1949-50 was reduced by only about $25 per semester. Still, with some
bitterness and considerable justice Snodgrass observed
that Boalt and even the new law school at UCLA (which
was not even in existence in 1944) would continue to be
paid the $150, without having to justify it by cost, and
only because the Regents had had the good luck to
adopt a higher non-resident fee before June 22,1944,12
Insofar as cost of operation was concerned, the
VA's case was incontrovertible. For the academic years
1946-47 through 1948-49, the College'S incomealmost 90 percent of which came from VA
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compensation-was $740,000, and its expenditures
were $343,000, a net surplus of $397,000, for a "profit"
of 116 percent. In this period, of the 15 state barrecognized law schools in California, Hastings had the
second highest income and the fourth highest expenditure (only Stanford, with a total income for these
three years of $776,000, had a higher income). Tuition
paid for veterans comprised only about 60 percent of
the total compensation. In terms of actual tuition, the
surplus from VA compensation was not excessive: It
cost the College $196 to educate a student in 1947-48,
$212 in 1948-49, and $201 in 1949-50, for which it received from the V A $300 per student in the first two
academic years, and about $250 in the last. The windfall
came from the application fees for veterans, which
amounted to about 35 percent of the total VA compensation to the College (summer school fees and handling
charges comprised 5 p~rcent). In 1947-48, veterans
constituted 88 percent of the student body and brought
in 93 percent of the revenue. The next triennium was
not such a bonanza time. The reduction of tuition compensation paid by the VA and a decline in the number
of new vetera.n enrollees both arrived in 1950-51, and
the decline became a plunge in the next year. But Hastings had made hay while the sun shone. Between 1947
and 1951, the Board invested about $390,000 in securities, many of them safe, low interest bonds. That sum
constituted the GI Bill bonanza. In acquiring and banking such a surplus Hastings was not unique; while Hastings cut back its request for state money to the statutory
$7000 for the period, the University of California received a steadily increasing flow of state money along
with the GI Bill bonanza and used its surplus to undertake its enormous postwar expansion.
Did Hastings give good value for money received?
It took in more veterans than any other law school in
California. In the first four years of the GI deluge,
about 18 percent of the state's law school students were
enrolled at Hastings. In 1949, Hastings had grown to
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become the tenth largest law school in the country in
terms of enrollments. Though it slipped to fourteenth
largest in 1950, and to twenty-first in 1951, in every year
since 1946 it had more students than any other California law school. It had given more returning servicemen
a chance for a legal education than any of its competitors. What its record was in terms of giving an education, not merely a chance for an education, indeed bears
scrutiny. Hit had taken in more veterans than any other
law school in the state from 1949 to 1954, when the bulk
of the veterans completed their studies, it graduated
only about 600 of them. In the years 1946 to 1949,
despite its large enrollments, only 106 of its graduates
took the bar examination. USC (with 292), USF (142),
Boalt (119), and Stanford (112) produced more candidates. More disturbing was the fact that, except f()r
USF, all of these schools had a better pass rate than
Hastings; a little over 70 percent from Hastings passed,
whereas USC's success rate stood at over 80 percent and
Stanford's and Boalt's at over 90 percent. (At just under
70 percent, USF's rate was only slightly worse than Hastings'.) Worse yet, Hastings graduates were on a
downward slope on the bar examination results.
The problem was not primarily a matter of quality
of instruction. A special survey board of three eminent
out-of-state investigators, who scrutinized the entire
legal educational and admissions structure of California
in 1948-49, visited classes of every full-time teacher and
most of the part-time teachers at Hastings and found
that "all classroom teaching thus observed was of acceptable quality, and much of it was superior," though
handicapped by overcrowding. 13 It could not have been
entirely a matter of examinations and grading standards, because the same panel found that "the questions
used meet acceptable standards for examinations in
first-rate American law schools," and rated Hastings'
standards as "excellent," along with those at Boalt, Santa
Clara, Loyola (Los Angeles), and USC; Stanford's were
considered only "good" because examination readers
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were used. 14 Moreover, Hastings excluded a greater
number of students at the end of each class-year than
any other law school except the night school, San Francisco Law School, and Balboa in San Diego: 23.6 percent
at the end of the first year, 16.9 percent at the end of the
second, and a big 9.1 at the end of the third. Its percentage of voluntary withdrawals at the end of the first
year was lower than most, but still stood at 6.5 percent,
bringing the total first-year attrition to over 30 percent.
Dean Snodgrass was not joking when he told a first-year
class, "Look to the right of you, look to the left of you;
the gentleman on your right and the gentleman on your
left will not be here next year."15 The same grim comment could have been made to a second- or a third-year
class also. By the beginning of its last semester, the Class
of '48 had lost 40 percent of its comrades, the Class of
'49, 42 percent, and the Class of '50, 38 percent. There
is irrefutable evidence that the faculty was rigorous
enough in the classroom, but too lenient at the year-end
grade-review session. Too many students (who were,
incidentally, anonymous in the review, being identified
only by a code number) were upgraded to avoid exclusion. The longstanding Hastings practice of permitting
readmission so that a below average grade might be
raised to passing level, was used too freely, was even
extended to first-year students. Dean Prosser of Boalt
accused Hastings of allowing such liberal readmission
"for the sole purpose of getting their [the students'] tuition."16 That was both uncharitable and unprovable.
The root of the problem was that Hastings' admissions standards were too low to afford its marginal students much hope of success on the bar examination.
Hastings required less college work than any of the
schools whose students did better on the examination,
and those same schools excluded fewer students in the
course of their program. The bar examination results
analyzed by the 1948-49 special survey board established a direct correlation between number of years in
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undergraduate college-and especially in the acqulSltion of an undergraduate degree-and success on the
bar examination. 1 7 Hastings and its dean prided themselves on giving a veteran a chance that other schools
would not. But the opportunity was not a guarantee of
success, and inevitably failure brought misery.
For some, misery appeared to be injustice. Men
who had hit the beach at Iwo Jima, thrown back
Rundstedt in the "Bulge," dodged flak over Polesti in a
B-24, stood fast on the deck of a flat-top as a kamikaze
came in, or suffered through winters in Greenland and
monsoons in Burma, would not abide injustice. The
Class of '50 began its last semester with only 62 percent
of its starting complement in 1948 surviving. A few days
before graduation 47, or 32 percent of the survivors,
were failed and barred from graduating. Most of them
were veterans, one of whom was about to fight again as a
captain, USMC, in Korea. This academic "slaughter"
touched off the sorriest episode in the era of the
ploughshares. And it demonstrated beyond doubt that
the College, from a commendable desire to give veterans the opportunity to acquire a legal education, had
been grossly derelict in not demanding a higher standard for admission and-hard though it might have
been-in not excluding more students on the basis of
weak records at the end of the first year. Early in July,
the 47 formed a committee and requested the Board of
Directors to review the examinations of the third-year
courses. 1S The students released their petition to the
press. The Board made no reply to the petition. Shortly
afterwards, the president of the Hastings Alumni Association called for Snodgrass' resignation! The Board
met August 9; it had before it a lengthy "report" with
much supporting documentation prepared by the
committee for the 47. The committee requested that the
47 be given the degree so that they would be eligible to
take the bar examination in October. The report alleged
that the 47 had been failed to assure a better pass-rate
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on the bar examination, the College being in danger of
losing its accreditation by the state Bar Examiners because of its low pass-rate (this was a very real peril at the
time). In support of this contention, they cited: Dean
Snodgrass' current crusade against the Bar Examiners
over the accreditation rule; a speech Snodgrass had
given to the Class of '50 in the previous February pointing out the College's peril and the only remedy, which
would be to fail about one-third of the Class of '50; and
a newspaper clipping, reporting his dispute with the
Committee, that was mailed out to everyone of the 47
failing students with the notice of their failure. Their
report gave instances of arbitrary grading practices, of
grades changed by the dean after certification of a
higher grade by professors, and of direct orders from
the administration to professors to reduce grades. The
Board did not even open the envelope containing the
request and report. The president of the Board, Chief
Justice Phil S. Gibson, did, and told one of the leaders of
the group to petition the faculty. By this time, the matter was notorious. President Sproul of the University
received letters urging him to intervene, and state legislators threatened legislation to correct the "situation" at
Hastings. The Bar Examiners Committee had already
met with the students and the administration in the attempt to work out a compromise: the "best" of the 47
would be graduated and allowed to take the examinations in October, and the College would retain its
accreditation even if there was less than a 60 percent
pass-rate. The dean rejected this solution; the 47 would
be allowed to retake the third year as the rules allowed-period.
The Directors could no longer wrap themselves in
their togas and leave the matter to the faculty, although
grades were the latter's responsibility. The Board met
again a few days after the August 9 meeting, and called
in the dean, who categorically denied the accusations.
Rebuking him "violently" for enclosing the clipping
with the letters to the failed students, the Board ap-
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pointed a special investigating committee, under the
chairmanship of Director Edgar T. Zook, a former
judge and son-in-law and partner of Charles William
Slack. Zook had the directness and energy of his fatherin-law. His investigation was apparently thorough. He
found that the 47 had deserved to fail, that the grades
were honest grades by faculty members of integrity, that
Snodgrass had not tampered with them, and that what
had happened was that the faculty had stopped being
lenient in passing students who should fail. Most of the
47 had failed in previous years and been upgraded by
the faculty at their annual grade-review meeting or
readmitted on examination. On the basis of Zook's report, the Board backed Snodgrass, none dissenting, and
directed the chief justice to send a letter to each student indicating that he had failed on his merits and had
no justifiable grounds of complaint.
At this remove it cannot be determined which if any
of the allegations of arbitrary grade practices instanced
in the students' report were true. It is hard to credit that
some of them were not, especially those attested to by
persons either reporting what they saw and heard, or
otherwise in a position to know what occurred. However, the further away the allegations were from 1950,
the more credible they seem-the weightiest evidence
was of practices and actions of some years before, not
connected with the current dispute, but included for
aggravation. Snodgrass' denial of arbitrariness was
borne out by Hale and McCaskill, 65ers on the faculty,
who admitted that they had been taken by surprise by
the large number of failing seniors. The faculty had
earlier decided to stop the upgrading of students and to
cease allowing a student with a failure to continue. But
that new policy was aimed immediately at first- and
second-year students. Perhaps with the new policy in
mind, the professors had unconsciously tightened standards for the third year as well. It was too late by the
June meeting to do much about it, save to upgrade some
marginal cases. Snodgrass was responsible for including
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the clipping, but only to indicate that leniency would no
longer be accorded failing students. 19
Snodgrass acted badly in the entire affair. The
clipping was a particularly thoughtless act, and appeared to indicate that decimation was undertaken pour
encourager les autres. His rigidity in rejecting out of hand
the Bar Examiners' compromise solution was perhaps
the act of a just man, but it bespoke a lack of equitableness that rests ill in an administrator. And upon Snodgrass' shoulders falls the blame for some of the wellfounded reproaches the students' report directed to the
College. At no time, they asserted, had they received
any counselling or guidance with respect to their
studies, and especially none in regard to their examination papers. Further, they said, the College had neglected to warn them of potential failure at an early
stage.
Despite the pressures upon them, the dean, faculty,
and Directors held fast. Approximately one-third of the
47 disappeared, a few of them to do a fourth year
elsewhere and then try the bar examination. Another
third retook the third year at Hastings; 2 failed, but 12
received the LL.B. in 1951. The saddest fate befell the
15 who were eligible to take the bar examination, even
though they had not graduated, because they had had
four years of legal study (most of them had already
retaken the third year once before). Only 2 of these 15
passed the bar examination in October 1950. Of the 84
graduates, most of them Class of '50, who took that
same examination for the first time, 57 passed, giving
Hastings a respectable success rate of 67.9 percent. The
dean and faculty were correct in their assessment of the
abilities of the 47. Thus ended the sad business of the
Great Failure Crisis of 1950: Standards were maintained, the College vindicated, but a number of students
suffered greatly in the process.
In myriad ways and for eight continuous years the
veterans made an impact on Hastings that moved it
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away from its traditional placidity. Sheer bulk was, of
course, one of the ways. Never had the College suddenly acquired so many students after having so fewindeed, never had it had so many at all. But more
significant was the erosion of old manners and mores by
a new breed of students, different in style and tone
from their predecessors of previous decades. With the
advent of the GIs, for the first time Hastings perceived
that students were something more than the young
gentlemen in a class who had sat respectfully even when
savoring Professor Bryan's startled reaction to a mechanical frog on his podium. Social life ceased to be
centered in the nearly-inclusive professional fraternities
and the eagerly awaited annual men's smoker, when the
dean dealt a mean hand of five-card draw but always
remained "the Dean." No money ever changed hands at
cards in the presence of William Marvin Simmons, who
detested gambling because it was ungentlemanly. Some
of the GIs had built up their nest-eggs for "rehabilitation" at cards and craps, and Public Law 346 maintenance was supplemented by some heavy nights of gaming. As a sign of the times, beer gave way to booze when
the GIs got down to serious partying. More to the point,
faculty found it increasingly inappropriate to allow So-cratic interrogation in class to slip over into bullyragging. "Gentlemen" began to give way to "men," and
chino pants, if not exactly de rigueur, no longer evoked
the stony professorial stare of disapprobation that a few
years before had greeted a student not attired in suit
and vest. Faculty found that they were not, apparently,
as unapproachable as they once had been, and some of
them found it difficult to adjust to an easy informality
that stopped just short of familiarity with a casually terminal "sir." There was something awesome about so
many young men who seemed so mature, battalion
commanders before they were of graduate-student age,
and fiyboys still too young to be served in a Kentish pub.
Unlike their predecessors, these students were
cosmopolites. They had not exactly been on the grand
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tour, but they had covered a lot of terrain. The more
sensitive of them had acquired a respect for diversity in
cultures that gave them a peculiar cast of mind, a certain
easiness in dealing with the unfamiliar and even the
totally strange. The crudest of them had experienced a
great deal and had learned something. None of them
were still what they had been when they went off to
basic training. Their self-identity had been formed in
bizarre places under trying conditions. They did not
have to "find" themselves; they knew what they wanted,
and they knew what they were going to become. If it
could be sung of the Doughboys of 1918, "How can you
keep them down on the farm, after they've seen Gay
Paree?", it could be said of the GIs that they had seen
both more and less than "Gay Paree" (it had disappeared in 1940 when the Wehrmacht goosestepped
over the tomb of Le Soldat Inconnu under the Arc de
Triomphe). For Americans had tasted for the first time
during World War II the whole horror of war and the
incivility of barbarism. The GIs always seemed to be in a
rush to get started in a "real" life, and their no-nonsense
professionalism probably did stem from that impatience. Maybe, though, they were also in a rush to get
away from something. Most of them succeeded in rushing into what they wanted in "real" life; none of them
managed entirely to get away from the surreal life of so
much experience packed into so few years. If in 1941
the swordsman had been made in a day, in 1946 it took
a good deal longer to make him into a ploughman.
The GIs were a remarkably stable lot even though
they were not stolid. They enjoyed the advantage that
the veterans of two wars since have not; they returned
as heroes from a victorious struggle for right. They
were not so much reintegrated into society; they became
society. Here numbers were with them, no GI feeling
that he was odd-man-out (that sense was more acute in
those who were not GIs). Public Laws 16 and 346 helped
enormously, not just financially, but by giving the veteran the assurance that as he had served his country at

Orrin Kip McMurray

Arthur M. Cathcart

Juanita M. Olsson

Robert W. Harrison

Swords and Ploughshares

275

the side of Mars, he would serve it now hand in hand
with Athene, goddess both of victory and of wisdom. A
grateful nation bid them serve in peace and prosper,
and it extended to them the beneficence to make that
possible. Purposefulness was not only a matter of
idealism, it was also a necessity. The GIs were other than
merely men-over half of them were married men. Stability came from stable family lives. The girl married on
a 48-hour pass, the girl swooped up after demobilization, proved a rock of loving support. Some of the marriages have not survived the wrack of time, but they
were remarkably durable for that season. For the first
time in Hastings' history there were wives around in
ample number. They were grateful and happy women
of high expectation, for their husbands and for themselves as mothers and "helpmates," and if a Hastings
model is needed they more closely resembled Mary
McHenry Keith than Clara Shortridge Foltz (like both,
some of them were law students and proceeded Bachelor of Laws). Married life also served to make the GIs
socially and emotionally a good deal more selfsufficient. Their impatience with traditional student
life-little though there was of it at Hastings-grew
from their own lack of need for it. They were desirous
of activity and involvement in real, big issues not confined to or even focussed within the walls of the College.
Despite a matchless capacity for delayed gratification
and a singleness of purpose that was almost furious,
they were politically involved in a way that their predecessors had eschewed.
For all their cosmopolitanism, most of them preserved a measure of provincialism that took the form of
a satisfaction at being back where they sprang from.
Hastings veterans contained virtually the same proportion of local boys as had their predecessors. First-year
entrants averaged 65 percent Bay Area residents for
1945-1949 and 57 percent for 1950-1954; the interwar
years saw an average of 68 percent Bay Area residents.
The proportion of San Francisco residents was down
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significantly, by about 15 percent of the total entrants,
but that reflected the results of two new bridges, some
good trains, and a mounting number of cars. The continuation of the dominance of the local constituency in
the Hastings student body also had a stabilizing effect.
The GIs were home in every sense of the word, and this
probably dampened excesses in behavior and reinforced purposefulness.
The veterans comprised a student body which, for
the first time in Hastings history, did not include an
overwhelming number of students who worked to
finance study. The "GI Bill" saw to that. By making
possible afternoon classes, this development eased
scheduling problems. More significantly, it afforded a
priceless opportunity to serious students to devote full
time to study. Since there was no way in which the
three-year program could be accelerated (because of the
strictures of ABA approval and the State Bar accreditation rules), a GI was almost constrained to study at a less
tiring pace than his predecessors, successors, and those
of his contemporaries who were not veterans. In fact,
not as many appear to have taken advantage of this
opportunity as one would have expected. There is no
hard data to indicate how much employment there was
of veterans, but there is indication that many GIs followed the old Hastings practice of working in law
offices-if upper-classmen in the afternoon, if first-year
students in the morning, when there were no first-year
courses given. Why a veteran would work is no mystery.
The GI Bill was generous, but it did not provide a
luxurious living standard. There was a concern, overall
unjustified but in particular cases warranted, that the
glut of law students would rapidly saturate the market
for lawyers, making it difficult to get a job. A desperation fund brought some ease of mind. Also, by working
in a law office, the veteran increased his chances of getting ajob immediately upon admission to the bar, ifnot
in the office he had served, then in another office in
town on the recommendation of his employer. There
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was no placement office at Hastings (that came only in
the 1950s). Before 1946, the widely-known and much
trusted "Ole" had been the effectual agent for a great
many students in helping them find employment.
Snodgrass had gathered that function into his own
hands, but was far too busy to handle it well. In the later
1940s, the Alumni Association stirred itself and tried to
help with employment, but there was no effectual onsite contact organization at the College to coordinate the
alumni's placement activities. Consequently, the veterans' apprehension about jobs, which persuaded them to
work though they apparently did not have to, was real
enough. Once again, the College was derelict. How
many of the less-strong, less well-prepared studentsthe gentlemen who sat on the right or on the left in the
first-year courses, and who failed-did so because they
worked to earn money, feeling they dare not devote all
the needed time to their studies, thus running an unacceptable and too often fatal academic risk?
The veterans at Hastings represented a tidal-wave
in more than mass. For the first time in its history, the
College found itself following in the train of student
initiative. In the 1920s, Dean Harrison had approached
the University about the possibility of awarding the A.B.
to former undergraduates who had entered Hastings
after three years at Berkeley and successfully completed
their first year in law school. Nothing had come of it. On
March 29, 1947, 77 Hastings veterans wrote Robert
Gordon Sproul requesting the same thing. 20 Their petition was a masterpiece of draftsmanship. They contended that Hastings was "the law department" of the
University and that by virtue of that affiliation the
privilege extended to Boalt students should be extended to them. They chided Boalt's reluctance to
expand to accommodate the GIs; many of them would
have gone to Boalt save for this. They pointed out that
they had to have the A.B. to do graduate law work,
LL.M. and J.S.D. programs requiring an undergraduate degree as well as the LL.B., and that without such
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graduate work they would not be able to use all of their
GI benefits. The petition had the approval of Snodgrass, but he was a cockboat in the wake of a dreadnought. Sproul, indifferent to the petition and desirous
of burying it, started it into the Berkeley administrative
and Academic Senate mazes. The petitioners went back
to study, but appointed Raymond Levy, '49, their ramrod. Two years of door knocking and corridorpounding in Berkeley, and a weighty, balanced, and
persuasive brief to the University accomplished nothing. In January 1949, the petitioners and their dean
opened a second front on a battlefield the University
never cares to fight upon. A Hastings alumnusassemblyman introduced a bill in the legislature that
would confer the A.B. by act. The imperial curia at
Berkeley recognized it was beaten and capitulated. Regents' counsel was quite correct in arguing that the bill
was unconstitutional, per Article 9, sect. 9 of the State
Constitution-butJno. U. Calkins,Jr., didn't relish having to take that case to court. 21 When the University
adjudged the matter "closed" in July 1949, 32 Hastings
students either had received the undergraduate degree
or were in process of receiving it-among them, exramrod Raymond Herbert Levy. Snodgrass enjoyed
immensely assuring Sproul that the assembly bill would
be withdrawn from the Military Affairs Committee, and
his self-satisfaction in acknowledging Sproul's surrender (the only time he signed a letter to Sproul "Cordially
yours") was uncontainable. 22 But the dean had been
more an agent than an actor; to the students must go
the credit for a brilliant, tenacious, victorious campaign.
With the same kind of verve and determination,
students moved Hastings into one part of the law school
major leagues. The first number of The HastingsJournal,
An Intramural Law Review was issued under date December 1, 1949, with a handsomely printed title page, but a
typewritten text. As the dean pointed out in a foreword:
The College officers, burdened with administrative detail resulting from a record enrollment of 915 students, have lacked
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the time in which to encourage such a venture. Due, however,
to the industry and initiative of our Associated Students, the
preliminary work has been done, and the first issue of the
Hastingsjournal is a reality.23

Subsequent issues were all printed, with the second
number the journal assumed its present name, The Hastings Law Journal, and with the fall 1951 issue reference
to "intramural" was dropped. The Journal would have
been pretty thin, however, without the sterling contributions of a brand new 65er, William Green Hale,
formerly of USC, who provided an article in each of the
first three issues on his specialty, evidence.
Student initiative also found an outlet in a flowering of new-style student organizations, some of which
survive, but most of which bloomed only for a season.
The Thurston Society, founded in 1948 in honor of the
third 65er to be appointed, Edward S. Thurston, was
the College's first honor society, and is still flourishing.
Thurston died in February 1948, and his passing was
gen uinely mourned. After a career at Harvard, he
taught his specialty, Torts, at Hastings, using the
casebook he had edited with Warren Seavey. The principal student organization, the Associated Students of
the Hastings College of the Law, patterned on the one
at the University at Berkeley, was the students' most
significant development. TheJournal was the Associated
Students' first achievement, but the organization gave
structure to student initiative and endeavor in the whole
range of College life. Out of small beginnings, it grew
into a formidable institution in the College, so successful
that in later years it showed alarming-but im pressive-signs of ossification. In its first years it did yeoman
service with its housing bureau, though its job placement bureau was not equal to the magnitude of its task.
The fraternities continued active, though there had
been some attrition (Sigma Delta Kappa, the sorority
Kappa Beta Pi, and the Eunomathia Debating Society
were gone); a new fraternity was founded in 1948, the
Traynor Senate of Delta Theta Phi, named for a former
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Boalt professor, then justice of the California Supreme
Court, latterly chief justice and presently Roger B.
Traynor Professor of Law at Hastings, that eminent
gentleman himself.
The ephemeral but· numerous special interest
clubs, most of them addressed principally to topics of
current concern, were yeasty. One is hard put to find a
radical of any hue in pre-war Hastings. One stalwart
counsel for unpopular causes, who came to a lively
awareness of the plight of the under-represented illhoused and ill-fed of the Depression era via involvement with the labor movement of the 1930s, was Ben
Margolis, '31. There were two or three other students
who were much exercised by the plight of labor in the
age of its classical struggle for full recognition. But they
were very much a few lone voices crying in the wilderness of a very staid Hastings. All of them were too busy
studying and working to support themselves to find
much time for causes, and the underdeveloped student
life of the lunch-box college made the formation of
political clubs almost impossible. Clair Engle, '33, parlayed an active political involvement as an undergraduate at Berkeley into a long career in California
politics, but at Hastings his nose was to the grindstone. 24
Some, like Myer C. Symonds, '33, found it possible in
later years in practice to fight for liberal causes. Only
with the GIs came the opportunity for political and
ideological diversity to find an outlet in student political
activity. Besides the usual polarities of Democrats and
Republicans, both of which found warm supporters
among the GIs in the hotly contested election of 1948,
Henry Wallace's breakaway Progressives could claim
some adherents in the California Building. To Snodgrass' dismay, the National Lawyers Guild formed a
small but active chapter at Hastings. In the mounting
McCarthyism of the late 1940s, the NLG was looked
upon with increasing suspicion and was on its way to a
place on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. Snodgrass could not bring himself to join
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even the American Civil Liberties Union, despite the
blandishments of a member of the Class of '51, Lawrence Speiser, who entered the ACLU's San Francisco
office as a staff counsel shortly after graduation. 25 The
phenomenon of political organizations and professional
organizations with political purposes appearing in educational institutions was a universal one in the late
1940s, and a contribution of the veterans. The proliferation had a great deal to do with the organizational
sophistication of young men who at an impressionable
age went almost directly from family to a very well structured architectonic society called the army. It took a
period for the GIs to de-organize themselves. That
there was a definite political cast to so many student
organizations might have had less to do with ideology,
or even profound dissatisfaction, than with an understandable desire to create a brave new world in the
shortest possible time.
That brave new world had to have, by common
agreement of the GIs and others who were not but were
sensitive to their aspirations, a place in it for all Americans. The war created a rare patriotism, one that was
sentimentally 'inclusive rather than exclusive. Even in
the tragic and strange aberration of the internment of
the Japanese-Americans, the inclusive quality of the
patriotic fervor served first to mollify and then to shame
occidental Americans for the way they had treated these
oriental fellow countrymen. In Nazi Germany especially, Americans were offered a vision of the dreadful
fruits of hate, especially of racial hatred. It is easily overlooked that what we today call "affirmative action" was
first essayed, and across the board of national economic
life, by an executive order of May 27, 1943. Aimed at
safeguarding the rights of Blacks to partake of the full
employment that war industry provided, the order required mandatory incorporation of nondiscrimination
clauses in contracts for war materials. Despite race riots
and strikes against hiring Black labor, despite Congressional and legislative reactionaries attempting to block
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civil rights legislation (and succeeding all too well), the
temper of youth-the temper of GIs-had turned
against racial discrimination. Hastings' first Black graduate, Thomas Lucius Berkley, '43, was a pioneer in
more ways than one. He' dealt with residual and not
even faintly disguised discrimination on the part of
some of his professors, but he enjoyed the tangible support of his classmates in his forthright, firm, and polite
rejection of second-class status. For the first time, in the
ploughshare era a significant number of Blacks found it
economically feasible and wholly appropriate to get a
legal education at Hastings. Terry Francois, '49, Horace
LeRoy Cannon, '52, Carl B. Metoyer, '52, George G.
Walker, '52, and Hiawatha T. Roberts, '53, have all risen
to professional, and some to political, eminence. Lionel
J. Wilson, '49, recently gave up a superior court judgeship to win election as Oakland's first Black mayor.
Wiley W. Manuel, '53, becarpe California's first Black
supreme court justice in 1977. He believes that three
attorneys made decisive breakthroughs in the Bay Area
for the practice of the law by Blacks: Thomas Berkley,
whose thorough preparation for practice signalled a
new professionalism; Carl Metoyer, whose intellectual
distinction went beyond mere learnedness; and Clinton
W. White, Boalt '48, whose reputation as an advocate
made him one of California's major criminal lawyers.
Hastings' score, 2; Boalt, I! Justice Manuel's own contribution is evident.
The GIs set the standards, provided the objectives,
and dictated the direction of student life between 1946
and 1954. Those of their fellow students who were not
veterans, including those too young to fight who came
to Hastings in the ploughshare years, accepted the GIs'
leadership, and often consciously, always at least subconsciously, imitated them. The graduates of the generation of the ploughshares are today a bit paunchy,
perhaps somewhat less enthusiastic than they were then,
but they are now at the height of their powers and their
power. At last count, there were about 180 Hastings
graduates on the bench in California and elsewhere; 40
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percent of them were of the Classes '46-'54. Graduates
of the era are leaders at the bar. Yet their generation
was not condemned to serve a long apprenticeship before they had a chance to do something significant in
their society. They made their mark, a remarkably indelible one, while they were still fledglings. Hastings was
the beneficiary then, society is today.
The legacy of bricks and stones, the immediate substantiallegacy of the GIs, was the first home for Hastings College of the Law that it could call its own.
Though most of the veterans, those who sweated and
strained to hear in the overcrowded classrooms in the
California Building on Van Ness were not able to appreciate it, the new building that the College occupied
in the spring of 1953 was made possible because of their
sufferings. Their mass moved the state to provide,
three-quarters of a century after Serranus Clinton Hastings' gift, truly adequate facilities for the teaching of the
law in the oldest law school in the West.
It is probable that from the outset of his tenure
David Snodgrass intended to build a permanent home
for the College. He was a builder by instinct, with a
sense of space and an eye for decoration. As a student at
Harvard Law School in the early 1920s, he might well
have shared in both the admiration for Langdell Hall's
imposing Classical portico with its severe, unfluted columns of the Ionic Order, and the prevailing distaste for
a building that was curiously bobtailed because the entire structure had not been continued far enough to
provide symmetry, and the facade looked uncompleted.
Langdell received its present finished state only in 1928.
Snodgrass had travelled in Europe in 1921 just after his
graduation, and he was not too old to feel that awe
reserved for the American when he first sees the great
monuments of the culture, not Richardson Romanesque (like Dana Hall at Harvard Law School) but real
Romanesque, A.D. 1100. The development of Snodgrass' architectural sensibilities might have stopped
short of real aesthetics, but he had acquired the taste for
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imposing buildings and a good notion of what makes a
building imposing. That proved to be relevant. The
present Hastings College of the Law at 198 McAllister
Street owed more to him in utilization of site, space
arrangement, and the appearance of the front, or
facade, than it did to the architect responsible for it.
Again in the dreary year 1944, Snodgrass had
sought to realize a dream. On August 23, he proposed
to the Directors that "serious consideration" be given to
acquiring "a building of its own for Hastings College
after the war," and Slack, Ehrman, and Maurice Harrison were appointed a committee to decide "ways and
means" to provide such a building. 26 There was no
question raised as to whether or not to build, only how it
was to be done.
With peace and the deluge of GIs, the College
began. serious planning. In late 1946, Hastings requested of the Department of Finance a $900,000 appropriation for building. The Department put a hard
question to the University: Why shouldn't the Regents
request the construction as part of the University's
building program?27 Sproul, reluctant to raise the
wholly thorny question of affiliation and the relationship between the two institutions, disclaimed all responsibility for such a building on the grounds that Hastings
had not presented a request to the Regents. Snodgrass
decided to move by a more direct route. He informed
the Director of Finance that because of VA revenue, the
College would make no extraordinary budget request
for the biennium, requiring only the statutory $7000.
This made the legislature well-disposed to two bills introduced in early 1947 by friends of Hastings for an
appropriation of $1,200,000 for the building. 28 The
University, fearful that it could not stop the bandwagon,
decided to try to drive it. It did not have much choice,
since the bills called for the money to be appropriated to
the Regents. The Regents had their own interests to
protect: The University had a special appropriation bill
in the hopper to provide $1,000,000 for the proposed
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law school at UCLA. James H. Corley, the University
comptroller, was directed to cooperate with Hastings,
and the University architect's office entered into discussions with Snodgrass as to the proposed building's size
and requirements. It soon became clear that $1,450,000
was necessary, and the bills (one in the senate, the other
in the assembly) were amended accordingly. On July
18, 1947, the governor signed the appropriation of
$1,450,000 for Hastings and another of $1,000,000 for
UCLA.29
For the first time in the "common law" marriage of
Hastings and the University, the somewhat reluctant
and always guarded "partners" had to work together.
The Regents had responsibility for the disbursement of
the appropriation; moreover, the College needed the
assistance of the University's office of architects and engineers in planning and executing a project of a kind
and size that was beyond the capacity of anyone at Hastings. By and large the collaboration went smoothly. The
only sticking point with the Regents came over whether
or not the interest accruing over the years on the unspent appropriation should go into the Regents' building
fund or be applied to the Hastings project. The University administration recommended the latter, and
though this was resisted by the Regents, it was finally
approved (thanks in part to Directors Ehrman and Harrison, who were also Regents, coming to the College'S
aid). The Regents were surprised and grateful at the
Board's willingness to provide a $50,000 guarantee out
of the GI bonanza against overrun costs. The collaboration with the president's office was particularly remarkable, thanks to unusual forebearance on Snodgrass' part
and the fact that he dealt with the comptroller, Jim Corley, who won the dean's undying respect and in turn
came to have a real affection for Snodgrass and Hastings. The University architect, Louis DeMonte, a man of
strong views but considerable flexibility in negotiation,
found Snodgrass cooperative. It is just possible that
Snodgrass has the distinction of being the only academic
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who ever persuaded DeMonte to accept major architectural revisions that ran counter to the architect's wellinformed judgment. The two worked well together and
with the outside project-architect.
Almost six years elapsed before the new building
was occupied. Snodgrass took time to choose the right
site, and he was reluctant to jump into an inflated building market. He also wanted to make sure that the structure would be adequate to the College's longterm needs,
and he was prepared to wait to see how enrollments
progressed. His caution proved to be correct. His first
impulse was to build downtown in the MontgomerySacramento-Clay area for easier accessibility for parttime faculty and students working in the business and
legal district. That would have been a mistake, as the
College'S reliance on part-time teachers was rapidly disappearing and, though he could not have foreseen it,
traffic congestion would become worse there than in the
Civic Center. The original estimate called for 30,500 sq.
ft. of usable area, accommodating 500 students; the experience of the late 1940s persuaded him that 48,500
sq. ft. with a capacity of up to 1000 students was better.
Time has proven him correct.
By the end of 1948, it was decided that the College
should remain in the Civic Center, and negotiations
were begun to purchase the 24,000 sq. ft. lot at the
northeast corner of McAllister and Hyde. 30 Opposition
to the move from organizations that saw the tax revenues that would be lost by conversion of this commercial
property to educational use came too late to prevent the
purchase; the alternative sites suggested were not suitable anyway. The outside architect was selected in 1949;
largely at the urging of the University architect, Masten
and Hurd was chosen rather than Wurster, Bernardi,
and Emmons. Masten and Hurd had designed a great
many public buildings: Letterman Hospital, Kezar
Stadium, Children's Hospital (San Francisco), Merritt
Hospital in Oakland, the University Press Building in
Berkeley, and the Shasta County Jail were among their
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works. None of these buildings soar with inspiration,
but they are solid, perhaps a touch too New-DealFederal in spirit. Indeed, the Hastings building proved
to be rather more pleasing to the eye than the others; it
is certainly more impressive than the squat boxyfacaded new Boalt Hall (completed in 1951) that has
been mercifully screened by the trees that have also
hidden brave words of Holmes and Cardozo. Yet Bill
Wurster and his associates might well have produced a
more imaginative structure and one that would not have
become dated quite so quickly as the design that was built.
Though there was a building committee throughout the planning of the edifice which included some of
the 65ers, Registrar Sammis, latterly two Directors, and
DeMonte in an advisory capacity, the man responsible
for the plan was Snodgrass. At the first meeting, after a
brief presentation by Oliver McCaskill of what, from his
long experience at Illinois, he believed a law school
building must contain, Snodgrass presented his ideas. 31
Except in one respect, the building that we see today
conforms to his presentation. He proposed that there be
one floor below ground and three above-the basement
level as the service area for the students, the ground
floor for the major classrooms, administrative offices on
the second floor, and faculty offices and library on the
third floor. The space on the third floor proved to be
inadequate to house both the faculty offices and a
lOO,OOO-volume library; consequently, the faculty
offices were moved to the second floor (along with
smaller classrooms) and the administrative offices were
put on a mezzanine, which is architecturally very neatly
executed and aesthetically very pleasing. At every stage,
as the plan underwent minor modification and the design developed, Snodgrass had the last word. It was at
his insistence that the classrooms were put in the interior of the building without windows-he had suffered
from street noise too long in the State Building and the
California Building to abide ever hearing another
backfire, revving engine, squeal of brakes, or sound
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truck in first-year Contracts. The infinite pains taken
with acoustics, including bringing in a UCLA physicist
to design very nearly perfect acoustics, was his idea. No
one would have to talk louder than in a conversational
voice even in a classroom with 200 students, sound
amplification would be unnecessary, and no one would
dare whisper during class because it could be heard
across the room. The ventilating system was as sophisticated as it could be without air-conditioning, and there
would be no way a student could turn it off, or would
there be any reason to do so. Finally, the terrace
stemmed from a country-boy's desire to have at least a
bit of open space, some "campus" even if it had no grass,
in the middle of the city. The students of a quartercentury who have lounged in the sun on the terrace
have the dean from Selma to thank for providing what
might easily have been considered unnecessary and
wasteful of space.
Groundbreaking took place on November 30,
1950. The construction went slowly, but Snodgrass took
infinite pains in matters of detailed space utilization and
even in decoration, and the slow pace enabled him to
keep "on site" supervision under his own eye. Strikes
delayed the work. Cost overruns proved troublesome,
but not insuperable. Finally, in late winter of 1952-53,
the dream was a reality and ready for occupancy. It was
a handsome building. The facade was imposing-no
Ionic Order, indeed, but the louvred lights gave a bold
appearance, avoiding an impression of fragility but also
preventing the massive heaviness that would have resulted if the louvres had not broken the box-like lines of
the great square windows. The interior was thoroughly
functional and almost luxuriously elegant. The
classrooms and moot courtroom were perfectly furnished. There Was finally room for Charles William
Slack's library, and the reading room was named in his
honor. Open stacks for the first time seemed to invite
Hastings students into the world of books. And there
were offices for all the faculty, a common room for
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them to meet in, and ample space for student activities.
All in all a splendid achievement.
The new building came on the wave of new law
school building everywhere. Within three years all of
the state-funded law schools in California-Boalt,
UCLA, and Hastings-acquired new quarters. Other
big city law schools like NYU and Temple built anew.
The University of Illinois, the University of Texas, and
smaller schools such as the University of New Mexico
and the University of Richmond found new housing.
Hastings had waited three-quarters of a century for the
day when it would have a home. There was an added
element of satisfaction that it was part of a nationwide
renewal.
On March 26, 1953, the 75th anniversary of the Act
of 1878 establishing Hastings, the new edifice that had
hardly yet been occupied was dedicated. The same
chief justice and president of the Board, Phil S. Gibson,
who had been present at the meeting that appointed
David Ellington Snodgrass acting dean thirteen years
before, was in the chair. The terrace was packed with
dignitaries, the faculty and Directors, representatives of
other law schools, legislators, and judges. Governor Earl
Warren (soon to be named Chief Justice of the United
States) bulked large on the platform. Clark Kerr, provost of the University, represented it in the absence of
Robert Gordon Sproul. 32 The speeches were appropriate to the occasion, laudatory and solemn, pleasing to
the ear. The principal address was given by the president of the Association of American Law Schools,
Charles B. Nutting, vice-chancellor and dean of the law
school at the University of Pittsburgh. His presence was
itself testimony to new-found recognition-Hastings
had been readmitted to the AALS in 1949. Earnest,
evoking the past, assessing the present, even essaying a
prophecy for the future, he spoke about the training of
lawyers for the future. Nutting concluded on a rising
note:
Through the years you have prospered and grown strong.
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You are noW in the full vigor of maturity. You have the enthusiasm which comes from the recognition which has been
given you by those who have supplied you with this beautiful
building. All these things speak well for the future. Perhaps,
with the long look of prophecy, I can see the day when we
gather to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of the
Hastings College of Law and to congratulate it for pioneering
in yet another field. 33

Prophecy is always dangerous. Much of the direction
that legal education took since his words were spoken
fell short of his prediction, much came long that he did
not foresee. Many there that day will not be here for the
one-hundredth anniversary. But there is a very good
chance that Professor Charles B. Nutting, a member of
the 65 Club at Hastings since 1972, will be.
David Ellington Snodgrass will not be present.
Those who are might, as they sit on the terrace of 198
McAllister, reflect on the aptness of a borrowed epitaph
applied to its builder: Si monumentum requiris, circumspice,
If you seek his monument, look about you.

VJIII David and
the Goliaths

resembled his Old Testament namesake in more ways
than one. He was short, bright eyed, swift in movement,
active, a countryman, and he rose from humble station
to a position of power-all of which was said of David.
Granted he was not a musician and poet to the measure
of the Psalmist, but he was clothed in the armor of righteousness, he feared not the lion or the bear, and he
would slay more than one Goliath, one Philistine, in his
life,
DAVID

ELLINGTON

SNODGRASS

And all this assembly shall know that the Lord saveth not with
sword and spear: for the battle is the Lord's, and he will give
you into our hands. [I Samuel 17: 47]

Like David, he enjoyed the power of imperium and he
built a "city of David" in Hastings. Passion, tenderness,
generosity, fierceness were his attributes, and in psyche
he was no less complex.
David Snodgrass was born in Selma, Fresno
County, in 1894. His father came to California from
Tennessee in the 1880s, scion of a solid family that had
produced a judge. The only work the elder Snodgrass
could find was digging potatoes in San Joaquin County
at a half-dollar a day for a 12-hour day. He had taught
school in Tennessee and one day, disgusted with his
present work and the wages, he threw down his hoe and
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went back to the blackboard. When he died he was president of five small banks; David's younger brother went
into the same line. A college friend remembered David's
mother as being "a lovely, intelligent, and towards
David, indulgent woman."l In 1912, David went to the
University of California, Berkeley, where he spent three
years and earned the reputation of being a bookworm.
Rather than be forced to take compulsory military training at the University, which he found intolerable, he
quit for a year and then went to Harvard as a senior. He
took his A.B. there in 1917, finishing with a creditable
record and an enviable reputation as a pinochle player.
After war service in the Navy, he entered Harvard Law
School, and graduated LL.B. in 1921.
The two men Snodgrass most admired at Harvard
were Dean Roscoe Pound and Professor 'Samuel Williston. From Pound, he acquired an abiding respect for
the common law as a tradition and a system. Pound was
a Westerner, too, from Nebraska, and the Californian
found it easy to identify with him. At Hastings, Snodgrass sported the same green eyeshade that was Pound's
coronet-not entirely from respect or affectation, but
because bright light really did bother Snodgrass (a sensitivity that resulted in the well-designed soft lighting at
198 McAllister).2 He kept up correspondence with
Pound, and he dearly wished that Pound might have
come to Hastings as a 65er; instead, UCLA claimed him
for a summer session. His affection for Pound was requited, for while Snodgrass' relations with Pound's successor as dean at Harvard, Erwin Griswold, were sometimes stormy, Pound always took pride in his old student in San Francisco. From Williston, Snodgrass
learned Contracts. Williston was not only a poised and
polished classroom performer, a dialectician without
peer, but he had had considerable experience in
practice. Snodgrass admired Williston's combination of
academic brilliance and practitioner's good sense.
Williston stood for the proposition that a lawyer must
develop real profundity in command of the law, and
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that profundity began in the first year where comprehension of ideas rather than a kaleidoscopic grasp of
the law was the object of study. Snodgrass followed
Williston closely, both in teaching Contracts, and in
practicing the master's oft-repeated precept: Non multa
sed multum, Not many things, but much. 3
Snodgrass practiced for awhile in Illinois, but returned to San Francisco in 1924. He began teaching as a
part-time instructor at Hastings' night school "step
daughter," San Francisco Law School, in 1925. He
served a year as secretary to Federal District Judge
Frank H. Kerrigan. Kerrigan was a shrewd and learned
man, with wide-ranging political connections and a sense
of how to get things done in government. It was a useful
apprenticeship for young Snodgrass. He began teaching at Hastings in 1928, giving upper-class courses in
Trusts and Future Interests. His chance to teach Contracts came in 1930, and from then until his death he
taught it regularly; Williston long remained his casebook. In 1927 he had become a house counsel with the
Tidewater Associated Oil Company, specializing in sales
work, and remained with the company until he became
a full-time professor at Hastings in 1936. He never
practiced again, though he was unstinting of his time in
giving an opinion gratis to old students and old friends
who asked for his expertise. Though specializing in
Contracts and Sales, he taught Suretyship, Trusts,
Mortgages, Common Law Pleading, and (reluctantly)
Domestic Relations. He knew his limitations: Some
years after he had last taught Suretyship, he refused to
review a case book in the subject on the grounds that he
was both too busy and too rusty in the subject.
Snodgrass was not a scholar in the sense that term
had come to be understood by the time he entered
aC<ldemia. He authored no casebook, his contributions
to journals were limited to book reviews, and he would
never have considered writing a treatise or monograph.
Yet he was scholarly, in that he knew when scholarship
was good (and praised it), and when it was bad (ex-
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coriated it). He kept thoroughly abreast of developments in Contracts, and though his own notion of the
way to teach the subject tended to be conservative, he
accepted the value of others' attempts to teach it differently. He liked practicality. Reviewing a new handbook
on the law of contracts, he neatly sidestepped a couple
of very hot current issues-the dispute between Langdellianism and Realism, and whether a handbook becomes a crutch for weak students by serving as a substitute for close case analysis-and gave the handbook a
benediction that revealed his own pragmatism and expenence:
The new text is richly endowed with the common sense and
class room judgment which were to be expected of an author
who has taught in a "city" law school for more than a quarter
of a century.4

Snodgrass enjoyed teaching, finding it stimulating and
in turn making it stimulating for his students. But the
law always remained for him personally a matter of
practice, not theory. Long after he had had to give up
practice, he recalled with pleasure a leading case before
the state supreme court in which he was co-counsel for
Tidewater, and there was a note of envy in his words to
an old student, "You are a lucky man, to be engaged in
the practice of the law."5
Snodgrass was famous for his wit. Some who knew
him call it "trenchant"; others, "caustic." It was both,
and the distinction was one of degree, not of kind. Directed at a slow student in first-year Contracts, "caustic"
became "sarcastic," and many old students still smart
under a destructive quip delivered years ago. By and
large, the faculty appreciated his skill with a bon mot, but
since they were nearly his equals in role and generally
his seniors in age, they were seldom on the receiving
end of his wit. His peers in the world of law school deans
sometimes smarted under it. Dean Griswold of Harvard
was not amused. Dean Prosser of Boalt could give as
good as he got, and had the distinction of being one of
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the very few who often managed to win an exchange.
Dean Coffman of UCLA never took offense, and Snodgrass in full cry was a source of considerable amusement
to him. Snodgrass could be devastating: addressing an
old student by his first name who had written Snodgrass
crowing about a case he had won for an electric company, the dean commented that to a
Professor of Contracts, Sales and Trusts, a case in which the
electrocution of a small child has resulted in the enlargement
of a law office is not a pretty thing. In devoting more than 100
pages of type to the facts, you excluded the possibility that an
artistic treatment of legal principles should be made. 6

His wit was generally appreciated by audiences who
heard him speak. He seldom used a prepared text and
his speech was never available in writing after it was
given. He was at his best after dinner, and fortified by
Old Bushmills he was incautious, naughty-and very
funny.
A tender side to Snodgrass shone through, especially in correspondence with old students. A letter to a
Mexican-American alumnus aspiring 1:0 political offic~
was full of encouragement, sound advice, and genuine
affection. An alumnus who had been disciplined for
misconduct wrote Snodgrass of his reinstatement and
acknowledged with gratitude "the friendship and the
guidance of certain men like yourself. ... "7 A letter of
apology from an old friend and fraternity brother
for apparently uncomplimentary remarks directed at
Snodgrass at a meeting where they were both present
elicited from Snodgrass a demurrer to the apology "for
remarks which, from my point of view, were intended to
be humorous, rather than offensive, ... Please give the
matter no further thought. You will never hear of it
again, from me."B A newly-appointed superior court
judge wrote the dean thanking him for his letter of
congratulations, and volunteered a compliment that
summed up the way a generation of students remembered Snodgrass:
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I have always thought of and remembered you, since I was
one of your brood at Hastings, as a learned man, an excellent
instructor, and last, but by no means least, a "darn good fellow." Being of a sympathetic nature, I regret to see disappointment come into the lives of those who try. At times I felt
that some of the instructors at Hastings were rather heartless
in their attitude toward the students. This attitude mayor
may not be necessary or advisable in view of the great number
aspiring to become members of our profession. But be that as
it may, I always felt that there was in your heart a wealth of
sympathy for those who just couldn't make the grade. 9

These words ought to be remembered in reflecting
upon the Great Failure Crisis of 1950.
Politics held infinite fascination for David Snodgrass. Though he never sought office, he liked the company of politicians, he was wise enough to realize that he
would need their assistance almost continuously, and he
never shrank from delivering himself on a political matter when he felt the occasion appropriate. His political
loyalties were complicated and mixed. A registered Republican, he maintained warm relations with Democratic congressmen and state legislators (many of them
Hastings graduates). When he campaigned publicly for
Republican Goodwin Knight in his gubernatorial race in
1954, Snodgrass' support grew from Knight's advocacy
of veterans' benefits rather than from his party. Snodgrass did not admire Earl Warren either as governor or
Chief Justice of the United States; Warren was too liberal for Snodgrass. He detested "leftwingers," and he
drew the line between left and center and right a good
deal further to the right than most of his contemporaries in academia in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Circumstances spared him the necessity of having to
deal with the disruptive issue that stalked the universities at this time-whether a past or present member of
the Communist Party was fit to teach. Because Hastings
was not subject to the Regents of the University of
California, the loyalty oath imposed by the Regents on
the University in March 1949 did not extend to Hastings. The Hastings faculty included no young, hot liber-
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als, and it is unlikely that any would have refused such
an oath; there was no opposition to the statewide oath
required by the Levering Act of 1950. Only Max Radin
might have been prone to take a libertarian stance on
the oath matter, but his falling out with Snodgrass
caused him to leave before the Levering Act. Had an
oath controversy arisen at Hastings, there can be little
doubt about the outcome. Directors Ehrman and Harrison, as Regents of the University, were hard-liners in
the oath crisis, and with Snodgrass' rightward leanings
at one with the Board's conservatism, a faculty member
refusing the oath would have been fired instantly.
Snodgrass would not lend his name to a spectrum of
causes ranging from the National Lawyers Guild (which
was well on the left) to the American Civil Liberties
Union. Moreover, he played a leading role, through the
local American Legion, in initiating the unsuccessful
disbarment proceedings brought against Richard Gladstein, Boalt '31, in the aftermath of Gladstein's strenuous and strident defense of the Party members in the
1948 Smith Act trial in New York.
For all of his conservatism, there was a touch of
old-fashioned populism in Snodgrass. He preserved the
small-farmer mistrust of big money and big property
that colored the San Joaquin Valley in his youth. He
recalled the hard times of Valley farmers in the first
three decades of this century. He was much agitated
by the possibility that the United Nations Declaration
on Human Rights might abrogate American control
over immigration into the United States. Snodgrass
didn't like the John Foster Dulles variety of executive
agreements, even if they were used as a means of assuring allies in the Cold War; his detestation for the Soviet
Union did not extend so far as to accept a threat to the
integrity of the "supremacy of our Federal Constitution."lo As a lawyer, Snodgrass could be expected to
favor the campaign of Senator Thomas C. Hennings,
J r., in 1960, against excessive secrecy in Federal civil
litigation. But Snodgrass was also concerned by the per-
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mClous side to Congressional investigations that the
McCarthy era demonstrated, and he was in favor of
legislative review to avoid the worst features of the
current system. Finally, despite his service in the First
World War and his patriotic civilian activity in the Second, despite his vehement opposition to Communism
and his adherence to the American Legion's brand of
patriotism, Snodgrass disliked the Korean War intensely, not because it was "Truman's War," but because
it was unnecessarily disruptive of America's life so soon
after the unremitting effort of World War II.
There are some features of Snodgrass that can easily be overlooked, but which are revealing. He was
genuinely gregarious. He was an avid attender of AALS
annual meetings, American Law Institute meetings, and
when he could find the time, ABA conventions. He
travelled a great deal in the state talking to local bar
associations, service clubs, professional groups, and
Hastings alumni organizations. He entertained prodigally at the Bohemian Club every visiting firemanwhether "useful" to him or not-who came to town. He
enjoyed good company; dull people bored him, but he
was generally civil to everyone. He also had an authentic
concern with making equal protection of the law available to everyone. At Harvard he had been active in the
legal aid clinic. In San Francisco, he was a strong supporter of legal aid to the poor, and to that work he gave
a great deal of time that he did not have to spare. Snodgrass possessed a real sensitivity to the needs of those
who could not afford to purchase legal assistance. Finally, Snodgrass liked animals. He was a devoted contributor of effort and money to the SPCA. The finest
piece of writing he ever did was "Old Dog Tray Goes to
Court," a witty, light, touching essay in the law governing canines.u It has been said that a man who likes
animals can't be all bad. More correctly, it can be observed that a man who likes animals has a capacity for
compassion, a predilection to take the part of the
underdog.
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To contemporaries, Snodgrass appeared to have
too strong a penchant for publicity and self-advertisement. He is the first and the last Hastings figure
who can almost be chronicled from back-issues of national magazines and local papers. There is no doubt
that Snodgrass liked to see his name in print, and he
never shrank from publicity, good or bad, turning all to
advantage. However, his recourse to the press was generally part of his current crusade, and publicity was
simply an aspect of strategy. His ferocity and bluntness,
his willingness to charge his enemies frontally, and his
witty sallies made good copy. While not exactly cultivating the gentlemen of the press, he would dash off a
quick note to columnists such as Arthur Caylor or Herb
Caen and hope for an assist the next morning. Snodgrass' press sallies outraged the more conservative
members of bar and academia. They also made him
many enemies and caused most of his friends to conclude that Dave Snodgrass' worst foe was Dave Snodgrass. In retrospect, while a bit of distaste for his excesses lingers, it is apparent that he used publicity with
enormous effectiveness. Indeed, it was most often his
success that brought opprobrium. There remain those
who are convinced that the Snodgrass campaign against
compulsory retirement, in press, magazines, and on the
after-dinner circuit, was merely a means to boom Hastings' uniqueness in having the 65 Club. In fact, Snodgrass had become convinced of the wrongness and
wastefulness of compulsory retirement, and the number
65 writ large in industry and government was just one
more Goliath that David meant to smite.
The personal crusades of Snodgrass were newsworthy and they remain fascinating, but they were not the
stuff of which history is made save when they were
fought in defense of Hastings. As he aspired to
strengthen the College, build it a permanent home, and
advance its reputation among law schools, so Snodgrass
feared that there were persons in positions of power
hostile to the College and to him personally. Perhaps
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there was a touch of paranoia in his fear, but that he
and Hastings had enemies is not in question. Unfortunately, because of his fierceriess, those who might
merely have been Snodgrass' enemies soon became
Hastings' enemies. He was incapable of distinguishing
between his personal foes and institutional foes. Unlike
Simmons, Snodgrass' personality was always caught up
in battle, his image continually confused with that of the
College. For Snodgrass, criticism constituted an attack
and an affront, and it did not matter at whom or at what
the attack was aimed, the defense was necessarily his.
He inspired loyalty as he stood on the ramparts.
The Directors never failed to support him when battle
royal was joined, though they tried manfully to quieten
him down as he moved into position. 12 He was fortunate
in having a Board that underwent less change than at
any other time in Hastings' history. During the 23 years
that he directed the College'S fortunes, there were only
six new Directors. Two were appointed at the outset of
his regular tenure in 1941: E. Clinton La Montagne (a
Hastings descendant) and Eugene M. Prince. In 1946,
Edgar T. Zook took the place of his deceased father-inlaw and law partner, Charles William Slack, and he was
a worthy successor to Slack's devoted affection for Hastings. Justice A. Frank Bray, '10, took Maurice E. Harrison's place in 1951-and still serves. Late in Snodgrass'
tenure, Judge Daniel R. Shoemaker, '28, and Leonard
A. Worthington, '32 (vice William Bradford Bosley)
were appointed in 1959, and both are still Directors.
Throughout the most perilous struggles of dean
and College, the Board was led by Bosley and Sidney M.
Ehrman, with Chief Justice Phil S. Gibson playing a
low-key but steadying role. Bosley succeeded Charles
William Slack as vice-president on the latter's death, December 20, 1945. The death of Slack was deeply felt.
Though almost 88, his intellect was undimmed and his
vigor undiminished when he presided over his last
Board meeting just 10 days before his death. He stood
for high academic standards, he was committed to the
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College's responsibility to serve the profession and the
community, and he was a staunch defender of Hastings'
integrity and independence. He had been the first dean
of the type that Snodgrass personified. It was appropriate that when Slack died, having made his last contribution in support of the dean during the grim days of the
War, the College was in the hands of a man who, though
of a different epoch and opposite personality, represented Slack's aspirations for Hastings. Bosley proved
worthy of Slack's presidial mantle, though he was more
hot-tempered and testy. Bosley, Ehrman, and Gibson,
along with Eugene Prince, who became influential especially in representing the College to the profession, admired Snodgrass. He merited and won their allegiance
in the struggles to come.
The two other pillars of Snodgrass' support were
his faculty and the College's alumni in positions of
power. Snodgrass held his faculty with him in the face
of adversity. The part-time practitioners who still
undertook a large part of the College's instruction were
loyal to a man, and carried weight with bar and capitol.
The 65ers, many of them former deans of eminent law
schools, would not suffer any derogation of an institution to which they lent their name and talents. With the
ABA and the AALS-on the national stage-these men
were veritable powers. Except for one important figure
in the Alumni Association, the president who called for
Snodgrass' resignation at the time of the Great Failure
Crisis of 1950, the alumni remained solidly behind dean
and College. Above all, the state legislature contained
Hastings alumni ready to take up cudgels almost on
demand for their old school: State Senator Gerald
O'Gara, '26, and Assemblyman Gordon A. Fleury, '39,
never failed to act when called into righteous battle, and
the same might be said for a half-dozen other legislators
who were only less prominent, not less loyal.
The two great struggles were with the California
state Bar Examiners and with the University of California. The former was a war in which Snodgrass was as
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much a champion of others as a defender of his own
interests. The latter struggle saw issue joined touching
the very survival of the College, and while the din of
arms was muted-unlike the war with the Bar Examiners which was fought out in public-the cost of defeat
would have been unbearably high.
While California had required a written bar examination of all candidates since 1920, it was not among
the 42 states which by 1949 were complying substantially
with the ABA's standards for legal education for admission to the bar. California did not require two years of
formal prelegal training for candidates for the bar examination over 25 years of age, and it still permitted
law-office, private-study, and correspondence-course
preparation for the bar examination without any other
form of legal education. Indeed, its requirements for
admission to the bar were lower than those of every
other state save Arkansas and Georgia, and that almost
three decades after the ABA's brave start on higher
standards for professional preparation. The formal
educational requirements for chiropodists, barbers, and
even manicurists in California were higher than those
for attorneys. Of course, this horror story took no account of the actual situation: Between 1932 and 1948,
95 percent of the 6531 who took the California bar examination had prepared in a law school, only 3 percent
by correspondence course, and 2 percent in a law office
or by private study.
California relied on a tough bar examination to
banish incompetence in the profession. The examination lasted three days and was set on 20 subjects. The
questions originated with law professors outside
California, were thoroughly reviewed and analyzed by
the Examiners and examination-readers before the examination, and were then assessed by California law
professors after the examination. The readers' work
was subject to appraisal by a panel. The candidates'
anonymity was preserved, and no prejudice could come
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to them. Grading was fair, but strict. Between 1934 and
1949, only 55 percent of those taking the examination
passed. No more than 62.6 percent had passed (fall
1948), and the pass-rate had dropped as low as 34.3
percent (fall 1943). But the California Committee of
Bar Examiners was likened to a football team "holding
defensively on the one-yard line" against a multitude
of poorly-trained postulants to the profession of
attorney.13
In 1949 there were 16 law schools in California, one
of them (UCLA) just starting in the fall of that year.
Seven of the schools were ABA-approved, that is, they
met the minimal requirements that had remained substantially the same since the Root Committee's reform in
1921: Boalt, Stanford, USC, Hastings, Santa Clara,
Loyola (Los Angeles), and the University of San Francisco. 14 They had enjoyed uniform success on the bar
examination given by the State Bar's Committee since it
had undertaken examination in 1927, succeeding the
supreme court-appointed examiners. The other eight
schools in existence by 1949 that presented candidates
for the examination had had a mixed to abominable
record on the examination. Admission to the bar was
governed by Business and Professions Code sects.
6060-6068 (1939), which besides making provision for
the bar examination established three paths to bar eligibility: by a law school "accredited" by the Bar Examiners; by a law school not so accredited; and by study in
a law office, by correspondence course, or privately. In
1937, the State Bar had adopted the Bar Examiners'
"accreditation rule" that was aimed at strengthening the
good schools, improving the better of the poor schools,
and eliminating the worst schools. The rule was not really an accreditation rule because it did not close off
admission to an applicant who had not graduated from
an accredited school; it merely made it more difficult
and time-consuming for him to gain admission. The
advantage derived by a student in an accredited school
(besides a better education and a better chance on the
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examination) was that upon graduation after three
years of full-time or four years of part-time schooling,
he was eligible to take the examination. If a candidate
had merely "diligently and in good faith studied law for
at least four years"15-in an unaccredited school, law
office, correspondence course, or privately-he was eligible for the examination upon proof of study and provided he had taken at the end of the first year's study a
mini-bar examination of indifferent strictness. If the
student had done his first-year work in an accredited
school and subsequently did not graduate, he was still
eligible to take the examination after his fourth year of
study-the situation in which a number of the 47 of the
Great Failure Crisis of 1950 found themselves.
An "accredited" law school was one which maintained, over three consecutive years, a certain cumulative average success rate on the bar examination taken
for the first time by its students, whether they had
graduated or not. In 1937, the required success rate was
30 percent, and it had been increased progressively to
60 percent in 1949. If a school failed to maintain the
required success rate over the three preceding years, it
lost its accredited status; henceforth its students would
have to take the first-year mini-bar examination and
would not be eligible to take the bar examination until
they had completed four years of study (whether full
time or part time made no difference). As soon as
a school managed to climb back over the required
success-rate line, it was once again accredited. Some
California schools had drifted in and out of accreditation in this way.
By 1949 there was general dissatisfaction with the
standards for admission in California, shared by the
profession and by most of the law schools in the state.
The reasons for the dissatisfaction varied considerably.
Some practitioners feared that the profession was reaching saturation; law schools packed to overflowing with
GIs seemed to give point to their apprehension.
Tougher standards seemed the way to protect the inter-
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ests of those already admitted, although understandably
the rhetoric used was that the public must be protected
from incompetent lawyers. Many practitioners were
seriously concerned that the bar examination defensive
action on the one-yard line was already pushed back
past the goal posts, that too many insufficiently learned
lawyers were being let through. Practitioners and
academics alike thought California's low admissions
standards brought California lawyers into obloquy
elsewhere in the country. The law schools were virtually
uniformly dissatisfied with one aspect of the current
situation: with the exception of only one school, they
were against the accreditation rule. The dean of one of
the strongest schools, in no danger of falling into unaccredited status, summed up the objections: The rule
had not eliminated the weakest schools; it was based
upon an arbitrary standard, subject to unpredictable
variations especially perilous to small schools; it reflected not a school's merits, but whom the school had
accepted and whom it failed; it was inequitable, since it
charged against a school the failures on the bar examination even of those the school had not graduated; it
induced "rat-race" competition among schools for a
success measured solely by bar examination results, to
which everything else was sacrificed-sometimes students, perhaps even the dean, always the curriculum. 16
The closer a school was to the dreaded "60 percent"
stipulated success-rate, the stronger became the dean's
objections to the rule.
The Bar Examiners' and the State Bar Governors'
dissatisfaction with California's standards of admission
and education led in 1947 to a bold plan to have an ad
hoc board of outside experts survey the state of the
subject. The board chosen comprised Joseph A. McClain, J r., a leading practitioner in St. Louis with
academic experience, Thomas F. McDonald, also of the
St. Louis bar, and Sidney Post Simpson, a New York
practitioner and professor at NYU with a decade of
teaching at Harvard in the 1930s. Their credentials
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were impeccable and their disinterestedness beyond reproach. They were also thorough-Simpson won the
sobriquet (which he sported with great pride) of "Sidney
Pest" for the whirlwind force of his fine-toothed-comb
investigative forays into California law schools. The investigation took a year of intensive effort, and the report was given to the State Bar in the fall of 1949 and
released in published form in January 1950. The report, over 300 pages with 35 statistical charts, was a
comprehensive general overview of California legal
education and bar admission, and a detailed study of
each law school in the state. 17 The survey board made a
series of recommendations that were specific and courageous, since there was considerable goring of sacred
cows.
The report quietened some apprehensions and
quickened others. It demonstrated that California was
in no longterm danger of professional saturation: of the
10 most populous states, six had more lawyers per
100,000 than California, none of these states was growing at the rate California was, and in fact, since 1936 the
proportion of lawyers per 100,000 had been in steady
decline with only some indication of levelling off beginning about 1945. Neither was the picture oflegal education as dismal as was popularly assumed: the seven ABAapproved schools were doing a good job, two unapproved schools (San Francisco Law School and Golden
Gate) were comparable in terms of success with the
lower ranking of the approved schools, and three of the
six weakest schools at least had potential for adequate
standards. However, the report was gloomy about the
immediate prospects for beginning attorneys, noting
the prediction of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics of
overcrowding in the next few years. It also asserted that
California had too many law schools, badly distributed;
that there were inadequate facilities for legal education
in southern California, even taking into account
UCLA's development, especially in the San Diego area;

I
I
I~

David Ellington Snodgrass

Robert Gordon Sproul

David and the Goliaths

307

and that Sacramento was in desperate need of better
educational opportunities. It castigated the University
of California for not fulfilling its responsibilities for
providing more low-cost legal education, especially in
areas where facilities were inadequate. The report made
clear that California had no excuse for not requiring
every candidate for admission to the bar to have had at
least two years of college; with eight state colleges and
55 junior colleges well-distributed over the state, educational opportunity was provided in abundance. What
was most desperately needed, argued the report, was
adequate, even generous funding of legal education in
California directed at better pay to attract better faculty.
Yet the clearest message was that the present system of
admission to the bar was in need of wholesale reform.
Here, apprehensions were more than quickened; they
were inflamed.
The survey board called for abolition of the Bar
Examiners' present accreditation rule, suggesting that
there should be a new accreditation rule by which: 1. all
schools presently ABA-approved would be accredited
by the Examiners, 2. five of the unapproved schools
would be given reasonable time to come up to essentially
ABA standards or else achieve accreditation by merging
with an ABA-approved school, and 3. the three weakest
schools would not be accredited at all. In essence, the
proposed rule would require graduation from an
ABA-approved school or at least one closely approaching ABA standards. The survey board also invited the
supreme court to reacquire control over bar admission
quality, albeit by working through the existing State Bar
machinery. The minimal statutory provisions would
remain, but higher standards would be exacted by
virtue of the court's power to determine the qualifications of those who were technically its officers and
privileged to plead before it. There was authority for
this in a case decided some years before. 18 Though the
survey board rightly feared that higher stand'lrds would
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be stubbornly resisted in the legislature, it was overly
sanguine in expecting the court to do what the legislature would not.
In focussing on the accreditation rule, the report
was roundly cheered by the law schools. But the law
schools were not universally happy with the recommended new rule that approached ABA standards.
Moreover, the report suggested a number of mergers of
law schools to bring the weakest under the control of the
strongest. These suggestions were the gorings that p,rovoked the loudest shrieks. The University of California
did not fancy taking over Balboa in San Diego, and it
was desirous neither of absorbing McGeorge in Sacramento nor of seeing Hastings do so. The recommendation that Southwestern in Los Angeles merge with
USC or else become both a full-time and part-time metropolitan school under the University of California
pleased no one. The amalgamation of San Francisco
Law School and Golden Gate with Hastings-by which
the two former would become part-time divisions of the
latter-was condemned by all three as a shotgun marriage not in the interests of any of them. All the law
schools were at least agreed that legal education in
California needed more money, and that the organized
bar should see that it got it, provided always, of course,
that the individual school's interests were not adversely
affected.
The Bar Examiners rejected virtually every recommendation that affected them, particularly the idea
that the supreme court assume responsibility for control
of admissions standards. They took pains to assure
everyone that they were open-minded on the subject of
accreditation, but that until "a rule is suggested which in
the judgement of the Committee [of Bar Examiners] is
workable and better than the present rule, the present
rule should be adhered to."19 In their report dated June
30, 1950, the Examiners promised full discussion of accreditation on the basis of questionnaires sent to the law
schools. Within 10 days, the law schools had put enough
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pressure on the Examiners that they decided to call an
open meeting with all interested parties to take place
July 21.
Before the open meeting all parties, including the
law schools, had copies of the answers to the questionnaire, and of a numbe.r of comments and proposals that
had been submitted to the Examiners. 2o Only Pacific
Coast (slated for oblivion by the survey report) favored
the present rule; the rest of the schools were against it.
Three schools, Loyola, Balboa, and UCLA, were unqualifiedly in favor of the survey board's recommended
accreditation rule. Stanford wanted a tougher rule than
the board's: no law schools accredited that were not
ABA-approved, and these to maintain an acceptable
pass-rate on the bar examination or their students
would have to take a first-year mini-bar examination. Of
five alternative plans suggested by the Examiners' questionnaire, two were combined in the replies of a majority of the schools as constituting the best solution to the
accreditation problem: ABA approval would be automatic accreditation, and other schools would be
accredited if they attained a watered-down ABA standard. The dilution of the standard would be in lowered
library requirements, no requirement for full-time
teachers, and a higher proportion of special students
than was allowed for in ABA standards. This was the
position of Hastings, USF, USC, Boalt, and Santa Clara,
and with variations that of San Francisco Law School,
Golden Gate, Southwestern, and (reluctantly) Lincoln.
Each position had its champion. Eustace Cullinan, a
San Francisco attorney who had been a Bar Examiner in
1937, stalwartly defended the rule he had helped fashion. His basic proposition was that it had strengthened
the good schools, improved the better of the poor
schools, and eliminated the worst schools. Perhaps the
middle proposition was sound-the rule had put salutary pressure on borderline schools to improve. 21 It had
not eliminated bad schools, for the six which disappeared in the I 930s were victims of the Depression. The
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good schools had strengthened themselves because they
were committed to educational improvement as a matter of principle and pride. Undoubtedly, Cullinan's position was favored by a majority of Bar Examiners in
1950, who wanted no change, notably Eugene Glenn of
San Diego and three Los Angeles members.
The champion of the survey board's proposed rule
and therefore of the three southern schools that opted
for it was Homer D. Crotty.22 Crotty, a senior partner in
the large Los Angeles firm of Gibson, Dunn, and
Crutcher was a brilliant man, successful lawyer,
genuinely learned, Boalt- and Harvard-trained, and a
Brahmin by instinct, breeding, and experience. He had
a national reputation through his activeness in the ABA,
had been chairman of the California Examiners, and
was about to become president of the California Bar. He
had played a role in establishing the survey board and
long advocated the ABA standards for accreditation.
However, on the eve of the] uly 1950 meeting, in seeking what he hoped would be an acceptable compromise,
he proposed a new rule that combined the best of the
survey board's recommendation and the worst of the
present rule: All ABA-approved schools would be
accredited, and all other accredited schools would have
to adhere rigidly to ABA standards; the California Examiners would police the adherence of both the ABAapproved schools and the other schools, rather than rely
on the imperfect review procedures of the ABA. So far,
so good. But a graduate from a school not so accredited,
or an office-trained, private-study, or correspondencecourse student, would still be eligible to take the bar
examination after studying four years and passing
mini-bar examinations at the end of the first and second
years of study. Standards for the better law schools
would be uniformly higher, but the backdoor to the bar
represented by grossly substandard schools and by no
formal schooling at all would remain open.
The champion of those schools which favored the
combined alternatives of outright accreditation of
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ABA-approved schools and accreditation of schools not
quite meeting full ABA standards was David Ellington
Snodgrass. His position was hardly an advance over
Crotty's, for though schools accredited by watereddown ABA criteria might be better than schools not
accredited under the present rule, they would still be
second-rate. However, there would be no lower road to
the bar than such schools-which was an improvement
over Crotty's compromise. The merit of this proposition
was that the pass-rate peril would be abolished, marginal schools would be preserved but required to meet
minimal criteria of academic soundness, and the strictly
exploitative schools without standards would be eliminated.
Snodgrass was self-proclaimed champion of what
he called the "democratic law schools." Crotty was the
enemy par excellence. Besides a certain measure of
temperamental incompatibility between them, Snodgrass detested Crotty's Brahminism and Crotty loathed
Snodgrass' public combativeness. But was there a substantial difference in their positions on the issue of accreditation? On balance, both positions fell short of
what the survey board recommended; neither was
much of an improvement over the present rule save in
getting rid of the obnoxious pass-rate threat, and
neither would contribute much to improving legal education in California. But there was one essential difference between the two proposals. Crotty's plan would
immediately force the eight non-ABA approved law
schools to become four-year schools because of their
wholly part-time faculties or inadequate libraries.
Perhaps two, or as many as four of these might be able
to improve themselves to ABA standards. Reasonably,
those that did not and had to operate on a four-year
basis would be so disadvantaged in attracting students
that they would fail. Snodgrass' plan would remove that
impediment from six of these eight. That was a difference substantial enough to polarize the two plans and
their two cham pions.
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Dean Snodgrass came by his mantle of champion
honestly. Of the ABA-approved schools, his remained
the most democratic and least elitist, with the longest
tradition of making a legal education available to the
less prosperous and to those whose paper record indicated questionable potential for success. With USF and
Santa Clara, Hastings stood in greatest threat of the 60
percent pass-rate stigma; this was not, in 1950, a matter
of merely academic concern to the dean of Hastings. He
had a solid reputation for helping veterans to an education, having sponsored the 1946 act allowing men whose
legal education had been interrupted by military service
to take the bar examination even though they had completed only two years of study in an accredited law
school. In 1950, that was again a hot issue, the same
legislation being proposed for Korea veterans, and
once again being vehemently opposed by the State
Bar. 23 In 1944, Snodgrass, with the backing of the Hastings Board and especially the good offices of Chief J ustice Gibson, had made a strong representation to the
Examiners against raising the accreditation pass-rate
percentage from 45 (set in 1942) to 50. That the increase did not take place until 1947 owed much to
Snodgrass' intervention. In 1948 he had been the most
forthright of all the deans in condemning the current
accreditation rule. Explaining to the survey board why
the College did not offer electives in new subjects such
as Labor Law and Public Utilities, Snodgrass said:
The relation between the curriculum and methods of the Law
School and the present California bar examinations is automatic. Instruction can be given in only those courses on
which graduates of the school are likely to be examined by the
bar examiners.24

What recommended Snodgrass most to his fellow
deans of like mind was his combative fierceness and his
unflagging enthusiasm for a fight. Deans Edwin J.
Owens of Santa Clara, Edward A. Hogan, Jr., of USF,
and Paul S. Jordan of Golden Gate were corresponded
with, persuaded to fall into line, and urged to maintain
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a united front by Snodgrass. Even Prosser, sharing honestly in Snodgrass' dislike for the accreditation rule and
on substantially the same grounds, found that he could
but follow. Moreover, in Kenneth G. McGilvray, '33, of
Sacramento, Snodgrass had an old student and staunch
ally on the Examiners Committee itself, and in Eugene
Prince, Director, a powerful figure on the Bar's Board
of Governors. To cap all, Snodgrass enjoyed a legislative
advantage, by virtue of Hastings alumni and friends
with seats in senate and assembly, such as no other dean
possessed. No one doubted that sooner or later, the
battle would see a new front open in Sacramento.
It is hard to see what the Bar Examiners hoped to
do by the open meeting in San Francisco on July 21,
1950. If they meant to witness their open-mindedness,
the majority had already made it clear that they were
unwilling to accept any change. If they thought that the
opposition to the present rule would talk itself out, they
underrated the seriousness of the outcry against the
rule and the vehement commitment of its opponents.
Perhaps they hoped that David Ellington Snodgrass
would cause such a commotion that the opposition
would go some way towards discrediting itself through
its mouthpiece. It was common knowledge that 47
seniors had been failed at Hastings and that some of
them would attend the meeting to demand justice.
There would be present plenty of Snodgrass' opponents,
including Homer Crotty, Eustace Cullinan, and Herbert
W. Clark, a San Francisco attorney who was chairman of
the ABA's Section of Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar. Later, Registrar Sammis voiced his personal
conviction that Cullinan and Clark knew beforehand of
a vituperative attack that the president of the Hastings
Alumni Association meant to launch against Snodgrass
at the meeting. The dean of Hastings could not get
through the meeting unscathed. If such was the expectation of the Examiners, it was confounded by Snodgrass' absence; whether fortuitously or deliberately, he
was away from San Francisco on Friday, July 21. Sam-
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mis, Director Prince, and Professor William G. Hale,
former dean of USC, were Hastings' representatives.
The meeting proved to be a donnybrook. At the
outset, it had to be moved to a larger room than the one
planned because of the concourse of people, including a
great many Hastings seniors. The Examiners favoring
the present rule alone spoke in initiating the discussion,
and they made a poor presentation. When the call went
out for an indication of those who wished to speak for
and against the rule, only six responded. The first to
speak was Hale, who castigated the rule because of the
unreliability of the pass-rate percentage growing from
the wide fluctuations in bar examination results from
year to year. Prince called Hale's speech "one of the best
bits of advocacy I have ever heard."25 Those speaking in
favor of Crotty's proposal, including Crotty himself,
were not very effectual. The apparent defection of
Dean Shelden Elliott of USC from the Snodgrass camp
to Crotty's proposal was no boon to Crotty-Elliott
would not accept the first- and second-year mini-bar
examinations proposed for students in unaccredited
schools, and he made clear that he was really more
against the pass-rate requirement than for Crotty's rule.
The dean of USC was obviously very confused. Dean
Carl Spaeth of Stanford was far too elitist in his approach, holding out for a higher standard than even the
Examiners could accept or the present rule demanded;
his more-royalist-than-the-king stance gave no comfort
to Crotty's compromise proposal, and Spaeth ended up
substantially in Cullinan's camp, arguing for no change.
Prosser of Boalt and Owens of Santa Clara were absent, and it fell to Hogan of USF to put forward the
position of the allies, which he did very effectively. As
the debate progressed-rather aimlessly-it became
apparent that without Snodgrass present those who had
come to shoot at him did not quite know what to do with
their guns. That did not prevent one of them from
shooting wildly anyway. Arthur W. Brouillet, '11, an
implacable foe of Snodgrass and president of the Hast-
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ings Alumni Association, rose to make a choleric personal attack on Snodgrass. His eye was on the legislators
present, his heart was with "Fuzzy" Taylor, whom he
obviously considered the last great dean of Hastings,
and his spleen was vented on behalf of the 47 failed
students. He accused Snodgrass of inattention to his job
(a strange charge coming from an admirer of Dean
Taylor), and of spending more time attacking the Bar
Examiners and giving press interviews than in working
to improve the school's record on the examination. The
failure of the 47 he called an act of "academic
blackmail." Hale and Sammis replied, and Brouillet was
badly mauled by their defense of Snodgrass and the
presentation of the facts in the case of the 47. In fact,
Brouillet had shot only himself. Imputations he directed at Hale as dean of USC only made the wound
worse. After Brouillet's wild sortie, the meeting evaporated. The first battle had gone to the presence that was
absent, the absence that was present, David Ellington
Snodgrass.
The rest of the battles were not so spectacular,
neither were they so significant. Snodgrass and his allies, whatever the merits or demerits of their position,
won the initiative on July 21, 1950, and they never lost it.
The Bar Examiners and the State Bar were forced to
fight a rearguard action that in the next three years
barely prevented a continuous retreat from becoming
an utter rout. The first concession came in November
1950 when the 60 percent pass-rate requirement was
amended to allow for a school that had fallen below it to
remain accredited pending a complete investigation of
its academic soundness by the Examiners. This had
been suggested before the open meeting by one of the
Examiners; it became an urgent matter when Golden
Gate, San Francisco Law School, and worst of all, Santa
Clara, fell below 60 percent in the October 1950 examination. InJanuary 1951, the Examiners recommended
that accreditation be frozen until January 1, 1954, and
they proposed to the State Bar that it sponsor legislation
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abolishing accreditation and requiring a candidate for
admission to complete at least two years of prelegal
college study, graduate from a law school requiring
classroom attendance, and pass a mini-bar examination.
The State Bar accepted the proposal, but deleted the
last provision. The Bar's bills in the senate and the assembly, in competition with pending bills promoted by
the opponents of the accreditation rule, were chewed to
pieces in committee, and the Bar Governors found
themselves in a hopeless situation unless they accepted
the strongest bill of their opponents. This was Senator
Gerald O'Gara's bill, SB 386, which might as well have
been called Snodgrass' bill. SB 386 would lower the 60
percent pass-rate to 50 percent, no longer charge students who had not been graduated against the college
that had failed them, and give a two-year grace period
to schools that had fallen below the 50 percent pass-rate
and were threatened with disaccreditation. The Bar
joined forces with O'Gara, who accepted the Bar's provision requiring graduation from a law school demanding classroom attendance. The O'Gara bill passed the
senate, but was amended in the assembly to eliminate
the graduation requirement; in this form it passed both
houses. Only the governor's veto prevented California
from having a weaker admissions standard than it had
before the accreditation rule came under attack.
The handwriting was on the wall; if the Bar did not
change the accreditation rule, the legislature would.
After much consultation and fervent breast-beating by
the Examiners (the membership of which had become
more favorable to the position of Snodgrass and his
allies), a new rule went into effect in 1952. It was just in
the nick of time. The October 1951 bar examination
results were a disaster, producing the lowest percentage
of passing candidates since the war. Though the Examiners explained it as a return to "normal," the best of the
GIs having passed through law school, the senate
judiciary committee (of which O'Gara was a member)
took up the cause of the failed candidates. After a thor-
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ough investigation, including public hearings, the senate committee requested the state supreme court to review the matter and called for the Bar Exami:rers to
be made responsible henceforth only to the supreme
court. 26
The Bar's new accreditation rule abolished the
pass-rate requirement. It approached the ABA standard in making the primary test for accreditation by the
California Bar Examiners the maintenance of a sound
educational policy by a school which admitted students
with two years of prelegal college-level work. However,
the school was allowed a higher percentage of special
students than the ABA stipulated for approval, the library of an accredited school was held to a standard
inferior to that of the ABA, and the school was not
required to have three full-time professors. In short, the
new rule was substantially that suggested by the schools
championed by Snodgrass in 1950. The only concession
to Crotty's proposal was that the Examiners would
police quality and be responsible for the accrediting
investigation-there was no choice, since a school with
such standards could not obtain ABA approval.
The accreditation matter settled, the State Bar felt
strong enough to tackle the legislature for amendment
of the code provisions: that by 1960 graduation from an
accredited law school alone would provide admission
eligibility; that in the meantime all candidates for the
bar would be required to have two years of college work
or its equivalent; and that by 1954 eligibility by law
office, correspondence course, and private study would
be abolished. The Bar's bill was mangled in the capitol.
Two years of college work as a requisite survived, but
graduation from an accredited law school as the sole
means to eligibility failed, and only private study was
damned. What the Bar Examiners hailed rather pathetically in 1953 as "the first step in raising the standards of
prelegal and legal education for admission to practice
law that has been taken in California since 1937"27 was
more a little sideways shuffle than a full pace. The State
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Bar had only itself to blame. Its intransigent adherence
to an accreditation rule that was both inadequate and
inequitable raised a furor in the legislature that did
not abate and which poisoned the chance for rational
reform. Had the Bar Examiners in 1950 taken up the
survey board's recommendations for accreditation,
there would have been much less opposition to change,
less intervention by the legislature, and some substantial
reform in the standards of legal education and admission in California. In the event, the opportunity was
lost. The new code provisions of 1953, hardly an improvement over those in effect since 1939, still stand
and still determine the educational requirements for
bar eligibility. That is the main reason why today, of
the 65 law schools in this country not approved by the
ABA or accepted as members of the AALS, 48 are in
California.
Noone had smarted more under Snodgrass' attack
on the old accreditation rule than Eugene Glenn of San
Diego, LL.B. Stanford, member of the Committee of
Bar Examiners and its vice-chairman, 1950-51. Glenn
had been roundly scored by Snodgrass in the press, and
Prosser concluded that Glenn manifested an attitude
towards Snodgrass "tending toward vindictiveness."28
In the heat of the battle in 1950, Glenn gave a speech
before the National Committee on State Bar Examiners
calling upon the ABA to reinspect law schools of questionable standards, and instanced Hastings as an example. He charged particularly that Hastings students
were so heavily engaged in outside employment that
Hastings was really a part-time law school, and its students should be required to study for four years, per the
ABA standards. The ABA took up the call, and an Oklahoma lawyer, John G. Hervey, who undertook a great
many inspections for the ABA, was ordered to inspect
Hastings. Hervey arrived in early winter 1950. He conferred first of all with Glenn, Herbert W. Clark (whom
Sammis suspected had had foreknowledge of Brouillet's
philippic at the open meeting in July), and Prof. James
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Brenner of Stanford-all three personal enemies of
Snodgrass and ill-disposed towards Hastings. Hervey's
inspection of the college was so slipshod and narrow in
focus as to leave no other conclusion than that it was
intended only to garner incriminating evidence. The
inspector talked to no faculty except Snodgrass, Sammis, and two 65ers (these latter only briefly and by
chance), visited no classes, and talked to no students. He
then went around San Francisco law offices, to find out
what he could about the employment of Hastings students. He did not make a return call on Snodgrass, but
went home, drew up his report, and submitted it to the
ABA's Section on Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar. 29 In February 1951, the Section found that
Hastings failed to comply with the ABA standards for
an approved school because it did not enforce the
full time requirement, its library accommodations and
classrooms were inadequate for the heavy enrollment
(although the Section recognized that the new building
would take care of this), it enjoyed such an extraordinary excess of income over expenditures as to savor of a
commercial operation, and its educational policy was
unsound in not providing for study breaks between
classes, placing undue emphasis in the curriculum on
bar examination subjects, and readmitting too many
failed students. A new inspection was to take place in
fall 1951. 30
Hastings rose up in arms. Director Eugene Prince
threatened to defy the ABA if the College was dropped
from approval. The refusal of the Section to give the
dean a copy of Hervey's report (despite the fact that the
report of the inspector in 1943, Russell N. Sullivan of
the University of Illinois, had been supplied then),
made it difficult to respond to the charges. After
wheedling more details out of the chairman of the
Section, the entire full-time faculty replied to the
charges: Snodgrass, Sammis, Vice-Dean Edward A.
Hogan, Jr.-who had just come aboard after having'
been dean at USF- and six 65ers. 31 Four of the faculty
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had been deans of other law schools (Cornell, Minnesota, USC, and USF), two were past presidents of the
AALS, and one had participated in the establishment of
the ABA's standards. They demolished the allegations.
The results of a questionnaire circulated to the students
indicated that about 60 percent of them were not regularly employed, and the remainder not so heavily engaged as to prevent them from devoting full time to
their studies. The physical facilities charge was a
make-weight and was easily dealt with. As for surplus
revenue, the faculty pointed out that since it went to the
College's program and benefit there was no commercial
operation, and the school was in strict conformity with
the ABA's strictures preventing profitmaking legal instruction. The school's educational policy was defended
on the grounds that concentrated classroom work was
preferable to a more languid program and gave as
much time for study, that the school had no choice in
the matter of course offerings because of the restrictiveness of the state bar examination, and that even before the inspection, the College had tightened up on
readmission in particular and standards in general. Earlier, Snodgrass had pointed out to the Section that the
survey board in 1949 had given a favorable report on
Hastings and had concluded that it was "the keystone of
legal education in Northern California so far as the
mass of prospective students is concerned" and that
with improvement "this school may well become one of
the great metropolitan law schools of the United
States."32
The local press took up Hastings' fight. The 65ers,
led by Everett Fraser, formerly dean at Minnesota, asserted the faculty's responsibility for student matters.
Readmission was tightened further and effective steps
were taken to cut back excessive outside work by students. Fraser and George G. Bogert went after Hervey
and the ABA with a vigorous counterattack that was
carried to the December 1951 meeting of the AALS.
So effective was Fraser before the AALS's committee on
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relations with the ABA, that it appointed a subcommittee to remonstrate with the ABA. This signalled the
effective end of the locally inspired counterattack
against Snodgrass and Hastings carried out at the national level. Hastings did not lose its ABA approval.
With the opening of the new building in 1953, the
April bar examination of that year was held in it, and
the State Bar's lectures in the continuing education program it sponsored were given in the new classrooms.
Snodgrass was even made an honorary member of the
San Francisco Bar Association. The final accolade came
from the president of the State Bar in his message of
congratulations on the opening of 198 McAllister:
No message on Hastings would be complete without a bow in
the direction of its inimitable Dean David E. Snodgrass. True,
he and the State Bar-particularly its Bar Examiners-in the
past have often failed to see eye-to-eye. Yet without his devotion to the college, his persistence and determination, I wonder whether the Hastings dream of a grand new home would
have been realized for many years to come? Kudos to you,
then, Dean "Dave" Snodgrass! 33

That was quite a compliment coming from a Stanford graduate, but he might have mentioned that if
Snodgrass and the Bar had not always seen eye-to-eye,
they were certainly eyeball-to-eyeball for a long time.
"Dave" had the better stare.
Robert Gordon Sproul, as W.W. Campbell's provost at the time of the Reed affair in the 1920s, had
formed an early and unfavorable opinion of Hastings.
From 1930, when he became president of the University
of California, to his retirement in June 1958, Sproul
never felt impelled to change that opinion. His was not
an active animus, merely a fundamental conviction that
Hastings was not and never could be an institution to
the measure of the University of California; that it was
and must remain inferior to the Berkeley School of
Jurisprudence. Hastings had no place in Sproul's ambitious scheme for the greatest state university in the-
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country. Unless he could control it, he could not
transform it-and Sproul was not sure Hastings was
worth transforming into anything other than a night
school, a glorified university extension program. He was
too astute a politician not to realize how difficult it
would be to get rid of Hastings entirely, protected as it
was by statute and venerableness. Routinely, Sproul
preferred to ignore Hastings, to keep it as far distant
from himself, the Regents, and the rest of the U niversity as he could. He was not averse to basking in its
reflected glory; he added its GIs to the University's rolls
to demonstrate how heavy were the pressures of numbers on the University, and how necessary, therefore,
that the legislature respond more generously to enable
the University to do its job. But he was quick to disown
any authority over or responsibility for Hastings when it
became involved in controversy. He was annoyed repeatedly by those who did not understand the nature of
Hastings' autonomy, and he sometimes found it impossible to avoid involvement under such circumstances.
When heavily pressed over some apparent outrage,
Sproul was moved to contemplate how Hastings might
be neutralized or even brought into the University fold
and so effectively repressed. He was always somewhat at
the mercy of his own troops, particularly the dean of
Boalt, those who were embarrassed by Hastings and its
prickly dean after 1940.
Sproul was a thoroughgoing imperialist and a
grand egotist. It was he who did indeed build the University of California into the greatest state university in
this country; it fell to Clark Kerr to complete Sproul's
work, articulate its philosophy in the notion of the "multiversity," and carry the whole one step further so that it
became one of the two or three most eminent universities of any sort in the United States, and among the
most renowned in the world. Sproul was a great imposing figure of a man, a superb speaker, with a booming
voice that moved one of his aides to chide him for using
the phone to call Sacramento when all he had to do was
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open the window. He administered as a caesar, his
directions were imperial rescripts, his memoranda
obelisks recording bold acts. He was justifiably loaded
with honors, he took an active part in partisan
politics-he nominated Earl Warren for President at the
Republican National Convention in 1948-and he had
the distinction of receiving an assembly concurrent resolution of the legislature in 1947 imploring him to resist
blandishments from other universities and remain at
the helm of the University. This was all very heady stuff.
Sproul knew only one great reverse in his tenure: the
loyalty oath crisis of the late 1940s and early 1950s, that
both tarnished his reputation in academia and irreparably eroded his command of the Regents. Sproul never
quite recovered either his former glory or his previous
authority in governance over the University.34 That did
not prevent him from trying, and he did not cease
to rule as well as reign until he stood down amid
panegyrics, becoming President Emeritus, and occupying his old office, in the building from which he had
directed the University's fortunes since its construction
in 1941, which was promptly named for him upon his
retirement.
David Ellington Snodgrass was no less an imperialist and egotist; only his fief was smaller. The relationship existing for two decades between Sproul and
Snodgrass was complex. Each respected the other's remarkable capacity for self-advertisement and selfaggrandisement. Each admired the other's courage and
cunning. They met easily on the neutral ground of the
Bohemian Club and enjoyed each other's company at
the Bohemian Grove. Their duels never degenerated
into a blood-feud: towards Mrs. Sproul, whose brother
had been professionally close to Snodgrass, the dean
always exhibited great gallantry, and Sproul's son (of
the same name), briefly a student at Hastings upon leaving the Navy in 1946, remembers Snodgrass' kindness
towards him. With Sproul's retirement, there crept into
the combatants' correspondence, which before had
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been at least wary, and usually acrimonious, the affectionate tone of nostalgic souvenir of old warriors resting
on the hilts of their swords, points downward.
So long as Orrin Kip McMurray was dean of Boalt,
there was no internal pressure on Sproul to deal in
any way with Hastings. That changed when Edwin D.
Dickinson became dean in 1936. Dickinson's concern
with Hastings' nonapproval by the ABA had moved
Simmons and the Board to the changes necessary to
gain that recognition. A month after Simmons' death in
1940, Dickinson wrote Sproul (obviously at Sproul's invitation) with respect to what policy the University
should follow in the light of the imminent appointment
of a new dean at Hastings. All that Dickinson would
suggest was "care and discrimination" in the choice of a
competent dean whose academic standards would be as
high as Simmons' had been. Though Hastings was not
"in step with modern developments in legal education,"
it did render a real service in training lawyers who could
not afford Stanford or Boalt or did not meet their admissions level. He was against merging Hastings and
Boalt, against moving Boalt to the City and Hastings,
and against moving Hastings to the Westwood campus
in Los Angeles. He concluded:
With mixed emotions and with some regret, I return to my
conclusion as previously stated. Hastings College of the Law
should carryon. The time may come later for a merg~r or
transfer. It seems clear that this is not the time. 35

Of course, the University had nothing to do with selecting the new dean, and it was in no position to say
whether Hastings could or could not "carryon."
Relations between the University and Hastings
worsened rapidly in the later 1940s, as the two imperial
potentates clashed. Even Dickinson, who was fairly
even-minded, was moved to write Sproul that the University should rid itself entirely of the "dubious and
"somewhat embarrassing relationship" with Hastings by
taking it over.36 Sproul had been appalled to discover in
.1945 that Hastings intended to open a branch in Sac-
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ramento which would, according to Regents' counsel, be
"a branch of a department of the University of California."37 Hastings had not discussed the move with the
University, and by the time the University reacted, Education Code sect. 20154 was already law: "All courses
conducted by the college at Sacramento shall be deemed
to be given at the site of the college [Hastings] in San
Francisco."38 Hastings did not open a Sacramento
branch because the GI deluge kept Snodgrass and his
administration too well occupied to divert attention
elsewhere. But the survey board in 1949 picked up
the notion in suggesting the arrangement between
McGeorge and the University, either directly or through
Hastings, and when the University entered into negotiations with McGeorge for University Extension to
give law courses in Sacramento, Snodgrass reacted like a
jilted suitor. The controversy was still echoing in the
early 1960s when the Directors expressed their concern
with the proposed law school at UC Davis. In 1947,
University Extension, with the backing of Dickinson and
Sproul, and in cooperation with the State Bar, moved to
give law courses in San Francisco for continuing education of attorneys. Overtures of cooperation made to
Snodgrass were rejected, and the dean let loose a counterattack in the press and through the San Francisco
Bar Association, as well as directly upon Sproul, that
raised a great furor. University Extension was not to be
stopped, however, and in 1948 the first courses were
given in San Francisco; they were an unqualified success. To Snodgrass, the courses were an invasion by the
University of the "last refuge of Hastings College of the
Law," and the product of a conspiracy between Boalt,
University Extension, and the State Bar to set up a night
school in law in the City. 39 Dickinson left Boalt for Penn
in 1948; Boalt's new dean, William L. Prosser, was made
of sterner stuff. Convinced that Snodgrass was paranoid, Prosser argued that the time had come "when
something must be done" about Snodgrass. 4o
Sproul had sought in the fall of 1947 to discuss the
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Extension matter at a Jomt meeting of Hastings Directors and University Regents. 41 Clearly, though,
amalgamation of Hastings and the University was in
Sproul's and Dickinson's minds. The meeting came to
nothing; Directors Bosley, Ehrman, Chickering, and
Zook apparently would not deal with the bigger issue,
and rightly insisted that the Extension affair was Snodgrass' business. The meeting was not really relevant to
Sproul's grand strategy, which had occurred to him
when Hastings had had to approach the state for its new
building through the Regents and by the good offices of
the University administration. At that time Sproul was
not ready to take up the suggestion of Comptroller
James H. Corley (an officer of the Regents) that now
was the time "to take over the entire administration and
complete jurisdiction of the college as well as the responsibility for the construction of the physical plant."42
That was too much, too soon. Sproul's strategy was to
stifle Hastings by kindness. The entire structure of
,budgeting and accounting required for state appropriation had become increasingly complex in the course of
the 1940s. Hastings did not have the administrative staff
to cope with the forms and the careful calculations demanded; even to obtain the statutory annual appropriation of $7000, a formal presentation supported by documentation had to be made to the state department of
finance. The University had a staff much practiced in
the procedures, and Sproul offered the services of Corley and the finance staff of the University to assist Sammis in preparing the 1949-50 budget. In the next year,
this assistance was expanded, and Corley undertook to
submit the Hastings budget in person at the Sacramento
budget session, acting for the College, not the Regents.
In December 1949, as Sammis struggled manfully to lay
out an entire preliminary budget in justification of a
$7000 appropriation that was due by right, Corley advised his assistants that their participation in Hastings'
budgetmaking was a "matter of policy, not accommodation."43 As Hastings became increasingly dependent

David and the Goliaths

327

upon the University for budgetary assistance, a general
administrative dependency might evolve. Sproul believed that the day could not be far off when Hastings
would gladly accept an "affiliation" tantamount to subordination.
There was a fatal flaw in Sproul's grand strategy.
He meant to effect by administrative means what could
only be worked at the highest policy level. The Regents
were not a party to his scheme. Doubtless, he hoped that
as the College's dependency increased, and Snodgrass
reached the point of capitulation, he could present the
Regents, and Snodgrass could present the Directors,
with a fait accompli. With Maurice Harrison and Sidney
Ehrman on the Regents, Sproul had to be circumspect;
and as the loyalty oath controversy deepened, Sproul
found himself increasingly on the opposite side on that
issue from Harrison and Ehrman, who took a hard line
in favoring the oath. Corley was technically an officer of
the Regents (and remained so even after the 1949 reorganization that made him vice-president-business affairs), but his working relationship in finance was with
the president, and he managed to play his part in the
scheme without compromising his duty to the Regents.
Jno. U. Calkins, Jr., the Regents' attorney, was told no
more than he needed to know in the matter, and he
accepted that Sproul sought to bring the University and
Hastings together at a high level of consensus for affiliation. Sproul did not exact any conditions for helping
Hastings, not because he did not want to, but because to
have done so would have required Regental action and
direct negotiation with Hastings' Board. This Sproul
was not prepared to risk. The failure to exact conditions
by formal agreement with the Hastings Board defeated
the grand strategy. Snodgrass might be grateful, but he
was not about to give anything away.
In fact, Snodgrass did very well by Sproul's kindness. He received a great deal of help when neither he
nor Sammis could take time to prepare budget. And
Snodgrass was never shy about asking for more. He
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badgered Corley for even greater assistance, and in
1951 Corley complained to Sproul of the thin line he
had to walk:
I find myself in an embarrassing situation in trying to follow
your instructions to work more closely with the Hastings administration and also, in this particular case [budget], to remain on the outside as far as the budget is concerned. 44

All that Sproul could tell Corley was not to accept any
responsibilities for Hastings, "custodial, protective, or
otherwise," until the relationship of the College to the
Regents had been reduced to formal terms, but to carry
on with such assistance to Hastings as had been extended in the previous couple of years. 45 Two years
later, Corley was still trying to find out how far he
should go. The issue then turned on whether Hastings
had to accept filing cabinets of the type supplied to all
University departments by the purchasing department,
or could buy its own from the $1600 gained by sale of its
old furniture (Snodgrass had to battle to keep that
money).46 Snodgrass wanted a better quality filing
cabinet! The provocation might be risible, but the profound import of the dispute was not. While the Regents
had title to 198 McAllister-by virtue of the act appropriating the money for its construction-the building'S
furnishings were the property of the Directors if they
were purchased with the College'S own funds, over
which it could claim control by virtue of the 1878 act. In
the event, Snodgrass got the file cabinets he wanted,
with Hastings money, and Corley and Sproul decided
not to press the matter to Regental level. Without a clear
Regental policy, only Snodgrass could win.
With the help of Sproul's kindness, Snodgrass and
Sammis soon learned the ropes of state financing. Moreover, Hastings began to acquire the extra administrative
personnel necessary in a bigger and more complex operation. The acquisition of Dean Edward A. Hogan,
Jr., from USF in February 1951 was the key development. Hogan became vice-dean with general responsibility for administration in curriculum and student
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matters. Besides providing new services the College had
not enjoyed before (such as a regularly operated placement service), Hogan freed Sammis to undertake
budgetary and finance operations almost full time. Instead of resulting in the creation of dependence upon
the University, the University's help educated a newand independent-administrative machine at Hastings.
Below the august level of president and vicepresident, the University's troops champed at the bit.
When Hastings was under fire from the ABA in 1951,
Prosser wrote Sproul that the ABA's attack "seems to
me to be one more indication that sooner or later the
University will have to take over Hastings ... " and operate it as a "good part-time law school ... " meeting ABA
standards. 47 Prosser's attitude towards Hastings (and its
dean) was ambivalent. In the March 1949 issue of the
alumni magazine, which featured the glorious imminent prospect of three University law schools, each in its
own new building, Prosser had called for a healthy
competition among the new Boalt, the new Hastings,
and the truly new UCLA Law School. 48 He also argued
that rivalry that would set them at cross purposes would
be disastrous. Though he did not say so in the article,
Prosser saw Hastings' role as being that of a night
school. Since Hastings and the two City night schools
refused to merge at the urging of the 1949 survey
board, Prosser believed that Hastings should fill that
need in the system.
While Hastings had no intention of becoming
merely a night school, in 1951 it seriously considered
adding a night-school program. A faculty committee
(Fraser and VoId, 65ers, and Hogan) weighed the advantages and disadvantages, and concluded on academic grounds that the night school should not be
tried. 49 What moved the consideration was that in 1951
enrollments at Hastings began to drop alarmingly.
From the high in fall enrollments of 915 in 1949, the
decline was to 724 in 1950, 485 in 1951, and a low of
293 in 1952. The GI bulge was ending, and to com-
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pound the problem, the faculty's new high standards
cut off marginal students already in the College and
discouraged others from applying. Beginning in 1951, a
graduating class was reduced to about 40 percent of its
beginning size-an increase in the drop rate of some 20
percent over 1950, when 62 percent of that class
graduated. Anticipating that the ABA would require
three years of college for admission to an approved law
school, Hastings required the same beginning in 1950.
This cut off at a blow an indeterminate but probably
sizable portion of Hastings' constituency. The AALS interpreted the new standard to allow a student with two
years of college to enter a four-year law school program; the ABA found this acceptable. Hastings, in
common with a number of law schools faced with the
famine after the feast, instituted the four-year program
in 1951-52 to cater to students with only two years of
college. The four-year program was never a success (it
was discontinued in 1961) because it did not bring in
enough students to make up the loss occasioned by
higher admissions standards. The California junior colleges produced plenty of students in two years, but few
.of them were so sanguine as to believe they were ready
for law school. In 1951, Hastings faced the grim prospect of much reduced income from the loss of student
fees, the end of the extraordinarily profitable GI bonanza, the necessity to consume its nest egg, and the need
to resort once again to substantial state funding. The
new building alone would require a level of maintenance that would have demanded extra funding even
at the height of the GI deluge.
Sproul, in a confidential memo to Prosser dated
February 6, 1952, reminded him of his remark a year
earlier, that "sooner or later the University will have to
take over Hastings," and concluded, "Do you believe
that the time has come for us to move in, or should we
continue to wait, at least until Bosley is gathered to his
Fathers?"50 Allowing for much forced bravado (Sproul
never told Prosser that the grand strategy was a bit more
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modest than "moving in"), it was a reasonable question
in the light of Prosser's answer. Prosser reported that he
had discussed Hastings' financial situation with Snodgrass, and that Snodgrass said the College was exploring
state financing-financing independent of the University-but that he had .been told in Sacramento that
Hastings had no hope of getting state money except
through the University.51 Snodgrass had admitted that
the College would be in the red in the current year, and
indicated he was very reluctant to consume the nest egg
from the GI years. According to Prosser, Snodgrass told
him that he had discussed with the Directors the possibility of "getting together with the University," and that
while a majority of them favored it, Bosley and one or
two of the older generation were violently against it, and
the rest of the Board would not vote it over their opposition. Allowing for Prosser's wonted predilection for
exaggeration, this was a startling admission even if it
was only partially correct. Prosser's advice was to wait a
year, when financial extremity would go far towards
changing the Board's ideas.
The situation was parlous. Quite aside from the
worsening financial predicament of Hastings, Sacramento had become accustomed to Jim Corley presenting the Hastings budget request; it was not unreasonable for the director of finance and the legislators to conceive of the Regents as the proper funnel for money to
Hastings. So far had Sproul's grand strategy worked. If
Hastings was not going to become dependent upon the
University for the appropriation requisite to its continuation, it was going to have to assert its autonomy by
acting directly on its own behalf with the finance department, and use every ounce of its political clout to
persuade the legislature to support it. Snodgrass was
equal to the task. When the assistant director of finance
asked the dean's advice on law schools for his son, who
had shown an interest in Hastings, Snodgrass' reply was
most warm. 52 When Clark Bradley, '31, was elected to
the assembly in 1953, Snodgrass' letter of c6ngratula-
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tion ended by urging him to support the College's future budget request. 53 In 1954, the College made its
appeal. Assemblyman Gordon A. Fleury, '39, and Senator Edwin J. Regan, '31, were joined by other legislators and ex-legislators-including Oliver Carter, '35,
Arthur H. Connolly, Jr., '35, and Gerald O'Gara, '26and a number of prominent California lawyers to urge
the legislature to save the College. The response was
gratifying; $49,080 was appropriated, and the department of finance, the legislative auditor, the governor,
and the legislature went on record as favoring state
support for Hastings in subsequent years. 54 The Hastings appropriation appeared in the budget act as separate from that for the University of California, as in all
prevIous years.
Only once more before Snodgrass' administration
ended was "affiliation" or a closer relationship between
Hastings and the University seriously broached.,1n the
budget act of 1958, Hastings was entered as a lineitemed budget for the appropriation, and therefore its
revenues made subject to being taken into the state
treasury. The University's regular budget had always
been (and is yet) exempt from line-itemization, that is,
from division under categories of need. The budget was
voted as a single lump sum, with its revenues exempted
from payment into the treasury. The Regents were
scared. 55 If Hastings was part of the University, then
line-itemization of its budget threatened the University's exemption from the same practice. In September
1958, the Regents' committee on finance directed the
new president, Clark Kerr, to arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement for "a closer integration and affiliation" of Hastings with the University, and to notify the
department of finance that Hastings "is a part of the
University of California and as such its budget should
be administered in the same manner as other University
budgets."56 Kerr sought to playa cool and steady game.
He kept the Regents out of direct contact with Hastings.
He strove to placate Snodgrass: Snodgrass alone, at
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Kerr's inaugural luncheon, was singled out for personal
recognition from among the "University's" law professors (much to the wounded pride of the Boalt professoriate). Snodgrass disingenuously assured Kerr that he
had made a personal contribution to the formulation of
such an agreement, but that the matter was in the hands
of the Board and its vice-president, William Bradford
Bosley. Bosley would have joined the Communist Party
before allowing Hastings to affiliate with the University
of California. By November 17, 1958 (an English historian notes it was the four-hundredth anniversary of the
accession of Elizabeth I), the last round of courtship to
make the common-law marriage of Hastings and the
University a legitimate union was dead. "Dear Clark,"
wrote Snodgrass, "Do you suppose that we'll get together by 1978, in time for the one-hundredth anniversary? With internecine regards, Dave."57 So far, the answer IS no.
Neither was line-itemization for Hastings recinded-Hastings still appears that way in the budget act
each year, though the University has not suffered by
that. Indeed, line-itemization is the talisman for Hastings' autonomy.
What Sproul had not accomplished, Kerr could not
really care about less. But the old warrior never gave up
hope. In March 1961, Robert Gordon Sproul, president
emeritus for almost three years, had dinner at the
Bohemian Club with William L. Prosser, who would retire at Boalt three months later. They talked about the
possibilities of the merger of Hastings and Boalt. Prosser was convinced that with Bosley having retired, the
Hastings Board would be more friendly to the idea, and
that Snodgrass would still be willing to back it. Sproul
suggested that Prosser talk to Snodgrass, and that if the
opportunity arose he would too, but that he was unwilling to take the initiative in view of his retired status.
Prosser suggested that Sproul read Capt. Joshua
Slocum's epic account of circumnavigation in the sloop
Spray.58 The nautical theme was a good one: for here

334

David and the Goliaths

were two old pirates, both on the beach, watching the
Hastings under full sail and still plotting how to board
and take her. One of them finally made it aboard-but
in the crew. William L. Prosser became a member of the
65 Club in 1963 and taught his specialty, Torts, there
for nine years.
Prosser died in 1972. Robert Gordon Sproul lived
until 1975. David Ellington Snodgrass was vouchsafed
Jess life than his old adversaries, though he too made it
into the 65 Club in 1959. On July 10, 1963, after heart
surgery, he failed to regain consciousness. It was at least
a quiet (and merciful) end to a marvellously turbulent
career.

IX Eminence
by Age
IN

MANY A law school over the past
two decades those bitter-sweet affairs called retirement
dinners, at which younger (sometimes not by much) colleagues bid goodbye to an eminent professor about to
become emeritus, are enlivened by a little ditty. All join
in lustily, some in tune, to the air of "Over the Hills to
the Poorhouse":

I'm approaching the date of retirement,
Next year on July twenty-nine;
A statutory requirement,
For few die, and none will resign.
I'm tired, and weary of teaching,
Worn down by the ultimate straw;
I'm hopeful I soon will be reaching
The Hastings College of Law,
Where nobody reads any cases,
And nobody does any chore,
And life is all lovely and lazy,
And nobody works any more.
There days go by without number
Like lilies afloat on a stream,
And no one's disturbing your slumber,
Or interrupting your dream.
No problems are ever suggested,
In quandaries no one is mired,
And quiet is requested
For those who have retired.
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There nobody reads any cases,
And nobody does any chore;
It's over the hill to Hastings
Where nobody works any more.
The process of daily digestion
Goes on without any surcease,
And no one proposes a question
Infringing that infinite peace.
In offices tasteful and cozy,
The faculty all take their rest;
And everything's golden and rosy
In that paradise out in the west,
Where nobody reads any cases,
And nobody does any chore;
It's over the hill to Hastings,
Where nobody works any more. 1

The Greeks said that one could not be a poet without
some foolishness; the same can be said of the dean of a
major law school. The poet here qualified on both
counts: William L. Prosser, who went over the hill to
Hastings in 1963.
Paradise Hastings might be, but a retirement home
it was not. That unique institution, Hastings' 65 Club,
has been constituted of superannuated but not retired
professors. For over three decades, the 65 Club has
provided Hastings with one of the most distinguished
faculties in any American law school. For two decades
these professors, ranging in age from 65 to 86, bore the
brunt of the teaching in the College. They revolutionized the program and curriculum. They brought
almost instant fame to the College. Though for the past
six years the instructional role of the 65 Club has been
reduced, these seniors of the profession still provide
Hastings with eminence by age.
The six 65ers hired between 1940 and 1947-0rrin
Kip McMurray and Arthur M. Cathcart in 1940, Edward S. Thurston in 1943, Oliver Le Roy McCaskill and
Chester G. Vernier in 1946, and Augustin Derby in
1947-did not constitute a "club." They were heralds of
a new departure, but they were not the departure itself.
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In May 1942, Snodgrass attended the American Law
Institute meeting in Philadelphia specifically to talk to
the deans of Harvard, Yale, Pennsylvania, and Columbia about future staff for Hastings; the implication was
that he was looking for younger, recent graduates of
these institutions. In itself, Snodgrass' mission was
significant. He was desirous of increasing the full-time
faculty at Hastings and he wanted lawyers of a more
academic type than the available pool of San Francisco
practitioners provided. There had been some discussion
in the Board about limiting part-time faculty to two
courses each, and this was an indication of the dean's
predilection for full-time instructors in the core of the
program. The exigencies of wartime prevented any action from being taken-the College was lucky to get any
instructors it could find. In the fall of 1945, in expectation of the GI bulge, the issue of limiting part-time instructors (to three semester hours) arose again. But of
equal interest, the dean and the Board discussed compulsory retirement of faculty at age 75. In December
1945, the Board voted retirement at age 75 as "a rule of
general application." In fact, while the rule remained on
the books, it was never enforced. The GI deluge beginning in 1946, coupled with a general shortage of law
teachers and the hot competition for them by all the
rapidly expanding law schools, persuaded Snodgrass
that the College's full-time faculty should be recruited
almost exclusively from 65ers. By 1948, with the hiring
of four 65ers (the largest number to date at one time),
Lawrence VoId, Max Radin, Dudley O. McGovney, and
Ernest G. Lorenzen; an article in Reader's Digest on the
65ers; and Snodgrass' almost automatic reply to jobseekers that the College was hiring no full-time faculty
under age 65, it was clear that the "club" was in existence. In 1949, when Everett Fraser, William G. Hale,
and George G. Bogert were hired, there was no question about Hastings' staffing policy.
Throughout the heaviest GI years, 1947 to 1951,
the 65ers provided about 40 percent of the College's
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instruction; 10 percent was undertaken by the three
full-time professors under 65 (Snodgrass, Sammis, and
the librarian), and 50 percent by the part-time faculty.
In academic 1951-52, the 65ers accounted for almost 70
percent of instruction (an increase of 25 percent in one
year). The number of 65ers did not increase-there
were seven in that and the two preceding academic
years. The increased percentage of instructional responsibility falling to the 65ers resulted from the rapid
diminution of part-time instructors, from 20 in 1949-50
to 12 in 1950-51 to 4 in 1951-52. With the GI bulge
over, reduction was necessary, but it was the part-time
faculty that was reduced, not the 65 Club.
The two decades' ascendency of the 65 Club began
in 1951-52. From then until academic 1972-73, never
less than 50 percent and as much as 90 percent (in
1963-64) of instruction was provided by 65ers. From
seven in 1951-52, their numbers dropped to six for the
next two academic years, but jumped in 1954-55 to ten
and began a steady increase to a peak of 25 in 1970-7l.
The part-time faculty expanded and contracted only
slightly, to never less than three or more than ten, between 1951-52 and 1968-69. During the same period,
the full-time non-65 faculty numbered between three
and five, and their instructional contribution in terms of
total load was negligible from 1957-58 to 1971-72; they
were, of course, primarily administrators. During the
two decades of 65 Club ascendency, the average teaching load of a 65er was 7.7 hours per week; it was never
less than 6.4, and in 1954-55 it went as high as 10.4
hours. During the same period, the average teaching
load of part-time instructors was four hours per week.
Taking into account that at the beginning of the period
the average teaching load at a major law school was
about 12 hours per week, and that this declined rapidly
over the 1960s to about 9 hours, the Hastings 65er's 7.7
hours perhaps left time for "daily digestion," but didn't
quite come up to Bill Prosser's wishful "nobody works
any more."

Edward S. Thurston

Oliver L. McCaskill

George G. Bogert

Everett Fraser

Albert
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Harno

A. Brooks Cox
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All of the Club continued teaching because they
champed at the bit of enforced retirement. In many
academic disciplines, retirement is often welcomed as an
opportunity to continue research, to finish off the last
big work of a career and a lifetime, unhampered by the
daily routine of classes. In American academic law,
scholarship is closely linked with teaching. Where in the
humanities or the social sciences the m~or scholarly
output of the researcher is to be found in the monograph or super-monograph, the law professor has
three principal vehicles for scholarly activity of roughly
equal importance: learned articles in law reviews; scholarly contributions to restatements of the law, to drafting of model codes and similar legislation, and to governmental commissions dealing with legal problems;
and texts and casebooks. Of these, the latter two almost
demand activity as a teacher. Texts and casebooks are
often important contributions to scholarship, but they
begin as teaching tools, and rarely has an academic
lawyer involved in restatement of the law or codedrafting not found the thrust and parry of the classroom a valuable means for defining ideas and even for
refining language used in the work. This is not to argue
that the humanities or social sciences professor does not
need teaching to undertake research (he does, rather
more than he is likely to be aware of). It is to indicate
that the law professor's scholarship relies less on the
massive acquisition of data than on constant stimulation
of ideas and remaining wholly up-to-date with-even
ahead of-rapidly changing legal developments, and
that the best way to maintain this grasp is to be bent to
the discipline of conveying the law to students. With
such an intimate link between teaching and scholarship
in the law, forcing retirement at an arbitrary age not
only can cost the classroom an experienced teacher, but
also can cost legal scholarship a savant at the height of
his powers.
However, something more was required than sunshine in "that paradise out in the west" to attract and
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keep scholars of the character and capacity of the 65
Club. The servant is worth his hire, and the 65ers could
not be expected to continue laboring in the classroom
for mere love of teaching. At first, there was wide variation in the salaries paid them. Some of the early 65ers,
notably Augustin Derby, Ernest Lorenzen, and Lawrence VoId (all hired in 1948) were badly underpaid in
comparison with others in the Club not one whit more
distinguished. In 1948-49, for example, Derby was paid
$666 per semester unit-and taught 12 units-while
Max Radin (also hired in 1948) was paid $2300 per unit,
and taught only four units. This inequity was less a matter of exploitation than a failure to establish a uniform
pay scale. It grew in part, too, from star-catching; Snodgrass desperately wanted the luminous Radin's services,
and Radin knew it and was prepared to profit by it. 2
Indeed, the falling out in less than a semester between
Snodgrass and Radin-for reasons that are still not
clear-might have owed something to Snodgrass' regret
that Radin had gotten out of him more than Snodgrass
wanted to give, and more than he thought Radin was
worth. Not long afterwards, a fixed unit scale was established for 65ers, the principle of which has obtained to
this day. The scale has always been competitive with the
highest salary step at Boalt., Sometimes it has been better
than Boalt's. In 1954-55, Boalt's highest salary step was
$10,596; Hastings' for full time nonadministrative faculty (that is, 65ers) teaching a full load of 12 hours was
$12,000. Though from 1957 the state Department of
Finance was committed to funding Hastings salaries at
parity with Boalt, in the 1960s there was some slippage.
In the 1970s, Hastings caught up with Boalt, which
might be only cold comfort, since the University's scales
have steadily eroded in comparison with those of universities of comparable standing.
The 65 Club would not have been possible if Hastings had had a retirement system or if the retirement
systems of American universities made provision for
forfeiture or reduction of pension for continuing em-
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ployment. The part-time nature of Hastings' faculty
from its inception was determinative on the first count.
As for the second, academic pensions were not under
Social Security, and they were so mean anyway that forfeiture provisions were seldom seriously considered.
One snag that would have cost Hastings the services of
eight of its 65ers (three of them presently serving)
would have been a decision by Sproul that Hastings was
so integral a part of the University of California that the
Regents' rules against continuing employment by retired University professors applied to the College.
Sproul decided otherwise in 1940 in McMurray's case.
This covered all cases of Boalt professors because the
University had its own retirement system. However,
J no. U. Calkins, Jr. was prevented from joining the
Club after his retirement as counsel to the Regents because he was pensioned under the State Employees' Retirement System, which imposed restrictions on continuing employment. 3 At Snodgrass' insistence as early as
1945, the state attorney general had ruled that Hastings
was exempt from the SERS, its professors excluded
from membership in the system. He solicited and received the same opinion from two later attorneys general, including Edmund G. Brown in 1957, thus effectively keeping the College out of the grasp of the SERS
and its mandatory retirement rule, which would have
prevented hiring 65ers under any circumstances. How
well the merely common-law marriage of Hastings and
the University worked to Hastings' advantage is illustrated by the Hastings faculty'S ineligibility for the University'S own retirement system because they were not
employees of the University, and their equal ineligibility
for the SERS because by the act and the subsequent
court decisions from Foltz v. Hoge to In re Students of
Hastings College of the Law, Hastings was an "integral
part" of the University. 4
The basic structure of the 65 Club was determined
by Snodgrass, and it has remained unchanged. In 1963,
he articulated its philosophy:
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1. There is only one reason why retired professors cannot be
recalled to active duty. That is the unwillingness of the local
administration to receive them ....
2. The physical condition of each member of an over-age
faculty should determine the amount of teaching which he
should be required to do ....
3. The salary scale for emeritus professors [continuing
teaching] should be exactly the same as that which is applicable to professors who are teaching in their sixties. No deduction should be made because of the right to receive retirement
benefits, which have been fully earned. 5

For Snodgrass, the expedient of the 1940s became his
crusade for the 1950s. Always a popular speaker and
much in demand, by the mid-1950s he could not be
persuaded to talk on any other subject than the iniquity
of compulsory retirement. He did not lack an enthusiastic audience in the Golden State that was growing in
population geometrically in large part by attracting retirees, in which the elderly were becoming a political
force of considerable proportions, and which gave our
language that infelicitous euphemism, "senior citizen."
The 65 Club and its creator received national publicity,
in Coronet, Look, Newsweek, on radio and television. In a
San Francisco election for a superior court judge in
1960, Snodgrass roasted a candidate, aged 56, whose
strategy it was to convince the electorate that his opponent, a 70-year-old lady municipal court judge, was too
old for the job. That Lenore Underwood was a Hastings
graduate, '32, merely added fuel to Snodgrass' torch,
and though she lost the election, thereafter such a political strategy became less frequent. Snodgrass received
numerous awards for his advocacy of the right of older
people to work. He also enjoyed the kudos of the great
and the small who congratulated him both on his cause
and on the excellence of the faculty he had brought to
Hastings. At the dedication luncheon for the new building, in March 1953, Director Sidney M. Ehrman, '98, a
few months away from being an octogenarian, owned
that if he were to present to the 65 Club a regimental
standard (how apt a flag), it would be emblazoned with
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the words, "We declare we will never retire! Until we lose
our pep and fire."6 Those were Dean Snodgrass' sentiments exactly, and when he qualified for the 65 Club on
September 11, 1959, his delight was downright boyish.
Snodgrass' active recruiting for the Club was very
direct-a no answer was never gladly received, and the
fierce little dean might have lured more than one great
man to Hastings by engendering fear of his displeasure
should his suit be spurned. Cornered, drink in hand, in
a leather chair in the Cartoon Room at the Bohemian
Club, even the most distinguished scholar was no match
for Snodgrass' persuasive pleading. The nonagenarian
Master, Roscoe Pound-who said no-felt compelled to
go into considerable explanation (new furniture in
Langdell, excellent working conditions, adequate extra
income) for his refusal, softening the blow by saying
that Snodgrass had "a wonderful faculty at Hastings
College of the Law, and if I had the urge to resume law
teaching I should certainly jump at the opportunity you
offer."7 However, the publicity surrounding the Club
presented hazards. At one point, Snodgrass complained
that most of the applicants for Hastings posts were
superannuated practitioners rather than experienced
teachers of law. His correspondence was full of ardent applications and his gentle discouragement. What
Snodgrass sought were the best academics he could
find. He well realized that he had a large pool of excellent local practitioners from which to draw part-time
instructors for practice-oriented courses. For Snodgrass, the Club presented the opportunity to gain a
scholarly faculty that the College could not acquire
otherwise. He made the best of it. In the men he recruited and the institution he created he gave Hastings
its richest legacy since the original gift of Serranus Clinton Hastings.
If imitation is the sincerest flattery, Hastings was
much flattered by a number of law schools which by the
end of the 1950s began to hire professors considered to
be superannuated. Most of the schools were either as yet
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unaccredited or just recently approved, but all were aspiring to become better. California Western and the
University of San Diego law schools took up the idea.
Even the old and well-established University of Oregon
law school enquired about the way to go about creating
a 65 Club. Moreover, law schools with a mandatory retirement age began to agitate (and with some success) to
"recall" retired professors to active service to teach a
course. Indeed, Hastings stood in some danger of losing
by its pathfinding. A few 65ers left to go to sunnier
climes. But there were plenty to take their place. It is a
true mark of distinction that today, as mandatory retirement begins to crumble, it was Hastings that first
showed the way three decades ago.

To date, there have been 76 members of the 65
Club. Five of them in effect spent their teaching careers
at Hastings. The indefatigable Robert W. Harrison
might well be called the first 65er because he reached
that age in 1937 and continued to teach until 1947.
Brooks Cox, a practitioner, taught part time from 1946
to 1951, and joined the Club and became full time in the
latter year, continuing active until 1972. Harold G.
Pickering, who was in practice in San Francisco from
1918 to 1953, joined the Club in 1954 and remained
until his retirement in 1963. Paul Basye taught part time
from 1948 to 1966, then joined the Club and is still
going strong, affectionately nicknamed the "Count,"
with obvious reference to a certain musician, but also to
his aristocratic bearing. David Ellington Snodgrass was
the fifth. Two other members had no previous teaching
experience in a law school. Chauncey D. Leake, M.D.,
who founded the school of pharmacology at the University of California in San Francisco, taught medical jurisprudence at Hastings from 1963 to 1966. 8 Arthur J.
Goldberg, formerly associate justice of the United States
Supreme Court (1962-65) and U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations in the Johnson administration, has been
Distinguished Professor of Law at Hastings since 1975.
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The other 65ers who have come to Hastings from practice or the bench had previous law school teaching
experience, full time or part time: Calvert Magruder
(1959-60, taught at Harvard before becoming a justice
of the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit), Warren
Madden (1961-71, taught at the University of Pittsburgh before taking a seat on the U.S. Court of Claims),
Roger B. Traynor, who has held the chair endowed in
his honor since 1970, after 30 years on the California
Supreme Court, latterly as chief justice, had taught at
Boalt for a decade, and Laurence Eldredge, a member
of the Club since 1970, came from active practice in
Philadelphia, where he also taught part time at Temple
and earlier full time at Penn. All the rest of the 65 Club
came to Hastings from regular full-time careers at other
law schools.
The academic preparation of the 76 club members
was of the highest order. Only two did not have the
LL.B.: Dr. Leake and Arthur M. Cathcart. Cathcart
spent a year at Harvard Law School in 1896-97, but
prepared for the bar in a Colorado smalltown law office,
a career pattern that was not unusual outside a large
metropolitan area at that time. He practiced for one
year, then went to Stanford in 1904, where in a thirtyfour year career he became one of the school's ornaments, teaching Pleading and making a major scholarly
contribution as co-editor of a casebook on code pleading. Cathcart, with McMurray, was a charter member of
the Club. Two were foreign-trained: Julius Stone, who
read jurisprudence for the B.A. at Oxford and took the
degree Bachelor of Civil Law there in 1929, and Moffatt
Hancock, who received the S.J.D. at Osgoode Hall,
Toronto, in 1940. Of the 72 graduates of American law
schools, 49 (64.5 percent) received the LL.B. from seven
major schools: Harvard (with 15 the highest number),
Yale, Columbia, Chicago, Michigan, Stanford, and
Boalt. Wisconsin and Iowa each produced three;
Pennsylvania, Cornell, Illinois, Missouri, and the University of Washington each produced two; NYU (the
closest Eastern cognate of Hastings), Northwestern,
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Minnesota, Texas, Nebraska, Montana, and Hastings
each produced one. At the time that these men received
their degrees, during the first three decades of this century (only McMurray from Hastings '93 and Robert W.
Harrison from Harvard '98 are the exceptions), the "national" law schools were Harvard, Yale, Columbia, possibly Penn, Michigan, and Chicago. They produced
then, and continue to produce now, a large proportion
of academic lawyers, in great part because they have
always enjoyed entree into major law firms in the Eastern and Midwestern metropolises, an inside track to
Federal legal posts in Washington, and a preferential
advantage in placing brand-new LL.B.s in clerkships to
important appellate judges. Since the 1920s, such firms,
posts, and clerkships, singly or in combination, have
been the principal avenues to teaching positions for aspiring academics. But already by this time, most of the
other law schools which produced many of the Club
were excellent institutions with solid regional reputations. Most of these have since acquired "national"
status, not only because they have grown steadily in size
and quality, but because the Eastern dominance in law
practice and in Washington has diminished. Conceivably, Harvard still affords a nose's length advantage, but
not since New Deal days has the road to Washington
required a left turn at Harvard Square.
Where the 76 taught before is even more
significant. Excluding the seven who had either no prior
teaching experience in law schools or had taught principally at Hastings, the remaining 69 had taught in 36
different law schools. Almost half of the Club's total
membership came from seven of these schools:
Boalt
Stanford

NYU
Illinois
Harvard
Michigan
Chicago

9 professors
6
5
5
4
4
3

11.8 percent of the total

7.9
6.6
6.6
5.3
5.3
3.9
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The fifteen (20 percent of the total) who merely moved
their base of operation up the Peninsula or across the
Bay provided the largest contingent. This should occasion no surprise; indeed is gratifying, because they did
not labor under the Eastern suspicion of the Wild West,
and they did not feel that Hastings was a comedown.
The Boalt 65ers came in two major groups: McMurray
(1940), McGovney and Radin (1948), and James P.
McBaine (1952) in the early years, and Roger B.
Traynor (from the state supreme court in 1970), Adrian
Kragen and Stefan A. Riesenfeld (1974), and Arthur
Sherry (1975) latterly, with Prosser sandwiched between
(1963). Stanford provided a fairly steady stream early
on, with Cathcart (1940), Chester G. Vernier (1946),
William B. Owens (1953), and George E. Osborne
(1958), followed by a break until John B. Hurlbut
(1970) and Moffatt Hancock (1976). The NYU contingent was composed of Augustin Derby in 1947, Judson
F. Falknor and Milton Green in 1966, Russell Niles in
1972, and Miguel de Capriles in 1974, all of whom followed in the trail of the first professor, John Norton
Pomeroy, who remains a respected figure in the history
of NYU. The train from Illinois began with Oliver
LeRoy McCaskill in 1946, and in the later 1950s Hastings looked like an outpost of Champaign-Urbana, with
the arrival of the "Illinois Gang": William E. Britton
(1954), Albert J. Harno (1956), and George Goble
(1958). This was in truth an affinity-group. Harno and
Goble were old friends from Yale Law School student
days, and the three had been the Illinois powerhouse of
the 1930s and 1940s. Russell N. Sullivan, who arrived in
1967, had been a student of all three of them at Illinois,
had succeeded Harno to the Illinois deanship, and like
Harno played a prominent role in the reform of legal
education in this country. The five from Illinois have
given a total of 39 years of service to Hastings,
the most of any law school (Boalt with 35.5 years and
Stanford with 35 are the runners-up). Harvard's four
include the third member of the Club, Edward S.
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Thurston (1943-48), much loved by his students, who
created the College's first honor society to memorialize
his name; James A. MacLachlan (1960-71); and Judge
Calvert Magruder (1959-60) and Snodgrass' old friend
Warren A. Seavey (1962-63)-the latter two staying only
one year. The Chicago men, though only three, have
been long-lived, and have provided a Chicago presence
at Hastings for the past three decades: George G.
Bogert (1949-59), Roscoe T. Steffen (1961-73), and
Sheldon Tefft (1968 to the present). The three Chicago
men shared a similarity in scholarly focus, on civil law
subjects with origins in equity. Perhaps more significantly, Bogert and Tefft, both of whom joined the
Chicago faculty in the late 1920s, manifested a concern
with the jurisprudential foundations of the law, which
flowered at Chicago from the 1930s through the 1950s.
The University of Washington produced three
65ers, Rudolph H. Nottelmann and John W. Richards,
both of whom came in the 1960s, better known as
teachers than as scholars, and Warren Shattuck, who
came in 1974 after almost four decades at Washington,
and is one of the most prolific and wideranging of the
Club's scholars. Two 65ers each have come from Columbia, Cornell, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, and UCLA. The UCLA men have
had remarkable associations with Hastings. Harold E.
Verrall (1970 to the present) was a close friend of Arthur M. Sammis, registrar and dean from 1963 to 1971,
and collaborated with him on a text on California community property law. Rollin Perkins was the third
longest-tenured 65er, teaching for sixteen years from
1957 to 1973, and though technically "retired," as a
65er taught first-year Criminal Law until 1976, finally
quitting the classroom at age 87 after almost six decades
at the podium. Sixteen other law schools, including
such notable institutions as Duke, Indiana, Iowa, Texas,
USC, and Yale, and the Australian University of Sydney, provided one 65er each.
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All of the American law schools from which 65
Club members have been drawn were at least ABAapproved at the time of the 65er's recruitment, and with
the exception of William Mitchell College ofthe Law, St.
Paul (from which Stephen R. Curtis came in 1964), all
were also AALS member institutions. This has been a
matter of policy since the creation of the Club. Dean
Snodgrass took seriously the notion that the ABA and
AALS cachets were the mark of minimal standards of
excellence for law schools. It is not to denigrate Stephen
Curtis' ability as a teacher to voice a suspicion that
his appointment as the only 65er from a non-AALS
member school owed something to other considerations. Before becoming dean at William Mitchell in
1958, Curtis had been dean of Ohio Northern in Ada,
Ohio, from 1955. There he had fought manfully and
successfully to get ONU approved by the ABA despite
the staunch opposition of Homer D. Crotty. No more
than David Snodgrass would Arthur Sammis forget an
old ally and fellow-sufferer at the hands of Crotty.
Curtis' appointment was justifiable by the necessity of
adding another section of Agency in the first year, and
he was a distinguished teacher until his retirement in
1971.
As of the end of the present academic year, the
Club's 76 members will have given Hastings 490 years of
service. This is an average of just under six years and
one semester of service per man. If we exclude the nine
who stayed no longer than a year, the average length of
service has been just over seven years. Among the past
members of the Club, 14 served ten years or more.
Brooks Cox is the laureate, with 21 years (1951-72),
teaching Municipal Corporations and Civil Procedure.
Cox, in practice in the City, taught part time from 1946
to 1951, and joined the Club on reaching 65. A man
remembered for his modesty, Cox was a much-loved
figure at Hastings; kind though never indulgent in the
classroom, he was an almost perfect blend of academic
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lawyer and practItIOner. Lawrence VoId, one of the
early recruits, taught from 1948 to 1965, a total of 17
years, after a career of almost a quarter of a century at
Nebraska and Boston University. Perkins, with 16 years,
holds third place. Two of the Club's most eminent
members taught 15 years: Everett Fraser (1949-64),
after 32 years at Minnesota (28 of them as dean), Snodgrass' stalwart lieutenant in the battle with the Bar Examiners and the ABA in the early 1950s; George Osborne, classmate of Snodgrass at Berkeley and Harvard,
intimate friend during his years at Stanford and fellow
Bohemian, a leading authority on mortgages and property security, remained actively teaching after his "retirement" in 1973. Lewis Simes, who came from Michigan, collaborated with Basye on a problembook on probate, and served 13 years (1959-72). Roscoe Steffen, for
a dozen years, 1961 to 1973, made the dull stuff of
Agency and Commercial Paper come alive, and his
reputation as "challenging" in class meant not only
"stimulating" but "probing." William Britton from Illinois and Norman Lattin from Ohio State served eleven
years at Hastings (1963-74). The five who taught for ten
years in the Club include Robert W. Harrison, who part
time and full time from 1901 to 1947 taught at Hastings
longer than any other faculty member in the College'S
history, Bogert from Chicago (1949-59), Judson Crane
from Pittsburgh (1954-64), Judge Warren Madden
(1961-71 )-who had been a Pitt professor before going
to the U.S. Court of Claims-and Richard R.B. Powell
from Columbia (1963-73). Powell, whose first contact
with Hastings had been under the somewhat strained
circumstances of his 1927 visit on behalf of the AALS,
latterly embraced the College and its program with fervor, bringing to Real Property the historical perspective
that is too often missing when taught by younger professors. And with the publication in 1977 of his study of
early California legal development, 1760-1860,9 Powell
both brought credit to Hastings and confirmed the
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widespread suspicion that he had become an adopted
son of the Golden State.
Among the serving members of the Club, four have
already served ten or more years. Milton Green from
NYU has been at Hastings since 1966, teaching Civil
Procedure, Conflicts, Federal Jurisdiction, and Practice.
Paul Basye, with 12 years in the Club built upon 18
previous years part time, is the "dean" of the present
faculty by virtue of his total tenure. Property and Probate are his subjects, but he taught physics and
meteorology during World War II, and still gazes at
clouds and stars. He has put his technical training to use
in the ABA-sponsored project for computerization of
land titles; as author of a treatise and editor of another
on Titles, Basye is not about to allow Justitia to be gagged
(she is already blindfolded) by the electronic marvel.
Russell Sullivan, the last of the Illinois men, is still going
strong after 11 years of teaching Constitutional Law.
Sheldon Tefft, who came from Chicago in 1968, remains a firm advocate of the importance of equity as a
branch of the law, and manages in Remedies to evoke
the ghost of Pomeroy. As a student in jurisprudence at
Oxford in the 1920s, Tefft found its program "at once
more professional and less professional" than that at the
University of Nebraska Law School from whence he
had come. 10 The longstanding English respect for equity was perhaps "less professional," but it made its
mark on him.
Besides the teaching abilities and scholarly distinction of the 65ers, they brought to Hastings an inimitable
quality of experience. The four judges, Goldberg,
Madden, Magruder, and Traynor, had national, even
international reputations as jurists. Dr. Leake was one
of the nation's top half-dozen medical scientists in the
1960s. Laurence Eldredge, who established his reputation not only in published scholarship, but by an enviable career as an advocate, enjoyed a nationwide renown as a legal scholar in the field of torts and law and
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medicine of the sort seldom accorded a practitioner. Of
the 65 members of the Club who came from other law
schools, most had, of course, spent about 40 years in
teaching. What is arresting is that on an average these
65 men had spent almost exactly a quarter of a century
at the law school from which they went to Hastings. For
an academic, long continuation at one place is a twoedged sword. It is easy to become too firmly set in the
environment, overly involved in in-house politics and
rivalries, smugly self-satisfied in having found a comfortable niche affording local recognition, and slowly
seduced into increased inactivity because the competitive challenge of new surroundings, new people, and the
need to prove oneself has evaporated. This is the pernicious edge of the sword. The salutary edge is caught
in the old saw about the rolling stone gathering no moss.
Frequent institutional change requires long periods of
adjustment during which serious scholarship is impossible. Institutional loyalty, which makes for wholehearted
professional involvement, takes time to grow, and frequent change nips it in the bud. Nothing erodes selfconfidence in the academic's sense of his powers more
than rootlessness. Therefore, for most of the 65 Club
members, their previous long tenure elsewhere afforded them the continuity to reach the peak of their
powers, to make their professional marks, and to develop as accomplished teachers and productive scholars.
Another aspect of the 65ers experience was their
administrative involvement in legal education.
Twenty-nine of them (just under 40 percent of the 76)
had been regular-not acting-deans of American law
schools. One other, Julius Stone, was dean of the law
faculty of the University of Sydney. The 29 deans of
American schools had a combined experience of 386
years, an average of just under 14 years each, in that
administrative office. The most experienced dean was
Albert J. Harno, with 35 years at Illinois after two years
at Washburn, 'and the year before he came to Hastings
he was acting dean at UCLA. Harno was succeeded at
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Illinois by Russell Sullivan, whose ten years added to
Harno's 35 provided 45 years of continuous Illinois
deanship represented in the Club. Three successive
deans of Boalt-McM urray, Edwin Dickinson, and
Prosser-brought 38 years of continuous deanship at
the same institution to Hastings. In Judson Crane and
Charles B. Nutting, the University of Pittsburgh provided two deans, who served continuously from 1942 to
1952, and Nutting later served another six years as dean
of George Washington. George Washington had three
very young deans between 1910 and 1923, all of whom
ultimately became 65ers: Ernest G. Lorenzen, Everett
Fraser, and Merton Ferson. Fraser was dean at Minnesota from 1920 to 1948; after an eight-year interlude,
William Lockhart assumed the office and remained in it
for 16 years. Ferson, after leaving George Washington,
was dean at North Carolina for two years and then at
Cincinnati for 20 years, 1926-46. William G. Hale had
27 years of deanship at Oregon, Washington (St. Louis),
and USC. Benjamin Boyer was dean of Temple from
1947 to 1965. Leon Green also held a deanship for 18
years, at Northwestern-where Arthur J. Goldberg was
one of his students-before Green went to Texas. NYU
gave Hastings Russell Niles and Miguel de Caprilles,
who were successive deans there from 1948 to 1967.
Cornell had been under the hand of both George G.
Bogert (before he went to Chicago) for four years and
William Ray Forrester for ten. In all, 25 law schools (not
including Hastings, which provided 65er Snodgrass)
had at one time or another been under the direction of
a man who would later take to Hastings the memories of
toil and glory, the knowledgeableness and sagacity
gained from the decanal experience.
The deanship of an accredited law school has been
a great deal more executive than administrative since
1920. It has only one cognate, the deanship of a medical
school. All other types of deans pale into something
only slightly better than insignificant in terms of extramural importance compared to these two. In major
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universItIes, where of late rotation of department
chairmen usually takes place every four or five years,
and rotation of deans every six or seven, the dean of the
law school generally remains lashed to the rudder for a
longer stint. In great part, such long tenure has less to
do with internal administrative concerns than with the
activity of the dean outside the university. The dean
must exert weight directly proportionate to the eminence of his school in the dual professional constituency
of the law school: the bar and the legal academic world.
The annual convention of the ABA in August and the
annual meeting of the AALS in December are the rock
and the hard place (that Welshman William Lloyd Prosser might have said the hell and the ironworks) between which the dean is caught, the poles between
which he gyrates. He must always at least show the flag.
If he is to do his job properly, he must become a power
in the councils of the AALS and at least an influential
voice in the ABA. If he has the inclination, can find the
time, and has something to contribute, active participa.tion in the American Law Institute and its model-code
work magnifies the dean's importance and redounds to
his school's reputation. All of the 65ers who had been
deans of AALS-member law schools brought with them
a national reputation derived from their leadership in
legal education, and as well the abundant contacts with
bench and bar derived from such eminence.
A special luster attaches to those law school professors (usually but not invariably deans) who serve the
one-year term of president of the AALS. Ten of the
65ers over the years were former presidents of the
AALS. McMurray was president in 1924 while dean of
Boalt; two were presidents during the 1930s, three in
the 1940s, two in the 1950s, and two in the 1960s. Those
members of the Club not presidents of the AALS were
active in other offices and in its sections. Similarly, most
of the 65ers have been participants in sections of the
ABA; today, three of the Club are on the councils of
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ABA sections, and a fourth is on the governing council
of the American Law Institute.
Perhaps such eminence comes as no surpriseinvolvement and honors are the expected lot of professionalleaders. There are other dimensions to the 65ers,
however, which are just as appreciated within the walls
of the College as their extramural eminence. Miguel de
Capriles, an Olympic medalist in fencing, who came to
Hastings from NYU in 1974, received a special Olympic
Order Medal in 1976 for his long contributions to the
sport. George Osborne was an avid football fan, his
loyalties in the Big Game torn between Cal where he had
been a student and Stanford where he had taught for 35
years. Fittingly, the Hastings rugby team has been
named in his honor. In a college where for many years
student support assistance was negligible, 65ers, their
old students and friends in their honor, have made notable contributions to scholarship and loan funds for
Hastings students. Two of the three endowed chairs
were given in honor of 65ers Robert W. Harrison and
Roger B. Traynor. The video tape library center was
given by E. Robert Wallach in honor of William L. Prosser, who had taught Wallach at Boalt. The Thurston
Society, the College'S first honor society, and the David
E. Snodgrass Moot Court Competition commemorate
two 65ers. The College community's appreciation of the
work and the persons of the 65ers over the past three
decades is caught up in such memorials, but the true
measure of Hastings' affection and respect for the 65ers
is apparent in the admiration of its students for vigorous professors a half-century older than they are.
It is amazing to an outsider how easy the relationship is between students and teachers so markedly older
than they. This appears always to have been the case,
judging by the recollections of old alumni who remember the early 65ers and those of the 1960s. In a
society that has made a cult of youth, an aged professor
is generally considered unable to "relate" to "young
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people," a figure to be treated with. indifference,
perhaps his fearsomeness to be feared, but not to be
taken entirely seriously. This has not been the case at
Hastings. Until the last few years there were no regular
and only a few part-time teachers young enough to
match society's image of the kind of teacher likely to be
effective in teaching young people. For some 30 years,
Hastings students have had to get used to men older
than their fathers and even their grandfathers providing them with the bulk of their instruction in the law.
Doubtless, in individual cases this took some getting
used to. Some 65ers were crotchety and short-tempered-but they probably had been when they were
younger. A few continued teaching too long; yet the
overall record is one of men no less intellectually and
physically vigorous than teachers elsewhere half their
ages. The students responded with a special kind of
respect that was compounded as much of love as of
recognition of a fine intellect. When "Mac," for everyone at Hastings called Oliver Le Roy McCaskill that,
reached his 75th birthday in December 1952, student
after student presented him with a shiny red apple. This
affectionate salute to a skillful teacher and kindly man
was the last-and probably the highest-honor that that
much-honored professor received, because he died just
a few weeks later. The grand old men of the 65 Club,
the sweet and the irritable, the loquacious and the
taciturn, the bold and the diffident, made an impression
on the minds of their young charges that has proven
indelible and vital long after the professors have gone
and the students themselves have drawn close to 65.
These alumni recall that they had been taught by great
men, known the encouragement and the reproof of
great men, been touched by great men. This remains a
badge of pride, a mark of difference creating a particularly fond memory of times-and of great men-past.
Memories of times past are not memories of times lost
when greatness though aged has been verdant, and
when the verdancy lives on.
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Put in the crudest actuarial terms, the 65ers have
been a remarkably sound investment. To date, only
four appear to have died during the academic term,
thus necessitating emergency rearrangements of
courses. Very few appear to have had to quit in midsemester because of failing health. Perhaps the saddest
case was that of William Britton, one of the "Illinois
Gang," who could not complete the spring semester in
1963 because of failing eyesight. Britton, with incredible
determination, carried on as long as he could, but God
doth not exact day labor light denied. Thirteen of the
Club retired as octogenarians-Brooks Cox, at 86,
claims that record, too. Seventeen ceased teaching between age 75 and 79. A faculty of comparable size composed of men less than 65 can hardly boast a better
record in terms of death or disability during the
academic year.
In 1972, the Board decided that henceforth a professor would retire at the end of the academic year in
which he reached his 78th birthday. If he wishes to continue to teach a course on a semester-by-semester basis,
he may be permitted to do so. The Board's intention
was to reduce the amount of instruction carried by the
65ers to 60 percent of the non-theory practice courses,
which has worked out to be about 40 percent of the
entire curriculum offering. This goal was attained
within a couple of years after the retirement of a
number of 65ers in 1973, and implementation of the
policy since then. There was no general dissatisfaction
with the work of the Club. On the contrary, the members of the 1970s have maintained as high an instructional standard and retained as much vigor as their
predecessors. In part, the move was made because of
increasing difficulty in recruiting as many 65ers as
would be required to staff a first year with upwards of
four sections in anyone course in a school with 1500
students. Certainly, longevity has not decreased, but for
the first time, in the 1970s professors have begun to
retire with at least adequate pensions, and economic
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necessity has had less influence on the decision to continue teaching than it had at the Club's inception and
during its first three decades. Moreover, a balanced
age-pattern in the faculty creates more flexibility in
programming and makes the curriculum less dependent upon part-time, adjunct faculty for suppleness.
The most important consideration in seeking an
age-spread has stemmed from necessary changes in the
curriculum. The staple subjects of the older curriculum
have virtually disappeared in the upper-class program,
and new subjects have been created in a disorderly but
stimulating manner, appearing with a suddenness that is
both disconcerting and reassuring. The changes have
been towards increasing specialization in the second and
third years, reflecting the increasing specialization in
the practice of the law. Specialization also testifies to the
unhappy circumstance of the decreasing ability of the
courts and the profession to deal with the increase in
litigation and the growing mass of case-law produced by
that litigation. The old categories of law have eroded
irreparably. To a large extent those categories were determined by the nineteenth century arrangement still
reflective of the Common Law's ancient forms of action.
Torts was ne'arly all-inclusive of the actions involving
wrongs to persons and property. Contract became in
the nineteenth century a distinctive branch of the law
governing formal relationships principally to a commercial end derived from certain of the old personal
actions at common law. The distinctions between torts
and contracts have steadily become smudged, particularly in terms of remedies. Specialization has further
erased the features of the two branches of the law. Now,
courses in Employment Discrimination, Environmental
Quality Law, Intellectual Property Law-the last incorporating patent, trademark, copyright, trade secrets,
and unfair competition law-and Suing the Government are necessary to provide narrowly focussed treatment of particular aspects of what were once torts and
contracts, but which now are becoming a general law of
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"obligations" which begs categorization by the ghosts
of the ancient forms of action. The new categorization is
that of subject matter, by problem orientation.
Problem-oriented law must find a place in the curriculum: Consumer Protection, Education Policy in the
Law, Land Use Planning, Oil and Gas Law, Aviation
Law, law of Broadcasting and Cable Communications
Systems, Indian Tribes and Treaty Federalism are all
new courses that echo the issues facing our society in the
headlines of the daily paper. Problem-oriented law requires a command of up-to-date social science of the
sort that the Legal Realists argued for in the early 1930s
and which is difficult to acquire, and a technical grasp of
the hard sciences which eludes most law professors. The
"new-style" courses are not readily taught by professors
trained 40 years ago; they are hard enough for bright,
young academics trained yesterday. This consideration
has also influenced the College to create a better agemix in the faculty.
Eminence by age in the full vigor of its youth not
only served the College well, but served it better than
any other manner of faculty staffing could have. Not
only did it provide instant national recognition of the
name, "Hastings," it brought together in a short space
of time men who were in the forefront of the major
changes in legal curriculum that changed the face of law
school education in post World War II America. This
was the long-term impact of the 65ers, and one which
demands special attention. The short-term impact was
no less important for the time. The ex-deans who rallied
to the College'S defense under the captaincy of Snodgrass in the face of attack from the Bar Examiners and
the ABA were the best of the College'S troops. They
exerted an influence that could not be withstood without the walls, and their allegiance was the key to beating
back the attackers. But they were not merely soldiersthe 65ers of the Snodgrass era were few enough in
number and eminent enough in stature to be a kind of
"general staff." With the 65ers, for the first time there
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emerged at Hastings a distinctive body, or even institution, that was something more than the sum of its parts,
a real faculty in the sense of a group of professors having a direct say in the operation of the College. Where
before the dean covered himself with the Directors and
then made a decision determinative in almost every
matter, great or small, that affected the College, after
the advent of Everett Fraser, George Bogert, and
William Green Hale in 1949, Snodgrass could not act
with the same imperious directness as was his wont and
in the College's tradition. Faculty meetings became frequent, and by the end of the 1950s faculty committees
had evolved, providing continuous faculty participation
in running the College. The faculty assumed almost
total responsibility for curriculum and standards, although not for personnel and recruitment. If Snodgrass
was the mightiest of the imperial deans who had begun
with Slack, he was also going to prove to be the last. It
was the 65 Club that brought to Hastings for the first
time a measure of that collegial faculty responsibility,
admittedly falling far short of control, that has become
in this century a feature of higher education in
America. This constituted a kind of greening, bringing the College into the mainstream of educational
institutions-greening, through graying.
The arrival of the 65 Club to primacy and permanence about 1949 coincided with a general wave of reformist sentiment in American legal education. The
country experienced again, as it had in the early 1920s,
the exhilaration of release from wartime restrictions, the
end of foregoing change "for the duration," and the
enhanced sensitivity to the importance of change that
accompanies war, especially great wars of national effort involving the entire citizenry. The yearning for
change was fed by the World-Fit-For-Heroes syndrome
which moved the victors (and particularly the Englishspeaking victors) of both great wars of this century. If
the universalized yearning for change was novel, the
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changes sought were not. The aftermath of war primarily brought conversions to old causes that had struggled
along for a decade or more without noticeable success.
This was as true of law school reform as it was of a great
many other reform movements in society-at-Iarge.
There were many manifestations of the yearning.
One, dealt with at some length in the last chapter, was
California's particular concern that issued in the 1949
special survey board report. California in fact led the
way-the 1949 report was the most comprehensive
study of legal education undertaken in those postwar
years. In 1948, legal educational reform found an organ
in the first issue of the Journal of Legal Education, published by the AALS. Besides longer articles that brought
virtually every aspect of law school activity under critical
review, its section on "Law School Developments" provided a forum for essaying any new idea, good, bad, or
indifferent, from any law professor, mighty, middling,
or measly. The new journal was avidly read, and it
enjoyed a greater influence during the first half-dozen
years of its existence than it has since (though it remains
useful). The monthly American Bar Association Journal
had been in existence since the second decade of the
century. Principally a professional journal, even a
"trade magazine," as its critics outside the profession
called it, the Journal in the late 1940s and early 1950s
provided more space for legal academics than it had
before. Of much less importance, the various law school
reviews by 1950 were catching the note of reform; their
readership was always limited and reformist articles
were less noticed than the solid, scholarly pieces that
gave the reviews currency among jurists and practitioners as well as academics. Still, the law reviews' impact
was significant as a reflection of a more general concern.
A single volume of the Journal of Legal Education,
Vol. 4 (1951-52), will illustrate the ferment. Russell N.
Sullivan of Illinois surveyed the reforms already worked
by the ABA and AALS on legal education and found
that while the progress made was encouraging, "further
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emphasis should be placed in the future on the quality
of legal education and somewhat less emphasis on the
purely quantitative rules" for ABA approval and AALS
membership.11 Edward S. Bade of Minnesota castigated
20 AALS-member law schools for having library holdings sufficient to meet the minimum standard for membership but wholly inadequate to provide a good legal
training. 12 A young professor at Florida, James R.
Richardson, advocated greater emphasis on the moot
court in the curriculum, not only for trial but also appelate experience, and provided a great many sensible
guidelines for a sound moot-court program. 13 Another
article was the report of the AALS's committee on prelegal education. In 1950, the ABA had adopted a new
rule for approved schools, requiring that they only accept students with at least three years of college training. The AALS was less determined about pre-legal
training than the ABA, and the AALS committee was to
determine whether or not the AALS should take a firm
stand on the content of pre-legal education. The report
was an all too typical committee effort. The committee's
policy statement concluded that content could not be
·prescribed by.requiring particular courses in college, but
that "quality of training" for pre-law students should be
education for language comprehension, for "critical
understanding of the human institutions and values
with which the law deals," and for "creative power in
thinking."14 This fell short of what Arthur T. Vanderbilt, chief justice of New Jersey, advocated in his 1944
report to the ABA on pre-legal education,15 and shorter
still of the hopes of those who sought to make the law
more reflective of social and economic realities by requiring thorough grounding in the social sciences for future
lawyers. Perhaps the most significant contribution was
that by a renowned teacher of Contracts, Edwin W. Patterson of Columbia. Weighing the merits and demerits
of the case-method in law teaching, he concluded that
the method remained the best instructional device possible, but that cases had to be supplemented by legisla-
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tion and non-legal materials that set the law in a broader
social and economic context. 16 Finally, a Black professor
at the segregated Texas Southern University School of
Law, Houston, William Beasley Harris, reminded the
profession that there were new members of the law
teaching profession in such state-supported Black
schools, reported a survey of non-Black schools as to
whether they would accept a Black professor (the replies were discouraging in the extreme), and voiced the
hope that all would "join forces and insist that education
be in a way of life that knows no color, race, or creed
that will deny to any man equality before God and
man."17 If these articles are cited as illustration, they
were in fact something more. They pretty well cover the
principal areas of concern for law school reform that
were surging through the academies and at least washing against the profession outside. If any concern was
missing, it was supplied in a speech given by Dean Erwin
N. Griswold of Harvard at the dedication of the Southwestern Legal Center at Dallas, and printed in the ABA
] Durnal for November 1951. 18 Griswold emphasized the
statutory nature of most new fields of law and the necessity to gain a better understanding of social and economic forces at work on the law. He called for law
schools to become centers of research, especially collaborative research, on the model of contemporary
medical schools, for the solution of legal problems
through massive scholarly effort as adequately funded
as scientific research. This was not the first time that
legal social-engineering was advocated; what was unusual was the implicit call, from a Harvard dean, for
government money to do it.
In 1945, the ABA's section on legal education and
admissions to the bar set on foot a project called the
Survey of the Legal Profession. The task was entrusted
to Albert J. Harno, dean at Illinois. Harno consulted a
wide spectrum of academic and practicing lawyers, and
was "advised" by nine learned gentlemen, including
Will Shafroth, who had carried on A.Z. Reed's annual.
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survey of legal education, Shafroth's successor in that
venture and Harno's colleague at Illinois, Russell N. Sullivan, Elliott Cheatham of Columbia, and, incidentally,
two of Snodgrass' "enemies," James E. Brenner of Stanford and Herbert W. Clark. Harno and Cheatham both
joined the 65 Club in the later 1950s; Sullivan came
aboard in 1967. More interestingly, and more unusual,
Harno took the advice of six non-lawyers, a Chicago
businessman, an expert in medical economics, a businessman who had become president of Temple University, a Methodist college president with a business background, an MIT scientist, and the dean of Minnesota's
school of business administration. Harno hoped that the
survey would gain in value to the law schools by its having received both the critical evaluation of non-lawyers
and their substantive contribution on how legal education might serve the wider community. After almost
eight years of part-time research, Harno's report was
published in 1953. Its faults were more apparent than
its strengths. Too much attention was devoted to longpast historical background (Reed's work was better and
more complete) and to the origins of professional involvement in legal education. Only two chapters, about
one-fifth of the entire, relatively short work, were devoted to contemporary education in the law school.
Worse yet, Harno was far too judicious; every proffered
criticism was countered by its reply, and the impression
is left that Harno pot only carried briefs for both parties, but was equally effective in pleading on behalf of
both. If Reed had been Jeremiah, Harno proved to be
Job-he could suffer patiently. Yet Harno's effort is
useful for its descriptive value, and sometimes by close
analysis of the descriptive one can divine where Harno's
heart was. The most striking passage dealt with diversity
in legal education. Remarking that there was heavy emphasis on practice courses, Harno also noted:
There is a marked stress on the broader and more cultural
areas-on a synthesis of the law and a fusion of legal and
non-legal materials. This movement finds expression in var-
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ious ways. One is through changes in the content of
casebooks. The modern casebook, as I have heretofore noted,
bears little resemblance to the casebook of an earlier era. It no
longer is a work made up exclusively of cases. Instead its
content consists of cases interspersed with relevant readings
and text materials from the area of the social sciences. 19

There was nothing galvanic about Harno's observation,
but it was accurate and reflected what had become the
consensus among legal academics as to how law should
be taught, and what law so taught was.
Harno, like most of his contemporaries, was both
too polite and too timorous to make direct reference to
the hottest debate that has ever raged in the halls of
legal academe. In the aftermath of the First World War,
when reformist sentiment had risen considerably, two
men of commanding learning and remarkable intellect questioned the philosophical foundations of the
Langdell/ Ames case method of instruction. One was
Jerome Frank, not an academic, but aNew York lawyer
who in the New Deal became an important figure on the
legal side of FDR's alphabet agencies and finished his
career as a Federal Appeals Court judge. In 1930, he
published a stunning book 20 on the judicial process
which gave wide currency to the already perceived fact
that judicial decisions are not always solely the result of
logical deduction from the law as revealed in cases, but
also in part the result of the mind-set of the judge, conditioned by his emotions as well as his non-legal learning
and his experience. Given such circumstances, law could
not be "pure," and therefore the jurist must among all
his other skills and knowledge command disciplines that
reflect the working of the law and that in turn ought to
affect the direction of the law.
The other formidably intellectual figure was Karl
Nickerson Llewellyn, a professor of Contracts and Sales
at Columbia. Llewellyn came to the law by a circuitous
route that involved a good deal more foreign study than
most American academic lawyers of his generation enjoyed. He took his LL.B. at Yale in 1918, aJ.D. in 1920,
and taught there (with some New York practice) until
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he moved to Columbia in 1925. At Yale, Llewellyn was
mightily influenced by his Contracts professor, Arthur
L. Corbin. Corbin had long been dissatisfied with the
assumption of the Langde11lAmes approach that study
of the "right" cases, or the "good" cases, would yield a
unity of doctrine that revealed a "pure" law. Corbin
argued that all the cases must be studied and that the
study begin with a close analysis of the factual situation
giving rise to the case. Where the Langdellians sawand if they did not see it, they made it-consistency in
doctrine, Corbin found inconsistency. Corbin was prepared to live with the inconsistency, to seek still for general principles of legal doctrine by virtue of similarity of
cases raised by the factual situations of the cases. Llewellyn was not. For him, the law had to be broken down
into as many discrete particles as the factual situations
gave rise to. Like French politics, where there are as
many parties as there are Frenchmen, in the law there
are as many doctrines as there are cases. Such atomization eroded beyond retrieval the unitary doctrinal
theory of Langdellianism. Corbin drew back from the
abyss; Llewellyn dove in. In the process, he became a
center of controversy (from which Corbin stood apart)
and coined an infelicitous label for himself and likeminded academics-Realists-that became one pole in
the contention with the Langdellians, who were the
other. 21
In 1930, the same year that Frank startled the legal
world with his book, Karl Llewellyn published a teaching book on Sales, entitled Cases and Materials on Sales.
The operative word is Materials. The usual principal
cases were heavily supplemented by non-legal, historical, and economic analysis and even data, and to the
principal cases were added digests of an enormous
number of secondary cases. The book has been characterized as "unteachable," but Llewellyn had many other
arrows to loose. 22 A spate of law review articles over the
1930s were directed at the repeal of the Uniform Sales
Act (drafted by Samuel Williston of Harvard) and the
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substitution for it of a uniform code incorporating actual business practices and where practicable giving
them the force of law. The code was precisely the task
Llewellyn himself undertook, under the auspices of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute, in creating
the Uniform Commercial Code. By 1954, when the staff
of bright young academics Llewellyn dragooned into
service on the project had disbanded, an incalculable
number of manhours had been expended in an heroic
and successful effort to provide a thoroughly precise
model code covering sales, commercial paper, letters
of credit, foreign banking, title documents, secured
transactions, and investment securities. Subsequently,
the UCC has been adopted in every United States jurisdiction save Louisiana. The same atomization that
Llewellyn brought to case law in Sales is built into the
UCC. That has not impeded its usefulness-but it has
encouraged a voluminous new case law that might seem
the very antithesis of what a code is supposed to do. 23
The great Coke said, De similibus idem est judicium, In like
cases the judgment is the same;24 the Realists came close
to denying anything is the same, because all facts are
different.
Llewellyn came in for more than his fair share of
obloquy at the time, and not all of it as good natured as
Prosser's doggerel:
Oh my darling U[niform] S[ales] A[ct],
you're completely shot to hell,
And I'll never know my darling any more,
For thanks to Karl Llewellyn,
now no mortal man can tell
What the law is, or will be evermore. 25

The nihilism of some of his followers was laid at Llewellyn's door, but he was too creative and too learned to
tumble into utter negation. He was a man possessed,
one-tracked, never in repose, always quick to except to
any criticism, quick to draw the sword in defense of his
idee fixe of that jealous mistress, Justitia. During one of
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the seemingly interminable debates at the ALI meetings
where the work of Llewellyn (as chief reporter) and his
staff was criticized, amended, and ultimately passed,
Grant Gilmore of Yale reported out a section to Article
6 of the proposed vee dealing with travelers checks.
A lawyer present, who represented",: a firm issuing
travelers checks, made the tactical error of suggesting
the search for a principle in the matter of liability for a
forged check. Llewellyn rose as if Justitia was about to
be ravished, and replied to the lawyer:
You see, I don't like to argue principle at any time, Mr.
Johnson, in a Commercial Code. We heard the results of that,
if you were here, and I fully sympathize with the results that
you are reaching for.
Now, the line along which I should be talking if I were
arguing principle-which I am not-would be that it is extremely bad for either an economic or academic community
to have the choice of when people get their rights and when
they don't get their rights, left in the uncontrolled discretion
of the person who is about to give them their rights. And that
is what I am not going to urge. 26

Here were all the terrible old demons of Langdellianism
about to rush back in again in an unguarded moment:
purist (if not "pure") principle in doctrine allowing full
play to the prejudices of the bench in judicial discretion,
to the destruction of the real economic interests it is the
law's task to serve.
The vee might be considered the Realists' only
victory. Perhaps even that must be denied them, because a great deal of the work done on the vee was by
those who would (and do) deny that they were ever
Realists. Moreover, there are doubts that there were
ever any Realists at all, beyond Karl Llewellyn's selfdescription. Even he came to deny that the Realists were
a jurisprudential "school." The Realist vs. Langdellian
controversy was tiresome; it was also very intense and
consequently relatively shortlived. By the end of the
1930s, everything to be said for either side had been,
many times over. In fact, Langdellianism was already a
dying, possibly dead horse, not least in its old stable,
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Langdell Hall. Of course, it is nearly impossible to stop
floggers of dead horses when passions run high. What
killed Langdellianism was the realization that there are
no "right" cases, just many cases, from each of which
one can derive comfort-new law, confirmation of old
law, or simply more of the same law. Nothing quite fails
like an idea that succeeds because almost everyone accepts its functional usefulness while denying its moral
worth. By the end of the 1930s, of a decade of great
depression, of social unrest, and of massive governmental activity directed at doing something about
both economic feebleness and social reaction to it, there
were few left who could accept the high-flying purity
of doctrine that had been the very substance-and
power-of Langdellianism. Rather like the Victorian
minister who told the Commons that "we are all
socialists now," there were few American academic
lawyers who might not have admitted in candor that by
1940 they were all Realists. The extra-legal dimension
of legal education, no matter how imperfectly practiced,
how insufficiently learned, could not be banished from
the law school.
There were, though, pockets of nonacceptancenot pockets of resistance, because that connotes more
active hostility than was the case. The pockets of nonacceptance existed where the instruction in the law school
was carried on principally by active practitioners who
remained tightly bound to the law as they had learned it
and wedded to the books from which they had learned
it. Even as they had in their practice learned to deal with
the new dimension (professional survival required no
less), they had not in their teaching been able to shake
off the limitations of the old ways. Until about 1950,
Hastings was largely such a pocket of nonacceptance.
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the teaching of
one of the most lively academic lawyers at Hastings,
David Ellington Snodgrass. Snodgrass taught Contracts,
the very subject which was central to the Realist vs.
Langdellian controversy.
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Recent scholarship has established beyond serious
question how shallow were the historical roots of
classical American contract law and how much Langdellian doctrinalism fashioned that branch of the law. 27
The first Langdellian casebook was published in 1871:
Christopher Columbus Langdell's Selection of Cases on the
Law of Contracts. It was exactly what the title indicates, a
"selection" of cases, of the "right" cases. Langdell was
used by Pomeroy and Slack (Slack's own copy of the
second edition, 1879, is in Boalt). The preface contained Langdell's famous assertion that "Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines." There were three chapters on mutual consent
(the shortest), consideration (the next longest), and
conditional contracts (the longest). The heart of the
work-and the heart of the Langdellian construct of
contracts-was the chapter on consideration. English
cases predominate; that fitted Langdell's assumption
that "Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present
state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth,
extending in many cases through centuries." It also testified less to the continuity of English common law in
the United States than to how slight the real body of
contract doctrine was; Langdell managed to create in a
few years at Harvard what the English and American
courts had not managed in the two and one-half centuries since Slade's Case! Two of Langdell's disciples also
produced books for Contracts courses. William A.
Keener, the Langdellian apostle to Columbia, published
in 1891 a text containing selections from two English
texts on Contracts supplemented by about half as many
leading cases as Langdell's book contained. 28 In 1894,
Samuel Williston, a young disciple at Harvard, published a casebook on Contracts by the same title as
Langdell's, which was indeed seen by Williston as a continuation of Langdell's work. 29 There were a great
many more cases (and more American cases, especially),
and the arrangement was very close to that of Keener's
text. The doctrine that loomed largest was, of course,
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consideration. By 1894, there was no longer any doubt
that consideration was the central stuff of contract law:
not only had Langdell said so, but the courts had dutifully followed suit.
Williston was the prime target of Arthur L. Corbin's revisionism. There was nothing personal in it; they
remained fast friends throughout their long lives. But
to Corbin, Williston's treatment of consideration was the
epitome of doctrinal blindness:
In the courts, the doctrine of consideration has gone its accustomed course. This course has involved an assumption that
the term consideration has a simple and uniformly applied
definition, that such a consideration is indispensable to the
enforcement of any informal promise, and that the court's
only function is one of deductive reasoning. The assumption
has always been false; ... 30

In 1921, Corbin published his own Cases on the Law of
Contracts, based on both English and American decisions, but with "extensive critical notes" (as the subtitle
put it). The doctrine of consideration was cut down considerably, to a fraction of the attention devoted to it by
Williston. Such drastic surgery was possible because the
courts already, under the pressures of changed economic circumstances, were applying other criteria to the
validity of a contractual relationship than consideration.
It was also possible because anti-Langdellians could play
the Langdellian game, and by including all the cases
find "better" cases to substitute for the Langdellians'
"good" cases.
From the beginning of his teaching career at Hastings (at least) until 1950, Snodgrass used Williston's
casebook. There were good, sentimental reasons why.
Snodgrass admired Williston almost as much as he admired Roscoe Pound. In practice for Tidewater Associated Oil Co. in the early 1930s, Snodgrass found that
Williston and the courts appeared to see eye-to-eye. By
the later 1930s, that had certainly begun to change. Indeed, in 1942, Judge C. Goodell, in teaching Contracts
(Snodgrass did not teach the course that year) used the
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first edition of Harold Shepherd's Cases and Materials on
the Law of Contracts (1939). This was much influenced by
the Realist position, evident in the inclusion of non-case
materials and in attention given to such a remedial
novelty as specific performance. Goodell gives point to
the observation that the bench is usually in advance of
the academy in accepting legal change. The same
proved true in the case of at least one practitioner:
part-time professor Brooks Cox, in teaching a second
section of Contracts during the GI years, used Patterson
and Goble, a casebook by Edwin W. Patterson of Columbia and George Goble of Illinois (a 65er from 1956),
which was even more advanced than Shepherd in
featuring non-case materials. 31 In 1950, Snodgrass
switched to Corbin. He stuck with it, apparently not
without reservations, for another year, and then went
back to Williston's fifth edition (1949). Williston had
changed none at all. Though consideration had shrunk,
there was still a marked devotion to other increasingly
obsolete contract doctrines, and nothing on specific performance. The next year, 1953, Snodgrass returned to
Corbin, and having made a final break with Langdellianism, went the rest of the way in 1954 with the adoption of the third edition of Shepherd. 32 He continued to
use Corbin occasionally, but in any event, he never
backslid to Williston. David Ellington Snodgrass had
taken the road to Damascus, and so he fought the good
fight, kept the (new) faith, arid finished the course.
It is impossible to say whether the conversion of
Snodgrass would not have taken place but for the presence of the new old men of the 65 Club at Hastings.
N one of the 65ers can be tagged as Realists in the sense
that they were disciples of Llewellyn and Frank. All of
them, however, demonstrated the increased consciousness of the relevance and importance of non-doctrinal
elements in the law that was current post World War II.
They taught the old, classical courses of the curriculum
in a non-classical way, with increasingly non-classical
content.
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The 65ers were also ready and able to introduce at
upper-class level new courses concentrating on more
specialized aspects of the law taught in existing upperclass courses (still heavily directed at the bar examination) or courses on subjects not hitherto given at Hastings. It took a long time to get these talents fully used.
In 1959, an ABA visiting committee found that the
"curriculum is satisfactory, but lacks imagination and is
too restrictive with respect to its elective program."33
This was just criticism. Snodgrass could not shake his
fixation with the bar examination results, and he was
unwilling to give much rein to innovation, though by
then he had a faculty capable of creating anew. Some
small, halting expansion came in the later 1960s, with a
marked increase in the number of third-year electives;
Dean Sammis did not share Snodgrass' fears. However,
65ers continued to be hired for their primary subject,
relevant to the bar examination. With the 1970s and
commitment to curriculum change, to broadening the
upper-class program, and to abolishing the obsolete and
meaningless distinction between second and third year
courses, the 65ers were given their chance. All of them
were versatile scholars, and a number of them were
widely published in fields not represented on the bar
examination. Their skills were utilized to bring into the
curriculum Jurisprudence, International Law, Comparative Law, and a number of other subjects of which
Hastings had been too long innocent. 34
The curriculum reforms worked by the members
of the 65 Club during their primacy were solidly founded
on their scholarship. Not only had they passed careers
in the classrooms of major law schools, but they had also
written the texts and casebooks used at a great many
other law schools. Only a half-dozen of the 76 were not
leading, published scholars in their respective fields of
academic law. Four of them have published texts or
casebooks in Torts; three have been authorities on Contracts, and two have done casebooks in the subject. Eight
have published extensively in Crimes and Criminal Pro-
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cedure, among them two authors of texts and casebooks, two of texts, and two of casebooks. Civil Procedure in one or another of its myriad forms claims nine
authors. Property has been represented by eight authors, for a total of six casebooks and three texts. To
turn to what are now upper-class courses, four Domestic
Relations professors in the Club have published three
casebooks and two texts. Constitutional Law has been
the field of scholarly work of seven 65ers, who produced three casebooks, a book of readings, a text, and a
number of monographs. Trusts occupied the major attention of four men, who published six casebooks and
three texts; two of the same four have written on Future
Interests and Estates in two case books and two texts.
Probate constitutes two texts. Three 65ers produced six
casebooks on mortgages and related fields (some with a
local jurisdictional emphasis of the sort much favored
by the Realists), and two texts. Sales, Negotiable Paper
and Banking and Bills and Notes, Business Law and
Corporations, Partnerships, Agency, Bankruptcy, and
Labor Law have been represented by three to five scholars in each field, who produced texts and casebooks in
profusion. Creditors' Rights and Remedies, Damages,
Restitution, Federal Antitrust, Tax Law, Regulation of
Public Utilities, Insurance, Patent Law, Press Law,
Legislation, and Land Registration and Titles have all
produced scholarly work including a number of texts
and a few casebooks by one or two men in each. Conflicts and Comparative Law have each had three scholars publishing a wide range of scholarly and teaching
books. International Law and Jurisprudence have been
graced by some of the College'S most eminent scholars,
who have also not neglected teaching materials. This
soulless library catalog deserves to be fleshed out by a
more critical appreciation of their contributions than
can be undertaken here. Yet, put briefly, everyone of
these authors has made a major contribution to knowledge and the dissemination of knowledge of the law,
and it has been up-to-date in its time. As the 65ers con-
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stitute half a millennium of teaching service to the College, so their scholarly publications would come close
to being enough to stock a major teaching library for
the law.
Only a much fuller treatment could do justice to the
men, their scholarship, or their important contributions
to Restatement,35 model codes, legislative drafting, service on commissions, advisory work to government,
practice, government service, and on the bench. In the
history of Hastings College of the Law, however, it will
be remembered most about the 65ers that they were
teachers. To their honor, perhaps even their glory, the
distinction of their teaching rested heavily on their distinction as scholars. With the 65 Club, Hastings moved
forward from being merely a law school-and a good
one-to being a distinguished law school staffed by a
distinguished, scholarly faculty. This was the seed of
greatness, which planted, flourished. The 65ers have set
the standard for the younger teachers who are now increasingly taking up their elders' burden. In institutions, nothing of greatness is lost unless the best is not
followed by the best. It is not to discourage the new
generation of younger faculty to remind them how high
they must aim.

ii

X Beginning's
End

THE DEATH
OF David Ellington
Snodgrass was the end of an era. It was not, though, the
beginning of another. The man who succeeded Dean
Snodgrass, Arthur Maxwell Sammis, was never able to
emerge from the shadow of his predecessor. This had
less to do with any weakness in Sammis than with the incredibly enduring strength of Snodgrass' image. Arthur
Sammis had lived and functioned too long in Snodgrass'
shadow to be able, in the seven years of his administration as dean of Hastings, to be accepted as his own man
on his own terms. That was a pity, because Sammis possessed strengths that Snodgrass lacked, and in raw administrative ability he was certainly Snodgrass' equal
and possibly his superior. What he lacked was Snodgrass' activism, boldness, protean personality, combativeness, and penchant for self-advertisement. Sammis
was an unpretentious man, an academic with a genuine
scholarly bent, not abrasive in human relationships, a
just man and a seeker of concord. He was not timorous
or vapid. Highly principled, he was fearless in saying
and doing what was right. Sammis when angry-which
was much less often than was the case with Snodgrasscould be formidable. He enjoyed socializing less than
did Snodgrass, but he was just as convivial with friends.
Remarkably, in terms of originality and creativity,
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Sammis was on a par with Snodgrass; unlike Snodgrass,
and in part because of him, Sammis had little opportunity to demonstrate his inventiveness.
Differences of personality aside, there were similarities in the backgrounds and interests of Sammis and
Snodgrass that contributed to their closeness. Both
came from the San Joaquin Valley and both were sons
of farmers who subsequently left the soil for business.
Sammis' father began as an olive grower in Wallace,
Calaveras County, and then became general manager of
a growers' cooperative which he helped establish. Sammis and Snodgrass shared a distaste for big government, big business, and big labor characteristic of the
Valley's middle-folks. Republican politics accompanied
the distaste, though Sammis was less conservative than
Snodgrass. Both went to college in California, and
neither felt inclined to affect any Eastern sophistication.
Sammis also had served as an officer in the Navy (which
pleased Snodgrass greatly). Finally, Sammis' interest in
California community property law-in which he coedited the leading casebook1-and in future interests,
corresponded with Snodgrass' practical bent and impatience with legal esoterica.
Young Arthur Sammis took some time to find himself. After graduating from high school in 1928, he
worked for a year in Wallace before going to the College
of the Pacific at Stockton. He switched to Modesto
Junior College for his sophomore year, and to Berkeley
for his junior year. He majored in chemistry, figuring
that would be most useful for him in following in his
father's footsteps in cannery management. His junior
year at Berkeley was a disaster; he flunked out. He went
to work. For four years, he worked in his father's
cooperative, a Stockton cannery, and as a machinist in
Alaskan packing plants during summers. He was adept
with his hands, and long after he settled down to the law
and legal education, he spent as many hours in his home
workshop as he could find time for. In 1936, Sammis
decided that while Wallace was a nice place to live in
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(especially if the hot Valley summer was avoided by
working in Bristol Bay, Alaska), there was a great deal
more to life than running a packing house. In April, he
had married Eugenia Rutherford, whose father was district attorney in Napa and whose two brothers were in
practice there. Eugenia urged him to try law. In August,
he enrolled at Hastings College of the Law, which found
his sparse academic credentials quite good enough.
Bristol Bay Packing Company's lathe claimed him the
next two summers, but during the remainder of each
year he toiled away under the eagle eye of Dean Simmons and his faculty. And he succeeded, magnificently,
attaining second place in the Class of '39. Of all his
teachers, Snodgrass was the one who fired him most,
and whom he most admired. His first job on leaving was
as a trust officer with the Bank of America. He then
served a year as secretary of the Bar Examiners (he had
been a reader before), an experience that stood him,
Snodgrass, and the College in good stead when the
great row of the late '40s erupted. After a year as an
attorney with the War Labor Board, he joined a City law
firm in 1944, at the same time joining Hastings' faculty
as a part-time instructor. In July 1947, in the midst of
the GI bulge, Snodgrass decided that Sammis was the
man to second him in the administrative headache of
the day, and he was appointed Registrar and Professor.
Sammis gave up practice with his firm, in which he had
become a junior partner. The remainder of his career
and his life was devoted to Hastings with total commitment. He did keep his hand in the olive business, and
summered when he could at the old place in Wallace. In
later years, because of the oppressive summer heat, he
had to forego even that pleasure. Arthur Sammis remained a countryman at heart.
Sammis' formal duties as Registrar were to maintain
student records and, on delegation of the Board of Directors, to manage the College's finances and deal with
its business. In fact, throughout the GI years, the
routine administration of the College fell to Sammis,
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acting singlehandedly. There was no established division of labor between Dean Snodgrass and Registrar
Sammis-Sammis did everything that Snodgrass didn't
want to do, saw everybody that Snodgrass didn't want to
see, and went everywhere that Snodgrass didn't want to
go. With little significant change, this pattern continued
until Sammis became dean in 1963. When Edward A.
Hogan, Jr., left the USF deanship to become vice-dean
at Hastings in February 1951 (at the same salary as
Sammis'), he took on either entirely new duties, such as
directing the revived moot court program and administering the new placement service, or the activities which
Snodgrass had not hitherto delegated to anyone, especially curriculum planning. Sammis did everything he
had done before, but now had to work in partnership
with another. He even lost status-Vice-Dean Hogan's
name preceded his in the catalogue, coming right after
Snodgrass'. In 1953, Sammis was appointed "associate
dean" as well as registrar; his position in the pecking
order didn't change, and the new designation even appeared to confirm his inferiority. Sammis remarked
ruefully, but without a hint of bitterness, in a letter to a
friend, that though a raise had come with the new rank
he would have received the raise anyway, and that the
new title was "merely recognition of the fact that all of
the duties that cannot be properly performed by an
Assistant Janitor fall within my jurisdiction. The only
thing now that has been added is the title!"2 That was a
pretty astute job description of Sammis' duties from
1947 to 1963. Anyone less self-effacing than Arthur
Sammis, having to work with anyone less kindly and
sensitive than Edward Hogan, would have created an
impossible situation. In fact, the two men were dear
friends, and when Hogan died suddenly, aged 49, just
as the new academic year began in 1957, no one grieved
more than Sammis. And everything that Hogan had
done as vice-dean fell to Sammis to do; he carried on
alone because no successor to Hogan was ever appointed by Snodgrass.
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Snodgrass' apparent thoughtlessness, even cruelty,
should not be misunderstood. Sammis stood very high
in his affections. No one was ever closer to Snodgrass.
Even during Hogan's tenure, it was Sammis whom
Snodgrass principally relied upon to hold the fort while
he was out fighting, sometimes to carry the first sally
against the foe if that seemed tactically sound. Snodgrass travelled a great deal. While away, he and Sammis
kept in almost daily contact by mail (the telephone was
too expensive usually for the two countryboys' thriftiness). Whether Snodgrass was back East corralling
65ers, rattling the ALI by his always active presence,
gracing the smoke-filled suites of other deans at AALS
meetings, or just relaxing at the Bohemian Grove,
Sammis gave him a blow-by-blow description of what
was happening at the College and in the City. An order
from the general in Boston, New York, or Philadelphia
was immediately carried out by his lieutenant in San
Francisco. Never did Sammis take advantage either of
his intimacy with Snodgrass or of his large area of responsibility to do anything that would derogate from
Snodgrass' authority. In return, Snodgrass kept no secrets from Sammis and leaned heavily on his affection
and loyalty in running the College. Finally, in 1960, a
decent token of recognition came to Sammis. He was
appointed the first Robert W. Harrison Professor, the
chair established in his honor by old students and
friends of that devotedly selfless member of the faculty.
The tragic death of Snodgrass on the operating
table shook Sammis. Doubly. He lost a close friend and
he had to take on the whole burden of the College as the
academic year began. Sammis himself had just returned
to work shortly before becoming acting dean onJuly 12,
1963, two days after Snodgrass' death. In early May,
Sammis had suffered six sharp heart attacks that had
almost killed him. It is touching to read Snodgrass' last
letters, full of unalloyed concern for Sammis, and then
to read Sammis' letters shortly after Snodgrass' death,
describing how Snodgrass had "been going on nerve
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alone for the past two or three years"3 with heartvalves
ruined by aortic stenosis. Sammis knew that he himself
was a marked man-marked by the black daub of
mortality-from the first day of his deanship. It gave
him pause, but it did not stop him.
Snodgrass' "testament politique" was that Sammis
succeed him. Indeed, there were rumors afloat shortly
before Snodgrass died that he was going to retire and
that Prosser, who had given up the Boalt deanship two
years before and was about to retire as professor, would
take his place. Snodgrass quashed the rumors by blunt
denials, pointing out that if he quit, his successor would
be Sammis. The Directors knew Sammis-as Registrar,
he had attended virtually every Board meeting since
1947. The faculty, both 65ers and part-time teachers,
had respect for Sammis and confidence in him. The
Board took the unusual step of polling the entire faculty
as to their recommendations for the new regular dean.
The faculty were unanimous in favoring Sammis.4 In
October 1963 Sammis was confirmed in the deanship.
He was delighted, took great pleasure in the congratulations that flowed in upon him, but replied to them by
saying that he did not think he could fill Snodgrass'
shoes. Invariably he went on to point out, however, that
he had shoes of his own, and he would do his best. Some
even urged him to wear Snodgrass' famous eyeshade,
but Sammis demurred; he would find some distinctive
mark of his own in due course, said he. He never did. It
probably would not have helped much to bring him out
of the shadow of his enduring predecessor. Anyway, he
was not unworthy of his predecessor, and in the seven
years given him to direct the fortunes of the College, he
made a number of valuable and important changes. If
most of them were variations on a theme by Snodgrass,
they were nonetheless substantial.
It took Sammis a year just to return the College to
normal operation. He began it without even an assistant
(his assistant registrar had left in March, and Sammis'
heart attacks in May stemmed in part from having

382

Beginning's End

undertaken literally the work of three men). It was not
until the beginning of academic 1964-65 that Richard
Amandes, '53, was taken on as assistant dean, and Marvin J. Anderson from California Western was appointed
Registrar. Enrollments went up in 1963, continuing the
climb of some years past. Five new 65ers joined the
faculty in August 1963, including Prosser, all of whom
imposed the additional burden on Sammis of engaging
them in the College'S routine. All this Sammis handled
alone, oppressed by the expectation of so many that he
would continue as Snodgrass had begun, woefully unsure of himself, and not yet restored to even moderate
good health.
The first major development undertaken by Sammis came in the spring of his first year at the helm. Since
1961, the College had given serious consideration to
establishing a full-fledged legal clinic program. In 1960,
] ohn Bradway had joined the 65 Club after almost three
decades at Duke. Bradway was still the missionary of
legal clinical instruction, and within two years of coming
to Hastings he managed to create a third-year course in
the subject, which he taught in a class limited to 20
students admitted on the basis of their cumulative average. The emphasis in the course was on first-hand experience in interviewing clients, gathering facts, and preparing cases for trial and ultimate disposition. Director
] ohn Pigott was particularly interested in expanding the
program. Sammis, more than Snodgrass, favored the
program, and in early 1964 final plans were laid for 40
students to work in the offices of the San Francisco
Legal Aid Society, and in the district attorney's and the
public defender's offices. Bradway was put in charge,
and the chief counsel to the Legal Aid Society, Thomas
Rothwell, was appointed to the adjunct faculty to direct
the afternoon office work of the students. From this
humble beginning developed the clinical and externship programs which today offer ten courses in the
practical application of the law learned in the classroom:
in clinics in civil justice, criminal justice, discrimination,
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labor law, legal health, and trial practice, and in externships in trial court and public office and in public interest practice. Hundreds of upper-class students now avail
themselves of the opportunity offered by one of the
largest and best clinical law curricula in the country.
Thomas Rothwell is presently the full-time director of
the programs, a worthy successor in Bradway'S apostolate. Bradway himself left in 1965 to carry the word to
California Western, somewhat disappointed that Sammis would not accept his grander scheme of making the
clinical project into an LL.M. graduate program. 5
Most of the rest of Sammis' curriculum changes
were less spectacular and not so fundamental. It fell to
his successor to recast the upper-class curriculum. However, early in Sammis' tenure some important changes
were made in Property, the second-year Property II
giving way to a more sophisticated course in Trusts and
Estates. Shortly after this change, the second-year Legal
Research and Writing course was moved to the second
semester of the first year where it would do more good,
and where it remains. First-year Agency was expanded
to include Partnership, and finally Agency and Partnership was moved to the second year. By the end of Sammis' deanship, the present first-year offering had come
into being: Civil Procedure, Contracts, Criminal Law
(with some procedure), Property (emphasis on realty),
Torts, and Legal Writing and Research. The first-year
course on Introduction to the Study of Law, an overview of the function of law in society with some jurisprudence and legal history, taught by Richard V. Carpenter, a 65er, flourished only briefly under Sammis. Its
disappearance leaves the curriculum poorer, but the
sudden rise and equally sudden fall of the course
merely corresponded to a general phenomenon in
American law schools in the 1960s.
All of Sammis' curriculum changes were made by
faculty action upon proposal by a faculty curriculum
committee. This procedure was a legacy from Snodgrass' last years, and reflected the prominence of the 65
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Club. What Snodgrass had not allowed to be delegated
to the faculty was faculty appointments; in that vital
realm his imperium was undiminished. Sammis did not
take quite so high a view of dec anal prerogative. He
recognized that the eminent and experienced academics
comprising the 65 Club could give invaluable advice in
selecting new members of the faculty. They had been
involved in the selection process where they had taught
before, whether they had been deans or not. None of
the major law schools after 1940 hired faculty without
some procedure for faculty review, and in most such
procedures had been in existence from the 1920s. Hastings, because of its previous reliance on part-time faculty
and by virtue of its tradition of deanship, had lagged
behind the norm in this. Sammis brought it up to date.
It was he who insisted that the Directors poll the fulltime faculty for their advice on who should be the new
,permanent dean after Snodgrass; his courage was
,matched only by his confidence. Sammis also required
that the full-time faculty act as a whole in confirming his
appointment. Henceforth, he applied the same procedure to the selection of new faculty. A faculty appointments committee was established, and its recommendations, while subject to the dean's veto, would go
forward for faculty confirmation before presentation to
the Board. The role of the dean in appointments was
not (and is not now) negligible and could be determinative, but the old way was banished forever by Sammis.
With the new age-mix rules of the 1970s, faculty involvement in appointments has become even more critical. The 65ers had a proven track record, had met the
most searching review procedures of the best law
schools, and after appointment at Hastings did not receive tenure. A mistake was hard to make under such
circumstances and easy to correct if made. With the hiring of younger faculty who have not yet proved themselves and who, under the revised rules for tenure
adopted by Hastings in the 1970s, will become perma,nent for a long career at the College, faculty review for
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appointment and for tenure is essential to safeguard the
College's interests in obtaining and keeping only the
best.
From a student's vantage point, educational institutions and prisons seem to have something in common. A
professor's perception is different, of course, if for no
other reason than that he's a "guard." There is something in the notion, because educational institutions,
like prisons, are almost invariably overcrowded shortly
after they are built. Snodgrass' pride and joy, 198 McAllister, was no exception. The new building had been
planned to accommodate 550 students comfortably, up
to 1,000 in a pinch uncomfortably, for a short period. In
fall 1963, Hastings' enrollment stood at 989; it had not
been as low as 550 since 1958. Since the new building
was occupied in 1953, enrollment had increased an average of 11 percent annually, and in 1962 it had jumped
21 percent and in 1963, 15 percent. As early as 1960,
Snodgrass had cast covetous eyes around the neighborhood in search of space. The old Iris Hotel, adjacent to
the College on its north side along Hyde Street, was the
best site, since it would allow for the addition of a new
wing contiguous to the school. Exploratory negotiations
with the owners were delicate. State appropriation for
purchase, razing, and planning and constructing a new
wing had to go through the Regents, an exercise requiring careful handling. By the time Sammis took office it
was clear that the College should go ahead. The increasing student enrollments were requiring additional sections in courses for all three years, and space was at a
premium. The faculty, which was expanding rapidly,
was increasingly ill-housed-offices were no longer
"tasteful and cozy," or if they were cozy it was because of
doubling up. It took Sammis two years to get the proposal beyond the mere planning stage with the University
and the state. The possibility of securing federal money
required further negotiations. Land acquisition waited
upon a bond issue for the University. For four years,
from 1965 until the handsome new wing was dedicated
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two days after Christmas 1969, Dean Sammis and Registrar Marvin J. Anderson were almost continuously occupied with the project. It all went too slowly. In 1967,
some relief of overcrowding had been secured by leasing the old Bancroft-Whitney building on Hyde Street,
currently state property, but the College had to secure
legislation to prevent San Francisco State College from
getting it for a downtown center. 6 All this provided additional headaches.
The new wing was deservedly a cause for jubilation.
The architects, successors to Masten and Hurd who had
built 198 McAllister, executed a thoroughly contemporary building with an extraordinarily dramatic visual
impact. The new faculty offices had prominent bay
windows, which gave a somewhat castellated appearance to the structure-but that was, after all, in keeping
with the architectural tradition of the university and
appropriate to Hastings' continuing struggle for autonomy and adequate housing. On five floors, twelve
more offices were made available, three classrooms of
about 100 seats each permitted four sections of firstand second-year courses and three for the third year,
and a splendid moot court room housed what had become a prominent feature of the College'S program. A
magnificent two-story library reading room, seminar
rooms, typing room, conference room, offices for the
Law Journal, and ample space for lounges, dining
facilities, and lockers completed the whole. As the dedication brochure noted with guarded triumph, "Overcrowding, so familiar to many of the 4,000 alumni, will
be eliminated-pro tern." Though the new addition
made it possible to do justice to the 1,200 students of
1969, the "pro tern" has already run out. Today, with
1,500 students, an expanded program, and higher expectations in legal education, the time has come to build
agam.
Tragically, for Arthur Sammis "pro tern" was all too
short. He had less than a year to enjoy the new building,
the attainment of which had required so much of his

Beginning's End

387

.effort. His labors, on borrowed time for seven years,
had taken a heavy toll. A few days before his 59th birthday in September 1970, he announced that he would
retire as dean on February 1, 1971. On October 29,
1970, he died. His epitaph should be a line from an
unsigned letter from a student, 20 years before, who
had taken Future Interests from him: "The '65-Club' at
school sets a very high standard for legal teaching, but
you certainly measure up to that standard."7 He was a
fine teacher and a devoted administrator.
Nothing beset Sammis more during his administration than students-not in fine, but in gross. There were
a great many of them, and more and more year-by-year,
and they were an unusually yeasty and demanding lot.
Sammis was probably better equipped by experience to
deal with them than almost anybody else who might
have been dean: He had begun his teaching and administrative career facing the GI bulge, and he had a very
well-defined idea of what legal education was and what
it was supposed to do. In coping with numbers of students and also their "non-negotiable demands" (always
itemized), his idea of legal education, which was consonant with the College'S traditional function, was an
asset.
One early change worked by Sammis was a gradual
phasing out of the old practice of taking as many who
came and relying on high grading standards to winnow
out the weak by the end of the first year. This was not an
abrupt action, butwas based on a strong, early intention
of the new dean. He did not like the waste of effort and
the harshness of the old way. Two developments gave
him the means to effect a new admissions policy. One
was the increasing number of applications. The other
was an already higher basic admission requirement inherited from Snodgrass. Since 1955-56, a B.A. or its
equivalent had been required of all entrants. This
brought Hastings into conformity with the highest prevailing standard in American law schools. And from
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1961-62, applicants were required to take the Law
School Admission Test, administered by the Educational Testing Service of Princeton, New Jersey. The
LSAT measures aptitude for law school study by an
objective-style of test for which it is almost impossible to
prepare with much hope of significantly improving
. one's score. Its virtue is that it is as statistically uniform
a test as can be devised. It is used nationwide, and over
the years a sufficient body of test results has been built
up to allow its use to predict the likelihood of success in
law school. Its vices are two, one intrinsic and the other
extrinsic. It is predicated, as are most "IQ" tests, on a
cultural norm that seriously disadvantages culturally
deprived persons; and cultural deprivation is in large
part the result of economic deprivation. It is also seductive, in the sense that its quantitative score seems more
solid than qualitative criteria, such as college grades and
letters of recommendation. Despite these vices, law
schools have relied increasingly on the LSA T score as a
major, if not the principal assessment of a student for
admission. Until the end of the 1960s, neither vice was
much apparent. The B.A. requirement excluded a
number of potential students who before would have
sought and been accorded admission (Arthur Sammis
was a case in point). Arguably, an applicant with a college degree was a better risk than one without. The
LSA T was not employed with the rigor that has been
used latterly, but it did enable the College to identify
and exclude those who, according to scores and grades,
were least likely to succeed. In 1963, for example, the
bottom 30 percent of the applicants were excluded by
combining LSAT scores and grades over four years of
college. s
By 1963, some steps had to be taken to reduce the
number of entrants. The number of applicants was far
outrunning the capacity of the facilities. This has continued to be true to the present. Graph 5 depicts the fall
enrollments from 1954 to 1977. The falling-off from
1965 to 1968 was caused by an act of policy, to get en-
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rollments down to 1000 after the high of 1088 students
in 1964-65. Only with the completion of the new wing in
1969 were enrollments unleashed again, to spring up 13
percent over the figure for 1968. In 1971-72, the maximum-not optimum-figure for existing facilities was
reached: 1500. That size of student body has been
maintained since.
Over the 1960s and into the 1970s, three developments conspired to build up such an enormous demand for legal education. One was the "war baby" boom
that stretched all educational facilities in the country;
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another was largescale immigration into California. The
baby boom is over and immigration is slacking off. The
third development, which is not abating, is the positive
and purposeful commitment of a great many people,
not (}ll of them young, to acquire a legal education.
The law has always been an avenue to a wellrewarded profession and to political office. This is no
less true today than it was yesterday. However, if the
demand for politicians seems to remain fairly modest,
the demand for lawyers in private practice and in public
service has been increasing exponentially. Contributing
to the demand is a marked rise in litigation. "Public
interest law" has created a new class of litigants by increasing general awareness of legal rights and affirming
the social value of asserting those rights. Also contributing to the demand is activist government, state and federal, but especially the latter, attempting wholesale
changes by legislation in the body politic, economic, social, and cultural. Bureaucracy and its regulations have
grown apace, demanding lawyers in government service
and lawyers for those dealing with government. The
frightening rise in crime has done its bit, adding to the
demand for lawyers to prosecute and to defend. It is
impossible today for any corporate entity to make a
move without taking legal advice; it is becoming increasingly difficult for the individual-especially if he is rich
or poor-not to seek legal assistance at some time. Our
society is one in which virtually every relationship either
has been or soon will be defined in legal terms, made
subject to adjudication, and necessitating recourse to
legal advice. Within the law itself, a number of subtle
changes have accelerated the activity of legal institutions
and lawyers. An increasingly fine definition of due process and its application to a broader range of circumstances have complicated the judicial process and increased the incidence of appeals. Too much legislation,
badly drawn in excessive haste, without sufficient attention to its consequences, has demanded judicial interpretation which itself often unsettles the law. The list
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could go on. For something more than a decade, then,
the legal profession has seemed to be an extraordinary
opportunity for the ambitious.
Since the later 1960s, there has been a marked increase in the law's appeal that goes beyond mere pecuniary attractiveness. The law has become a way to
do good while doing well. Again, public interest law is
the key. Idealistic youth believes it can contribute to the
commonweal, to the solution of pressing problems in
our society, by activism in which the law is the instrument for change. This has been a constant refrain in the
American law school for some years. The sincerity of it
is not to be doubted, though its durability remains to be
seen, both generally and specifically. Moreover, what
appears to be a contraction in other vocational opportunities is turning college graduates to the law.
Academic jobs are becoming scarce, and those who
might have gone into teaching in the humanities or social sciences find law school an acceptable alternative.
The natural sciences, pure and applied, are shrinking in
their appeal for a great many reasons, not all of which
are economic. The law recruits from among those who a
generation ago would have become physicists or engineers. To judge by the decreasing population of
seminaries, law schools also are making advocates out
of many who a generation ago would have become
preachers. Because the law school provides the shortest
possible professional education of any major postgraduate institution save business school, it is unusually
attractive in a time of high costs and job uncertainty.
The same consideration enhances the law school's appeal to more mature people desirous of a career
change-in many cases, from the kitchen-in middle
age. Finally, the law school is one of the most accessible
and rewarding educational institutions for aspiring
minorities. In addition to all that it provides in future
pecuniary and social advantages, it also opens the door
to power and to the opportunity to serve the cultural
group.
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The mounting number of students in the 1960s did
not work much change in the geographic origins of the
Hastings student body. From the years of the GI bulge
and over the 1950s, about two-thirds of the students
came from San Francisco and the Bay Area. In the
1960s, this proportion fell to between 45 and 55 percent. Despite higher admissions standards, Hastings
continued to draw heavily from its old metropolitan
constituency. This suggests that the higher standards
for entrants merely caught up with a general increase in
education among young people in the country as a
whole. Significantly, Hastings did take proportionately
more students from southern California than it had
during the previous 30 years. The proportion of outof-state students doubled in the 1960s, to about 15 percent of the total student body; this despite almost annual increases in out-of-state fees (Hastings followed the
University faithfully in this), indicating that the College
remained good value in competition with public institutions in other states and private institutions everywhere.
During the 1970s, the proportion of metropolitan students has declined somewhat, and the proportion of
out-of-state students has increased significantly. One result of the latter phenomenon has been considerable
pressure from Sacramento to cut back on out-of-state
enrollments. The legislature's concern is understandable, but excessive restriction of admission to natives
would fix parochialism on the College and cost the state
the valuable asset of outside talent who come here as
students and remain as professionals.
Sometime in the 1960s, the old Hastings tradition
of the working-student eroded irreparably. In the aftermath of the ABA's attack on Hastings in 1950-51 for
allowing students to undertake a significant amount of
outside work, the faculty and administration became
more sensitive to the issue. The 65ers were full-time
teachers throughout their careers with scant sympathy
for part-time students. The amount of class preparation
required increased and class attendance was enforced.
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Consequently, by 1955 about half the students were not
regularly employed, 30 percent worked up to 20 hours
per week, and 8 percent worked more than 30 hours
per week. In 1959, 70 percent were not regularly employed, 14 percent worked as much as 20 hours per
week, and only 1 percent over 30 hours. In 1964, these
percentages were 78 percent with no regular employment, 13 percent up to 20 hours, and.2 percent over 30
hours. 9 While the College still did not schedule afternoon classes save for multiple sections in first-year
courses, it enforced with as much rigor as it could
Saturday morning classes. Taking attendance was burdensome, and Saturday classes were no less an annoyance to faculty and administrators than they were to
students. Snodgrass favored afternoon classes, but he
could not persuade the Board to go along with him.10
By the end of the 1960s, Saturday classes were under
heavy attack by students-indeed, the era of student
activism at Hastings was ushered in in 1968 by agitation
against Saturday classes. Saturday classes were finally
abolished in 1969 and afternoon classes for all three
years instituted in their place. Today, student employment figures less than ever before, and is negligible. Not
only has a full five-day week contributed to the demise
of outside employment, but the program at Hastings
has continued to become tougher and more timeconsuming. Summer employment is the most that most
students today can consistently afford to undertake.
The disappearance of outside employment has not
proven a barrier to obtaining a Hastings degree. The
prosperity of the 1960s enabled parents to provide support for their children, especially in a law school where
fees were so modest. In 1953, the Board had taken the
decisive step of adding to the meagre scholarship and
loan funds available to Hastings students eight Hastings
College Scholarships named in honor of the Founder,
former deans, and eminent professors. 11 The endowment came from the surplus G I Bill funds. Over the
years these grew to 15 as former Directors and eminent
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.alumni were honored. The scholarships were generous,
and have increased in stipend. They also encouraged
further endowments, providing over a score more
scholarships since. None has been more significant than
the Antenor Patino, Jr. endowment, given by Mrs.
Francesca Turner in memory of her son who died while
a student at Hastings. This has provided both support
for the child care center and major scholarships for
worthy students of great potential in the law. The generous donation of loan funds has also supplied a real
need.
With a student body of 1500, made up increasingly
of economically disadvantaged students, federal money
has become a necessity. Since 1965-66, beginning with
the work-study positions provided under Title 4 of the
Higher Education Act of 1965, federal support for students has played an increasing role. Federally insured
loan funds through banks with deferred repayment
began in 1968, and were followed by the National Direct
Student Loans, which provided for deferred repayment, a low interest rate, and possibility of remission of
interest in return for public service. Loans have proven
the most significant source of .financial assistance at
Hastings during the past decade. In 1969, the College
began to receive Legal Education Opportunity Program
funds to enable economically disadvantaged minority
students to attend Hastings. The College'S concern with
minority entrants began in the aftermath of the murder
of Martin Luther King, J r., in 1968. Faculty, students,
and alumni created a memorial fund in Dr. King's name
to witness the "concern of the College in enlisting students, young men and women from minority groups,
who meet our entrance requirements."12 The Associated Students went further, and in 1968-69 for the first
time made the ASH fee mandatory, with part of it earmarked for aid to minority students. Support for minority students, with both LEOP money and the College'S
own funds, has increased steadily over the years. Indeed, student support as a whole has grown steadily. Of
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late years, approximately half the students at Hastings
have received some direct financial aid. Federal money
(much of it on a matching basis with state funds) remains the foundation of financial assistance. It should
not become the whole structure. Hopefully, the alumni
and friends of Hastings who have given generously in
the past will continue to do so to preserve a degree of
autonomy in student assistance.
That fall day in 1964 in Berkeley when Mario Savio
stood on top of a police car with Jack Weinberg inside it
seemed to many who witnessed it the dawning of a new
age. The hitherto apathetic students of America were
rising to demand the Constitutional right of freespeech. The corollary was "academic freedom," whereby the role of administrators would be to make sure the
bathrooms were supplied with toilet paper-Savio provided that job description at a later demonstration.
Others who witnessed the first great event of the Free
Speech Movement saw it not as a dawning but as the
descent of a dark night of barbarism. It was neither. It
was the opening shot of a turbulent era for American
universities; it was also a shot heard round the world, as
the torn-up paving stones of the Paris Left Bank proved
in May 1968. The Free Speech Movement ushered in a
Biblical seven years of troubles and turmoil, but the
period did not profoundly change the nature, structure,
or function of the university in American society. Those
years, with such notable exceptions as the events at
People's Park in Berkeley, Columbia, and Kent State,
were not so violent as they appeared night after night
on the six o'clock news (the movement learned early to
schedule things so that the TV videotapers could work
in full light and get the tapes to the wire services by 2
pm). Confrontation, not riot or terrorism, was the tactic.
Early success stiffened resistance and diluted support.
Administrators learned how to be firm, flexible, and
facile, with increasing success and an occasional triumph. The Vietnam war extended the life of the
movement beyond its time, but deflected its attack from
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the university towards the government. Ultimately, the
movement fragmented, becoming the ever-diminishing
behemoth of increasingly particular interests. It dissipated rather than died, a victim of satiation of means
rather than satisfaction of ends. All the bangs were over
by 1972, with only a few whimpers to come. It was
rough while it lasted, though, and it mauled academic
administrators as nothing else has in the nation's experIence.
Hastings did not share in the early turmoil of its
common-law partner across the Bay. Its students did
not take part in the Free Speech Movement to any
noticeable degree, but then their Boalt brethren were
not very prominent in FSM either. The first rumblings
of student unrest at Hastings occurred in 1968, and
Saturday classes were the issue. It is hard to say to what
extent the issue masked more deep-seated grievances.
In any event, it was not without significance. Though
Hastings students would become actively involved in the
anti-war movement, the ecology movement, and most
importantly in the movements for minority and women's rights, the focus of student activism at Hastings
remained largely academic matters. The anti-war
movement saw the protestors ranged on Civic Center
Plaza and elsewhere, but not on Hastings' terrace. The
ecology movement concentrated on course development. The steps taken to increase minority admissions
in 1969, though it would be characterized as insignificant by those who demanded more of it five years
later, defused a potentially explosive issue. What ran as
a theme through student activism at Hastings from
1968 to 1972, when it began to evaporate, was the demand for "improved legal education." This was an echo
of the educational reform program that constituted the
Berkeley faculty's misdirected, mistaken, and misleading reaction to FSM. It is at least likely that the large
proportion of Berkeley graduates who were Hastings
students in the late 1960s (21 percent of the students in
1968-69) brought this sentiment for reform with them.
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The Berkeley program was proposed by a special committee of the Academic Senate chaired by English Professor Charles Muscatine, and accepted by the Senate.
The Muscatine Report can be summarized as proposing
intimate faculty-student contact, student participation
.in curriculum planning, boldly conceived new courses
to take the place of tired old courses, "relevancy" in
education, and de-emphasis of grades, class standing,
and such mechanistic paraphernalia considered to be
choking the motivation for reallearning. 13
Intimate faculty-student contact was hardly possible in first-year courses, but Hastings students wanted
more of it in upper-class courses. The problem was that
the College did not have enough professors to staff
seminar-size courses. At particularly tense moments in
the years of student activism, the students received a bit
too much intimate attention from some faculty: students complained of the nasty things professors had
said in class about the movement. The activists seldom
manifested the tolerance for others (for old men annoyed by what they could not appreciate and what they
feared the consequences of) that they demanded as of
right for themselves. They had a way of forgetting that
free speech is a two-way street, and that academic freedom is meaningless outside the classroom and impossible if civility and academic purpose are not maintained
in the classroom. The students' demand for educational
reform was based on the argument that much of the
existing curriculum was irrelevant to the new age
dawned; that "relevant" courses would train the lawyer
to tackle "real" issues in society and motivate him to
accomplish the assurance of civil rights; that the 65ers
were too set in their ways and too torpid to make any
changes; and that the case method was mechanical and
uninspiring, harshly and brutally used, an affront to the
student's dignity. None of these complaints was particularly novel, though "relevant" had a freighted meaning
limited to matters that the students considered crucially
important. What was unusual was the assumption that
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student participation could reform all these shortcomings. The students demanded student evaluation of
professorial performance, the evaluations to be given
weight in the decision to retain or terminate a professor.
The most stoutly attacked, in part because it was the
most easily targeted grievance was the grading system.
The demand was for pass-fail grading and the abolition
of class-ranking. Relieved of the competitiveness of
hierarchical grades, the student could learn happily,
and without class-ranking invidious inequality would be
banished.
Arthur Sammis found it difficult to cope with the
demands and the stridency with which they were advanced. He believed in Hastings' traditional purpose of
producing excellent practitioners learned in the fundamentals of the law. He mistrusted "relevancy" even as
he saw it making converts at other law schools. Convinced that practice would continue to require grounding in fundamentals, he held that Hastings' graduates
trained in the traditional manner would enjoy a competitive advantage over the "relevant" products of other
schools. Sammis had a sincere commitment to academic
freedom, which he conceived of in its conventional
sense of freedom of the academic process in the
classroom from the incursion of outside forces. He was
a man of principle, and he didn't like being accused of
dishonesty, hypocrisy, fraud, meanness, injustice, and
all the other denigratory terms of confrontational
rhetoric. Under pressure, Sammis tended to react
sharply, even angrily, which did not do justice to his
own judicious temperament and kindly decency. He was
prepared to take a hard line in defense of the institution
and its integrity as he understood it. Fortunately, he was
seconded by a lieutenant of extremely even temper who
could withstand great pressure without becoming rattled or angered. Marvin Anderson increasingly bore the
brunt of the turmoil, and his imperturbability under
fire, his spirit of compromise, and his willingness to lis-
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ten and to talk disarmed potentially violent confrontations.
As campus troubles went, Hastings got off lightly.
There were no sit-ins. Occasionally large groups of students would confront the deans, but once heard outthreats and all-were always persuaded to leave. Picket
lines were few and far between, and the size of the pickets' squads was moderate. At no time were police called
in to keep order. There was a bomb scare, which, like
the "bomb" itself, proved a wet squib. The Kent State
crisis brought the only real milling about of students on
the premises. There was only one case where a discipline hearing was called for, in 1970, after some disruption of the class of a professor accused of being antiwomen. Plenty of tension made nerves raw, but violence
remained only verbal throughout these troubled years.
As Sammis' successor as dean, Marvin Anderson
was in a position to deal with the reform demands of the
students with more detachment than Sammis could
muster. He was no less stout in defense of academic
freedom, but he accepted that so long as the fundamentals of law were taught, and taught well, there was a
place in the curriculum for problem-oriented courses,
which by definition would be "relevant." He also saw the
advantages of smaller classes, and particularly the
stimulation that seminar instruction affords. With the
full and ready participation of the faculty, in the course
of his first few years as dean, Anderson restructured the
curriculum.
The first year remained unchanged, but the distinction between second- and third-year courses was abolished, and upper-class courses were made totally elective save for moot court. The moot court, which had
disappeared with World War II, had been revived in
1951 under the direction of Edward Hogan. Upon
Snodgrass' death the moot court competition had been
named in his honor. It grew under Sammis, and
reached its full attainment with Anderson's reforms.
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The presence of a former U.S. or California Supreme
Court justice or other leading jurist, a practicing attorney, and a third-year member of the moot court board
as judges hearing appellate cases provides an invaluable
learning experience for all upper-class students. The
only other basic distinctions in upper-class work are between the case-method electives, the seminar courses,
and moot court-which comprise the professional curriculum for the last two years-and the clinical and externship programs. "Relevant" courses-and the relevancy changes, of course-are spread over the range
of the upper-class courses and programs. The result is a
curriculum of great richness, variety, instructional diversity, and thoroughness.
In 1971-72, students were given the choice of three
grading options: the old numerical-letter grade system,
a four-tier system (indistinguishable from the old system save that "Fail" equalled "D" and "F" in the old
system), and pass-fail. Subsequently, this grading method was modified by making certain courses subject to
numerical-letter grades and others to pass-fail, with
non-numerical, strictly letter grades for non-examination courses. Hastings' experience was the same as
that of most other law schools which attempted to convert to pass-fail in whole or in great part and to abolish
class-ranking. The students came to prefer more concrete methods of measuring success because employers
were reluctant to hire graduates whose records did not
provide some clear indication of relative accomplishment. Class-ranking was abolished, though lately it has
made something of a comeback since individual student
requests for ranking are honored; again, the employers
have had the last word.
Student participation in curriculum planning was a
harder bone of contention to deal with. After considerable discussion, forums, and public meetings involving
students, administrators, and faculty, a structure was
hammered out in 1973 by which four students, two of
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them alternates, are members of the curriculum committee, the other members of which are five professors.
The students have two votes. Once suspicions declined
and a consensus was arrived at that the job of the committee was the unspectacular one of improving the
curriculum, student collaboration became a valued contribution. Student participation on the faculty appointments committee was not allowed, but student
input in the form of evaluation of each individual professor's teaching has been accepted for the past five
years as one of a number of kinds of evidence upon
which retention and tenure decisions are made.
By 1972, student opinion began to change. Activism found its principal outlets off-campus, especially
in the anti-war movement, which began to smell success.
A great many of the entering students at Hastings had
begun to sense that they had manned the barricades
(literally and figuratively) long enough in college, and
that professional goals should take precedence in professional school. The curriculum reforms worked by
Anderson and the faculty satisfied all but the hardcore
activists that changes were well started and advancing
rapidly. The big internal concerns had become the
working out of the details of student participation in
curriculum planning and of how student evaluation of
professors should be utilized. Something of a chill wind
blew through 198 McAllister as federal money began to
tighten up; that wind would continue to blow and get
chillier in 1974-75 when there was an actual contraction
of federal student su pport. The last commotion came in
1975, with picket lines in support of a more thoroughgoing special admissions program for minority
students and a demand for the firing of the lady assistant dean in charge of student affairs and the LEap on
the grouIlds that she was "insensitive" to minority interests. A coalition of three activist groups on campus, led
by the Third World Caucus, mounted the campaign.
What was more significant than the hullabaloo was that
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the assistant dean was warmly defended by a great many
students, publicly and in print. She remained on the job,
and the agitation centering on her faded.
If the point the demonstrators intended to make
was that there should be more minority students, that
was never in question. From the late 1940s, the College
had graduated an increasing number of Black students,
many of whom had risen to positions of prominence.
Today, the first Black state supreme court justice,
majority leader in the legislature, and mayor of Oakland are Hastings graduates. Asian-Americans had provided a steady stream of graduates from the third decade of the century. Mexican-American recruits were
slower in coming, but their number increased in the
1960s. By the mid-1970s, the number of N ativeAmericans at Hastings was second only to the number at
the University of New Mexico. At the time of the 1975
demonstration for increased special admissions of
minorities, the College was in process of evolving the
present student-faculty cooperation procedures for
evaluating economically disadvantaged applicants, the
student evaluator coming from the ethnic group of the
applicant under consideration. This system works well;
it has helped to increase the number of LEOP students
and to assure that those admitted have a realistic hope
for success. Since the emphasis is on economic disadvantage rather than on race or ethnicity, the current program has a good chance of surviving even if the United
States Supreme Court upholds the decision of the
California Supreme Court in Bakke vs. The Regents of the
University of California. 14
The positive legacy of the years of student activism
is evident in the changed curriculum, increased student participation in the academic life of the College,
and greater responsiveness to student sensitivities. The
idealism of the students, even when the vehicle for it
was less than ideal and less than idealistic, was not lost
on their elders. Moreover, as in the GI years a quartercentury earlier, the spurt given to student involvement
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revived student institutions which had become dormant
or somnolent and created new ones. The Associated
Students was given a new lease on life, and has come to
exercise a general watching brief for student interests.
A couple of years ago, ASH sponsored, albeit unsuccessfully, legislation to change the composition of the
Board of Directors; questions of the constitutionality of
the proposed act aside, there is not quite the "generation gap" the ASH perceived between the students and
the Directors, and by virtue of the growth of the College
the role of the Board is more that of an overseer than of
a participant in College governance. The student newspaper, the Hastings Law News, still thunders when it
senses injustice or callous disregard for student interests
and aspirations. Three new student-run law reviews
have come into existence, addressed to the increasing
specialization of the law and student interest in it: The
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly (1975), The Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review (1977), and
Comm/Ent, a journal of communications and entertainment law (1978). Student responsibility for the David E.
Snodgrass Moot Court Competition has increased by
the agency of the moot court board, and through it
Hastings students participate in national moot competitions. The traditional legal honor and fraternal
societies have been given a new lease on life: the
Thurston Society, the Order of the Coif, and three
fraternities as well as the sorority, Kappa Beta Pi. As
signs of the times, the Clara Foltz Society of Women
Law Students, and the ethnic Asian, Black, La Raza, and
Native American Law Student Associations are active in
recruitment, counseling, placement, and social functions. The old Hastings Law Wives has recently been
renamed the Hastings Law Partners, in recognition that
whereas women as short a time ago as 1969-70 represented a little over 7 percent of the student body, in
1976-77 they comprised almost half of it. More women,
more minority students, older and more mature students, students whose college training was taken out-
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of-state, all are becoming prominent at Hastings. Today's students are bright and well-prepared for law
school. There are many fewer marginal students than
there were even a decade ago. The median grade point
average is now about 3.50 (B plus), the median LSAT
score about 670 (out of a possible 800), and with 10
applicants for every place in the entering class, the college can afford to be choosy. Things have settled down
in the once-turbulent arena of student affairs, but the
old easy assumption that students are more likely to
accept than reject the reasoned wisdom of professors
and deans is not the basis on which anyone can afford to
operate anymore.
The advent of Marvin J. Anderson to the deanship
on the death of Sammis in October 1970 did signal a
new era. Anderson did not become dean in Sammis'
shadow. Sammis created no shadow-it was not his
character or instinct to leave an indelible mark. Already
Anderson had in the process of faithfully and diligently
assisting Sammis begun to influence the direction of the
College. He had the unique distinction of being deandesignate before Sammis' death; upon submission of
Sammis' resignation to take effect some months later,
the Board named Anderson his successor. When Sammis died, Anderson was immediately confirmed in the
deanship.
The new era has not marked a break with the past
of Hastings College ofthe Law. Rather, it is one of many
new beginnings, but more significant than many that
preceded it because the College now faces its second
century. All at Hastings are aWare of this. In recognizing the continuity of the past, Hastings accepts the first
century as the end of its beginning.
Marvin Anderson differs from his predecessors in a
number of significant ways. Unlike all Hastings' deans
from Slack onwards, he was not either a native-born
Californian or an arrival who came to the state in his
youth before or at the outset of his career. Unlike them,
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.he was a full-time teacher in another law school for
some years before joining the faculty at Hastings. Unlike his predecessors, he has not practiced law in
California. In short, he was formed in a different ambience than that which marked his predecessors. He has
not remained a foreigner to California's manners and
mores, but his perspective is less provincial than that of
his predecessors. He is more an urbanite than a countryman, and the big cities of the Midwest and the West
in which he has lived induced in him a sensitivity to
urban problems that is reflected in the sense of metropolitan purpose he sees for Hastings in its next century. A Midwesterner, raised in Wisconsin and educated
at its great state university, he was admitted there after
receiving his LL.B. in 1942. He practiced both in Wisconsin and in Detroit, specializing in corporation insurance and workmen's compensation. In 1959, he joined
the faculty of California Western in San Diego. For
three summers he was a Ford Foundation fellow at
NYU, from which he received the LL.M. in 1964-the
first Hastings dean to have taken graduate work and a
graduate degree in law. He cut his teeth in administration at California Western, which was what recommended him to Sammis, who appointed him professor
and acting Registrar at Hastings in 1964. The indications
of his expanding role in the College and Sammis' growing reliance upon him were his regularization as Registrar and appointment as assistant dean in 1965, promotion to associate dean in 1967, and to vice-dean in 1969.
Anderson has taught a gamut of courses, with specializations in Constitutional Law, Administrative Law,
and legal clinic programs. Reflective, well read, broadly
experienced, he can summon a wide range of learning
in law, philosophy, history, literature, religion, and the
social sciences to give depth to thought and meaning to
an address. He is low-key in his approach to administration. Articulate without being loquacious, he thinks before he speaks, and delivers himself with a quiet, disarming diffidence that lends weight to his words. He is
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engaging, convivial, and able to take the chaff of
friendly intercourse in good spirit. His organizational
abilities are exceptional, his diligence is unstinting, and
his purposefulness is unswerving. He excels at planning
and execution, his instincts are for program building,
and he takes a very high view of the nature of legal
education and the purposes it is to serve.
The new administration's first order of business
was to meet the challenges of student demands. Curriculum changes, the increased number of courses of
smaller size on specialized topics, changes in grading
practices, engagement of students in the academic functioning of the College, and the expansion of opportunities for minorities and women were accomplished in a
short period of time. Anderson had to restrain the student constituency and bring along with him the faculty
constituency, mollify alumni fears, and reassure the
legal profession that Hastings was still producing
lawyers, not revolutionaries. Many administrators elsewhere attempted the same with much less success. The
establishment of a child care center provided an essential facility to encourage women to enter law school.
Women professors and women in major administrative
offices became increasingly prominent. The ethnic
complexion of the faculty began to change, with young
professors from minority groups bringing a new perspective on law and a more acute concern for law and
social needs. A smooth transition to a new age-mix in
the faculty made broader recruitment possible and induced curriculum innovation. In a few years more program and personnel changes were wrought at Hastings
than ever before. To top it all-and to undergird allthe library was brought to a genuine level of excellence
and sufficiency, with 150,000 volumes. The library
budget is now just under $500,000 a year. The ghost of
Charles William Slack hovers approvingly.
Curriculum and personnel changes, library growth,
and the expansion of opportunities for minorities and
women have demanded a level of state support without
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,parallel in the College's long history. The foundations
laid during Sammis' tenure-in which Anderson had
played a major role in preparing budget and seeing it
through Sacramento-had doubled state support between 1964 and 1969 to almost $1,000,000. In the first
seven years of his tenure, Anderson increased state
support to three and one-half times of what it had been
in 1969. And this was during the administration of a
governor not generally believed to be very well-disposed
to increased spending, and cerfainly not on higher education. In the process, and with the generosity of alumni
and friends of the College and the fervent support of
the Board, Anderson increased the College's support
from itsown funds to more than $1,000,000 per year for
the past three years. In 1976-77, the total budget of the
College was just short of $5.5 million composed of state
money, College-generated money including endowment income, and federal student-aid funds. This
growth in financing the operation of the College has,
been phenomenal. It was the accomplishment of a very
practical and persuasive administrator, who could point
out to Sacramento that Hastings spends less to educate a
lawyer than any of the other law schools of the University of California.
Under Anderson, Hastings has finally evolved an
adequate administrative structure. Nothing over the
history of the College hampered the opportunity to
plan and to execute plan more than the absence of
sufficient officers charged with specific responsibilities.
From Slack to Sammis, the dean was torn between
fragmented duties, delegation was largely ad hoc, and
the administration found itself without contingency
preparations and consequently subject to grabbing at
expedients to meet problems that could have been better handled by established procedures. Had such procedures existed, the problems might well not have arisen. A vice-dean is responsible for curriculum and also
exercises a roving commission as well as serving as secre,tary to the faculty. Three associate deans, each with a
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,defined departmental responsibility, handle administration, development, and student affairs, respectively.
Legal matters are the responsibility of the general counsel, who is also registrar and secretary to the Board.
There is provision for special assistants to serve the
dean on an ad hoc basis for particular functions. The
librarian and three directors for special curricula (clinical programs, moot court, legal writing and research)
exercise departmental responsibility. All these officers
report to the dean, have ready access to him, and join
with him in an informal council which provides routine
administrative coordination. Increasingly, the dean's
functions are policy and planning-not administering.
With 1500 students, over 50 full-time and nearly 3'0
part-time faculty, and a further 25 temporary part-time
instructors in legal writing and research, departmentalization provides administrative oversight that would be
otherwise impossible. The dean is afforded time to
maintain and advance the College's relationship with
alumni, legislators, the bar, and the academic profession
and other law schools. The dean can keep the Board of
Directors fully informed and genuinely involved in the
development of the College. Bureaucracy has become a
dirty word in our vocabulary. If bureaucracy is sometimes soiled by excess, the absence of sufficient sophisticated bureaucracy does not make for purity, only for
muddiness.
'
The evolution of an efficient and self-sufficient
administrative structure has served another end.
longer is Hastings dependent, as it had been during
much of Snodgrass' tenure, on the University's assistance and expertise. This has reinforced the College's
autonomy. By making David a little more Goliath's peer,
a certain deterrent has been built into the armory that
once was only a slingshot. That is not to intimate that
since the passing of the two old warriors of the 1940s50s, the relationship between Hastings and the University has been other than proper and harmonious. President Clark Kerr was far too occupied in the early years
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of his administration with establishing more campuses
of the University to concern himself with Hastings, and
too occupied in the later years with the student troubles
and the fight for the survival of the existing University.
His successor, Charles J. Hitch, coming from outside
the University and the state, did not have the incubus of
the past bearing down upon him. Hitch's relations with
Sammis and Anderson were genuinely amicable, and
the administrations of both the University and Hastings
found themselves allied in the wearing and wearying
defense of higher education in the face of Governor
Ronald Reagan's distrust of the University and his policy of economization. Both the University'S attempt to
establish a new law school on the Santa Barbara campus
and Hastings' proposal to open a branch in San Diego
were downed by the chill from the governor's mansion
in the early 1970s. Recently, Hastings has established
joint-degree programs with two schools on the Berkeley
campus,15 and health facilities for Hastings students are
provided by UC San Francisco. The common-law marriage is in a period of tranquility and mutual respectwith even a touch of affection gracing the entente
cordiale.
Not all was accomplished by the current dean
.alone, but much of it was planned by him and all of it
was spurred to accomplishment by him. Anderson has
sought to open Hastings to new influences and to bring
it to a heightened sense of purpose. He has strengthened faculty autonomy and expanded the faculty'S role in
hiring and tenure decisions. To bring town and gown
closer together, the College now has a board of visitors
composed of alumni, civic leaders, educators, businessmen, and lawyers who represent the outside world to
students and staff, and who, by witnessing the routine
operation of the College, interpret it to the communityat-large. The Alumni Association has been strengthened and its support solicited for more than merely its
members' checkbooks. The Hastings Community, the
alumni magazine, and a frequently issued directory of
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.alumni tie the current College family to its past members in a bond of respect and affection based upon
knowledge of Hastings today, not on fading memories
of Hastings yesterday. Through the endowment-raising
activities of the 1066 Foundation, the College's alumni,
staff, and friends are afforded an opportunity to contribute to the growth of Hastings in the years to come.
And there is now the UC Hastings Law Center Foundation, dedicated to the monumental task of raising some
$15 million to give Hastings the facilities for its next
century.
Since the late 1960s, the College has had available to
it the old Bancroft-Whitney plant across Hyde Street.
Since 1971, the College's dean and its Board have envisioned a use for that site which will give Hastings the
finest physical facilities of any law school in the West,
and a match for those anywhere else in this hemisphere.
There has been something expansionist about the spirit
of Hastings College of the Law since David Ellington
Snodgrass dreamt his dreams of a permanent building
for the College and plotted a midnight requisition of old
McGeorge in Sacramento during the hard years of
World War II. In fact, there was something expansionist about Hastings from the beginning-if Serranus
Clinton Hastings didn't think of buildings for expansion, he did think of program expansion. The new law
center planned for the Civic Center across Hyde Street
from the present building is not to be just another structure to take off the pressure on existing facilities. It will
be the vehicle for setting on foot the most ambitious
program the College has undertaken since the Founder's creation of the University's "law department."
The outline of that program is already a reality.
Since 1971, Hastings' College of Advocacy, by offering
workshops and expert instruction, has provided an opportunity for practitioners from all 50 states, American
.territories, and foreign countries to hone forensic skills
and broaden their horizons as advocates. What is now
primarily a summer program, latterly involving both
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civil and criminal practice at both trial and appellate
levels, has the potential for becoming a year-round
program once the new law center's facilities are available. Already, the Western Regional Office of the National Center for State Courts, funded by the federal
government and directed at studying ways to improve
the administration of justice in a period when the ideal
of justice has never been more highly desired and more
elusive of attainment, is associated with Hastings. Further expansion of the National Center's work in the
West depends upon better facilities available on a regular basis. The planned courtroom facilities in Hastings'
new center, with ample office and support space, will
enable the College to make a contribution to legal
development that it cannot now make. The Hastings
Service Foundation, which maintains and operates the
bookstore, Hastings Research Services, a non-profit
corporation that affords students and graduates an opportunity to undertake part-time legal work with a practical research dimension, and the clinical programs are
now working out of nooks and crannies, dependent
upon the largesse of others. The center will provide
them with good housing. New library facilities, requisite
to house double the collection that the College now has,
and which will be demanded by a vital research and
scholarly emphasis in the law school of the future, will
find a home in the center. Indeed, this book itself is a
harbinger of that new emphasis, the first publication of
the Hastings College of the Law Press, a candle from the
past to light a path in the future for a succession of
scholarly monographs on the law. Other programs,
some scholarly, some instructional, some practice-oriented, all related to legal needs and concerns, some of
which we are already familiar with, some of which we do
not yet perceive, will make the new law center a laboratory for the law to be, not an oratory to the law that was.
The law school, like its parent the university, must remain a castle rather than a cathedral.
The new beginnings are meant to enhance, not
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diminish, the century-old traditional function of Hastings: the education of lawyers. For all the many mutations that American law has undergone in the two centuries of our national experience, its purpose remains
the same. Law is to do justice, maintain public order,
preserve rights, and advance the commonweal. Implicit
injustice, order, and rights, explicit in the advancement
of the commonweal, is the idea that the law changes.
The essence of legal education remains: it is the preparation of lawyers to work necessary change in the law
and to know what is the commonweal. The vision of the
new law center, as evoked by the man who conceived it,
Marvin J. Anderson, fits that objective:
If legal institutions are to continue to be effective in their
expanding role within our rapidly changing society, then our
law schools must seek revitalization and innovation. Now is
the time to act for the society of the year 2000.
Hastings College of the Law has an unprecedented opportunity to create a truly significant Law Center which will
combine the resources of a great national law school with
those of the organized bar and the broader civic and business
communities-dedicated to provide superior legal talent to
the profession while working for meaningful change in society under the rule of law. 16

We lack the ear for the elegant high-flown rhetoric of
Serranus Clinton Hastings at Berkeley on June 5, 1878,
when he announced the foundation of Hastings College
of the Law. Allegory is too frail for our hardbitten expressions of reality in a technological world. Yet Anderson's matter-of-fact statement catches the echo of that
earlier address:
This institution is intended to supply a substitute for the Inns
of Court, the historic Inner Temple, a temple of the law,
which shall extend its arms and draw within its portals all who
shall be worthy to worship at its shrine, resulting in the coronation of its votaries, as a reward for application, industry and
merit. 17

Epilogue

SERRANUS CLINTON Hastings and his contemporaries
entertained no doubts about the value and the validity
of history. For them, history taught lessons, and practical ones at that. A statesman ignorant of history was
innocent of statecraft. He might be the helmsman of the
ship-of-state, but he would not be a navigator. History
was also the key to understanding the inimitable and
even ineffable "spirit" of a people, a "race." The towering philosopher of nineteenth century German
metaphysics, G.W.F. Hegel, had posited the working of
Geist, or spirit, as a process in history over time. For
Hastings' generation, the worlds of the mind and of
society seemed dominated by two of Hegel's wayward
intellectual "children," both of whom were probably
familiar to Hastings, if for no other reason than that the
German universities which he visited in the 1870s were
charged with their notions. Karl Marx had rejected
Hegel's Geist and substituted for it materialism, but a
materialism that was a process in history over time,
obeying the same laws of dialecticism as Hegel's Geist.
Hastings would never have approved of Marx. Neither
would he have found Heinrich von Treitschke much
more palatable; Treitschke's exaltation of the German
Volkgeist, the spirit of the German race, would not have
sat well with one so eminently Anglo-Saxon as Hastings.
Yet, Hastings understood the appeal of "spirit," and
abhorred:
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a growing tendency ... to neglect the study of history of the
law and its traditions, without the knowledge of which the
student can never become imbued with the true spirit of
jurisprudence. 1

Hastings would have appreciated the careful scholarship of the most eminent German historian of the day,
Leopold von Ranke, a "scientific" historian who
shunned subjectivism without tumbling into positivism.
And Hastings' Catholicism would have made him open
to the appeal of John Lord Acton, who reminded his
generation that "History compels us to fasten on abiding issues and rescues us from the temporary and the
transient."z Hastings' own ambition in founding the
College that bears his name was to provide a hedge
against the temporary and the transient. He succeeded ..
We are no longer sure that history teaches anyone
anything. Historical "process," whether in the manifestation of the spirit or the material, has little appeal to
our age. The path pointed out by Treitschke led to the
double holocausts of Verdun and Auschwitz, and the
Marxists have found it simpler to jettison the Teacher's
history than to attempt to make it fit the evidence that
tells against it. Perhaps Acton has best stood the test of
time and the trammels of technology-the "abiding issues" do indeed abide, thanks to an innate human sense
that such issues exist, and thanks to historians who,
while they tell us more and more about less and less, still
assume that the past has meaning and that history has
some other purpose than to entertain.
The "abiding issues" of Hastings' first century
might easily be overlooked in the sometimes dramatic,
always engaging events of its past. That would be a pity,
because Hastings has enjoyed a remarkable continuity
in its institutional development. For all the struggles,
despite the setbacks, regardless of weaknesses, and notwithstanding often limited resources, the College has
maintained its purpose, its constituency, its contribution
to society, and its integrity.
From the beginning the College's purpose has been
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to train lawyers. This it has never failed to do. It has
prepared more men and women to practice law than
any other law school in California, and this has been its
almost exclusive function. Unlike a number of other
major law schools, it has not sought to train academic
lawyers-it still eschews a graduate law program. It has
never aspired to being a school of 'jurisprudence," not
even in the middle years of the first half of the twentieth
century when a number of law schools accepted a
broadly-based jurisprudential emphasis as the mark of
distinction in academic law. While its curriculum and
programs, especially during the past two decades, have
been expanded and modernized, the thrust of the
changes has been towards practicality and practice.
Hastings has always avoided pedagogical frills (going so
far, sometimes, as to avoid apparent frills which would
have added measurably to its program), and the observation in 1935 of Monroe Deutsch, vice-president of the
University of California, that the Directors of Hastings
were more interested in substance than in form in the
matter of legal education 3 has been true throughout the
College's history.
Hastings has remained loyal to its constituency.
Above all, it has remained loyal to its students. From the
outset, it sought to train anyone possessing the qualities
of intellect and character requisite to a lawyer, without
respect to social status or wealth, to the limits of the
College's facilities. Serranus Clinton Hastings made
clear the College's policy on this point:
the founder (and he hopes his descendants) will look upon
the rejection of any applicant or student on account of his
poverty or limited means of support, as a calamity subversive
of the object of the foundation. 4

It required Clara Shortridge Foltz and Laura De Force
Gordon to make explicit that "student" included women, but it has welcomed women aspirants since. Today,
in its recruitment of women and minorities Hastings has
gone further than most law schools in this country and
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at least as far as any other. Hastings has also remained
true to its greater community. It has always drawn the
bulk of its students from the San Francisco Bay Area. It
has maintained close relations with the legal profession
in the Bay Area and the state. It has refused to move
away from its traditional bailiwick of downtown San
Francisco, and it remains committed to the urban environment, to the inner-city, to the cause of the metropolitan area in an era when very little is to be gained
educationally by proxirriityto the courts and when other
institutions and individuals have been fleeing to exurban areas. This purposefulness and solidity is maintained at the expense of many of the amenities which
traditional academic life values.
Hastings' contributions have been primarily to the
practicing bar and to the judiciary drawn from the bar,
secondarily to California political life in elected, appointed, and civil-service officials. This was true from
the earliest graduates (from the Class of '82) and it remains true today. In a profound way, Hastings College
of the Law is a "service institution," contributing its sons
and daughters to the legal and political system which
continues to be the instrument for change, the forum
for civic life, and the vehicle for human aspirations,
personal and collective, for a better life in a better
society.
Hastings College of the Law, though it remains "the
law department of the University of California," has not
been for three-quarters of a century the only law school
of the University. Nevertheless, it contributes to the
greatness of that great University by rounding out its
structure for legal education. The College has had to
struggle t.o retain its autonomy-its integrity. A succession of deans and generations of Directors have had to
avoid the embrace of an institution which has grown
enormously over the years, of a university the units of
which have become excellent while losing their inimitable individual characters. Hastings has managed to become excellent while retaining its individuality and dis-
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tinctive institutional character. Without its own Board
of Directors and without the privileged position afforded it by the 1878 act, Hastings long since would
have been swallowed up by the behemoth University.
The price paid for autonomy has been Hastings' isolation from the cross-fertilization of a larger university
community. The cost was less than an academic would
usually be prepared to credit: law schools everywhere
have tended to be rather more isolated from other university units than any other professional school, and the
65 Club gave to Hastings at a critical moment in its
growth a faculty that had been as throughly involved in
a broad nexus of interdepartmental influences as any
law professors anywhere. The gain has been great.
Hastings has been enabled to retain its principal purpose undeterred by blandishments to do something else
because current academic ideology dictates it be done.
Because of its isolation, Hasting has been able to remain
faithful to its constituency-to its students by a more
immediate contact between the policymakers at the top
and the recipients of education at the bottom, to its
metropolitan community by the intimate connection between the College and the bench and bar. The College
remains graspable as an institutional entity-the dean is
available and the dean can act with finality. No other
unit of the University of California (assuming that Hastings is such a unit) has been in a position to deal so
directly with students and community since Robert
Gordon Sproul transformed the presidency of one
campus into an imperium over many. Hastings remains
open to direct influences from outside. There is no filtering process between the outside and the law school,
no statewide administration either to absorb external
pressure or to impose its own interpretation of external
reality. The perils of openness are more than offset by
the benefits. The direct links between Hastings and the
legal and political life of California make the College
and its students aware of external realities and sensitive
to societal concerns.
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This Actonian analysis does not quite do justice to
the historic Hastings. Perhaps there is something to be
said for Hegelian "spirit" in evoking an institution's
past. Hastings' Geist-its unique and inimitable quality-is a compound of its adherence to traditional educational and professional values and its determination to
adapt to new circumstances. From the outset, it has
sought to make "learned" lawyers capable of dealing
intelligently, discerningly, and knowledgeably with legal
problems. In these pages, the educational activities of
the College have received major attention. Overlooked
has been what the College demanded of its postulants in
terms of character. Probity has been a constant refrain
from the beginning, even though about 1950 the requirement for an applicant to present evidence of good
moral character was dropped from the announcement,
and a course in legal ethics, so devoutly desired by the
Founder, has appeared, disappeared, reappeared, and
disappeared again. Good character was a constant refrain even when such an eminent graduate as Abe Ruef,
'86, ended up in San Quentin for corruption and a
number of others of its alumni found themselves afoul
of the law and professional standards of propriety. With
probity goes civility, and civility in turn evidences professional commitment. Over the course of a century,
Hastings' alumni have manifested as students and practitioners a high level of good behavior and professionalism. The College has demanded no less professionalism of itself. With its eye fixed on the needs of the
legal profession, the College has sought to provide the
best education for the practitioner. In its early years,
this was the Pomeroy System; in its middle years, the
detailed curriculum of traditional subjects conveyed by
the Langdell/Ames method; latterly, the problemorientation taking account of broader concerns and
contemporary social context. The professors have
gladly taught and the students gladly learned, whether
there was a sole Professor, a staff composed almost en-
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tirely of part-time practitioners, a faculty of eminent
retired professors from other law schools, or a faculty
composed (as it is today) of retirees, younger full-time,
and part-time professors. No matter how poor-or how
rich-the College has adapted to changing needs in
legal education by its commitment to educating practicing lawyers, and it has been prepared to do the unusual
in providing that education. It has eschewed trendiness
while welcoming novelty. Hastings' Geist has been the
spirit to stand firm but not pat.
Historians make poor prophets-their eyes are too
firmly fixed on the past to afford them much prospect
of the future-and they should be without honor as
prophets everywhere. Yet there is merit in applying to
institutions what earlier was directed at the College's
early graduates:
Youth, what man's age is like to be doth show;
We may our ends by our beginnings know. 5

Hastings' youth is over; its maturity begins. It is now a
major, national, American law school, in curriculum,
admissions standards, and quality of faculty hardly
distinguishable from the other dozen or so sisterinstitutions which inhabit those empyrean heights of
legal academe. It carries with it the affection and the
loyalty of the thousands it has made learned in the law.
It goes forth with the respect of the community of which
it is a part and which it has served for a century. Hastings' "youth" was turbulent and productive. Given its
first century, it is unlikely that the second will be any less
challenging, any less dramatic, any less creative. It only
remains to be seen what the challenges will be, how the
drama will unfold, what new paths creativity will take.
Here the historian would have to turn prophet, and that
he would not be. But the present makes clear that the
abiding issues remain, the spirit is undiminished. Hastings will remain unique, inimitable in its next century as
it was in its first.
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27. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I") J.H. Corley to R.G. Sproul, Jan. 4,
1947.
28. AB 1106 (Albert C. Wollenberg, George D. Collins, Jr., Bernard
R. Brady, and Randall F. Dickey) introduced Jan. 28, 1947 and SB 624
(Gerald J. O'Gara, '26, Bradford S. Crittenden, '07, Thomas F. Keating,
'31, and Oliver Carter, '35) introduced Jan. 28, 1947, 57th general session.
29. Cal. Stats. (1947) ch. 1530 (for Hastings) and ch. 1557 (for
UCLA).
30. CU-5, 719 (49)(1948).
31. CU-5, 741 (49)(1949) minutes of meeting of building committe~,
March 2, 1949. Other sources for the building planning, etc., CU-5, 1175
("HCL, Pt.I"), 764 (49)(1950), 822 (49)(1952); Snodgrass Pprs. (1941-9
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through 1953); Calif. State Archives: D 525, F 3453-14.
32. Sproul had a meeting of the Regents' building committee the day
. after the dedication. He'd written Vice-President Bray of the Hastings
Board to this effect. Snodgrass was not satisfied, and sent a mimeographed
form letter of invitation to Sproul, which Sproul's staff thought should be
ignored. CU-5, 836 (49)(1953).
33. G.B. Nutting, "Training Lawyers for the Future," Hastings Law
Journal, 4 (1953) 85. For an excellent description of the new building, see
E.A. Hogan, "A New Home for the Oldest Law School in the West,"
Journal of Legal Education, 6 (1953) 226-35.
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VIII

I. G.E. Osborne, "David E. Snodgrass," Hastings Law Journal, 15
(1963) 3.
2. During World War II, Snodgrass tried strenuously to get University purchasing to secure him a fluorescent desk lamp-without success,
because he did not have a high enough "priority" for a scarce item, CU-5
593 (49)(1943).
3. Sutherland, 338.
4. Snodgrass Pprs. (1955), draft of review of Laurence P. Simpson,
Handbook on the Law of Contracts (St. Paul, 1954), published in NYU Law
Review, 30 (1955) 1135. Simpson was a professor at NYU, hence the complimentary allusion to the author's experience.
5. Snodgrass Pprs. (1941-9) D.E.S. to Louis M. Brown, April 20,
1948. The case before the supreme court, in which he was co-counsel with
Orr M. Chenoweth, '07, was Associated Oil Company (Appellant) v. Harold
Myers et al. (Respondent) 217 Cal. 297 (1933) involving contract for lease for
sale of gas and oil by a service station; decided for the Appellant. See
Snodgrass Pprs. (1957)(2) D.E.S. to Orr M. Chenoweth, June 4, 1957.
6. Snodgrass Pprs. (1941-9) D.E.S. to LM. Shadwell, Sept. 19, 1947.
7. Snodgrass Pprs. (1963) May 12, 1963.
8. Snodgrass Pprs. (1954) D.E.S. to F.E. Gray, Oct. 27, 1954.
9. Snodgrass Pprs. (1941-9) S.F. Finley to D.E.S., Aug. 28, 1941.
10. Snodgrass Pprs. (1953) D.E.S. to A.J. Schweppe, May II, 1953.
II. California Monthly (March 1949); the scholarship was not negligible-there are two dozen citations to case law!
12. MB, II, 17, Board meeting Jan. 17, 1950: "Resolved: That no
public statement concerning the policies or the public relations of Hastings
College of the Law be made or issued by its Dean, Registrar, or any members of its faculty without prior submission of such statement to and approval of it by any two (2) members of the Executive Committee of the
Board of Directors." The Snodgrass torrent was not to be staunched by
such porous stuff.
13. U.A. McClain, Jr., T.F. McDonald, & S.P. Simpson] Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar in California (Los Angeles, 1949) 93.
14. The minimum standards for ABA approval were: 3 full-time
teachers (at least 1 for each 100 students); library of 10,000 volumes of
current usefulness, including reports, etc.; adequate physical facilities; not
operated commercially for profit; two years of college required of stu-
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dents; 3 years full-time study or 4 years of part-time study required for
the LL.B.
15. Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in California, as amended to
October 28, 1949 (Committee of Bar Examiners, 1949) 11.
16. W.L. Prosser, "Legal Education in California," Calif Law Review,
38 (1950) 206-10.
17. Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar in Calfornia. The survey of
Hastings is pp. 167-77.
18. In re Lavine, 42 P.2d.311 (1935), 2 Cal.2d.324 (1935).
19. Journal of the State Bar of California, 25 Guly-Aug. 1950) 325.
20. Hastings' copy of these materials are in Sammis Pprs. (Loose)
beginning with Goscoe O. Farley to D.E.S., July 10, 1950.
21. E. Cullinan, "Despite the Deans the California Accreditation Rule
Should Not be Scrapped," Journ. State Bar of Calif, 25 (March-April 1950)
163-70.
22. Crotty's position can be found in H.D. Crotty & P. Works, "Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar in California," Journ. State Bar of
Calif, 25 Gan.-Feb. 1950) 25-36-a review of the survey report of 1949and H.D. Crotty, "Who Shall be Called to the Bar?" The Bar Examiner, 20
Guly 1951) 173-99.
23. Cal. Stats. (1951) ch. 1722, signed by the Governor July 24, 1951.
24. Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar in California, 170.
25. This account of the July 21 meeting is taken from Sammis Pprs.
(Loose) "Memorandum with reference to the open meeting of the Committee of Bar Examiners held on July 21," by A.M. Sammis, who was
present in place of Snodgrass, and a very full report in The Los Angeles Daily
Journal (the official paper of the city and county) July 28, 1950, by Elmer
Cain, its editor.
26. The resolution, adopted by the Senate committee February 2,
1952, and the Bar Examiners' explanation of what happened on the October 1951 examination are in Journ. State Bar of Calif, 27 Gan.-Feb. 1952)
16-18 & 26-44.
27. Journ. State Bar of Calif. , 30 Guly-Aug. 1953) 191; the act, amending Business and Professions Code, sect. 6060, is Cal. Stats. (1953) ch.
1090.
28. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I") W.L. Prosser to RG. Sproul, April 9,
1951.
29. Ibid.; the only source for Hervey's visit is Prosser's letter. Hervey,
who one supposes might have been favored by Prosser because of Prosser's
own reservations about Hastings and Snodgrass, came out looking
very bad.
30. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I") Richard Bentley, chairman ABA section oflegal education and admissions to the bar, to D.E.S., March 1, 1951.
31. Ibid. R Bentley to D.E.S., March 23, 1951; faculty of Hastings to
R. Bentley, May 10, 1951.
32. Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar in California, 177, cited in
CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I") D.E.S. to R Bentley, March 7,1951.
33. Charles Beardsley, in Journ. State Bar of Calif., 28 (March-April,
1953) 74.
34. D.P. Gardner, The California Oath Controversy (Berkeley, 1967)
248-49.
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35. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt. I") E.D. Dickinson to RG. Sproul, Aug. 27,
1940.
36. Ibid. E.D. Dickinson to RG. Sproul, Oct. 3, 1947.
37. Ibid. J.H. Corley to RG. Sproul, June 10, 1946.
38. Cal. Stats. (1945) ch. 1525-it is still in the Education Code, sect.
23464.
39. Snodgrass Pprs. (1941-9) D.E.S. to L.M. Brown, April 20, 1948.
40. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.III") A. Robb to RG. Sproul, memo, Feb.
24, 1949. This file contains a great deal of DC internal correspondence
over the Extension matter, including a number of newspaper clippings
reporting Snodgrass' angry blasts towards Berkeley.
.
41. CU-5, 696 (49)(1947).
42. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt. I") J.H. Corley to R.G. Sproul, Aug. 28,
1947.
43. CU-5, 741 (49)(1949) E. Groff to A. Intorf, telegram, Dec. 16,
1949.
44. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I") J.H. Corley to RG. Sproul, Dec. 8,
1951.
45. Ibid. RG. Sproul to A. Robb, memo, Dec. 2, 1951.
46. CU-5, 836 (44)(1953).
47. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I") W.L. Prosser to RG. Sproul, April 9,
1951.
48. W.L. Prosser & D.E. Snodgrass, "Three Law Schools," California
Monthly (March, 1949); though jointly authored, the contributions of each
are apparent by their distinct rhetoric. The prolix Prosser suggested that
there might be allocation of "particular specialized courses" among Boalt,
UCLA, and Hastings and that the "time is obviously near when all three
schools, together with the University administration and interested members of the bar, must sit down and agree upon the future."
49. Sammis Pprs. (Desk 4) D.E.S. to Board, Aug. 5, 1953, and "Report
of the Faculty Committee Appointed to Consider the Policy regarding
Evening Law School Instruction at Hastings."
50. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I").
51. Ibid. W.L. Prosser to RG. Sproul, Feb. 11, 1952.
52. Snodgrass Pprs. (1952) D.E.S. to F.W. Links, Nov. 25, 1952.
53. Snodgrass Pprs. (1953) D.E.S. to C.L. Bradley, March 22, 1953.
54. Snodgrass Pprs. (1954) D.E.S. to K.G. McGilvray, April 13, 1954
and (1953) D.E.S. to G.A. Fleury, May 2, 1953, calling Fleury to arms.
55. CU-5, 954 (101)(1957-8).
56. CU-5, 1031 (600-30, Routine no. 1), Regents' committee on
finance, Sept. 19, 1958.
57. Ibid. D.E.S. (holograph) to C. Kerr, Nov. 17,1958. How well, by
this time, Hastings was handling its own budget request is evident from a
memo of the Governor's budget hearing, Oct. 16, 1959, Calif. State Archives: D 525, F3453-14.
58. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I") memo of RG. Sproul, March 30, 1961,
in note to A. Robb.
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CHAPTER

IX

1. Law School Association Lyrics, W.L. Prosser ed. 45-46.
2. Radin had a worldwide reputation as the most eminent scholar of
legal history, jurisprudence, and Roman Law in the United States. Snodgrass wanted to snag him along with Derby, Lorenzen, and Void to answer
the criticism-that Hastings relied too much on part-time faculty-voiced
by the survey board in 1948, Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar in
California, 58. Radin would not only be a full-timer, but he would also lend
unusual prestige to the College and its curriculum. Snodgrass never tried
star-catching again.
3. CU-5, 1031 (600-30, Routine no. 1), D.E.S. to Hastings Board,
Nov. 17, 1958.
4. CU-5, 1175 ("HCL, Pt.I") deputy Atty. Gen. to D.E.S., Aug. 29,
1945, and Sammis Pprs. (Desk 2) D.E.S. to Hastings Board, Dec. 2, 1957.
5. Snodgrass Pprs. (1963) D.E.S. to B.L. Melvin, Jan. 30, 1963.
6. S.M. Ehrman, "We Declare We Will Never Retire, Until we Lose
our Pep and Fire," Hastings Law Journ. 4 (1953) 88.
7. Snodgrass Pprs. (1963) R. Pound to D.E.S., Feb. 14, 1963.
8. Chauncey Leake died in January 1978, just as this was being
written.
9. R.R. Powell, Compromises of Conflicting Claims: A Century of California Law, 1760 to 1860 (Dobbs Ferry, 1977). Unfortunately, this book came
to hand too late for me to make use of it in the early chapters.
10. Quoted in F.H. Lawson, The Oxford Law School, 1850-1965 (Oxford, 1968) 238.
II. R.N. Sullivan, "The Professional Associations and Legal Education," Journal of Legal Education, 4 (1952) 401-26.
12. E.S. Bade, "Library Standards," Ibid. 427-30.
13. JR. Richardson, "Is There a Place for Moot Court in the Law
School Curriculum," Ibid. 431-5.
14. "On the Aims and Quality of Pre-Legal Education: An Association View?" Ibid. 441-7.
15. A.T. Vanderbilt, A Report on Prelegal Education (n. p., 1944); also,
Vanderbilt, "A Report on Pre-Legal Education," NYU Law Review, 25
(1950) 199.
16. E.W. Patterson, "The Case Method in American Legal Education:
Its Origins and Objectives,"Journ. of Legal Educ. 4 (1951) 1-24.
17. W.B. Harris, "New Members of the Law Teaching Profession in
America," Ibid. (1952) 436-40.
18. E.N. Griswold, "Educating Lawyers for a Changing World: A
Challenge to Our Law Schools," ABA Journ. 37 (Nov. 1951) 805-08. A.M.
Cantrall, a West Virginia practitioner, started a buzz in the law schools with
"Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing its Job?" ABA
Journ. 38 (Nov. 1952) 907-10 & 972; in fact, the article was so tendentious
and so anti-academic as to not be worth much serious consideration.
19. A.J. Harno, Legal Education in the United States (San Francisco,
1953) 185.
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20. J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York, 1930).
21. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law, 78 n.25.
22. Ibid. 82 n.36.
23. The Uniform Laws Annotated: Uniform Commercial Code presently
comprises 7 volumes, 5 of them commentary.
24. 7 Rep. 18.
25. Law School Association Lyrics, 23, "The Uniform Commercial
Code," by W.L. Prosser, to the tune of "My Darling Nellie Gray." In Prosser's version, it is "N.LL." not "U.S.A.," but the author has heard it both
ways:
26. American Law Institute: Consideration of Proposed Final Draft of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1950, 368-9, session of May 20, 1950. Mimeographed. The sections under discussion vis-a.-vis travelers checks (6-203 to
6-207) were not in the final version of the UCC.
27. L.M. Friedman, Contract Law in America: A Social and Economic Case
Study (Madison, 1965) and G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Columbus,
1974).
28. W.A. Keener, Selectionsfrom Leake's Elements of the Law of Contracts
and Finch's Cases on Contracts, 2 vols. (New York, 1891). Boalt's copy was
owned by Charles William Slack, and probably used by him in teaching
Contracts at Hastings.
29. S. Williston, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (Boston,
1894).
30. A.L. Corbin, "Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts,"
Harvard Law Review, 50 (1937) 453.
31. E.W. Patterson & G.W. Goble, Cases on Contracts, 3d ed. (Brooklyn, 1949); Patterson and Goble covered themselves well by dedicating the
volume to both Williston and Corbin.
32. H. Shepherd, Contracts and Contract Remedies: Cases and Materials,
3d ed. (Brooklyn, 1952).
33. Calif. State Archives: D 525, F3453-14, ABA inspection report of
Hastings, Dec. 10-11, 1959, by D.J. Dykstra (Univ. of Utah) and G.N.
Stevens (Univ. of Washington) with J.G. Hervey, adviser-a full, balanced
report, a considerable improvement over Hervey's effort of 1950.
34. These more "exotic" fields (from the practical perspective of an
American law school) have been heavily represented in the 65 Club, from
Orrin Kip· McMurray, Max Radin (briefly), Edwin Dickinson, and Ernest
Lorenzen in earlier years to Jerome Hall, Stefan Riesenfeld, Rudolf
Schlesinger, and Julius Stone of late.
35. For the significance of Restatement under the auspices of the
American Law Institute, see Gilmore, The Ages of American Law, 72-74.

CHAPTER

X

1. H.E. Verrall & A.M. Sammis, Cases and Materials on California
Community Property (St. Paul, 1966). Verrall, then at USC, joined the 65
Club in 1970.
2. Sammis Pprs. (1954-5) A.M. Sammis to J.R. Merritt, May 29,
1954.
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3. Sammis Pprs. (1963) A.M. Sammis to B. Boyer, Aug. 20, 1963.
4. Sammis Pprs. (1963) A.M. Sammis to A.J. Harno, Oct. 28, 1963.
5. Sammis Pprs. (1964) J.S. Bradway to A.M. Sammis, Oct. 14, 1964,
with comments on the same by Sammis.
6. Cal. Stats. (1969) ch. 797, signed by the Governor, Aug. 22,1969,
adding to Education Code new section, 23465.
7. Sammis Pprs. (1954-5) "a student" to A.M. Sammis, July 2, 1949.
8. Sammis Pprs. (1963) A.M. Sammis to A.J. Harno, Oct. 28, 1963.
9. Tabulated results of student-employment questionnaires for
1955, 1959, 1960, and 1964 are in Sammis Pprs. (Desk 1 & Desk 3). These
must be used with caution, because it was in the interest of the students
questioned to underemphasize outside employment. Allowing for an error
factor of as much as 20 percent, the tables still support the conclusion that
there was much less outside employment than there had been before
World War II.
10. Sammis Pprs. (Desk 2) D.E.S. to Board, Dec. 2, 1957. A student
revolt against Saturday classes in 1956 was led by a first-year student under
the appropriate pseudonym of "Thomas Paine," who raised the issue in a
letter to the UC Regents. Sproul referred the matter to Hastings. CU-5,
910 (49) (1956).
11. MB, II, 42, Board meeting Jan. 20, 1953.
12. MB, 11,152, Board meeting June 21,1968.
13. Education at Berkeley: Report of the Select Committee on Education
(Berkeley, March 1966).
14. 18 Cal.3d. 34, 132 Cal.Rptr. 680, 553 P.2d. 1152 (1976).
15. The Hastings-UC Berkeley Joint Degree Program involves the
School of Environmental Design (Department of Urban Planning) and
School of Business Administration (J .D.!M.B.A. program). Hastings students also participate in a less formal way in the Berkeley joint J.D.!Ph.D.
program in legal history, given by Boalt and the Department of History.
16. Quoted in brochure announcing proposed new law center, 1976.
17. Address of S.C. Hastings, 15.
EPILOGUE

1. Address of S.C. Hastings, 5.
2. John Lord Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, G. Himmelfarb ed.
(London, 1956) 26.
3. CU-5, 378 (33) [1935] M.E. Deutsch to R.G. Sproul, Feb. 1, 1935.
4. Address of s.c. Hastings, 13.
5. Sir John Denham, Of Prudence.

Bibliographical Notes

This bibliographical note is intended to indicate the principal sources for
the study of Hastings during its first century, with particular attention to
material not otherwise cited in the notes to the text. It is not a comprehensive bibliography of all works consulted and used. Hopefully, it will serve
to direct a reader into areas for further study, some of them beyond the
bounds of Hastings proper.

ARCHIVES

Hastings College of the Law is poor in archival sources from its origins to
about 1940. The early records of the College, such as they were, were
destroyed in the great earthquake and fire of 1906. All that survived, and
that because it was kept in one of the Director's offices not destroyed in the
calamity, was the Minute Book of the Board of Directors. The first volume
of the Minute Book is for 1878 to 1948; the second volume, 1948 to the
present. The first Minute Book is a rich source because of the Board's
involvement in much of the routine administration of the College. From
the deanship of D.E. Snodgrass (1940-63), the Board was increasingly less
involved with administration and more concerned with finances and policy
matters; the second volume makes its contribution in these latter areas.
The papers of the early deans were considered private property and were
not left in the College-they have disappeared. In fact, save for business
records generated in the College, including financial records and student
records, there was probably little documentation created in the course of
early administration. Most "running" of the College was done by word of
mouth until the post World War II expansion made this impossible. I am
surprised that more financial materials from 1906 to the end of Harrison's
deanship, 1925, are not extant. From 1926, the College has maintained
good student records, thanks to the assiduous businesslike attention of
Juanita Olsson, first as dean's secretary and later as registrar from 1925 to
1946, who began an archival tradition continued by her successors. With
Snodgrass, the bulk of the College'S archives begins. His papers (cited as
Snodgrass Pprs.) include correspondence, memoranda, newspaper and
magazine clippings, and miscellaneous printed materials. Sammis' papers
(cited as Sammis Pprs.) are of the same nature for his deanship, 1963-70,
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. with the bonus of a considerable amount of documentation relevant to his
tenure as registrar, 1947-63, under D.E. Snodgrass. The documentary
sources of the present administration of Dean Marvin Anderson leave
nothing to be desired-save better arrangement and a policy as to retention.
The University of California at Berkeley has a splendid archive. Because Hastings was (and is) "the law department" of the University, among
both the Regents' Papers (CU-I) until about 1930 and the President's
Papers (CU-5) from William Wallace Campbell's presidency in the 1920s
there are virtually annual files of documents relating to Hastings. Without
this material, the history of the College in its early and middle periods
would be very thinly founded.
Special collections in the Bancroft Library, on the Berkeley campus,
though not necessarily archives in the formal sense of the term, proyide
useful evidence. The papers of Mary McHenry Keith (CB595), who was
the first woman graduate of Hastings, are particularly valuable for the
insight they give into the Pomeroy System in the curriculum. Incidental
documentation in other collections have provided additional information
on Serranus Clinton Hastings and his contemporaries.
The California State Archives, Sacramento, furnish important insights
into Serranus Clinton Hastings as attorney general (Dr 4718, Loose Letters, 1850-56) and some materials on the early years of the University and
its "law department" (Dr 652, LP6:270). In files of the Department of
Finance, there are a number of items relevant to Hastings, including the
ABA visitation report of 1959 (D 525, F3453-14).
Though perhaps not archival material in the formal sense of the word,
the tape-recorded oral interviews which I undertook as part of this project
will be available for use in the Bicentennial History. Most of these interviews were of older alumni, some of past or present faculty and staff. All
were useful. However, the shortcomings of the procedure were soon evident. Precise factual details usually elude the interviewee, the passage of
time erodes accuracy, and the bias of the person interviewed is difficult to
deal with because of his self-consciousness in making "historical record."
The principal value of the tapes was the general impressions of the interviewees. Perhaps "oral evidence" is a more exact name for the enterprise
than "oral history." I also did not hesitate to write or phone people who
could perhaps supply information on particular points. The personal evidence provided by tapes, letters, and conversations contributed greatly to
this history.

PRINTED WORKS

California
California has a rich and well-tilled historical literature. It is best to begin
with a sound general history, and Walton Bean's textbook, California, An
Interpretive History, 2d ed. (New York, 1973) is excellent and up-to-date.
Besides furnishing a succinct overview, its bibliography is a guide to
deeper investigation in both the classical histories of the state and the
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extensive monographic literature of the last half-century. Such works provide the broader political, economic, and social context of California's
development in which Hastings was set and from which its students came.
For the urban and regional setting of Hastings, three recent works,
each different in kind and approach, are particularly valuable. Gunther
Barth, Instant Cities: Urbanization and the Rise of San Francisco and Denver
(New York, 1975) is a comparative study in urban history revelatory of the
peculiar development of San Francisco during the nineteenth century,
from founding, through the search for order, the development of culture,
and change under the impact of technology. Barth picks up where Roger
W. Lotchin, San Francisco, 1846-1856: From Hamlet to City (New York, 1974)
left off. Kevin Starr's Americans and the California Dream, 1850-1915 (New
York, 1973), the first of two volumes that will recount the intellectual and
cultural history of the state, avowedly deals with "the imaginative aspects of
California's journey to identity [vii]." It is brilliant and full of suggestion,
sometimes perilously seductive, always stimulating. Taken together, Barth,
Lotchin, and Starr provide the context for Hastings' urban setting and its
early cultural milieu. There is not yet a similar range of recent scholarship
of the same high quality for San Francisco and its region in the twentieth
century. Walton Bean, Boss Ruef's San Francisco (Berkeley, 1967) enjoys a
solitary eminence in revealing graft and corruption at the hands of labor
and big business in turn-of-the-century San Francisco-the villain, a
graduate of Hastings, a hero, its dean.
The California Historical Quarterly, 56 volumes to date from 1922, seldom failed to provide a volume with an article or note relevant to this
study. Institutional history, political history, aspects of economic and legal
developments, cultural and educational history, and biographical sketches
all figure in its pages.

Legal Developments
American legal history as a genre of scholarly investigation is still in its
infancy. The point of departure for obtaining a grasp of America's legal
development is James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law
Makers (Boston, 1950). In Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American
Law (New York, 1973), the field finally has a general survey, uneven in
places because the secondary literature for so many aspects of American
legal history is sparse. A sparkling set of lectures given at Yale by Grant
Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven, 1977) is particulary useful
for aspects of law in transition in the twentieth century, especially the
Realist-Langdellian controversy.
The nineteenth century is increasingly receiving attention from American legal historians, and this has relevance to the founding of Hastings.
Though none of them is directly concerned with California legal development, three recent books are essential to an appreciation of the epoch that
produced Serranus Clinton Hastings and his fellow lawyers of early
California. James Willard Hurst, Law and the Condition of Freedom in the
Nineteenth-Century United States (Madison, 1967) points the direction to
. understanding the interaction of economic growth and legal change.
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Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) provides a great deal of insight into this development
in the early national period, though his thesis is controversial because it
rests upon the notion of an "instrumental conception of law" that might
not have been shared by all jurists everywhere throughout the period and
leaves unexplained developments in the law that were obviously not "instrumental." Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial
Process (New Haven, 1975), with a narrower focus on one area of legal
development where there was definitely an instrumental conception of the
law at work on the bench, is particularly helpful in understanding the
position of John Norton Pomeroy on constitutional law. To measure the
impact of Blackstone on American law, its influence on lawyers of Hastings' vintage, the Commentaries must be read in any of the numerous editions; to render that almost intractable work comprehensible, the best
guide is Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: An Essay on
Blackstone's Commentaries (Boston, 1958).
California legal history has not been so fortunate. Much of its literature remains in the rather ephemeral stage of articles. Richard R. Powell's
Compromises of Conflicting Claims: A Century of California Law, 1760-1860
(Dobbs Ferry, 1977) is a step in the right direction, but it deals with early
legal development primarily at the doctrinal level. Four major areas of
California legal history in the nineteenth century alone cry out for detailed
study of the law in its social, political, and economic context: land-claims
settlement, water and mining rights, the impact on the law of populist
agitation against the railroads, and California codification. A book on each
. of these subjects would have been exceptionally helpful to this study of
Hastings.
Lawrence M. Friedman, in Contract Law in America: A Social and Economic Case Study (Madison, 1965), affords insight into a major legal development over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, drawing on the materials available in one jurisdiction, Wisconsin, with applicability beyond its boundaries. This brilliant and provocative book contributes necessary background to the Realist-Langdellian controversy of the
1930s, and provides the starting point for Grant Gilmore's The Death of
Contract (Columbus, 1974). The. Realist-Langdellian controversy was the
spawn of academic legalism, and thus immediately important to what the
law schools were attempting to do. Besides the relevant works of Langdell,
Keener, and Williston cited in the text and in the notes for Chapter IX,
Langdellianism can be appreciated by recourse to a standard text that had a
half-century's currency, Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases. A Course of
Instruction in Reading and Stating Reported Cases, Composing Head-Notes and
Briefs, Criticising and Comparing Authorities, and Compiling Digests (Boston,
1892) chs. I-II, IX-X. A foreign jurist, trained in the Civil Law, attempted
to unravel the Langdellian case method at the behest of the ABA; he only
partly succeeded but did provide considerable analytical insight into it:
Josef Redlich, The Common Law and the Case Method in American University
. Law Schools, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Bulletin 8 (New York, 1914). For a judicious but not uniformly profound
treatment of the advocate of Realism, the recent study by William Twining,
Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (London, 1973), should be consulted
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(one feels sympathy for an English scholar, trained in English law, attempting to comprehend the remarkable influence of legal academics in
America). The Llewellyn sorties into the controversy in the 1930s must be
followed in the law reviews, but his fully developed theories of law in
historical context in its relation to social science are best seen in The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston, 1960), based upon lectures
given at Yale in 1940. If the theories are somewhat mystifying, Richard
Danzig, "A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code," Stanford Law Review, 27 (1975) 621-35 helps in decoding them. As
for the UCC itself, Uniform Commercial Code, May 1949 Draft (1949) and
American Law Institute: Consideration of Proposed Final Draft of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1950, mimeographed, are of prime importance. The latter, a transcript of the debate, reveals Llewellyn at his rhetorical best. That
he could practice the social science that he preached is evident in K.N.
Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way-Conflict and Case
Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman, 1941), a legal-anthropological
study in which Llewellyn was in yoke with a cultural anthropologist; it is
stimulating reading.

Education
The historical literature on education in America is vast. A useful place to
begin is with the concept of liberal education as Hastings and his contemporaries understood it. Besides the works of John Henry Newman, Mark
Pattison, and Mark Hopkins, the essence of the Classical tradition can be
found in Sheldon Rothblatt, Tradition and Change in English Liberal Education: An Essay in History and Culture (London, 1976). The changing complexion of secondary education paralleling the first three-quarters of a
century of Hastings College of the Law and affecting the quality of its
entrants is treated in Edward A. Krug, The Shaping of the American High
School, 2 vols. (Madison, 1964-72). A lively and contemporary treatment of
higher education in California is provided by John R. Thelin, "California
and the Colleges," California Historical Quarterly 56 (1977) 140-63 & 230-49.
The particular role of the University of California in the history of
Hastings requires recourse to a number of works devoted to the University. The oldest, by William Carey J ones, Illustrated History of the University of
California (Berkeley, 1901) is still useful, written by an intimate of Serranus
Clinton Hastings and the founder of Boalt. William Warren Ferrier, Origin
and Development of the University of California (Berkeley, 1930) is an accurate
and detailed study of the University. UC's centennial in 1968 produced
Verne A. Stadtman's The University of California, 1868-1968 (New York,
1970), which does justice to UC's lively past, but which because of its length
does not afford the detailed treatment that the archives would allow, and
The Centennial Record of the University of California, V.A. Stadtman ed. (Berkeley, 1967), a mine of factual information. Two major crises of the University since World War II are given detailed attention in David P. Gardner, The California Oath Controversy (Berkeley, 1967) and Max Heirich, The
Spiral of Conflict: Berkeley 1964 (New York, 1971), the latter on the beginnings of student unrest in the Free Speech Movement.
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Legal education in America has produced a large corpus of law school
histories (to which the present work is an addition) and a number of
surveys, reports, and many articles on the subject. Legal Education, A Selective Bibliography, Dusan J. Djonovich (Dobbs Ferry, 1970) is the most useful
guide into the subject.
Of the histories of particular law schools, Harvard has received the
most attention. Charles Warren, History of the Harvard Law School, 3 vols.
(New York, 1908) and the Centennial History of the Harvard Law School,
1817-1918 (Cambridge, Mass., 1918) are dated, though still useful. Arthur
E. Sutherland's The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817-1967
(Cambridge, Mass., 1967) is a splendid study, and particularly useful on
Langdell and Ames. A History of the School of Law, Columbia University, Julius
Goebel ed. (New York, 1955) is a composite of essays of varying merit, but
together they comprise a sound study. Yale is chronicled in four short
works by Frederick C. Hicks, Yale Law School (New Haven, 1935-38), from
its foundation to 1915. Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Legal Education at Michigan, 1859-1959 (Ann Arbor, 1959) is a compendium of factual data of
. considerable interest but almost impossible density and dryness. The University of Chicago has made a beginning with Frank L. Ellsworth, Law on
the Midway: The Founding of the University of Chicago Law School (Chicago,
1977), which deals with the early years and whets the appetite for more.
Brief portraits of the law schools in existence about 1890 (including Hast. ings) are to be found in the Boston lawyers' magazine, The Green Bag,
beginning with vol. I in 1889.
The most recent treatment of legal education in America is Robert
Stevens, "Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School," in Perspectives
in American History, Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 5 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1971) 403-548. Trenchant, Stevens' study touches all issues relevant
to the curriculum development of the schools and the Realist-Langdellian
controversy. In the same volume, Jerold S. Auerbach, "Enmity and Amity:
Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-1922," 548-601, provides another
perspective on legal education. For all the merits of these extended essays,
the history oflegal education in America must start with Alfred Zantzinger
Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law: Historical Development and
Principal Contemporary Problems of Legal Education in the United States, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Bulletin 15 (New
York, 1921). Besides its value as an historical survey of meticulous scholarship, Reed's book was, of course, the manifesto for legal educational reform. The follow-up study, Reed's Present-Day Law Schools in the United
States and Canada, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
Bulletin 21 (New York, 1928) and the annual Review of Legal Education in
the United States and Canada, compiled by Reed and published by Carnegie,
1913 and 1915-1934, continued by the ABA (Will Shafroth ed.) as the
Annual Review of Legal Education, must also be used. More recent works on
curriculum reform have value both as primary sources and secondary
literature: Albert J. Harno, Legal Education in the United States (San Francisco, 1953) and Trainingfor the Public Professions of the Law: 1971, Report to
the AALS (Washington, 1971)-the "Carrington Report." Other materials
are cited in Chapter VI, particularly the various publications of the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools. The
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two surveys of legal education in California are [W. Shafroth & H.C.
Horack] Report of the California Survey Committee 1933 and U.A. McClain,
Jr., T.F. McDonald, & S.P. Simpson] Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar in California (Los Angeles, 1949). The Proceedings of the California Bar
Association, beginning in 1910, and the journal of the State Bar of California,
beginning in 1926, round out the sources for the local dimension of legal
education. Thejournal of Legal Education, 29 vols. (1948 to date) is essential
reading for seeing changes in educational ideas and practices during the
past three decades.

Hastings
Previous essays in the history of the College are the Golden jubilee Book,
1878-1928, Hastings College of the Law of the University of California [San
Francisco, 1928] and Edward A. Hogan, "History of the Hastings College
of Law," Hastings Law journal, 4 (1953) 89-100. The latter is of little use;
the former is extremely valuable because of the personal recollections of
men connected with the College during its first half-century.
Most of the available sources on the Founder, Serranus Clinton Hastings, are cited in the notes to Chapter 1. Of particular importance to
understanding his motivation in founding and his ideas concerning the
College are his two early formal speeches: Address of s.c. Hastings, Founder
of Hastings' Law Department of the University of California, before the Regents,
President and Faculty (San Francisco, 1878) and Annual Address delivered to the
Students of the Law Department of the University of California, August 1879, by S.
Clinton Hastings (San Francisco, 1879). A good deal of miscellaneous information about Hastings is to be found in early San Francisco newspapers, in the record of his litigation, and in articles in the California Historical
Quarterly. Time did not permit me to make as thorough a search for surviving materials on the Founder as I would have wished; he deserves a study
in his own right. Since no corpus of his personal papers appears to have
survived, a thoroughgoing biography will be difficult.
Serranus Clinton Hastings and his contemporaries, as well as some of
the early graduates of the College, are noticed in Oscar T. Shuck, History of
the Bench and Bar in California (Los Angeles, 1901). This collection of antiquarian essays and overblown, short biographical notices is valuable far
beyond its demerits. J .C. Bates, History of the Bench and Bar of California (San
Francisco, 1912) imitates Shuck in more than title alone, but does additionally provide a great many biographies of lawyers who achieved
prominence in the 1890s and 1900s. The early graduates of Hastings are
listed in Catalogue of Graduates of Hastings College of the Law, T.A. Perkins
ed. (San Francisco, 1897), Directory of Graduates of the University of California,
1864-1916, California Alumni Association (Berkeley, 1916), and William
Carey Jones, Illustrated History of the University of California (San Francisco,
1895); the latter also provides a brief career-note on each graduate to '94.
Hastings graduates are noticed in The Golden Book of California, Robert
Sibley ed. (Berkeley, 1937). Later biographical compilations, particularly
Bench and Bar of California, 1937-38 (Chicago, 1937) and Bench and Bar of
.California: Centennial Edition, 1949 (San Francisco, 1949), are useful. Who's
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Who in America (1897 to date) and Who Was Who in America (1943 to date),
the Dictionary of American Biography 22 vols. (1943), Great American Lawyers,
8 vols. William Draper Lewis ed. (Philadelphia, 1907-09), and the Directory
oj Law Teachers, published almost annually by the AALS since 1922, provide biographical information. The last compilation is especially useful for
the 65 Club members. For early women lawyers connected with Hastings,
Notable American Women, 1607-1950, Edward T. James, Janet Wilson
James, & Paul S. Boyer eds., 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) and Lelia].
Robinson, "Women Lawyers in the United States," The Green Bag, 2 (1890)
10-32 are helpful. Brief vignettes of Serranus Clinton Hastings and his
contemporaries on the state supreme court as well as of successive chief
justices (Presidents of the Board of Directors) were done by ]. Edward
Johnson as a series in the Journal oj the State Bar oj California, 21-47 (194662). To date, of the Hastings faculty only Dean Taylor has found a biographer: Kenneth M. Johnson, The Life & Times oj Edward Robeson Taylor,
Physician, Lawyer, Poet, and Politician (San Francisco, 1968).
The Pomeroy System of legal education is revealed in the printed
Syllabi, [1880-84]. A number oflibraries have these, but the most extensive
set (still lacking some courses) is in the College library, the gift of Frank M.
Angellotti, '82. Pomeroy's works are treated above in Chapter III. His
pedagogical ideas, both as to substance and method, are set forth in The
Hastings Law Department oj the University of California: Inaugural Address oj
John Norton Pomeroy, LL.D., August 8, 1878 (San Francisco, 1878). After
Pomeroy and until the 1950s, the curriculum must be reconstructed from
the annual Announcement of the College, either in loose form or as incorporated in the annual Register oj the University oj California. The Announcement
lists texts as well as courses throughout the period before faculty records
begin in the 1950s. The Announcement also is a principal source for the
names and residences, and usually degrees, of students.
Hastings' relationship with the San Francisco bar can be uncovered in
The Bar Association oj San Francisco: An Illustrated History, ].0. Denny ed.
(San Francisco, 1923) and Kenneth M. Johnson, The Bar Association of San
Francisco: The First Hundred Years, 1872/1972 (San Francisco, 1972). On the
more general matter of the development of the large firm, the sharpest
light is cast by Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and its Predecessors,
1819-1948,3 vols. (New York, 1946-48), a work of remarkable scholarship
by a senior partner of that eminent New York firm, which was the first big
law office. Until a similar study is done of a major San Francisco firm, it will
be difficult to say exactly how local growth differed from the New York
development.
The patent relevance to Hastings of official California publications,
particularly the Statutes, the Journal oj the Assembly, and the Journal oj the
Senate, has required continuous recourse to them. Also, the law reports
have supplied a great deal of information, some of it directly related to
Hastings; this material is cited in the notes to the text.
Newspapers have been used with discretion in this study. The scholar,
like the general reader, must treat the press with skepticism. The following
San Francisco papers, the Chronicle, the Evening Bulletin, the Examiner, the
News-Call Bulletin, and the legal paper, the Recorder, and the Oakland Tribune have furnished useful information.
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The College's own publications, the students' Hastings Law News, the
alumni magazine The Hastings Community, and the scholarly journals, particularly the Hastings Law Journal, contain a wealth of information. For the
most recent events and developments they are an invaluable source supplementing the more formal records of the College.
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